CourtListener 10764127•Graiwer v. Shokrian CA2/1
Texte intégral
Filed 12/23/25 Graiwer v. Shokrian CA2/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
JONATHAN LEHRER GRAIWER, B341273
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 24STCV04722)
v.
JASMIN M. SHOKRIAN,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Daniel M. Crowley, Judge. Affirmed.
Law Offices of Daniel J. Bramzon & Associates,
Daniel J. Bramzon and Eric M. Post for Defendant and
Appellant.
Davidovich Stone Law Group, Niv Davidovich and
Jodi C. Rosner for Plaintiff and Respondent.
____________________________
This is an appeal from a judgment entered in an unlawful
detainer action in favor of the landlord, plaintiff and respondent
Jonathan Lehrer Graiwer, after the trial court granted his
motion for summary judgment against the tenant, defendant and
appellant Jasmin M. Shokrian.
Shokrian argues the trial court erred in granting summary
judgment because the three-day notice to pay rent or quit dated
February 8, 2024 overstated the amount of unpaid rent due from
September 2023 to February 2024. According to Shokrian,
although Graiwer sent three letters notifying her of rent
increases during her tenancy, those letters failed to increase
lawfully the initial monthly rental rate of $2,750 to $3,034.16.
She claims the first letter, dated October 28, 2017, was a nullity
because Graiwer mailed it 34 days — instead of 35 days — before
the first rent increase stated therein was to take effect on
December 1, 2017. Under Shokrian’s theory, because her
monthly rental obligation remained $2,750 after
December 1, 2017, the other letters from October 2018 and
September 2019, respectively, sought rent increases above the
percentage limitations imposed by local rent control ordinances.
Thus, Shokrian claims she owed only $16,500 for the six-month
period at issue, and not the $18,204.96 Graiwer had demanded in
the three-day notice to pay rent or quit.
Although Shokrian challenged the validity of the
October 28, 2017 letter in her opposition to the summary
judgment motion, we conclude she failed to preserve for appeal
her new theory that the invalidity of that notice caused the
October 2018 and September 2019 letters to seek rent increases
greater than that allowed by local law. Shokrian advances no
other legal theory establishing a triable issue as to whether the
2
three-day notice to pay rent or quit dated February 8, 2024
overstated the amount of rent due. We thus affirm the judgment
without addressing whether the October 28, 2017 letter provided
Shokrian with sufficient notice of the rent increase scheduled to
take effect on December 1, 2017.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND1
We summarize only those facts that are relevant to our
disposition of this appeal.
In August 2016, Graiwer agreed to lease to Shokrian a
residence in Los Angeles, which lease term began on
September 1, 2016 and was scheduled to conclude on
August 31, 2017. Shokrian agreed to an initial base rent of
$2,750 per month due on the first of each month. After the
one-year term expired, the lease became a month-to-month
tenancy.
Graiwer sent three letters to Shokrian informing her of
rent increases. In the first letter, which was dated
October 28, 2017, Graiwer stated, “[E]ffective December 1, 2017,”
Shokrian’s rent would “increase by $82.50 to $2,832.50 per month
from the current rent of $2,750.00 per month.” In a letter dated
October 2, 2018, Graiwer informed Shokrian her rent would
“increase by $84.97 to $2,917.47 per month from the current rent
of $2,832.50 per month” “effective December 1, 2018 . . . .” In a
letter dated September 11, 2019, Graiwer said, “[E]ffective
December 1, 2019, [Shokrian’s] rent . . . w[ould] increase by
1 We derive our Factual and Procedural Background in
part from the parties’ admissions in their filings. (Association for
Los Angeles Deputy Sheriffs v. County of Los Angeles (2023)
94 Cal.App.5th 764, 772, fn. 2 [utilizing this approach].)
3
$116.69 to $3,034.16 per month from the current rent of
$2,917.47 per month.” Whereas the October 2, 2018 letter
indicates it was “HAND-DELIVERED” and the
September 11, 2019 correspondence includes the phrase
“MAILED AND HAND-DELIVERED,” no such notation
appears in the October 28, 2017 letter. In his declaration
submitted in support of the summary judgment motion, Graiwer
attested he “mailed these 30-day notices to [Shokrian] more than
30 days before they became effective.”
On February 7, 2024, Graiwer served Shokrian with a
three-day notice to pay rent or quit dated January 30, 2024,
wherein he demanded $39,444.08 for rent owed from
September 2020 to September 2021 (COVID notice to pay or
quit).2 On February 8, 2024, Graiwer served Shokrian with a
three-day notice to pay rent or quit dated February 8, 2024,
wherein he demanded $18,204.96 for rent owed from
September 2023 to February 2024, which he claimed constituted
six months’ unpaid rent at the monthly rate of $3,034.16
(February 8, 2024 notice to pay or quit).3 In his declaration,
Graiwer attested, “After three days following service of each
[t]hree-day [n]otice, [Shokrian] failed to pay the rent demanded
in either [n]otice and . . . continued to fail to pay the rent
2 In his declaration, Graiwer claimed, “This rent became
due on August 1, 2023, after the local moratorium on the
collection of back rent lifted for COVID rent during the
‘transition period.’ ”
3 In the February 8, 2024 notice to pay or quit, Graiwer
stated the rent for each month during that six month period came
due on the first of the month, e.g., the rent for February 1, 2024
to February 29, 2024 came due on February 1, 2024.
4
demanded. [Shokrian] continue[d] to occupy the . . . [p]roperty
[as of the date of the declaration, to wit, May 30, 2024].”
On February 26, 2024, Graiwer filed a verified complaint
for unlawful detainer against Shokrian. Shokrian later filed a
verified answer to the complaint.
Graiwer moved for summary judgment, arguing he was
entitled to judgment in his favor based on the COVID notice to
pay or quit and the February 8, 2024 notice to pay or quit. In her
opposition to the motion, Shokrian argued (1) the COVID notice
to pay or quit was defective because it demanded rent accrued
more than 12 months before Graiwer served the notice, and
(2) the February 8, 2024 notice to pay or quit was defective
because it overstated the amount of rent due. Regarding the
latter argument, Shokrian maintained that Graiwer’s letter
dated October 28, 2017 did not effectively raise the rent because
he mailed the letter to Shokrian fewer than 35 days before the
effective date of the new rent, that is December 1, 2017, thereby
running afoul of Civil Code section 827 and Code of Civil
Procedure section 1013.4
The trial court heard and granted Graiwer’s motion on
June 10, 2024. The court found the COVID notice to pay or quit
was defective because it demanded rent accrued more than
12 months before it had been served. As for the February 8, 2024
notice to pay or quit, the court ruled Civil Code section 827 does
not require a notice of rent increase to be mailed to a tenant at
least 35 days before it becomes effective, and that Shokrian may
have waived her right to challenge the validity of the
4 We describe in greater detail this portion of Shokrian’s
opposition in Discussion, part B, post.
5
October 28, 2017 letter by paying the increased rent. The court
thus granted summary judgment for Graiwer based on the
February 8, 2024 notice to pay or quit.
On July 5, 2024, the trial court entered judgment in favor
of Graiwer and against Shokrian. In the judgment, the court
declared that Graiwer was entitled to immediate possession of
the premises, and awarded Graiwer past due rent of $18,204.96,
holdover rent of $10,214.13 accrued from March 1, 2024 to
June 10, 2024, and interest and costs. Shokrian appealed from
the judgment on September 20, 2024.5
5 Although the record contains a certificate of mailing
indicating the trial court clerk served upon Graiwer’s counsel a
July 5, 2024 minute order that “constitute[d] notice of entry of
Judgment,” the certificate does not indicate the clerk served the
minute order on Shokrian or her counsel. The indices for the
appellant’s appendix and the clerk’s transcript indicate the
record does not contain (1) any other notice of entry of judgment,
or (2) any filed-endorsed copy of the judgment that had been
served on Graiwer or Shokrian. Accordingly, Shokrian timely
filed her notice of appeal within 180 days of the date of entry of
the judgment. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.104(a)(1) [“[A]
notice of appeal must be filed on or before the earliest of:
[¶] (A) 60 days after the superior court clerk serves on the party
filing the notice of appeal a document entitled ‘Notice of Entry’ of
judgment or a filed-endorsed copy of the judgment, showing the
date either was served; [¶] (B) 60 days after the party filing the
notice of appeal serves or is served by a party with a document
entitled ‘Notice of Entry’ of judgment or a filed-endorsed copy of
the judgment, accompanied by proof of service; or [¶] (C) 180 days
after entry of judgment.”].)
6
APPLICABLE LAW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
A. Applicable Law
“A ‘tenant of real property is guilty of unlawful detainer’
where the tenant, among other circumstances, ‘is in default for
nonpayment of rent.’ [Citations.] ‘The basic elements of
unlawful detainer for nonpayment of rent . . . are (1) the tenant is
in possession of the premises; (2) that possession is without
permission; (3) the tenant is in default for nonpayment of rent;
(4) the tenant has been properly served with a written three-day
notice; and (5) the default continues after the three-day notice
period has elapsed.’ [Citation.]” (KB Salt Lake III, LLC v.
Fitness Internat., LLC (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 1032, 1045 (KB Salt
Lake III, LLC).)
“A notice that seeks rent in excess of the amount due is
invalid and will not support an unlawful detainer action.
[Citation.] In addition, a three-day notice must be served within
one year after the rent ‘becomes due.’ [Citation.] If the landlord
waits over a year to sue for unpaid rent, he or she is limited to
collecting such rent in a standard breach of contract action,
‘which results only in a money judgment without restitution of
the demised property.’ [Citation.]” (Levitz Furniture Co. v.
Wingtip Communications, Inc. (2001) 86 Cal.App.4th 1035, 1038.)
Civil Code section 827, subdivision (b)(1) provides in
pertinent part: “In all leases of a residential dwelling . . . from
week to week, month to month, or other period less than a month,
the landlord may increase the rent provided in the lease or rental
agreement, upon giving written notice to the tenant, as follows,
by either of the following procedures: [¶] (A) By delivering a copy
to the tenant personally. [¶] (B) By serving a copy by mail under
7
the procedures prescribed in Section 1013 of the Code of Civil
Procedure.”
Subdivision (b)(2) of section 827 of the Civil Code in turn
states: “If the proposed rent increase for that tenant is
10 percent or less of the rental amount charged to that tenant at
any time during the 12 months before the effective date of the
increase, either in and of itself or when combined with any other
rent increases for the 12 months before the effective date of the
increase, the notice shall be delivered at least 30 days before the
effective date of the increase, and subject to Section 1013 of the
Code of Civil Procedure if served by mail.” As relevant here,
Code of Civil Procedure, section 1013, subdivision (a) provides,
“[A]ny period of notice and any right or duty to do any act or
make any response within any period or on a date certain after
service of the document . . . shall be extended five calendar days,
upon service by mail, if the place of address and the place of
mailing is within the State of California . . . .”
“A notice of a rent increase that is not given in the
minimum number of days prior to the effective date of the
increase stated in the notice is a nullity and ineffective. If the
notice is not served with sufficient time between the date of
service and the stated effective date of the increase, the landlord
cannot merely extend the effective date even if the tenant is
informed of the extension and relies on the notice. The landlord
must give another notice.” (10 Miller & Starr, Cal. Real Estate
(4th ed. 2025) § 34:74.)
B. Standard of Review
“ ‘Summary judgment is appropriate only “where no triable
issue of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” ’ [Citation.]” (Barenborg v. Sigma
8
Alpha Epsilon Fraternity (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 70, 76.) “Under
summary judgment law, ‘ “[t]here is a triable issue of material
fact if, and only if, the evidence would allow a reasonable trier of
fact to find the underlying fact in favor of the party opposing the
motion in accordance with the applicable standard of proof.”
[Citation.] In making this determination, “the court may not
weigh the plaintiff’s evidence or inferences against the
defendants’ as though it were sitting as the trier of fact, [but] it
must nevertheless determine what any evidence or inference
could show or imply to a reasonable trier of fact.” ’ [Citation.]”
(Lares v. Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation
Authority (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 318, 331–332.) “ ‘We review the
ruling on a motion for summary judgment de novo, applying the
same standard as the trial court.’ [Citation.]” (Barenborg, at
p. 76.) “ ‘ “We are not bound by the trial court’s reasons for
granting summary judgment because we review the trial court’s
ruling, and not its rationale.” ’ [Citations.]” (KB Salt Lake III,
LLC, supra, 95 Cal.App.5th at p. 1046.)
“ ‘ “Even when our review on appeal ‘is de novo, it is limited
to issues which have been adequately raised and supported in
[the appellant’s opening] brief. [Citations.] Issues not raised in
an appellant’s brief are deemed waived or abandoned.’ ”
[Citation.] To succeed[,] . . . [an appellant] must first establish
error. . . . “ ‘[T]he most fundamental rule of appellate review is
that an appealed judgment or order is presumed to be correct.’
[Citation.] It is the appellant who bears the burden of
overcoming that presumption.” [Citation.]’ [Citation.] To
‘rebut[ ] the presumption of correctness accorded to the trial
court’s decision,’ the appellant must ‘ “ ‘ “supply[ ] the reviewing
court with some cogent argument supported by legal analysis and
9
citation to the record.” ’ [Citation.]” [Citations.]’ [Citation.]”
(Cruz v. Tapestry, Inc. (2025) 113 Cal.App.5th 943, 953–954.)
DISCUSSION
On appeal, Shokrian argues the trial court erred in
granting summary judgment because “it was undisputable that
[Graiwer] imposed an illegal rent increase resulting in the
[February 8, 2024] notice [to pay or quit] being overstated.”
(Boldface & underscoring omitted.) Specifically, Shokrian claims
her rent obligation from September 2023 to February 2024 was
only $16,500 — and not the $18,204.96 demanded in the notice to
pay or quit — because Graiwer failed to increase lawfully the
monthly rate from $2,750 to $3,034.16. In support of her
position, Shokrian argues that Graiwer’s letters dated
October 28, 2017, October 2, 2018, and September 11, 2019 were
defective.
Shokrian’s appellate claim hinges on her legal theory that
because Graiwer allegedly failed to afford Shokrian sufficient
notice of the rent increase provided in the October 28, 2017 letter,
Graiwer’s letters dated October 2, 2018 and September 11, 2019
purported to increase the rent in excess of caps imposed by a
Rent Increase Bulletin issued by the Los Angeles Housing
Department (Rent Increase Bulletin). (Discussion, part A, post.)
Shokrian forfeited that theory by failing to present it below.
(Discussion, part B, post.) Shokrian makes no other argument in
support of her position there is a triable issue of material fact
regarding whether the February 8, 2024 notice to pay or quit
10
demanded an excessive amount of rent. (Discussion, part C,
post.) Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.6
A. Shokrian’s Claim of Error Hinges on the Limits
Imposed by the Rent Increase Bulletin
Shokrian argues Graiwer could not increase the rent from
$2,750 per month to $2,832.50 via the letter dated
October 28, 2017 because he mailed the letter to Shokrian
34 days — rather than 35 days — before the date the increase
was set to take effect, to wit, December 1, 2017. Shokrian thus
argues the increase was ineffective under Civil Code section 827,
subdivision (b) and Code of Civil Procedure section 1013,
subdivision (a).
Next, Shokrian asserts that because there was no effective
rent increase on December 1, 2017, the October 2, 2018 letter
would have raised Shokrian’s rent by “5.98%.”7 Shokrian argues
the October 2, 2018 letter was “defective and ineffective to
change” the rent because it sought a rent increase that
“exceed[ed] the 3% cap for 2018” set forth in the Rent Increase
Bulletin. Similarly, under Shokrian’s theory, because Graiwer
failed to increase lawfully the rent in his October 28, 2017 and
October 2, 2018 correspondence, Graiwer was, in effect,
6 In light of this conclusion, we do not address whether the
October 28, 2017 letter gave sufficient notice of the increase in
monthly rent from $2,750 to $2,832.50.
7 By our calculation, the difference between the initial
monthly rent of $2,750 and the $2,917.47 monthly rent sought in
the October 2, 2018 letter is approximately 6.09 percent. This
disparity between our and Shokrian’s respective calculations does
not affect our disposition of this appeal.
11
attempting to raise the rent from $2,750 to $3,034.16 effective
December 1, 2019 in his letter dated September 11, 2019.
Shokrian asserts the “increase from $2750 to [$3,034.16] is
10.3%, exceeding the 4% cap for that year” provided in the Rent
Increase Bulletin and “requiring the provision of 90 days’ notice
under [Civil Code section] 827[, subdivision (b)](3)(A) . . . .”
In arguing that 90 days’ notice was required, Shokrian
relies on the current version of Civil Code section 827,
subdivision (b)(3)(A) instead of the version of section 827 in effect
in September 2019 that provided for a shorter notice period.8 Be
that as it may, the fate of Shokrian’s appellate claim rests
8 The current version of Civil Code section 827,
subdivision (b)(3)(A) provides in relevant part, “If the proposed
rent increase . . . is greater than 10 percent of the rental amount
charged to that tenant at any time during the 12 months before
the effective date of the increase, . . . the notice shall be delivered
at least 90 days before the effective date of the increase, and
subject to Section 1013 of the Code of Civil Procedure if served by
mail.” (See Civ. Code, § 827, subd. (b)(3)(A).) The version of
Civil Code section 827 that was in effect in September 2019
did not include subdivision (b)(3)(A). (See Stats. 2004, ch. 568,
§ 1.) Under subdivision (b)(3) of that version of the statute, for a
rent increase greater than 10 percent, “the minimum notice
period required pursuant to [subdivision (b)(2)] shall be increased
by an additional 30 days[, meaning the tenant is entitled to
60 days’ notice], and subject to Section 1013 of the Code of Civil
Procedure if served by mail.” (See Stats. 2004, ch. 568, § 1.)
Thus, even if the September 11, 2019 letter sought a rent
increase in excess of 10 percent and Graiwer mailed (but did not
personally deliver) it to Shokrian on that date, the
correspondence provided Shokrian with more than the 65 days’
notice that was required by the then applicable version of Civil
Code section 827, subdivision (b)(3).
12
entirely on the limits imposed by the Rent Increase Bulletin. Her
challenge to the validity of the rent sought in the October 2, 2018
letter relies upon the 3 percent limit imposed by the Rent
Increase Bulletin. Shokrian’s assertion the September 11, 2019
letter illegally raised the rent to $3,034.16 is in turn premised on
(1) the invalidity of the October 2, 2018 letter and (2) the
4 percent cap imposed by the Rent Increase Bulletin. As set forth
below, Shokrian has forfeited these arguments.
B. Shokrian Forfeited Her Legal Theory Predicated on
the Rent Increase Bulletin by Failing To Raise It
Below
“ ‘ ‘Generally, the rules relating to the scope of appellate
review apply to appellate review of summary judgments.” ’
[Citation.] . . . . ‘Ordinarily the failure to preserve a point below
constitutes a [forfeiture] of the point. [Citation.] This rule is
rooted in the fundamental nature of our adversarial system: The
parties must call the court’s attention to issues they deem
relevant. “ ‘In the hurry of the trial many things may be, and
are, overlooked which could readily have been rectified had
attention been called to them. The law casts upon the party the
duty of looking after his legal rights and of calling the judge’s
attention to any infringement of them.’ ” ’ [Citation.] ‘Indeed, if
this were permitted procedure, parties opposing and losing
summary judgment motions could attempt to embed grounds for
reversal on appeal into every case by their silence.’ [Citation.]”
(Meridian Financial Services, Inc. v. Phan (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th
657, 698 (Meridian Financial Services, Inc.).)
As noted above, Shokrian’s legal theory that Graiwer failed
lawfully to raise the monthly rent from $2,750 to $3,034.16
depends on the caps set forth in the Rent Increase Bulletin. We
13
conclude Shokrian failed to preserve for appeal her arguments
based on the Rent Increase Bulletin. Because this issue is
intertwined with this court’s prior ruling denying Shokrian’s
motion for judicial notice of that document, we first turn to that
motion.
Concurrent with her opening brief, Shokrian filed a motion
for judicial notice of the Rent Increase Bulletin, which she stated
had been “issued by the Los Angeles Housing Department” and
“identif[ied] allowable rent increases for properties subject to the
Los Angeles Rent Stabilization Ordinance” (LARSO), codified in
“Los Angeles Municipal Code (‘LAMC’) § 151.00 et seq.” Shokrian
asserted, “LAMC § 151.06(D) provides that the rent may only be
increased by an amount ‘as determined and published by the
[Los Angeles Housing] Department.’ [Citation.]” (Quoting
LAMC, § 151.06(D).) She argued the Rent Increase Bulletin was
judicially noticeable pursuant to Evidence Code section 452,
subdivision (c) and section 459, subdivision (a) “[a]s an official act
of a local executive agency . . . .”
In the motion, Shokrian admitted she did not ask the trial
court to take judicial notice of the Rent Increase Bulletin. She
claimed not to have sought judicial notice below because “the
parties agreed that a 3% increase was permitted for 2017 and
2018, and that a 4% increase was permitted in 2019. This was
undisputed throughout the entirety of the proceedings, and the
parties took it as a given that only 3% was permitted.”
Conspicuously absent from her motion for judicial notice was any
record citation supporting her claim the aforesaid limits for rent
increases were “undisputed throughout the entirety of the
proceedings . . . .”
14
Graiwer opposed Shokrian’s motion for judicial notice.
Graiwer argued, inter alia, that the Rent Increase Bulletin is
“irrelevant to the issues preserved for review” because Shokrian
did not present it below and “[t]here is no mention of allowable
rent increases in [Shokrian’s o]pposition” to the summary
judgment motion. Graiwer further contended there was no need
for him to present evidence concerning whether he had “lawfully
imposed [rent] increases” because Shokrian did not cite the Rent
Increase Bulletin in opposing the summary judgment motion.
“For instance, LAMC Section 151.06[,] which provides for
automatic adjustments based on the Consumer Price Index, also
provides that if the landlord pays all costs of electricity and/or
gas, the landlord can adjust the rent by an additional . . . two
percent. None of this evidence was before the trial court . . . .”9
Upon considering the parties’ submissions, the presiding
justice denied Shokrian’s motion for judicial notice approximately
two weeks before Shokrian filed her reply brief.
Shokrian does not ask us to reconsider that ruling or claim
to have preserved for appeal her argument that the alleged
invalidity of the October 28, 2017 letter caused the
October 2, 2018 and September 11, 2019 letters to seek rent
9 (See LAMC, § 151.06(D) [“The maximum rent or
maximum adjusted rent may be increased in an amount based on
the Consumer Price Index – All Urban Consumers averaged for
the twelve (12) month period ending September 30, of each year,
as determined and published by the Department on or before
May 30, of each year . . . . If the landlord pays all the costs of
electricity and/or gas services for a rental unit then the maximum
rent or maximum adjusted rent may be increased an additional
one percent (1%) for each such service paid by the landlord, not to
exceed a total of two percent (2%).”].)
15
increases higher than LARSO permitted.10 She does complain,
however, that she “merely sought to have this Court judicially
notice the applicable law,” and that the Rent Increase Bulletin “is
critical to assess the validity of subsequent rent increases when
the prior[, October 28, 2017,] rent increase was not properly
made.”
We agree with Graiwer that Shokrian failed to “preserve[ ]
for review” her arguments premised on the Rent Increase
Bulletin. In Shokrian’s opposition to the summary judgment
motion, she argued the letter dated October 28, 2017 did not
increase the rent because Graiwer mailed it to her fewer than
35 days before the increase was scheduled to take effect on
December 1, 2017. She did not, however, argue that because the
October 28, 2017 letter was invalid, the percentage rent increases
Graiwer sought via the October 2, 2018 and September 11, 2019
letters exceeded those permitted under LARSO. In fact, she
did not mention the October 2, 2018 and September 11, 2019
correspondence at all. Instead, she vaguely claimed to have been
“owed an offset for every rent increase that was made after [the
October 28, 2017 letter] which violated LARSO,” and that,
because that initial letter “was a legal nullity[,] . . . each
subsequent increase was likewise invalid.”
Because Shokrian failed to apprise the trial court and
Graiwer of her theory that the October 2, 2018 and
September 11, 2019 letters purported to increase the monthly
10 (See Dakota Payphone, LLC v. Alcaraz (2011)
192 Cal.App.4th 493, 509, fn. 6 [noting that an “appellate ruling
does not become law of the case unless it reflects a decision on the
merits considered by a panel of three justices and agreed upon by
the majority”].)
16
rental rate above increases permitted by LARSO, she cannot
raise that theory on appeal. (See Simplon Ballpark, LLC v. Scull
(2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 660, 668, 670 [holding that an appellant
must provide the trial court and the respondent with “sufficient
notice of the issue presented or the relief requested” to avoid
forfeiture].)
We decline to excuse Shokrian’s forfeiture for three
reasons. First, even though Graiwer informed Shokrian and this
court of his position that Shokrian is raising a “new theor[y] on
appeal,” Shokrian does not ask us to exercise our discretion to
consider that new theory. Second, this case is an unlawful
detainer action that “involves ‘a private dispute and does not
implicate matters of public interest or policy.’ [Citation.]” (See
Meridian Financial Services, Inc., supra, 67 Cal.App.5th at
p. 700.) Third, permitting Shokrian to raise her new theory more
than a year after the trial court granted summary judgment
would undermine the legislative purpose of our state’s unlawful
detainer statutory scheme, that is, “ ‘ “ ‘provid[ing] an expeditious
remedy for the recovery of possession of real property.’ ” ’
[Citation.]” (See KB Salt Lake III, LLC, supra, 95 Cal.App.5th at
p. 1045.)
C. Shokrian Fails Otherwise To Show That a
Reasonable Factfinder Could Conclude the
February 8, 2024 Notice To Pay or Quit Overstated
the Rent Due
In her reply brief, Shokrian argues we “need not” pass upon
“the validity of the [October 2, 2018 and September 11, 2019] rent
increases” because “it cannot be reasonably disputed that, since
[Graiwer] failed to make a valid rent increase, the rent never
changed from $2750, and therefore the notice demanding
17
$3,034.16 per month was overstated.” Shokrian does not further
explain why she believes a rational factfinder could conclude “the
rent never changed from $2750” without evaluating whether the
October 2, 2018 and September 11, 2019 rent increases were
valid. Accordingly, we do not address Shokrian’s unadorned
contention further. (See Meridian Financial Services, Inc., supra,
67 Cal.App.5th at p. 699 [“ ‘ “We may and do ‘disregard
conclusory arguments that are not supported by pertinent legal
authority or fail to disclose the reasoning by which the appellant
reached the conclusions he wants us to adopt.’ ” ’ ”].) Because
Shokrian fails to demonstrate the judgment entered in Graiwer’s
favor was erroneous, we affirm.
DISPOSITION
We affirm the trial court’s judgment. The parties are to
bear their own costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
BENDIX, J.
We concur:
ROTHSCHILD, P. J.
M. KIM, J.
18
Vous vous demandez comment ce texte s’applique à votre situation ?
Consultation gratuite, sans engagement
Décrivez votre situation. Notre équipe vous recontactera par e-mail pour votre consultation.
Poursuivez vos recherches dans ChatGPT ou Claude
Connectez Omnilex pour rechercher dans le corpus juridique depuis votre assistant IA.