CourtListener 10764916•Ghosal v. Ajou CA4/1
Texte intégral
Filed 12/24/25 Ghosal v. Ajou CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SAMIRA GHOSAL et al., D084846
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
v. (Super. Ct. No. 37-2022-
00052537-CU-OR-CTL)
RAAD AJOU et al.,
Defendants and Respondents.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
James A. Mangione, Judge. Affirmed.
Samira Ghosal and Francis Ghosal, in pro. per., for Plaintiffs and
Appellants.
First American Law Group, Patrick Reider and Nicole S. Dunn for
Defendants and Respondents.
In February 2014, Samira and Francis Ghosal lost a parcel of real
property to foreclosure. Around March 2016, the property was sold to Raad
and Thana Ajou. In December 2022, the Ghosals filed a complaint alleging
claims for adverse possession and quiet title against various entities involved
in the foreclosure as well as the Ajous. The Ghosals, who are self-
represented, now appeal the judgment on the pleadings entered against them
and in favor of the Ajous. Resolving this matter by memorandum opinion
(see generally People v. Garcia (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 847), we affirm.
I.
This matter is not the Ghosals’ first lawsuit—nor their first appeal—
arising out of the 2014 foreclosure of their property.
First, the Ghosals brought Case No. 37-2015-00031212-CU-OR-CTL
against Deutsche Bank National Trust Company as indenture trustee for
New Century Equity Loan Trust 2005-1 (Deutsche Bank); Carrington
Mortgage Services, LLC (Carrington); and Doe defendants, alleging claims for
various violations of the California Civil Code, unfair business practices,
quiet title, and cancellation of the trustee’s deed upon sale. The trial court
granted the defendants’ demurrer without leave to amend and entered
judgment against the Ghosals. The Ghosals did not appeal.
Second, the Ghosals brought Case No. 37-2017-00038037-CU-OR-CTL
against Deutsche Bank; Carrington; New Century Mortgage Corporation
(New Century); Carrington Foreclosure Services, LLC (CFS); and Doe
defendants, alleging claims for various violations of the California Civil Code,
slander of title, cancellation of recorded instrument, quiet title, and unfair
business practices. The trial court granted the defendants’ motion for
judgment on the pleadings and entered judgment against the Ghosals. The
Ghosals again did not appeal.
Third, in December 2022, the Ghosals brought the instant action, Case
No. 37-2022-00052537-CU-OR-CTL, against Deutsche Bank, Carrington,
CFS, New Century, New Century Liquidation Trust, Atlantic & Pacific
Foreclosure LLC, and the Ajous, alleging claims for adverse possession and
quiet title. In a prior appeal, we affirmed the trial court’s sustaining of
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Deutsche Bank and Carrington’s demurrer without leave to amend after
concluding claim preclusion barred the Ghosals’ quiet title claim and their
claim for adverse possession was inadequately pled. (See generally Ghosal v.
Deutsche Bank National Trust (Oct. 14, 2024, D083206) [nonpub. opn.].)
The Ajous also demurred to the complaint, which the Ghosals
attempted unsuccessfully to amend. The Ajous then moved for judgment on
the pleadings as to the original complaint. On June 7, 2024, the trial court
granted the Ajous’ motion, concluding the Ajous were in privity with
Deutsche Bank and therefore claim preclusion barred the Ghosals’ claims.
The Ghosals moved for a new trial under Code of Civil Procedure
section 659 and to set aside or vacate the judgment under section 663. The
court denied the motion for a new trial because no trial occurred. The court
denied the motion to set aside or vacate the judgment because the Ghosals
“provided no support for their contention that the Court’s finding that [the
Ajous] were in privity with Deutsch[e] Bank . . . was an incorrect or
erroneous basis for granting the motion.”
Judgment was entered against the Ghosals. The Ghosals’ notice of
appeal indicated they were appealing only from a judgment or order entered
on June 7, 2024—in other words, the order granting the motion for judgment
on the pleadings. This court subsequently construed the appeal as taken
from the judgment.
II.
The Ghosals’ opening brief is not a model of clarity, but as best we can
discern, they argue the trial court (1) erred in granting the motion for
judgment on the pleadings based on claim preclusion, (2) erred in denying
their motion for a new trial or to set aside or vacate the judgment,
(3) mishandled documents by losing their proposed First Amended and
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Verified Complaint, (4) ignored or refused to consider the Ghosals’ evidence,
(5) erroneously “decided to bring to trial only three defendants,” and (6) was
biased or discriminated against them. (Some capitalization omitted.) As
explained below, we conclude the Ghosals are not entitled to relief on any of
these bases.
We are mindful the Ghosals represent themselves and the technical
requirements of the appellate process may be difficult for those without legal
training to navigate. Even so, a self-represented party “is to be treated like
any other party and is entitled to the same, but no greater, consideration
than” a party represented by counsel. (Elena S. v. Kroutik (2016)
247 Cal.App.4th 570, 574.) Thus, while we have liberally construed the
Ghosals’ appellate brief, to the extent the Ghosals have asserted additional
arguments we have not addressed, they are forfeited for failure to either
adequately support or develop them (see People ex rel. Reisig v. Acuna (2017)
9 Cal.App.5th 1, 25; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(B)) or raise them in
the trial court (see Perez v. Grajales (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 580, 591-592).
A.
The Ghosals claim the trial court erred in granting the Ajous’ motion
for judgment on the pleadings because claim preclusion does not apply given
the Ajous were not defendants in the prior lawsuits. Even putting aside
claim preclusion, however, the court was correct that the Ghosals’ claims
were facially defective. The court therefore did not err.
“‘A motion for judgment on the pleadings performs the same function as
a general demurrer, and hence attacks only defects disclosed on the face of
the pleadings or by matters that can be judicially noticed.’” (Burnett v.
Chimney Sweep (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 1057, 1064.) The court may also
consider any written instruments attached to or incorporated by reference
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into the pleading. (Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co. v. Vaughn (1988)
199 Cal.App.3d 171, 178.) We review the trial court’s ruling de novo (Howard
Jarvis Taxpayers Assn. v. City of Riverside (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 679, 685) to
“determine whether the complaint states a cause of action,” assuming all the
alleged facts are true (Lance Camper Manufacturing Corp. v. Republic
Indemnity Co. (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 194, 198). “If a judgment on the
pleadings is correct upon any theory of law applicable to the case, we will
affirm it regardless of the considerations used by the trial court to reach its
conclusion.” (Coshow v. City of Escondido (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 687, 703.)
According to the complaint, the Ghosals’ property was foreclosed upon
in February 2014. Around March 2016, the Ajous purchased that property.
The Ghosals waited until more than six and a half years later to file the
instant matter bringing claims against the Ajous.
The Ajous argue the Ghosals’ quiet title claim is barred under the
three-year statute of limitations governing fraud actions given the Ghosals
allege the sale of the property to the Ajous constituted “deceit and false
statements by the Defendants.” Even applying more generous standards, we
agree the claim is statutorily barred and therefore fatally defective.
Under section 318 of the Code of Civil Procedure, “[n]o action for the
recovery of real property, or for the recovery of the possession thereof, can be
maintained, unless it appear that the plaintiff . . . was seized or possessed of
the property in question, within five years before the commencement of the
action.” “‘An action to quiet title to real property is an action for the recovery
thereof within the meaning of section 318.’” (Safwenberg v. Marquez (1975)
50 Cal.App.3d 301, 311.) Consequently, the Ghosals had to have possession
of the property sometime after December 2017—five years before they
commenced their action against the Ajous—for their quiet title claim to be
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timely. Such an allegation is missing from the complaint. Indeed, given the
Ajous acquired the property in March 2016, it is unlikely the Ghosals
possessed the property within five years of the initiation of this action.
Accordingly, the Ghosals have not stated—and almost certainly cannot
state—a claim for quiet title against the Ajous. (See Stafford v. Ballinger
(1962) 199 Cal.App.2d 289, 295 [quiet title action barred by section 318 where
plaintiff “failed to allege . . . possession of the property within five years prior
to filing this action”].)
The adverse possession claim is similarly defective. First, this claim is
also subject to section 318, which is fatal to the Ghosals’ claim for adverse
possession for the same reasons it dooms their quiet title claim. (Marriage v.
Keener (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 186, 191.) Second, the elements of a claim for
adverse possession include, among others, “continuous possession for at least
five years” and “payment of all taxes assessed against the property during
the five-year period.” (Mehdizadeh v. Mincer (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 1296,
1305.) But, as noted above, the Ghosals’ complaint admits they lost the
property to foreclosure in 2014 and fails to allege they possessed it at any
point thereafter, much less for the requisite five continuous years. Nor do the
Ghosals allege they have paid any taxes on the property since the 2014
foreclosure. Accordingly, the complaint also fails to state a claim for adverse
possession.
While we must consider whether these defects could be cured by
amendment (Schonfeldt v. State of California (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 1462,
1465), the Ghosals bear the burden of establishing amendment would not be
futile (Gould v. Maryland Sound Industries, Inc. (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 1137,
1153). The record contains no indication they made any such showing below,
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and their appellate brief fails to argue the ability to amend. The court thus
did not err in granting the Ajous’ motion.
B.
As to the denial of the Ghosals’ motion for a new trial or to set aside or
vacate the judgment, “‘[o]ur jurisdiction on appeal is limited in scope to the
notice of appeal and the judgment or order appealed from,’” and “[w]e have no
jurisdiction over an order not mentioned in the notice of appeal.” (Faunce v.
Cate (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 166, 170.) Here, the Ghosals’ notice of appeal
identified only the order granting the motion for judgment on the pleadings,
which this court construed as an appeal from the subsequent judgment. The
Ghosals did not appeal from the order denying their motion for a new trial or
to set aside or vacate the judgment. Accordingly, we lack jurisdiction to
review that order. (See In re J.F. (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 70, 79.)
Similarly, the trial court’s alleged mishandling and misplacement of
the Ghosals’ documents is beyond our jurisdiction. (See Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 904.1 [appeals may be taken only from enumerated orders and judgments];
Faunce, 222 Cal.App.4th at p. 170.)
To the extent the Ghosals argue the court ignored or refused to
consider their evidence, we perceive no error. As already acknowledged, a
motion for judgment on the pleadings looks only to the complaint itself, any
written instruments incorporated therein, and any matters subject to judicial
notice. “No extrinsic evidence can be considered.” (Jayasinghe v. Lee (1993)
13 Cal.App.4th Supp. 33, 36.) Accordingly, the court did not err in refusing to
consider any additional materials the Ghosals may have introduced. At any
rate, the Ghosals have not adequately developed this argument by identifying
the materials the court allegedly ignored or refused to consider and why that
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was improper. They thus have additionally forfeited this point. (See Acuna,
9 Cal.App.5th at p. 25.)
The Ghosals likewise have not developed their claims the trial court
somehow limited the defendants in the action or was biased or discriminated
against them. (Acuna, 9 Cal.App.5th at p. 25.) There is no indication in the
record the court somehow improperly prevented this action from going
forward against any defendant. Instead, the complaint itself alleges, for
example, that New Century has been “‘DEFUNCT’ . . . since 2007,” and the
record fails to evidence New Century ever was served with the summons or
appeared through counsel. As to bias, we presume “that official duty has
been regularly performed” (Evid. Code, § 664), and “the burden of proof is on
[the Ghosals] as the party claiming bias to establish facts supporting [their]
position” (Betz v. Pankow (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 919, 926). The Ghosals’ bare
assertions of judicial bias and discrimination, unsupported by any argument
or record evidence, fail to satisfy this burden.
As a result, we conclude the Ghosals have not established entitlement
to relief on any of the claims they raise.
III.
We affirm and award the Ajous their costs on appeal.
CASTILLO, J.
WE CONCUR:
DATO, Acting P. J.
KELETY, J.
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