CourtListener 10763048•People v. Wilburn CA4/1
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Filed 12/22/25 P. v. Wilburn CA4/1
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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D084186
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. (Super. Ct. No. SCN389558)
JONATHAN WILBURN,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Kelly C. Mok, Judge. Affirmed.
Michael C. Sampson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters and Charles C.
Ragland, Chief Assistant Attorneys General, Christopher P. Beesley and
Daniel Rogers, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Jonathan Wilburn appeals from a judgment imposed after a jury
convicted him of second-degree murder and assault with a firearm. He
contends the trial court erred by giving erroneous jury instructions on his
claim of self-defense. We find no reversible error and affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Prosecution Evidence
On the evening of August 3, 2018, Wilburn had a family gathering
at his apartment in Carlsbad. The guests included his cousin Anthony
McFarlin, McFarlin’s girlfriend Alyssa A., and multiple others. Later that
night, the group went to a nightclub in San Diego, then returned to Wilburn’s
apartment around 2:30 or 3:00 a.m., where they continued partying. The
group was drinking and using marijuana throughout the night, but no one
was arguing or fighting.
Around 4:30 a.m., McFarlin and Alyssa went into the main bedroom to
go to sleep. As they were getting ready for bed, Wilburn banged on the door
and came “storming” into the bedroom. He was upset and said they could not
stay in that bedroom. McFarlin responded, “Well, you know, that’s fine. It’s
dirty anyways.” Wilburn then went to the closet and took out a gun. Neither
McFarlin nor Alyssa was armed.
Alyssa stood up from the bed when she saw Wilburn had a gun.
Wilburn walked up to her and kept repeating, “You think I’m soft. You
think I’m soft.” Wilburn then fired the gun twice. One shot hit Alyssa just
below her left knee. According to Alyssa and one other witness, no one had
attacked or threatened Wilburn before the shooting.
Alyssa’s cousins took her from the bedroom to the living room.
McFarlin and Wilburn also left the bedroom. Wilburn kept jabbing the
gun into McFarlin’s stomach, pointing it at his chest and head, and saying,
“You think I’m soft. You think I’m soft.” and “I’ll kill you. So I’m soft?
So I’m fake?” McFarlin tried to calm Wilburn down.
Alyssa’s cousins called 911 and took her outside to wait for the
authorities. McFarlin then ran out of the apartment towards Alyssa.
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Wilburn followed McFarlin out of the apartment, raised his gun, and fired
a shot that struck McFarlin in the back of the head and caused him to fall
to the ground. No one was fighting with Wilburn or threatening him when
he shot McFarlin. Wilburn said, “See, I’m not soft” or “That’s what that
motherfucker gets.” He held the gun over his head in a “boasting” gesture
and seemed proud of shooting McFarlin. Wilburn then went back inside his
apartment where he remained for five to 10 minutes before police arrived.
One of the five percipient witnesses called by the prosecution,
Khayri B., testified to a different version of events preceding the shooting.
According to Khayri, Wilburn was being loud and aggressive and banging on
the bedroom door. McFarlin opened the door and they “started getting into
it.” Wilburn ran into the bedroom and then came out into the living room
with a gun drawn. He and McFarlin then returned to the bedroom. Wilburn
raised the gun and aimed it at McFarlin. Khayri unsuccessfully tried to
knock the gun out of Wilburn’s hand. In response, Wilburn pushed Khayri
into Alyssa, causing her to fall to the ground. Alyssa got up and “charged” at
Wilburn. She swung at him once or twice and hit or scratched him. Wilburn
then fired the gun several times, and one of the shots hit Alyssa in the leg.
Khayri and McFarlin both ran outside. As McFarlin was running away from
Wilburn, Khayri saw Wilburn aim his gun and fire it in McFarlin’s direction.
McFarlin’s back was turned to Wilburn.
McFarlin died from a single gunshot wound to the back of his head.
Alyssa suffered an injury from the gunshot wound to her leg. Wilburn
suffered a gunshot wound to his left foot and scratches on his face and arm.
In DNA testing, Wilburn’s and McFarlin’s DNA was found on swabs taken
from underneath Alyssa’s fingernails.
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B. Defense Evidence
Wilburn testified on his own behalf. After the group returned to his
apartment from the club, they all hung out in the living room for a while.
McFarlin and Alyssa eventually retired to Wilburn’s bedroom. Wilburn
stayed up for another 45 minutes.
When Wilburn eventually got tired and tried to get into his bedroom,
the door was locked. Wilburn knocked on the door for about four minutes
before McFarlin finally opened it. McFarlin was “irritated” and said to
Wilburn, “Why the fuck are you knocking on the door? What the fuck do you
want? I’m trying to sleep with my fucking girl.” Wilburn had never seen
McFarlin in such an “aggressive state” and felt intimidated.
McFarlin told Wilburn, “Come outside. I’ll beat your ass. It’s
whatever. You’re little to me. You’ve always been little to me. I’ll beat your
ass.” Wilburn asked McFarlin to leave his apartment. McFarlin woke Alyssa
up and told Wilburn he no longer considered him family, he was going to beat
Wilburn up, and Wilburn would regret asking him to leave.
Wilburn was surrounded by McFarlin, Alyssa, and one of Wilburn’s
cousins (Khayri B.) who was “pumping up the situation” and seemed to be
on McFarlin’s side. Wilburn felt scared they “might jump” him, so he walked
into his room and retrieved a Glock handgun from his dresser. He walked
out of his room with the gun pointed at his feet and told McFarlin, Alyssa,
and Khayri to leave.
Khayri lunged at Wilburn and tried to take the gun from his hand.
Wilburn pushed him away. Khayri fell into Alyssa and knocked her down.
Alyssa then got up and charged at Wilburn. She scratched his back, arms,
and shoulders. Wilburn was afraid she was going to take his gun. He began
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to backpedal and fired three “warning shots” towards the ground. One of the
shots hit his own foot and another hit Alyssa.
After Alyssa was shot, chaos ensued. McFarlin, his brother, and
Khayri confronted Wilburn. They pushed him and shoved him and tried to
get his gun. During the struggle, furniture was overturned and the television
damaged. Wilburn was afraid his life would be over if they got his gun.
McFarlin pushed Wilburn in the kitchen, causing him to hit his head
on the wall. The fight between Wilburn and the other three men continued
and moved towards the front door. The other men repeatedly reached for his
gun. McFarlin then yelled, “I’m going to get a fucking gun and kill you.”
Wilburn was in fear for his life. He believed McFarlin was going to retrieve a
gun from his car and kill him. As McFarlin turned and began to leave,
Wilburn raised his gun and shot him in the back of the head from a distance
of four to five feet.
After the shooting, Wilburn gave his gun to another guest and waited
in his room until police arrived. He surrendered to the police and agreed to
talk to them. When Wilburn told the officers what happened, he did not
mention that McFarlin had threatened to get a gun and kill him. As he was
being escorted to a patrol car after his arrest, Wilburn said he wanted
McFarlin to leave his apartment, and he had shot McFarlin in self-defense
because “they kept coming forward to him.”
C. Trial and Sentencing
In a jury trial, the jury found Wilburn not guilty of first degree murder,
but guilty of second degree murder (Pen. Code,1 § 187, subd. (a)) and assault
with a firearm (§ 245, subd. (a)(2)). The jury also found that Wilburn
personally used a firearm (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)), personally discharged a
1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
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firearm causing death (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)), and personally inflicted great
bodily injury upon Alyssa (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)). The court sentenced Wilburn
to 40 years to life in state prison.
DISCUSSION
I
Wilburn first argues the trial court committed reversible error by
giving CALCRIM No. 3472 on contrived self-defense as follows: “A person
does not have the right to self-defense if he or she provokes a fight or quarrel
with the intent to create an excuse to use force.” Wilburn objected to this
instruction at trial but did not request that the court give any further
clarifying instruction. On appeal, Wilburn contends the instruction
incorrectly stated that he was categorically prohibited from claiming self-
defense even if he provoked a fight with the intent to use only non-deadly
force.
We disagree. Under controlling case law, the instruction as given was
a correct statement of California law. (People v. Enraca (2012) 53 Cal.4th
735, 761 [approving materially identical CALJIC analog to CALCRIM
No. 3472]; People v. Eulian (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 1324, 1333–1334 (Eulian)
[holding that CALCRIM No. 3472 was “a correct statement of law” under
Enraca].)
In Eulian, the trial court gave the same instruction and the Court of
Appeal concluded: “The instruction is a correct statement of law.” (Eulian,
supra, 247 Cal.App.4th at p. 1334.) However, the court acknowledged that
under the holding of People v. Ramirez (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 940 (Ramirez),
CALCRIM No. 3472 “might require modification in the rare case in which a
defendant intended to provoke only a nondeadly confrontation and the victim
responds with deadly force.” (Eulian, at p. 1334.) Accordingly, CALCRIM
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No. 3472 has since been modified (effective September 2022) to add a
bracketed second sentence for use in appropriate cases as follows: “However,
if the defendant used only non-deadly force, and the opponent responded with
such sudden and deadly force that the defendant could not withdraw from the
fight, then the defendant had the right to defend (himself/herself) with deadly
force and was not required to stop fighting.” (CALCRIM No. 3472.)
Because the first sentence of CALCRIM No. 3472 is a correct statement
of law, and Wilburn did not request that the second bracketed sentence be
given, he has forfeited any claim that the instruction as given was too general
or incomplete without modification. “The long-standing general rule is that
the failure to request clarification of an instruction that is otherwise a correct
statement of law forfeits an appellate claim of error based upon the
instruction given.” (People v. Rundle (2008) 43 Cal.4th 76, 151.) “ ‘A party
may not complain on appeal that an instruction correct in law and responsive
to the evidence was too general or incomplete unless the party has requested
appropriate clarifying or amplifying language.’ ” (People v. Jennings (2010)
50 Cal.4th 616, 671.)
Wilburn contends that his case is similar to Ramirez, in which a
divided panel concluded that CALCRIM No. 3472 and the prosecutor’s
arguments prejudicially misstated the law as applied to the particular
circumstances of the case. In Ramirez, there was evidence that the
defendants confronted rival gang members intending to start a fight, but not
to shoot or kill anyone. (Ramirez, supra, 233 Cal.App.4th at p. 944.) One of
the defendants (Armando) testified that after a fistfight broke out, one of the
rival gang members (Rivera) raised his hand holding an object that looked
like a gun. Armando then pulled his own gun from his sweatshirt pocket and
fatally shot Rivera. (Id. at p. 945.)
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At trial, the defense argued that because Armando’s group started
the fight intending to use only non-deadly force, and Rivera responded with
sudden and deadly force, Armando still had a right to use deadly force in self-
defense. (Ramirez, supra, 233 Cal.App.4th at p. 948.) But in response, the
prosecutor repeatedly invoked CALCRIM No. 3472 to argue to the jury that
the defendants had forfeited any right of self-defense (perfect or imperfect)
if they were the initial aggressors, even if they only intended to provoke a
fistfight. (Ramirez, at pp. 943, 946, 948–949, 950.) In other words, the
prosecutor argued that “contriving to use any amount of ‘force’ entirely
precluded defendants’ self-defense claim, whether Rivera actually drew a gun
to escalate the confrontation to deadly force or Armando only thought he did.”
(Id. at p. 950.) The prosecutor repeatedly told the jury that, under CALCRIM
No. 3472, “it doesn’t matter” whether Rivera escalated a non-deadly conflict
to deadly proportions. (Ibid.) She “erroneously argued CALCRIM No. 3472
obliterated all forms of self-defense—both perfect and imperfect self-defense
alike—if the defendant contrived to use any force.” (Ibid.)
Although the Ramirez court acknowledged that “CALCRIM No. 3472
states a correct rule of law in appropriate circumstances” (Ramirez, supra,
233 Cal.App.4th at p. 947), the majority nevertheless concluded that
“CALCRIM No. 3472 as given here and as argued by the prosecutor
erroneously foreclosed defendants’ imperfect self-defense claim.” (Id. at
p. 952.) “In essence, the instructions and the prosecutor’s argument
erroneously required the jury to conclude that in contriving to use force, even
to provoke only a fistfight, defendants entirely forfeited any right to self-
defense.” (Id. at p. 953.)
We find Ramirez to be distinguishable. In contrast to Ramirez, the jury
here could not have understood anything the prosecutor said as an argument
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that Wilburn forfeited the right of self-defense if he contrived to use any
amount of force, even non-deadly force. Rather, the prosecutor argued that
Wilburn’s use of force was unreasonable and disproportionate to any threat
and that the others had a right to act in self-defense to prevent themselves
from being shot after he pulled out the gun. Moreover, even if any of the
prosecutor’s arguments could be construed to suggest that Wilburn had no
right of self-defense if he contrived to use only non-deadly force, Wilburn did
not object and has therefore forfeited any claim that the prosecutor misstated
the law. (People v. Centeno (2014) 60 Cal.4th 659, 674.)
Finally, even assuming any error in giving CALCRIM No. 3472 without
the second bracketed sentence, we would find it to be harmless on this record.
The undisputed evidence established that Wilburn himself introduced the
threat of deadly force into the family gathering by pulling out a loaded gun in
a verbal squabble over who was going to sleep in the main bedroom. Having
done so, Wilburn could not reasonably claim he was acting in self-defense
because of the way the others responded to his own threat of deadly force.
Although the jury could have concluded that Alyssa responded to his threat of
deadly force by charging at Wilburn and scratching him with her fingernails,
no reasonable juror would have found it was reasonable for Wilburn to react
by firing his gun inside the bedroom or that Alyssa’s or anyone else’s conduct
justified his subsequent actions in shooting McFarlin in the back of the head
outside as he was fleeing. Moreover, to the extent Wilburn testified at trial
that McFarlin made a threat to “get a fucking gun and kill [him],” no other
witness corroborated this testimony, Wilburn made no mention of it in his
own statement to the police, and this would not have constituted a threat of
imminent harm when McFarlin was at the time unarmed and running away
from Wilburn. On this record, therefore, no reasonable juror would have
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reached a different verdict on a theory that Wilburn contrived to use only
non-deadly force and McFarlin or anyone else responded by escalating the
situation into one requiring him to use deadly force.
It is especially improbable that CALCRIM No. 3472 contributed to the
jury’s verdict because there was no evidence that Wilburn “provoke[d] a fight
or quarrel with the intent to create an excuse to use force.” (Italics added.)
Wilburn himself did not testify that he provoked the fight with such a
contrived intent. Notably, the court instructed the jury: “Some of these
instructions may not apply depending on your findings about the facts of the
case. Do not assume, just because I give a particular instruction, that I am
suggesting anything about the facts.” Giving an irrelevant or inapplicable
instruction is generally harmless error. (People v. Cross (2008) 45 Cal.4th 58,
67.)
In these circumstances, any error in giving only the first sentence of
CALCRIM No. 3472 without modification would be harmless under either the
Watson standard for state-law error or the Chapman standard for federal
constitutional error. (People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836; Chapman
v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24.)
II
Wilburn next argues that the trial court erred by giving CALCRIM
No. 3471 over his objection that it did not apply to the facts of the case.
Wilburn claims this instruction “applies only when the defendant starts a
physical fight with the victim, or when the victim and defendant mutually
agree to engage in a physical fight.”
We conclude substantial evidence supported the instruction. (See
People v. Ibarra (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 1070, 1077 [“we determine
independently whether substantial evidence supported the instruction”].)
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CALCRIM No. 3471 provides in relevant part:
“A person who engages in mutual combat or who starts
a fight has a right to self-defense only if:
“1. He actually and in good faith tried to stop fighting;
“AND
“2. He indicated, by word or conduct, to his opponent, in
a way that a reasonable person would understand, that he
wanted to stop fighting and that he had stopped fighting;
“AND
“He gave his opponent a chance to stop fighting.
“If the person meets these requirements, they then had
a right to self-defense if the opponent continued to fight.”
Although we agree with Wilburn that there was no evidence of mutual
combat, there was substantial evidence that he started the fight by initiating
the confrontation with McFarlin and Alyssa in the bedroom, arming himself
with a loaded gun, pointing the gun at McFarlin, and firing shots that hit
Alyssa and himself. Contrary to Wilburn’s suggestion, the principle of law
set forth in CALCRIM No. 3471 is not limited to situations in which the
defendant starts a physical fight by initiating an exchange of blows. “ ‘If the
defendant in any way challenged the fight, and went to it armed, he cannot
afterward maintain that in taking his assailant’s life he acted in self defense.
A man has not . . . the right to provoke a quarrel and take advantage of it,
and then justify the homicide.’ ” (People v. Holt (1944) 25 Cal.2d 59, 66,
italics added.) In Holt, for example, the court found the defendant provoked
the fight “in that by his quarrelsome and challenging attitude, not only
toward deceased but others in touch with him a short time prior to the
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homicide, he had created an atmosphere of antagonism that might naturally
lead to physical combat if he continued, as he did, in this quarrelsome pursuit
of trouble.” (Id. at p. 67; see also People v. Bolton (1979) 23 Cal.3d 208, 215
[defendant was initial aggressor because he pointed gun at victim who posed
no immediate threat, and when victim appeared to be reaching for a gun in
response, defendant “as the aggressor was bound to retreat and not to stand
his ground”].)
We therefore find no error in the trial court’s decision to give CALCRIM
No. 3471. Having rejected Wilburn’s only two arguments, we also find no
cumulative error.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
BUCHANAN, J.
WE CONCUR:
MCCONNELL, P. J.
CASTILLO, J.
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