CourtListener 10764126•In re A.G. CA2/1
Texte intégral
Filed 12/23/25 In re A.G. CA2/1
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
In re A.G. et al., Persons B343051
Coming Under the Juvenile (Los Angeles County
Court Law. Super. Ct. No. 24CCJP02989)
LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF
CHILDREN AND FAMILY
SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
JOSE G.,
Defendant and Appellant;
ARIANNA G.,
Respondent.
APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Syna N. Dennis, Judge Pro Tempore. Affirmed.
Akila A. Shenoy, under appointment by the
Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant Jose G.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, and Kimberly Roura, Principal
Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent
Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family
Services.
Janette Freeman Cochran, under appointment by the Court
of Appeal, for Respondent Arianna G.
____________________
Defendant and appellant Jose G. (father) and respondent
Arianna G. (mother) have two children, A.G. and Brandon G. In
the judgment dissolving father’s and mother’s marriage, the
family court awarded sole physical custody of the children to
mother and authorized father to have unsupervised overnight
visits. The Los Angeles County Department of Children and
Family Services (DCFS or the agency) later filed a dependency
petition for A.G. and Brandon G., alleging father violated a
restraining order protecting mother and abused the children
emotionally. At a combined jurisdiction and disposition hearing,
the juvenile court sustained the petition, declared A.G. and
Brandon G. dependents of the court, and terminated jurisdiction
with orders awarding mother sole physical custody and granting
father monitored visits with A.G., unmonitored visits with
Brandon G., and less visitation time with the children than
father previously had under the judgment of dissolution.
2
On appeal, father argues the juvenile court erred by issuing
its custody and visitation orders without finding, by clear and
convincing evidence, that father presented a substantial danger
to the children and there existed no reasonable means to protect
the children without removing them from his physical custody for
the purposes of Welfare and Institutions Code1 section 361,
subdivision (d). Father does not otherwise challenge the court’s
rulings. We conclude that subdivision (d) was inapplicable
because father did not have “physical custody” of the children for
the purposes of that provision. (See § 361, subd. (d).) Instead of
taking the children from father’s physical custody, the juvenile
court merely altered father’s visitation rights. Accordingly, we
affirm the custody and visitation orders.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND2
We summarize only those facts that are relevant to our
disposition of this appeal.
On July 8, 2024, a family court filed a judgment dissolving
mother’s and father’s marital relationship. The judgment of
dissolution declared that mother and father are the parents of
A.G. (born in 2012) and Brandon G. (born in 2016), awarded
mother sole legal and physical custody, and granted father
unsupervised visits on (a) the first, third, and fifth weekends of
the month from Friday at 6:00 p.m. to Monday at 8:00 a.m. or
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code.
2 We derive our Procedural Background in part from
admissions made by the parties in their briefing. (Cruz v.
Tapestry, Inc. (2025) 113 Cal.App.5th 943, 948, fn. 1 [utilizing
this approach].)
3
drop off at school, and (b) “Wednesday from 3:00 pm or pick up at
school until 8:00 pm” during the school year and “Wednesday at
3:00 P.M. to Thursday at 8:00 P.M.” during “Summer break . . . .”
On September 20, 2024, DCFS filed a dependency petition
on behalf of A.G. and Brandon G. At the initial hearing held on
October 7, 2024, the juvenile court detained the children from
father, released them to mother, and authorized father to have
monitored visits.
In November 2024, DCFS filed a first amended petition
seeking dependency jurisdiction over A.G. and Brandon G. under
section 300, subdivisions (b)(1) and (c) on account of, inter alia,
father’s “violat[ions of] an active restraining order that protects
mother from father” and father’s “emotional abuse” of A.G. and
Brandon G. In light of DCFS’s filing of the first amended
petition, the juvenile court dismissed the dependency petition
filed on September 20, 2024.
At the combined jurisdiction and disposition hearing on
December 11, 2024, the juvenile court sustained the first
amended petition; declared the children dependents of the court;
awarded the parents joint legal custody and mother sole physical
custody; granted father monitored visits with A.G. and
unmonitored visits with Brandon G.; terminated dependency
jurisdiction; and stayed the order terminating jurisdiction
pending issuance of juvenile custody orders. The court
thereafter: (1) issued juvenile custody orders (a) awarding the
parents joint legal custody and mother sole physical custody;
(b) granting father no less than nine hours of monitored
visitation with A.G. each week; and (c) authorizing father to have
unmonitored visitation with Brandon G. a minimum of
4
nine hours per week; and (2) terminated dependency jurisdiction.
Father timely appealed from these rulings.
On May 21, 2025, father’s appointed appellate counsel filed
an opening brief raising no issues pursuant to In re Phoenix H.
(2009) 47 Cal.4th 835. Father later submitted a supplemental
brief in pro. per. arguing, inter alia, the juvenile court failed to
make “removal findings” prior to issuing the custody orders. On
July 23, 2025, this court found father had made “ ‘a showing of
good cause that an arguable issue does, in fact, exist’ ” (quoting
Phoenix H., supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 844), and requested briefing
from counsel for the parties on the following three questions:
1. Upon conducting a combined jurisdiction and
disposition hearing and before issuing orders
awarding sole physical custody of A.G. and
Brandon G. to mother and granting father visitation,
was the juvenile court required to find by clear and
convincing evidence that removal was proper under
section 361, subdivisions (c) or (d)?
2. If the answer to question #1 is yes, then did the
juvenile court in fact make the removal findings
required by section 361, subdivisions (c) or (d)?
3. If the answer to question #1 is yes but the answer to
question #2 is no, then what impact, if any, would the
juvenile court’s failure to make the required removal
findings have on the validity of the court’s
dispositional rulings?
Counsel for father, mother, and DCFS have since briefed
these questions.
5
APPLICABLE LAW AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Section 361, subdivision (c) provides in pertinent part: “A
dependent child shall not be taken from the physical custody of
their parents . . . with whom the child resides at the time the
petition was initiated, unless the juvenile court finds clear and
convincing evidence of any of the following circumstances listed
in paragraphs (1) to (5), inclusive . . . .” (See § 361, subd. (c).)
Subdivision (c)(1) in turn applies if “[t]here is or would be a
substantial danger to the physical health, safety, protection, or
physical or emotional well-being of the minor if the minor were
returned home, and there are no reasonable means by which the
minor’s physical health can be protected without removing the
minor from the minor’s parent’s . . . physical custody.” (See id.,
subd. (c)(1).) Subdivision (c)(3) applies when “[t]he minor is
suffering severe emotional damage, as indicated by extreme
anxiety, depression, withdrawal, or untoward aggressive
behavior toward themselves or others, and there are no
reasonable means by which the minor’s emotional health may be
protected without removing the minor from the physical custody
of their parent . . . .” (See id., subd. (c)(3).)
Similarly, section 361, subdivision (d) provides in relevant
part: “A dependent child shall not be taken from the physical
custody of their parents . . . with whom the child did not reside at
the time the petition was initiated, unless the juvenile court finds
clear and convincing evidence that there would be a substantial
danger to the physical health, safety, protection, or physical or
emotional well-being of the child for the parent . . . to live with
the child or otherwise exercise the parent’s . . . right to physical
custody, and there are no reasonable means by which the child’s
physical and emotional health can be protected without removing
6
the child from the child’s parent’s . . . physical custody.” (See
§ 361, subd. (d).)
“The court shall state the facts on which the decision to
remove the minor is based.” (§ 361, subd. (e).)
“When ‘the juvenile court terminates its jurisdiction over a
minor who has been adjudged a dependent child . . . the juvenile
court on its own motion[ ] may issue . . . an order determining the
custody of, or visitation with, the child.’ [Citation.]” (In re
N.M. (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 1090, 1094 (N.M.), quoting § 362.4,
subd. (a).) This custody/visitation order, which is “commonly
referred to as an ‘exit order[,]’[ ] . . . will become part of the
relevant family law file and remain in effect in the family law
action ‘until modified or terminated by a subsequent order.’ ”
(See In re T.S. (2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 503, 513 (T.S.), fn. omitted.)
“[T]he proper interpretation of a statute and the
application of the statute to undisputed facts are questions of
law, which we review de novo.” (In re R.C. (2011)
196 Cal.App.4th 741, 748.) “[R]egardless of the applicable
standard of review,” “[t]he appellant bears th[e] burden of
rebutting the presumption of correctness accorded to the [lower]
court’s decision . . . .” (See Association for Los Angeles Deputy
Sheriffs v. County of Los Angeles (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 764, 777.)
To discharge this burden, the appellant must support the
positions taken with “ ‘ “reasoned argument and citations to
authority . . . .” ’ [Citation.]” (See In re J.F. (2019)
39 Cal.App.5th 70, 79–80 & fn. 5.)
Even if we were to hold the juvenile court erred in failing to
make the findings specified in subdivisions (c) or (d) of
section 361, that error would “ ‘be deemed harmless [if] “it is not
reasonably probable such finding, if made, would have been in
7
favor of continued parental custody.” ’ [Citation.]” (See In re L.O.
(2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 227, 247; see also id. at pp. 246–247
[applying this harmless error test to a juvenile court’s failure to
make findings under § 361, subd. (c), and indicating this
standard applies to “ ‘cases involving a court’s [failure to
discharge its] obligation to make findings regarding a minor’s
change of custody or commitment’ ”].) “ ‘Reasonable’ probability
means merely a reasonable chance that is more than an abstract
possibility; it does not mean more likely than not.” (L.O., at
p. 247.)
DISCUSSION
Before the dependency proceedings commenced, the family
court had issued a judgment awarding mother sole legal and
physical custody of A.G. and Brandon G. and granting father
unmonitored visitation with the children on (a) the first, third,
and fifth weekends of the month; and (b) each Wednesday from
3:00 p.m. or pick up at school until 8:00 p.m. during the school
year, and, during summer break, from Wednesday at 3:00 p.m. to
Thursday at 8:00 p.m. (See Procedural Background, ante.) After
holding a combined jurisdiction and disposition hearing, the
juvenile court terminated jurisdiction with orders awarding:
mother sole physical custody of A.G. and Brandon G.; joint legal
custody of the children to both parents; and father a minimum of
nine hours’ weekly monitored visitation with A.G. and a
minimum of nine hours’ weekly unmonitored visitation with
Brandon G. (Ibid.) Thus, the juvenile court’s exit orders reduced
the minimum amount of time father could visit the children, and
eliminated his preexisting right to unmonitored visitation with
A.G., replacing it with monitored visitation. On appeal, father,
mother, and DCFS agree that the juvenile court did not make the
8
findings required to take a child from the physical custody of his
or her parent pursuant to either subdivisions (c) or (d) of section
361.
According to father, although “the juvenile court was not
required to apply Section 361, subdivision (c)” “[b]ecause the
children did not reside with [him] at the time the petition was
initiated,” “the juvenile court was required to find by clear and
convincing evidence that removal was proper under section 361,
subdivision (d) before issuing [these] exit orders . . . .” In
contrast, mother contends the juvenile court was required to
make findings under subdivision (c) of the statute, but the court’s
failure to do so was harmless. For its part, DCFS argues that
neither subdivisions (c) nor (d) of the statute applies because the
juvenile court did not remove the children from father’s physical
custody. Further, per DCFS, even if the court erred by not
rendering the findings required by subdivisions (c) or (d), any
such error was harmless.
We agree with father that section 361, subdivision (c) was
inapplicable because the children did not reside with him when
the agency filed the dependency petition. (Discussion, part A,
post.) We also agree with the agency that subdivision (d) does not
apply because the juvenile court did not take the children from
father’s physical custody, but merely altered the duration of his
visitation and, with regard to A.G., required monitored visitation.
(Discussion, part B, post.) Accordingly, the juvenile court did not
err in issuing the exit orders without first making findings under
section 361, subdivisions (c) or (d). We thus do not address
mother’s and DCFS’s assertions of harmless error.3
3 Our decision also moots DCFS’s assertion that father
did not preserve for appeal his claim the juvenile court erred by
9
A. Section 361, Subdivision (c) Did Not Apply Because
the Children Did Not Reside With Father When
DCFS Filed the Dependency Petition
As noted above, section 361, subdivision (c) constrains a
juvenile court’s authority to “take” a “dependent child” “from the
physical custody of their parents . . . with whom the child resides
at the time the petition was initiated . . . .” (See § 361, subd. (c),
italics added.)
Mother appears to argue section 361, subdivision (c)
applied because the children resided with father at the time
DCFS filed the petition. She maintains, “[T]he petition [filed on
September 20, 2024] stated, prior to intervention, Minors lived
with Mother and Father.” She further contends, “The supporting
affidavit for an order authorizing entry into [the] home for
removal purposes stated the children were currently located
[with] father. DCFS was not seeking to remove the children from
Mother or enter her home. [Citation.] On September 17, 2024[,]
the court ordered removal of the children from Father.”4 Mother
also contends, “When [a children’s social worker] interviewed
Brandon [on August 6, 2024,] she stated she knew that Brandon
lived in two homes, one with his mother and one with his father.”
failing to make the findings required by section 361,
subdivision (d).
4 DCFS’s detention report indicates that on
September 18, 2024, the agency was unable to serve the removal
warrant on father at his home because he was in Arizona. It
appears that when the agency attempted to serve father with the
warrant, the children were at school, mother intended to pick
them up upon dismissal from class, and father did not intend to
return from Arizona for several days.
10
The excerpts from the record mother cites indicate the
agency may have been confused at the outset of the proceedings
as to whether A.G. and Brandon G. resided with both parents.
Nevertheless, mother, father, and the agency acknowledge that
at the outset of the dependency case, mother had sole physical
custody of the children and father was entitled only to visits.
Furthermore, according to the detention report, the children
resided with mother and the parents lived at different residences
when the dependency proceedings commenced. These facts
establish, as a matter of law, that for the purposes of section 361,
subdivision (c), the children did not “reside” with father “at the
time the petition was initiated . . . .”5 Therefore, the juvenile
court did not err by issuing the exit orders without making the
findings required by the statute.
5 (§ 361, subd. (c); see Discussion, part B, post [explaining
that a parent who has “sole physical custody” of a child has the
exclusive right to reside with, and determine the placement of,
the child, whereas the other parent may have the right to
visitation]; see also In re Anthony Q. (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 336,
351–353 & fn. 10 (Anthony Q.) [holding that with certain
exceptions not relevant here (e.g., when the parent is
incarcerated), “ ‘resides’ as used in section 361, subdivision (c),
[means] ‘to dwell permanently or for a considerable time[,]’ ” and
that “the Legislature plainly intended the formal commencement
of the dependency action to be the relevant point for determining
whether the child at risk was residing with one or both of his or
her parents”]; In re Julien H. (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 1084, 1089
[concluding that a father who had “unmonitored weekend visits”
with his child did not “reside” with the minor for purposes of
§ 361, subd. (c)].)
11
B. Section 361, Subdivision (d) Did Not Apply Because
Father Did Not Have Physical Custody of the
Children
DCFS argues, “The juvenile court was not required to make
orders removing the children from father’s physical custody
[under subdivision (d) of section 361] prior to issuing the juvenile
custody order[s].” (Boldface & some capitalization omitted.) The
agency advances two arguments in support of this position:
(1) “Altering the parameters of father’s visitation did not remove
physical custody of the children from father”; and (2) “the juvenile
court is not required to make removal orders when issuing a
juvenile custody order [if] it terminates jurisdiction over a child”
“immediately after the jurisdiction and disposition phase of the
proceedings . . . .”6 Although father disagrees with DCFS’s
second argument, absent from his briefing is any response to
DCFS’s first contention that subdivision (d) did not restrict the
juvenile court’s authority to modify father’s visitation rights. We
now turn to that question.
By its terms, section 361, subdivision (d) provides, “A
dependent child shall not be taken from the physical custody of
6 DCFS also offers these two arguments in support of its
position that section 361, subdivision (c) did not apply. In light of
our conclusion subdivision (c) was inapplicable because the
children did not reside with father at the time the agency filed
the dependency petition in September 2024, we do not address
whether subdivision (c) was inapplicable for the additional
reasons advanced by DCFS, that is, the agency’s assertions that
(1) altering the parameters of father’s visitation did not
constitute a removal under that provision, and (2) the provision
does not apply if a juvenile court is terminating jurisdiction with
an exit order at the dispositional phase.
12
their parents . . . with whom the child did not reside at the time
the petition was initiated” unless the juvenile court finds clear
and convincing evidence that “there would be a substantial
danger” to the child “for the parent . . . to live with the child or
otherwise exercise the parent’s . . . right to physical custody, and
there are no reasonable means” to protect the child “without
removing” him or her from “the parent’s . . . physical custody.”
(See § 361, subd. (d).) Courts construing the term “physical
custody” in this context have found it refers to “ ‘[t]he right to
have the child live with the person’ ” (see In re A.T. (2025)
110 Cal.App.5th 722, 733–734 (A.T.)), and “the right to determine
[the child’s] placement” (see Anthony Q., supra, 5 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 339, 354).7
Prior to the commencement of the dependency proceedings,
father did not have the right to live with the children or
determine their placement because the family court had awarded
mother sole physical custody and granted father only visitation.
(See Procedural Background, ante; see also A.T., supra,
110 Cal.App.5th at p. 733 [observing that “ ‘sole physical
custody’ . . . mean[s] ‘that a child shall reside with and be under
the supervision of one parent, subject to the power of the court to
7 Although Anthony Q. construed the term “physical
custody” in section 361, subdivision (c) (see Anthony Q., supra,
5 Cal.App.5th at p. 339), the Court of Appeal’s interpretation is
instructive because subdivision (d) employs that term as well (see
§ 361, subd. (d); see also North American Title Co. v. Superior
Court (2024) 17 Cal.5th 155, 173 [“ ‘ “It is elementary that, absent
indications to the contrary, ‘a word or phrase . . . accorded a
particular meaning in one part or portion of the law, should be
accorded the same meaning in other parts or portions of the
law . . . .’ ” ’ ”]).
13
order visitation[,]’ ” quoting Fam. Code, § 3007, italics added].)
Because father did not have “physical custody” of the children,
the juvenile court could not have “taken” A.G. and Brandon G.
from his physical custody. (See § 361, subd. (d).) Therefore,
section 361, subdivision (d) did not require the court to find clear
and convincing evidence that father posed a substantial danger to
the children and there existed no reasonable means to protect
them short of removal before it could modify the terms and
conditions of his visitation. Rather, the court had the authority
to formulate a “visitation order at termination based on the
children’s best interests.” (See T.S., supra, 52 Cal.App.5th at p.
514; see also id. at p. 513 [noting that in “issu[ing] a custody and
visitation” exit order, “ ‘the court’s focus and primary
consideration must always be the best interests of the child’ ”].)8
California Rules of Court that correspond to subdivision (d)
of section 361 bolster our conclusion.9 Specifically,
rule 5.695(c)(2) refers to an order issued pursuant to section 361,
subdivision (d) as a ruling by which “a dependent [is] removed
from the physical custody of a parent . . . .” (See rule 5.695(c)(2),
8 On appeal, the custody and visitation provisions of an
exit order are reviewed for abuse of discretion. (See N.M., supra,
88 Cal.App.5th at p. 1094.) Father’s counsel does not argue the
juvenile court abused its discretion by issuing the visitation
orders in question.
9 (See In re T.G. (2020) 58 Cal.App.5th 275, 288, 291 &
fns. 12 & 15 [noting that “[r]ules adopted by the Judicial
Council,” including the California Rules of Court, “ ‘are entitled to
a measure of judicial deference’ ”].)
Undesignated rule citations are to the California Rules of
Court.
14
italics added; see also rule 5.695(c) [the heading for
rule 5.695(c)(1) & (c)(2) reads “[r]emoval of custody-required
findings (§ 361),” italics added, boldface & some capitalization
omitted].) Likewise, rule 5.695(d) requires a court issuing such a
ruling to “consider whether reasonable efforts to prevent or
eliminate the need for removal have been made . . . .” (See
rule 5.695(d), italics added.) Rule 5.502(35) in turn defines
“ ‘[r]emoval’ ” as “a court order that takes away the care, custody,
and control of a dependent child . . . from the child’s parent . . . ,
and places the care, custody, and control of the child with the
court, under the supervision of the agency responsible for the
administration of child welfare . . . .” (See rule 5.502(35).) This
definition of “[r]emoval” strongly suggests that section 361,
subdivision (d) applies only if the court is suspending a parent’s
right to care for and live with the child or control the child’s
placement, and not the mere alteration of visitation rights. (Cf.
Anthony Q., supra, 5 Cal.App.5th at pp. 339, 354 [indicating that
a removal order issued under § 361, subd. (c) “suspend[s a
parent’s] custody rights”].)
Lastly, although father does not in his briefing respond
directly to DCFS’s argument that section 361, subdivision (d) did
not restrict the juvenile court’s authority to modify father’s
visitation rights, father does seem to argue that because
subdivision (d) comes into play only if “ ‘the child did not reside”
with the parent in question “at the time the petition was
initiated’ ” (quoting § 361, subd. (d), italics supplied by father),
the provision must apply to “noncustodial, offending parents” like
him. In advancing this argument, father overlooks the fact that a
parent can have physical custody even if the minor does not
reside with that parent. (See, e.g., Anthony Q., supra,
15
5 Cal.App.5th at pp. 339, 353 [noting that “[a]lthough [the child]
was living with his stepgrandmother [and not with the child’s
father] when dependency proceedings were initiated, [the father]
had sole legal and physical custody of the child” at that time].)
Indeed, the statutory language requiring a court to assess
whether “there would be a substantial danger” to the child “for
the parent . . . to live with the child or otherwise exercise the
parent’s . . . right to physical custody” (see § 361, subd. (d), italics
added) confirms that subdivision (d) applies to a parent who has
the right to physical custody but does not live with the minor.
Father is not such a parent because he lacked the right to
physical custody of the children prior to the dependency
proceedings.10
DISPOSITION
We affirm the juvenile court’s orders awarding sole
physical custody of minors A.G. and Brandon G. to respondent
Arianna G. and visitation to defendant and appellant Jose G.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
BENDIX, Acting P. J.
We concur:
WEINGART, J. M. KIM, J.
10 We thus do not address the agency’s alternative
argument that section 361, subdivision (d) does not apply to exit
orders issued at the dispositional phase of the proceedings.
16
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