In re Ignacio CA2/5

CourtListener 10764391Calctapp23 déc. 2025

Texte intégral

Filed 12/23/25 In re Ignacio CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

In re B346675

ERIC RUBIO IGNACIO (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. Nos.
on Habeas Corpus. 25CJHC00054-01 &
KA0400038-01)

ORIGINAL PROCEEDINGS; petition for writ of habeas
corpus. William C. Ryan and Robert M. Kawahara, Judges.
Petition granted.
Jennifer Peabody, Executive Director and Richard B.
Lennon, under appointment by the Court of Appeal for Petitioner.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Noah P. Hill and Heidi Salerno, Deputy
Attorneys General for Respondent.
Petitioner Eric Rubio Ignacio was convicted of second
degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a))1 in 1998. Gang and
firearm enhancements (§§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1), 12022, subd.
(a)(1)) were found true, and he was sentenced to 16 years to life
in prison. He was granted parole by the Board of Parole
Hearings on August 12, 2022, and released from prison on
January 18, 2023.
While on parole, petitioner tested positive for
methamphetamine multiple times. On March 29, 2023, the
People petitioned to revoke petitioner’s parole. After petitioner
admitted to parole violations, the superior court revoked
petitioner’s parole and remanded him to the custody of the
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) pursuant
to section 3000.08, subdivision (h).
In May 2025, petitioner filed a habeas petition in the
superior court, alleging he should not have been remanded to
state prison under section 3000.08, subdivision (h), but instead
confined to county jail for no more than 180 days pursuant to
section 3000.08, subdivisions (f) and (g). After the superior court
denied the petition on May 14, 2025, petitioner sought habeas
relief in this court.
In a return to our order to show cause why relief should not
be granted, the People conceded the superior court erred in
remanding petitioner to the custody of the CDCR. The People
ask us to remand the matter to the superior court for further
proceedings to determine what penalties to impose under section
3000.08, subdivisions (f) and (g). We agree and now grant the
petition.

1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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DISCUSSION
Until 2020, the term of parole for an inmate convicted of
murder was governed by section 3000.1. That section provides:
“In the case of any inmate sentenced under [s]ection 1168 for any
offense of first or second degree murder with a maximum term of
life imprisonment, the period of parole, if parole is granted, shall
be the remainder of the inmate’s life.” (§ 3000.1, subd. (a)(1).) In
addition, “if [s]ection 3000.1 . . . applies to a person who is on
parole and the court determines that the person has committed a
violation of law or violated his or her conditions of parole, the
person on parole shall be remanded to the custody of the
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation and the
jurisdiction of the Board of Parole Hearings for the purpose of
future parole consideration.” (§ 3000.08, subd. (h).)
In 2020, the Legislature enacted section 3000.01, which
applies to all inmates released from state prison on or after
July 1, 2020. It provides that “notwithstanding any other law”
(§ 3000.01, subd. (b)), “[a]ny inmate sentenced to a life term shall
be released on parole for a period of three years” (§ 3000.01, subd.
(b)(2).)2
By using the phrase “notwithstanding any other law,” the
Legislature “signaled its intent for the later-enacted statute—
section 3000.01—to preempt the conflicting, preexisting statute”
in section 3000.1. (People v. Reed (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 43, 53.)
Therefore, it is section 3000.01 and not section 3000.1 that
applies to convicted murderers who, like petitioner, are paroled
after July 1, 2020. Because section 3000.1 does not apply to

2 Subdivision (b) is also subject to two exceptions not rele-
vant here (§ 3000.01, subd. (d).)

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petitioner, he is not subject to section 3000.08, subdivision (h),
remanding him to the custody of CDCR either.

DISPOSITION
The petition for writ of habeas corpus is granted. The trial
court is directed to vacate its order remanding petitioner to the
custody of the CDCR and hold further proceedings to determine
what penalties to impose for petitioner’s parole violation, as
provided by section 3000.08, subdivisions (f) and (g).
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

MOOR, J.
I CONCUR:

KIM (D.), J.

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The People v. Eric Ignacio
B346675

BAKER, Acting P. J., Dissenting

The Attorney General too quickly confesses error in my
view. For reasons I will explain, I am not convinced the Legisla-
ture intended to abrogate a statute that sets a special parole term
specifically for convicted murderers. If that was the Legislature’s
intent, it needs to speak more clearly than it has.
Prior to 2020, there were two interlocking statutes govern-
ing parole terms for convicted murderers. One of them, Penal
Code section 3000.08, provides that inmates released from state
prison after July 1, 2013, are subject to parole supervision by the
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (the Department)
if serving a sentence for a serious felony, a violent felony, a third
“strike” crime under the Three Strikes law, or any crime for
which the inmate is classified as a high-risk sex offender (among
other things).1 (§ 3000.08, subd. (a).) Section 3000.08 further
provides—“[n]otwithstanding any other law”—that if “[s]ection
3000.1 . . . applies to a person who is on parole,” the person shall
be remanded into the Department’s custody if he or she is found
to have committed a violation of law or the conditions of parole.
(§ 3000.08, subd. (h).)
Section 3000.1, the cross-referenced statute in section
3000.08, subdivision (h), establishes a special parole term for

1
Statutory references that follow are to the Penal Code.
murderers, and for certain child sex offenders. Specifically, sub-
division (a)(1) of the statute states that “[i]n the case of any in-
mate sentenced . . . for any offense of first or second degree mur-
der with a maximum term of life imprisonment, the period of pa-
role, if parole is granted, shall be the remainder of the inmate’s
life” (though this lifetime parole can be discharged after service of
a specified continuous period on parole (§ 3000.1, subd. (b))). The
same life parole term applies to inmates sentenced to a life term
for certain aggravated child sex offenses. (§ 3000.1, subd. (a)(2);
see also, e.g., §§ 269 [aggravated sexual assault of a child], 288.7
[commission of a sexual act with a child 10 years old or younger].)
In 2020, the Legislature enacted another parole-related
statute, section 3000.01, and the effect of that enactment is at the
heart of this appeal. Section 3000.01 states it “applies to persons
released from state prison on or after July 1, 2020, and who are
subject to the jurisdiction of, and parole supervision by, the De-
partment . . . pursuant to Section 3000.08 . . . .” (§ 3000.01, subd.
(a).) The statute further provides that for those inmates to whom
it applies, “[a]ny inmate sentenced to a life term shall be released
on parole for a period of three years” and “[a]ny inmate sentenced
to a determinate term shall be released on parole for a period of
two years.” (§ 3000.01, subd. (b).) Section 3000.01 also includes a
carve-out from these provisions. As pertinent for our purposes,
the statute states it “shall not apply” to “[a]n inmate currently in-
carcerated for an offense that will require the person to register
as a sex offender pursuant to Chapter 5.5 (commencing with
[s]ection 290) of Title 9 of Part 1.” (§ 3000.01, subd. (d).)
Defendant and appellant Eric Ignacio (defendant), the At-
torney General, and the opinion for the court understand the en-
actment of section 3000.01 to displace the provisions of section

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3000.1 setting life parole terms for murderers because section
3000.01 is the later-enacted statute. Specifically, they take the
position that enactment of section 3000.01 modified defendant’s
parole term to three years (rather than a life term subject to dis-
charge), and this means that under section 3000.08, defendant
can be sentenced to a maximum of 180 days in county jail for vio-
lating the conditions of parole on his murder sentence. There is
support for this view. (People v. Reed (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 43,
53-54.)
But that is not how I see it. Section 3000.01 (unlike sec-
tions 3000 and 3000.08) does not reference section 3000.1, either
by name or in substance. That matters because repeals by impli-
cation are disfavored. (See, e.g., Hohenshelt v. Superior Court
(2025) 18 Cal.5th 310, 335.) If the Legislature had intended to
displace the special parole term for murderers it previously en-
acted in section 3000.1, it is odd that there is no mention of that
intent by express reference in section 3000.01’s text or in the
statute’s legislative history. (See, e.g., Reed, supra, 103
Cal.App.5th at 54 [noting the legislative history “shines little
light on the intended effects of section 3000.01 other than to high-
light that the statutory changes do not apply to those required to
register as a sex offender”].)
I do not believe section 3000.01’s later-enacted status or its
carve-out for sex offender registrants make up for what I see as
statutory silence. While it is true that courts do give primacy to
later enacted statutes, it is equally true that courts give primacy
to more specific statutes as compared to those that are more gen-
eral. (See, e.g., Code Civ. Proc., § 1859; In re James M. (1973) 9
Cal.3d 517, 522.) Here, section 3000.1 is the more specific statute

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because it applies not to a very narrow, targeted group—murder-
ers (and child sex offenders) sentenced to life in prison. Section
3000.01, on the other hand, applies much more broadly to deter-
minate and indeterminately sentenced inmates alike, and even
considering only the subdivision of section 3000.01 focused on in-
determinately sentenced inmates, it is still the more general stat-
ute because it applies to life sentences generically (which can in-
clude three-strikes sentences, aggravated kidnapping sentences,
and others) rather than life sentences specifically imposed on
murderers. Because section 3000.01 is more general in scope, I
see no reason to conclude from its mere later enactment that it
displaces section 3000.1’s specific rule for murderers. Nor does
section 3000.01’s carve-out for sex offender registrants reveal an
intent to abrogate 3000.1. The argument, of course, is that carv-
ing out sex offender registrants purportedly reveals an intent to
include murderers because section 3000.1 establishes a life parole
term for aggravated child sex offenses in addition to murders.
(See, e.g., Reed, supra, 103 Cal.App.5th at 54.) If it were true
that section 3000.01 made an exemption for only one of the two
groups subject to a lifetime parole term under section 3000.1, I
would agree that would be good evidence of legislative intent.
But it isn’t true. It is not an apples to apples comparison because
section 3000.01 exempts all sex offender registrants from its pro-
visions, whereas section 3000.1 mandates lifetime parole only for
certain aggravated child sex offenses. I therefore regard section
3000.01’s exemption as a generic legislative desire to avoid bene-
fiting any sex offender, not as an expressio unius indication (Reed,
supra, at 53-54) that the Legislature wished to dispense with one
part of section 3000.1 (lifetime parole provisions for murderers)

4
while preserving the other part (lifetime parole provisions for ag-
gravated child sex offenders in section 3000.1).
Perhaps recognizing its holding makes possible some seem-
ingly counterintuitive results, the Court of Appeal in Reed, supra,
103 Cal.App.5th 43 felt compelled to observe that if the Legisla-
ture did not intend the result reached in that case, “it has the
power to amend the relevant statutes accordingly.” (Id. at 54.)
That is true, but I think it gets the burden of legislative inertia
backwards. I would affirm the trial court’s order because if the
Legislature really wants to shorten the parole term it previously
set specifically for murderers, it must do so clearly, not by non-
specific implication.

BAKER, Acting P. J.

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