CourtListener 10763085•People v. Reed CA2/8
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Filed 12/22/25 P. v. Reed CA2/8
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION EIGHT
THE PEOPLE, B336029
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. TA149670)
v.
SELLAS FANZEL REED,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County. Danette J. Gomez, Judge. Conditionally affirmed and
remanded with directions.
Jennifer L. Peabody and Jonathan E. Demson, under
appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Idan Ivri and Theresa A. Patterson, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
**********
Defendant and appellant Sellas Fanzel Reed appeals from the
trial court’s order denying, at the prima facie stage, his petition for
resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6 (former section
1170.95).1 In 2019, defendant pled no contest to attempted murder
and admitted he intentionally discharged a firearm in the
commission of the offense within the meaning of section 12022.53,
subdivision (c). In 2022, defendant submitted a preprinted form
petition under section 1172.6 contending he was entitled to
sentencing relief. The trial court found defendant was ineligible
as a matter of law. Based on our independent review of the record,
we conclude defendant’s form petition, consisting only of legal
conclusions, failed to contradict a record of conviction
demonstrating he was convicted as the sole shooter and would-be
killer and not on any theory of imputed malice.
While this appeal was pending, the Supreme Court issued its
decision in People v. Patton (2025) 17 Cal.5th 549 (Patton),
clarifying a defendant’s prima facie burden when seeking relief
under section 1172.6. We therefore conditionally affirm the order
denying defendant’s petition with directions to the superior court to
consider anew an amended petition, should defendant choose to file
one.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL SUMMARY
The People filed a felony complaint charging defendant,
codefendant Jesse Holman, and codefendant Joey Thompson with
multiple felonies arising from a car-to-car shooting that occurred in
June 2019. Codefendants are not parties to this appeal. The People
charged the three men with four counts of attempted murder (§ 187,
subd. (a), § 664, subd. (a); counts 1–4) for the four victims who had
1 All undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
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been in the other car during the incident. The People alleged the
attempted murders as to two of the victims were willful, deliberate
and premeditated. (Counts 1 & 4.) Defendants were also charged
with shooting at an occupied vehicle (§ 246; count 5), coupled with a
gang allegation (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(4)).
As to counts 1 through 5, the People alleged defendant
personally and intentionally used and discharged a firearm in the
commission of the offenses within the meaning of section 12022.53,
subdivisions (b) through (e). No firearm use allegations were
alleged as to codefendants Holman and Thompson. Individual
counts were alleged as to each defendant for being a felon in
possession of a firearm. (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1); counts 6–8.) A gang
allegation was also alleged as to those three counts. (§ 186.22,
subd. (b)(1)(A).)
On October 21, 2019, the date set for the preliminary hearing,
all three defendants agreed to a negotiated disposition by plea.
The court granted the prosecutor’s request to amend count 1 to
second degree attempted murder, and the willful, deliberate and
premeditated allegation was dismissed. Defendant pled no contest
to count 1 and admitted he personally and intentionally discharged
a firearm in the commission of the offense within the meaning of
section 12022.53, subdivision (c). Holman and Thompson pled to
lesser charges. The court accepted the waivers of all defendants on
the record and found them to have been voluntarily, knowingly and
intelligently given. All counsel stipulated to a factual basis for the
plea based on “the police reports, the probation report, and any
other discovery[.]”
Sentencing was conducted the same day. The court sentenced
defendant, in accordance with the agreed-upon disposition, to an
upper term of nine years for the attempted murder, plus a 20-year
term for the firearm enhancement. The court awarded defendant
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59 days of presentence custody credits. Holman and Thompson
received sentences of 14 years and six years, respectively. All
remaining counts and special allegations were dismissed.
At the time defendant entered his plea, Senate Bill No. 1437
(2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) had already gone into effect. The bill
amended and narrowed the law regarding murder liability, and also
enacted section 1172.6, which provided a procedural mechanism for
individuals convicted of murder to petition for retroactive
sentencing relief.
After defendant’s 2019 plea, the Legislature passed Senate
Bill No. 775 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) which expanded the scope of
who could petition for resentencing under section 1172.6 to include
individuals convicted of attempted murder under a natural and
probable consequences theory.
On August 29, 2022, defendant filed, in propria persona, a
form petition for resentencing under section 1172.6. By marking
the boxes on the preprinted form, defendant stated under oath that
he had been charged with attempted murder under the natural and
probable consequences doctrine, he accepted a plea in lieu of trial,
and he could not presently be convicted of attempted murder under
the amended murder statutes. Defendant also checked the box
requesting appointment of counsel. Defendant submitted an
unsworn typewritten attachment to his petition that cited to
various legal and constitutional principles in general terms but did
not state any additional facts.
The trial court deemed defendant’s petition facially sufficient
and appointed defendant counsel. The People filed a response
arguing defendant was ineligible for relief as a matter of law.
Copies of the transcript from the plea hearing and defendant’s
preconviction probation report were attached as exhibits. The
factual summary in the probation report said defendant and
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codefendant Thompson confronted two male victims at a gas station
and asked about their gang affiliation. The two victims denied gang
affiliation and a verbal argument ensued. The two male victims
returned to their car where two female friends were seated. When
the victims attempted to flee, defendant, Thompson and Holman
sped after them in a car driven by Holman. During the chase,
defendant, seated in the passenger seat, fired 10 gunshots at the
victims’ car. The victims were able to drive to a police station
where officers located 10 bullet holes in the rear of the victims’ car.
Defendant’s appointed counsel filed a reply brief arguing the
law regarding the prima facie showing under section 1172.6. No
additional facts were provided in defendant’s supplemental brief.
Defendant subsequently filed another preprinted form petition in
October 2023 that also did not provide any additional facts.
The prima facie hearing was held on October 30, 2023. At the
start of the hearing, the court acknowledged defendant had filed
two petitions and stated it was ruling as to both. The court denied
defendant’s petition, finding he was ineligible as a matter of law
because he was convicted as the actual shooter in the attempted
murder. The court also found that at the time he entered his plea,
the law had already changed and the People could not have pursued
a natural and probable consequences theory to convict defendant.
When the court asked if counsel had anything to add, defense
counsel challenged the argument about the timing of the plea.
Counsel argued that after the passage of Senate Bill No. 1437, the
People continued to argue the natural and probable consequences
doctrine applied to attempted murder until subsequent case law
and legislation, including Senate Bill No. 775, held otherwise. The
court said it understood that argument, but that it found defendant
was still “ineligible as a matter of law because he was the actual
shooter” and he was not prosecuted on an imputed malice theory.
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The court then asked again if there was anything further to add
and defense counsel said no.
This appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
“[R]esentencing under section 1172.6 involves three stages.
It begins with a facially valid petition that entitles petitioner to
counsel, continues with asking whether petitioner has made a
prima facie case for relief, and, if so, proceeds to an evidentiary
hearing on the ultimate question of whether petitioner should be
resentenced.” (Patton, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 562.)
Defendant contends the record of conviction does not support
the denial of his petition at stage two. Defendant says he pled no
contest to attempted murder after waiving his right to a
preliminary hearing and nothing in the limited record of conviction
supports the trial court’s finding he was the actual perpetrator of
the attempted murder or that he was otherwise ineligible for relief
as a matter of law. He argues the trial court’s additional finding he
was barred from relief because his plea was entered after the
passage of Senate Bill No. 1437 also constituted error.
Alternatively, defendant requests that we remand for further
proceedings to allow him the opportunity to present an amended
petition in accordance with Patton.
The People concede the trial court’s finding on the timing of
defendant’s petition constituted error. We agree. We therefore only
address the trial court’s additional finding that defendant was
ineligible for relief because he was convicted as the sole shooter and
not under a theory of imputed malice. “We review de novo a trial
court’s prima facie determination that a petitioner is ineligible for
section 1172.6 relief as a matter of law.” (People v. Allen (2023)
97 Cal.App.5th 389, 395.)
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In Patton, supra, 17 Cal.5th 549, the Supreme Court clarified
the trial court’s role at the prima facie stage. Patton emphasized
the prima facie inquiry is not merely duplicative of the facial
inquiry. (Id. at p. 562.) Rather, the trial court, accepting the
petitioner’s factual allegations as true “ ‘ “ ‘makes a preliminary
assessment regarding whether the petitioner would be entitled to
relief if [those] factual allegations were proved.’ ” ’ ” (Id. at p. 563.)
Patton acknowledged the trial court’s inquiry at the prima facie
stage is limited and does not include factfinding involving the
weighing of evidence. (Ibid.)
But Patton also reaffirmed People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th
952, 971 in which the Court concluded the prima facie inquiry
under section 1172.6 is “ ‘analogous’ to the prima facie inquiry in
habeas corpus proceedings.” (Patton, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 563.)
Just like a habeas petitioner, a petitioner in a section 1172.6
proceeding must “ ‘make[] a prima facie showing’ (§ 1172.6,
subd. (c)) to frame a disputed issue that entitles that petitioner to
an evidentiary hearing.” (Patton, at p. 566, fn. omitted.)
Moreover, Patton resolved an issue that had created a split of
authority in the appellate courts. Patton concluded that a trial
court does not engage in impermissible factfinding if it considers
unchallenged facts from a preliminary hearing transcript that
demonstrate relief under section 1172.6 is unavailable. (Patton,
supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 564.) “Where facts from the record of
conviction are undisputed, accepting them over contrary legal
allegations that are merely conclusory is not ‘ “factfinding involving
the weighing of evidence or the exercise of discretion.” ’ ” (Id. at
pp. 565–566.) The Court pointed again to the similarity of habeas
proceedings, explaining that the particularity requirement imposed
on habeas petitioners “helps courts identify ‘material issues of
disputed fact.’ [Citation.] It does not impose ‘technicalities; it
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simply demands of [the petitioner] a measure of frankness in
disclosing [the relevant] factual situation’ supporting relief.” (Id. at
pp. 564–565.)
Patton cautions that trial courts may not resolve material
factual disputes “at the prima facie stage.” (Patton, supra,
17 Cal.5th at p. 567.) Uncontradicted facts in the record of
conviction, including in a preliminary hearing transcript, are
considered for purposes of issue-framing only. Where factual
disputes exist, the trial court must issue an order to show cause and
hold an evidentiary hearing. (Ibid.)
The record of conviction here was limited. Defendants, in a
joint plea hearing, waived their right to a preliminary hearing and
proceeded to a joint disposition, so there is no preliminary hearing
transcript to consider. The People contend it was proper for the
court to consider the factual summary in the probation report,
noting that defendant stipulated through counsel to a factual basis
for his plea based on the probation report.
We need not resolve whether consideration of the probation
report in assessing defendant’s eligibility for relief is proper.
We conclude the record of conviction, without the probation report,
demonstrates defendant was convicted as the sole shooter who
acted with intent to kill and not under any theory of imputed
malice.
First, the People alleged firearm use allegations in the felony
complaint only against defendant, indicating defendant was
charged as the sole shooter and direct perpetrator of the attempted
murders, while Holman and Thompson were charged as his
accomplices.
In addition, the plea hearing proceeded as a joint hearing
with all three defendants present, represented by counsel, and
aware of each other’s respective pleas. The People agreed to a plea
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where defendant was the only one to plead to attempted murder
and to intentionally discharging a firearm during the commission of
that attempted murder. In contrast, the People agreed to allow
Holman and Thompson to plead to lesser charges, without objection
from defendant. All three defendants stipulated, through counsel,
to a factual basis for their negotiated disposition in which defendant
received an agreed-upon upper term sentence significantly longer
than his two accomplices.
In pleading to second degree attempted murder, defendant
admitted to a “ ‘specific intent to kill and the commission of a direct
but ineffectual act toward accomplishing the intended killing.’ ”
(People v. Covarrubias (2016) 1 Cal.5th 838, 890; see also CALCRIM
No. 600 [elements of attempted murder].) Implied malice does not
support a conviction for attempted murder. (People v. Rodriguez
(2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 451, 456.)
Defendant also admitted he discharged a firearm within the
meaning of section 12022.53, subdivision (c). In so pleading,
defendant admitted he personally and intentionally discharged a
firearm during the commission of the attempted murder. (See
CALCRIM No. 3148; see also People v. Estrada (2024)
101 Cal.App.5th 328, 338 [pleading to a sentencing enhancement is
a binding judicial admission of the elemental facts necessary to the
enhancement].)
Thus, the only theory of the case consistent with the plea
agreement the People accepted, and to which defendant agreed,
reflects that defendant was convicted as the sole and direct
perpetrator of the attempted murder, with Holman and Thompson
convicted as his accomplices. Only defendant admitted an intent to
kill while Holman and Thompson did not. Consequently, the only
possible direct perpetrator among the three of them, under the
People’s theory, is the defendant. As a result, the record of
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conviction refutes defendant’s conclusory check-box allegations that
he was convicted as an accomplice to attempted murder under the
natural and probable consequences doctrine. (Patton, supra,
17 Cal.5th at p. 569.) Defendant’s petition did not “create a factual
dispute about whether he played a meaningfully different role in
the attempted murder.” (Ibid.)
Further, like the defendant in Patton, defendant, with the
assistance of counsel, had multiple opportunities to “proffer specific”
additional facts, but did not do so, either in the reply brief or during
argument. (Patton, supra, 17 Cal.5th at pp. 567–569.) As Patton
instructs, defendants “confronting a record of conviction that
demonstrates relief is unavailable have the burden of coming
forward with nonconclusory allegations to alert the prosecution and
the court to what issues an evidentiary hearing would entail.” (Id.
at p. 567.) Defendant failed to state nonconclusory facts framing a
factual dispute warranting an evidentiary hearing. His petition
was therefore properly denied.
However, defendant did not have the clarification provided by
the Supreme Court’s decision in Patton, which was decided while
this appeal was pending. We therefore conditionally affirm the
denial of defendant’s petition with directions to the superior court to
consider an amended petition from defendant, should he choose to
file one. We express no opinion on the viability of any additional
facts defendant might allege.
DISPOSITION
The order denying defendant and appellant Sellas Fanzel
Reed’s petition for resentencing is conditionally affirmed. The case
is remanded to the superior court with directions to consider an
amended petition from defendant if he chooses to file one. If
defendant files an amended petition within 30 days of issuance of
the remittitur, the superior court shall hold further proceedings in
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accordance with Penal Code section 1172.6. If defendant does not
file an amended petition, the order denying the petition shall be
deemed affirmed.
VIRAMONTES, J.
WE CONCUR:
WILEY, Acting P. J.
UZCATEGUI, J.
Judge of the Los Angeles County Superior Court, assigned by the
Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California
Constitution.
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