CourtListener 10763283•In re D.L. CA2/6
Texte intégral
Filed 12/22/25 In re D.L. CA2/6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SIX
In re D.L., a Person Coming 2d Juv. Crim. No. B342123
Under the Juvenile Court Law. (Super. Ct. No. VJ46384)
(Los Angeles County)
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
D.L.,
Defendant and Appellant.
D.L. appeals an order transferring him from the juvenile
court to an adult court of criminal jurisdiction. (Welf. & Inst.
Code,1 § 707.) He contends there was insufficient evidence to
support the transfer order. We affirm.
1 Further unspecified statutory references are to the
Welfare and Institutions Code.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In September 2020, the prosecution filed a section 602
petition alleging that 16-year-old D.L. committed two counts of
murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a)) and one count of attempted
willful, deliberate, and premeditated murder. (Pen. Code, §§ 187,
subd. (a), 664, subd. (a).) According to the probation report, D.L.
was a member of the Bay 13 gang. He was walking on a sidewalk
when he was approached by a car occupied by Armando Avalos
and Belen Alzaga, who were members of the Elm Street Watts
gang. Avalos pulled the car up next to D.L. and asked, “Where
you from?” D.L. pulled out a firearm and fired multiple shots into
the car. One shot fatally struck Avalos in the head.
About an hour later, in a separate incident, D.L. fatally
shot Armando Calderon in the face outside Calderon’s home.
The home was about one mile from the scene of the previous
shooting.
By the time of the transfer hearing, D.L. had spent four
years in juvenile hall, from 2020 to 2024. At the hearing, the
prosecution presented as evidence detention observation reports,
which compiled information from various staff members
regarding D.L.’s behavior in juvenile hall, a June 2019 pre-plea
probation report, and two camp reports from August and October
2019, reflecting D.L.’s prior delinquent history — D.L. had two
prior sustained petitions for a 2018 vandalism and a 2019
attempted robbery. This evidence also showed the services
previously provided to D.L. and his progress and participation in
such services. Several probation officers and family members of
the victims also testified.
In support of his defense, D.L. submitted certificates
reflecting his participation in and completion of various
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programs. He also received a high school diploma and completed
college courses. Psychologist Dr. Vela Gonzalez testified as an
expert witness on D.L.’s behalf. She evaluated him in 2021 and
noted that D.L. suffered from trauma as a child due to his
exposure to gang violence and that he had a history of substance
abuse. She opined that D.L. could be rehabilitated within five
years (when D.L. reaches the age of 25 and the juvenile court’s
jurisdiction expires).
The juvenile court found clear and convincing evidence that
D.L. was not amenable to rehabilitation while under its
jurisdiction. In so ruling, the court considered all five transfer
criteria under section 707, subdivision (a)(3)(A) through (E), and
found the prosecution met their burden with respect to four
criteria — whether D.L. could be rehabilitated prior to the
expiration of the juvenile court’s jurisdiction, his previous
delinquent history, his performance on previous attempts to
rehabilitate, and the gravity of the alleged offenses.
DISCUSSION
D.L. contends the transfer order must be reversed because
there was insufficient evidence he was not amenable to
rehabilitation under the juvenile court’s jurisdiction. We
disagree.
Substantial Evidence
Section 707, subdivision (a)(3) provides that in order to
“find that the minor should be transferred to a court of criminal
jurisdiction, the court shall find by clear and convincing evidence
that the minor is not amenable to rehabilitation while under the
jurisdiction of the juvenile court.
In making its decision, the court shall consider the
following five criteria: (A) “The degree of criminal sophistication
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exhibited by the minor”; (B) “Whether the minor can be
rehabilitated prior to the expiration of the juvenile court’s
jurisdiction”; (C) “The minor’s previous delinquent history”; (D)
Success of previous attempts by the juvenile court to rehabilitate
the minor”; and (E) “The circumstances and gravity of the offense
alleged in the petition to have been committed by the minor.”
(§ 707, subd. (a)(3)(A)-(E).)
“If the court orders a transfer of jurisdiction, the court shall
recite the basis for its decision in an order entered upon the
minutes, which shall include the reasons supporting the court’s
finding that the minor is not amenable to rehabilitation while
under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.” (§ 707, subd. (a)(3).)
The minor’s amenability to rehabilitation under the
juvenile court’s jurisdiction is “the ultimate question for the court
to decide.” (In re E.P. (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 409, 416.) In
deciding that question, the juvenile court shall analyze the five
criteria set forth in section 707, subdivision (a)(3) “focused
through the lens of amenability to rehabilitation.” (In re S.S.
(2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 1277, 1288 (S.S.), superseded by statute on
other grounds as stated in In re J.M. (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 745,
at pp. 751-753, E.P., supra, Cal.App.5th at p. 416.)
We review the juvenile court’s order transferring a case to
an adult court of criminal jurisdiction for abuse of discretion.
(People v. Superior Court (Jones) (1998) 18 Cal.4th 667, 680.)
The juvenile court’s findings as to the five fitness criteria under
section 707, subdivision (a)(3)(A) through (E), are factual findings
that we review for substantial evidence. (Id. at p. 681.) We also
review for substantial evidence the court’s ultimate finding of
whether the minor was amenable to rehabilitation while under
the juvenile court’s jurisdiction. (In re Miguel R. (2024) 100
4
Cal.App.5th 152, 165 (Miguel R.).) The substantial evidence
standard is deferential, and we review the record most favorably
to the judgment to determine whether there is substantial
evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could have made
the requisite finding under the governing standard of proof.
(Ibid.; In re Jerry M. (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 289, 298 (Jerry M.).)
We give due deference to how the trier of fact evaluated the
credibility of witnesses, resolved conflicts in the evidence, and
drew reasonable inferences from the evidence. (Conservatorship
of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 1005.)
The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in ordering
the transfer of D.L.’s case to adult criminal court. In determining
D.L. was not amenable to rehabilitation while under the juvenile
court’s jurisdiction, the court based its ruling on four of the five
criteria weighing in favor of transfer. Substantial evidence
supports these findings.
First, when evaluating the circumstances and gravity of the
alleged offenses, the juvenile court “shall give weight to any
relevant factor, including, but not limited to, the actual behavior
of the person, the mental state of the person, the person’s degree
of involvement in the crime, the level of harm actually caused by
the person, and the person’s mental and emotional development.”
(§ 707, subd. (a)(3)(E)(ii).)
Here, evidence, including the incident reports and
photographs, showed that D.L. shot multiple times into the car
occupied by Avalos and Alzaga. Avalos was fatally shot in the
head. Within hours of the first incident, D.L. fatally shot
Calderon in the face. There was no evidence that any other
person was involved in these murders or that the victims were
armed. As to D.L.’s mental and emotional development, D.L. was
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almost 17 years old at the time of the offenses and there was no
evidence of developmental delays. As the juvenile court observed,
the level of harm was “immeasurable” — two lives were lost and
several family members of the victims testified regarding the
impacts the murders had on them and their families. Substantial
evidence supports the finding that the circumstances and gravity
of the alleged offenses weighed in favor of transfer.
Second, when evaluating the minor’s previous delinquent
history, “the juvenile court shall give weight to any relevant
factor, including, but not limited to, the seriousness of the minor’s
previous delinquent history and the effect of the minor’s family
and community environment and childhood trauma on the
minor’s previous delinquent behavior.” (§ 707, subd. (a)(3)(C)(ii).)
Here, the October 2024 probation report, a June 2019 pre-
plea probation report, and two camp progress reports from 2019,
established that D.L. had previous sustained petitions for
vandalism in July 2018 when he was 14 years old and attempted
robbery in March 2019 when he was 15 years old. He was placed
home on probation for the vandalism offense and placed in a
community camp program for the attempted robbery offense.
Less than a year after his camp program, D.L. committed the
instant murders and attempted murder. D.L.’s delinquency
history reflects that his previous offenses for vandalism and
attempted robbery were close in time, occurring within one year
of each other. And, his current offenses occurred less than two
years after the attempted robbery. The evidence reflects a
pattern of escalating criminal behavior, despite D.L. being under
probation supervision and receiving services for his past offenses.
Moreover, the detention observation reports and probation
officers’ testimonies regarding D.L.’s behavior in juvenile hall
6
further supports his delinquent history weighed in favor of
transfer. (D.C. v. Superior Court (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 441, 453
[conduct, including the minor’s behavior in school, occurring after
the alleged offense was relevant to evaluating the minor’s
delinquent history].) Some of the detention observation reports
documented numerous instances of violence, including D.L.
fighting other youths in juvenile hall, assaulting a probation
officer, and threatening a probation officer. There were also
numerous instances of D.L. possessing contraband including vape
pens or cartridges and appearing under the influence.
Additionally, probation officers Kathleen Iwoha and Carla
Beltran, who prepared detention observation reports, testified
about D.L.’s behavior as documented by the reports and noted
several instances of possession or use of illegal contraband and
aggressive behavior, including assault. In sum, the evidence was
sufficient to support D.L.’s previous delinquent history weighed
in favor of transfer.
D.L. contends the juvenile court ignored all evidence
favorable to him, including evidence regarding his family,
community environment and childhood trauma. But, the record
reflects the court was aware of such evidence. The court
expressly acknowledged it when considering the criminal
sophistication criterion and ultimately found that that criterion
weighed against transfer. We presume the court properly
weighed all relevant factors both favorable and unfavorable to
D.L. when evaluating his previous delinquent history. (In re
Julian R. (2009) 47 Cal.4th 487, 499.)
D.L. also contends the detention observation reports should
be given little weight and are insufficient to support his transfer
because none of the testifying witnesses had personal first-hand
7
knowledge of the information contained in the reports. We are
unpersuaded. The detention observation reports contained
observations by various probation officers regarding D.L.’s
behavior in juvenile hall. Such evidence is admissible in a
transfer hearing. (See People v. Chi Ko Wong (1976) 18 Cal.3d
698, 717-719, overruled on other grounds in People v. Green
(1980) 27 Cal. 3d 1, 33-34; People v. Superior Court (Steven S.)
(1981) 119 Cal.App.3d 162, 173.) D.L. had the opportunity to
present witnesses to counteract any portion of the reports to
demonstrate inaccuracies therein, but he did not do so. (Steven
S., at p. 173.)
Third, when evaluating the previous attempts by the
juvenile court to rehabilitate a minor, “the juvenile court shall
give weight to any relevant factor, including, but not limited to,
the adequacy of the services previously provided to address the
minor’s needs.” (§ 707, subd. (a)(3)(D)(ii).)
Here, D.L. received services in connection with his two past
offenses. While he was home on probation, D.L. was referred to
family functional therapy, but was terminated because of his
failure to participate. During camp placement, D.L. participated
in services. The camp progress reports reflect that D.L. exhibited
generally positive behavior in camp. He participated in
schooling, individual counseling, a 14-week dialectical behavior
therapy, and completed a 10-week substance abuse course. The
juvenile court found he received adequate services — a finding
that is undisputed here. Although D.L. exhibited advancement
in education, therapy, and other services while in camp, he
committed the current offenses about 8 months after release from
camp. His re-offense sufficiently supports that his previous
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attempts to rehabilitate weighed in favor of transfer, as D.L.
continued to commit crime and engage in violent behavior.
Fourth, when evaluating whether a minor could be
rehabilitated prior to the expiration of the juvenile court’s
jurisdiction, “the juvenile court shall give weight to any relevant
factor, including, but not limited to, the minor’s potential to grow
and mature.” (§ 707, subd. (a)(3)(B)(ii).)
The focus “is whether there is enough time to rehabilitate
the minor while the minor is still eligible to remain under
juvenile court jurisdiction.” (Miguel R., supra, 100 Cal.App.5th
at p. 166.)
Here, this case was somewhat unique because there were
four years of juvenile hall records due to the procedural posture
of this case — the petition was filed in September 2020, but the
transfer hearing did not occur until October 2024. There were
several detention observation reports spanning the four years
D.L. was in juvenile hall, which reflected that D.L. continued to
exhibit violent behavior, possessed contraband, and was under
the influence throughout his time in juvenile hall. (See ante, at
p. 7.) The most recent detention observation report from October
2024 reflected that D.L. failed to follow instructions. He was
defiant and disrespectful to a probation officer and threatened to
cause physical harm or death to them. Furthermore, the
probation report recommended transfer, in part, because D.L.
had opportunities to rehabilitate when he was home on probation
and in community camp placement, but “it does not appear that
court intervention has changed his ways and he does not appear
receptive to doing better. He continues to receive services, but
still has moments of misbehavior in juvenile hall.”
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D.L. contends the juvenile court “downplayed” his progress
and Dr. Gonzalez’s testimony. To the contrary, the court
acknowledged D.L. received numerous certificates for his
achievements in programs, graduated from high school, and
continued college educational courses. It also acknowledged Dr.
Gonzalez’s testimony and her opinion that D.L. could be
rehabilitated under the juvenile court’s jurisdiction. But, the
juvenile court was not required to adopt Dr. Gonzalez’s
testimony. (See In re Alejandro G. (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 472,
480; In re J.S. (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 205, 212.). On appeal, we
do not reweigh evidence or substitute our judgment for that of the
finder of fact. (Jerry M., supra, 59 Cal.App.4th at p. 298.)
D.L. contends the evidence was insufficient because the
prosecution did not present expert testimony. Citing S.S., supra,
89 Cal.App.5th at page 1291, D.L. asserts that “expert testimony
will likely be necessary for a complete analysis” on this criterion.
While we acknowledge that expert testimony can generally assist
a juvenile court in assessing this criterion, the evidence here was
nonetheless sufficient because the juvenile court had the benefit
of considering D.L.’s growth, maturity, and progress in the four
years he was in juvenile hall during which time he received
rehabilitative services.
In weighing evidence favorable to D.L. against other
evidence, the juvenile court found “doubt that [D.L.] will grow
and mature at a rate where he will be rehabilitated before the
expiration of the juvenile court’s jurisdiction.” The court stated
that its conclusion was “based upon the rate of growth and
maturity that we have seen over the years, especially during his
time in the hall, which is close to four years. And that’s exactly
how much time left the court has in juvenile jurisdiction.” We
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conclude substantial evidence supports the court’s finding that
this criterion weighed in favor of transfer.
Lastly, we conclude that substantial evidence supports the
ultimate finding that D.L. was not amenable to rehabilitation
under the limited time of the juvenile court’s jurisdiction based
on the same substantial evidence supporting the four fitness
criteria weighing in favor of transfer. We conclude the juvenile
court did not abuse its discretion in transferring the matter to
adult criminal court.
Minute Order
D.L. also contends the ruling needs to be set aside because
the juvenile court’s minute order does not adequately explain the
reasons for the transfer of jurisdiction pursuant to section 707,
subdivision (a)(3).
The juvenile court must “recite the basis for its decision in
an order entered upon the minutes, which shall include the
reasons supporting the court’s finding that the minor is not
amenable to rehabilitation while under the jurisdiction of the
juvenile court.” (§ 707, subd. (a)(3).) A “failure to provide an
adequate statement of reasons for a transfer decision” will not
require reversal if such error was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt. (C.S. v. Superior Court (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 1009, 1036
(C.S.); Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18.)
We conclude there is no basis for reversal. Here, the
minute order reflects that the juvenile court based its decision on
the four aforementioned criteria. The reporter’s transcript of the
court’s ruling reflects the court articulated its “evaluative
process” as to each criterion, including the weighing of evidence,
identification of specific facts supporting the decision, and the
discussion of all relevant factors. (C.S., supra, 29 Cal.App.5th at
11
p. 1029.) The judge’s analysis was thorough. Because of this, we
can discern the juvenile court’s analysis and reasons for its
ruling. Any error in failing to provide a more detailed rationale
in the minute order itself is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
DISPOSITION
The transfer order pursuant to section 707 is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
HIPPACH, J.*
We concur:
YEGAN, Acting P. J.
CODY, J.
* Judge of the Santa Barbara Superior Court assigned by
the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the
California Constitution.
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Sharonda P. Bradford, Judge
Superior Court County of Los Angeles
______________________________
Richard D. Rome, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Idan Irvi and Theresa A. Patterson, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
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