People v. Alexander CA2/6

CourtListener 10763087Calctapp22 déc. 2025

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Filed 12/22/25 P. v. Alexander CA2/6

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

THE PEOPLE, 2d Crim. No. B333956
(Super. Ct. No. 22CR01253)
Plaintiffs and Respondents, (Santa Barbara County)

v.

ISAIAH ALEXANDER,

Defendant and Respondent.

Appellant Isaiah Alexander challenges his conviction and
sentencing, contending the trial court erred by instructing the
jury regarding imperfect self-defense, imposing the upper term
sentence on count 5 without making any findings as to the
alleged factors in aggravation, and issuing an abstract of
judgment incorrectly noting he was convicted of first-degree
murder instead of second-degree murder. We conclude the jury
instructions properly stated the law, and appellant forfeited any
claim they were misleading. We agree appellant is entitled to
resentencing on count 5, and the abstract of judgment must be
corrected.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Appellant was recorded on a doorbell camera burglarizing
the apartment of a Santa Barbara drug dealer. Richard Cardona
and Anthony Lopez were enlisted to retrieve the stolen items, so
they employed a ruse to get into the hotel room where appellant
was staying. At one point, Cardona told appellant he was there
to get the stolen property, pulled out a firearm, and ordered
appellant to the ground. Appellant reached for his firearm and a
shootout ensued. Cardona fled the hotel room through a window.
He ran to his van in the hotel parking lot and tried to drive away.
Appellant pursued Cardona yelling that he was going to kill him.
He shot at Cardona numerous times at point blank range. Once
Cardona was in the van, appellant fired at him three more times.
Cardona was shot once in the thigh, once in the abdomen, and
once in the head. The head wound was fatal.
Appellant was charged with: first degree murder (Pen.
Code §§ 187, subd. (a), 189, subd (a)1, with allegations of the use
of a firearm and discharge of a firearm causing death (§§ 12022.5,
subd. (a), 12022.53, subd. (d)) (count 1); shooting at an inhabited
dwelling in violation of section 246, with another use of a firearm
allegation (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)) (count 2); shooting at an occupied
motor vehicle in violation of section 246, with the same use of
firearm allegation (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)) (count 3); first-degree
residential burglary in violation of section 459 (count 4); and
second-degree commercial burglary in violation of section 459
(count 5).
It was further alleged appellant had two previous strikes
under the Three Strikes law (§ 667, subds. (d)(1), (e)(1), &
(e)(2)(A)), that these were prior “serious felonies” (§ 667, subd.

1 Further undesignated statutory references are to the

Penal Code.

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(a)(1)) and that appellant was out on bail when he committed the
offenses (§ 12022.1, subd. (b)). To impose an upper-term
determinate sentence (§ 1170, subd. (b)(2)), the prosecution
alleged aggravating factors that appellant engaged in violent
conduct indicating a serious danger to society, his prior
convictions were numerous or of increasing seriousness, and he
had previously served a prison term, all aggravating factors.
(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421(b)(1), (2), & (3))2.
The jury found appellant guilty of the lesser included
offense of second-degree murder as to count 1. Appellant was
acquitted of shooting at an inhabited dwelling in count 2 but
found guilty as charged in counts 3 through 5. The personal use
and discharge of a firearm allegations were found true.
Appellant waived his right to a jury trial on his prior
convictions and out on bail allegations. The court found true
appellant had committed a felony while on bail and been
convicted of two prior strikes qualifying as prior serious felonies.
Neither the court nor the jury found the alleged aggravating
factors true.
The court sentenced appellant to an aggregate determinate
term of 26 years in prison followed by an indeterminate term of
100 years to life. As to count 5, the court sentenced appellant to
a consecutive upper term of three years doubled to six years due
to his prior strikes.
DISCUSSION
Appellant Forfeited Any Claim
the Instructions Were Misleading
CALCRIM No. 3474 generally instructs that the right to
use force in self-defense “continues only as long as the danger

2 Further undesignated rule references are to the California

Rules of Court.

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exists or reasonably appears to exist.” It adds that the right to
use force ends “[w]hen the attacker withdraws” or “no longer
appears capable of inflicting any injury.”3
CALCRIM No. 571 instructs the jury regarding imperfect
self-defense.4
Appellant contends the trial court erred by including the
language of CALCRIM No. 3474 in CALCRIM No. 571. He
asserts the instruction improperly precluded the jury from
considering imperfect self-defense if Cardona had withdrawn.
We disagree. Although including the language of CALCRIM No.
3474 in the instruction on imperfect self-defense could have been
misleading, appellant forfeited any such claim because he did not
make that argument below.

3 CALCRIM No. 3474 states: “The right to use force in self-
defense continues only as long as the danger exists or reasonably
appears to exist. [When the attacker withdraws, then the right
to use force ends.]”

4 CALCRIM No. 571 states: “A killing that would otherwise
be murder is reduced to voluntary manslaughter if the defendant
killed a person because he acted in imperfect self-defense. If you
conclude the defendant acted in complete self-defense, his action
was lawful and you must find him not guilty of any crime. The
difference between complete self-defense and imperfect self-
defense depends on whether the defendant’s belief in the need to
use deadly force was reasonable. [¶] The defendant acted in
imperfect self-defense if: [¶] 1. The defendant actually believed
that he was in imminent danger of being killed or suffering great
bodily injury; [¶] 2. The defendant actually believed that the
immediate use of deadly force was necessary to defend against
the danger; [¶] BUT [¶] 3. At least one of those beliefs was
unreasonable. [¶] Belief in future harm is not sufficient, no
matter how great or how likely the harm is believed to be.”

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Defense counsel initially objected when the court said
CALCRIM No. 3474 should be included in CALCRIM No. 571,
but he conceded after the court explained its reasoning.
Appellant did not request the trial court modify, clarify, or
explain either instruction. If the instructions were potentially
misleading, appellant’s trial counsel had a duty to request a
clarifying advisement to cure any potential to mislead. (People v.
Thomas (1990) 219 Cal.App.3d 134, 145.) Failure to request
clarifying instructions forfeited the claim on appeal. (People v.
Lee (2011) 51 Cal.4th 620, 638.)
Appellant asserts forfeiture does not apply because the trial
court’s instruction was an incorrect statement of the law. (People
v. Hudson (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1002, 1012.) We disagree because
the instruction accurately stated the law. “An appellate court
reviews the wording of a jury instruction de novo and assesses
whether the instruction accurately states the law.” (People v.
Mitchell (2019) 7 Cal.5th 561, 579.) We consider jury instructions
as a whole and assume jurors are intelligent and capable of
understanding and correlating all jury instructions given.
(People v. Ramos (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1082, 1088.)
CALCRIM No. 571 is an accurate statement of the law. It
distinguishes between “complete self-defense” which renders a
killing lawful, and “imperfect self-defense” which renders a
killing voluntary manslaughter.
CALCRIM No. 3474 also correctly states the law. It
addresses the “right to use force in self-defense,” a right that
exists only with complete self-defense. It does not mention
imperfect self-defense. Including the language of CALCRIM No.
3474 in CALCRIM No. 571 did not result in a misstatement of
the law.

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Appellant is Entitled to Resentencing on Count 5
Appellant contends the trial court’s imposition of the upper
term on count 5 was improper because no aggravating
circumstances were found true by a jury or the judge. We agree.
Section 1170, subdivision (b)(2) provides: “The court may
impose a sentence exceeding the middle term only when there are
circumstances in aggravation . . . that justify the imposition of a
term . . . exceeding the middle term and the facts underlying
those circumstances have been stipulated to by the defendant or
have been found true beyond a reasonable doubt at trial by the
jury or by the judge in a court trial. . . .” (§ 1170, subd. (b)(2).)
“The burden is on the People to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
the facts relied on to justify an upper term sentence.” (People v.
Wiley (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1069, 1086 (Wiley).)
Prior to sentencing, the prosecutor asserted the court was
permitted to take judicial notice of the rule 4.421(b) aggravating
factors and that those factors were not for the jury to decide. The
court agreed. Defense counsel did not object. Later, after a
bifurcated court trial on the special allegations, the court
sentenced appellant to the upper term on count 5. There was no
mention of the aggravating factors. Respondent contends
appellant forfeited by failing to object and, alternatively, that any
error is harmless because a single factor in aggravation is
sufficient to justify a sentencing choice.
We disagree the claim is forfeited. “[U]nder the current
statute [section 1170] a Sixth Amendment violation occurs when
the trial court relies on unproven aggravating facts to impose an
upper term sentence, even if some other aggravating facts relied
on have been properly established.” (People v. Lynch (2024) 16
Cal.5th 730, 768.) Here, appellant’s Sixth Amendment rights
were violated because no aggravating factors were proven to a
judge or jury beyond a reasonable doubt. The right to a jury trial

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under the Sixth Amendment is a substantial right. No objection
is required to raise this type of error on appeal. (§1259; See
People v. French (2008) 43 Cal.4th 36, 48 [“Defendant did not
forfeit his Sixth Amendment right by failing to request a jury
trial on the aggravating circumstances”].)
We also find the error is not harmless.
First, we decline to speculate that the court relied upon
only one aggravating factor.
Second, we cannot conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that
a jury would have found each of the alleged aggravating facts
true. “When a defendant is deprived of a jury trial on
aggravating facts used to justify imposition of an upper term
sentence, the reviewing court must apply the Chapman standard
of review. [Citations.] Under that standard, ‘a sentence imposed
under . . . section 1170(b) must be reversed and remanded unless
the reviewing court concludes beyond a reasonable doubt that a
jury, applying that same standard, would have found true all of
the aggravating facts upon which the court relied to conclude the
upper term was justified, or that those facts were otherwise
proved true in compliance with the current statute.’ [Citations.]
Lack of a jury trial is not harmless under Chapman [v. California
(1967) 386 U.S. 18 [17 L.Ed.2d 705]] if ‘the record contains
evidence that could rationally lead to a contrary finding’ with
respect to the aggravating fact at issue.” (Wiley, supra, 17
Cal.5th at p. 1087.)
Whether appellant’s prior convictions are of increasing
seriousness (rule 4.421(b)(2)) is an inquiry requiring a
comparison and evaluation of the relationship between the prior
convictions and their relative seriousness. It involves more than
simply finding the convictions were sustained and what elements
were required to prove them. (Wiley, supra, 17 Cal.5th at
p. 1082.) Given his prior convictions occurred 16 years earlier,

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we cannot discount the possibility that in making the
determination as to increasing seriousness, a rational juror could
have either placed greater emphasis on his prior offenses, or on
his more recent criminal conduct. (Id., at p. 1089.)
The Abstract of Judgment Should be Corrected
Appellant claims, and respondent concedes, the abstract of
judgment should be corrected because it notes appellant was
convicted of first-degree murder when he was in fact convicted of
second-degree murder. We have “‘the inherent power to correct
clerical errors . . . so as to make these records reflect the true
facts.’” (People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185.) The
abstract should be corrected and a copy forwarded to the
Department of Corrections.
DISPOSITION
The matter is remanded for resentencing and correction of
the abstract of judgment consistent with this opinion. In all
other respects, the judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

CODY, J.

We concur:

YEGAN, Acting P. J. HIPPACH, J.*

* Judge of the Superior Court for Santa Barbara, assigned

by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the
California Constitution.

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Brian E. Hill, Judge
Superior Court County of Santa Barbara
______________________________

Adrian Dresel-Velasquez, under appointment by the Court
of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Noah P. Hill, Supervising Deputy
Attorney General, and David F. Glassman, Deputy Attorney
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

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