People v. Gregg CA4/3

CourtListener 10761921Calctapp19 déc. 2025

Texte intégral

Filed 12/19/25 P. v. Gregg CA4/3
Opinion following transfer from Supreme Court
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent, G060803

v. (Super. Ct. No. 21CF0388)

JONATHAN LEE GREGG, OPINION

Defendant and Appellant.

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County,
Andre Manssourian, Judge. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded
with directions.
Cynthia M. Jones, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Eric A.
Swenson and Felicity Senoski, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
A jury found Jonathan Lee Gregg guilty of attempted murder and
assault of a minor under the age of 18 with intent to commit a sexual offense.
On appeal, Gregg seeks resentencing given an amendment to Penal Code
section 1170 (all undesignated statutory references are to this code). He also
argues the trial court abused its discretion by declining to strike two
passages from the probation report.
In our prior opinion in this matter, we affirmed the trial court’s
judgment. (People v. Gregg (May 24, 2023, G060803) [nonpub. opn.].) Gregg
petitioned for review. The California Supreme Court granted the petition and
deferred the matter pending the disposition of People v. Lynch (2024)
16 Cal.5th 730 (Lynch). After its decision in Lynch, the Supreme Court
transferred the matter to this court with directions to vacate our decision and
reconsider the cause in light of Lynch. In accordance with the Supreme
Court’s directions, we vacated our prior decision. Both parties thereafter filed
supplemental briefing.
In light of Lynch, we find the trial court committed prejudicial
error because it is conceivable a jury would not have reached the same
conclusion as the trial court on one of the aggravating factors: whether Gregg
“engaged in violent conduct that indicates a serious danger to society.” (Cal.
Rules of Court, rule 4.421(b)(1).) We vacate Gregg’s sentence and remand the
matter for litigation of the alleged aggravating circumstances and full
resentencing. In all other respects, we affirm the judgment.
FACTS

We generally restate the facts from our prior opinion, People v.
Gregg, supra, G060803. The evidence at trial established Gregg met a
depressed and suicidal minor online and, at her request, agreed to kill her in
exchange for $200 and her cell phone. When the minor attempted to back out

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and told Gregg she needed time to get her affairs in order, he told her, “No,
you need to do it now, while you still have the resolve.”
Gregg and the minor met the following morning. She told him she
was 16 and gave him $200. After first considering whether he could assist the
minor in jumping off a bridge, Gregg drove her to a secluded space at a park
and she gave him her cell phone. He told her, “Once you’re ready, just turn
around.”
When the minor did turn around, Gregg began to choke her and
hit her head against a brick wall. Although the minor, who was groggy from
ingesting pills and alcohol, had not consented to any sexual contact, Gregg
also groped her breast, removed her clothing, rubbed his penis against her
vagina and attempted to penetrate her. Despite her impairment, the minor
was able to get away; Gregg left her lying naked on the ground. Before
leaving, he took her clothing and cell phone.
In September 2021, following a jury trial, Gregg was convicted of
attempted murder (§§ 664, subd. (a), 187, subd. (a)) and assault of a minor
under the age of 18 with intent to commit a sexual offense (§ 220,
subd. (a)(2)). The jury found true the allegation that the attempted murder
was done willfully, deliberately, and with premeditation.
The probation officer’s report listed these circumstances in
aggravation: Gregg’s crime involved great violence; a threat of great bodily
harm and callousness; a victim who was particularly vulnerable; planning;
violence indicating a serious danger to society; and the violation of a position
of trust. Circumstances in mitigation were the victim sought assistance to
end her life and Gregg had no criminal record.
The court sentenced Gregg to seven years to life on the attempted
murder charge, plus a consecutive upper determinate term of nine years on

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the assault charge. In explaining its decision to impose the upper term, the
court told Gregg, “I am not sure I have the appropriate words to capture how
horrific your conduct was in this case. It’s shocking, inhumane the things you
did. [¶] If I could have sentenced you to more time, I would sentence you to
every minute of time available. There is no purpose for you to walk the
streets again. Nothing. Despite your childhood, despite what you have done,
it has to be this way right now because you being on the streets is not safe for
this community. This community can’t have somebody like you out of prison
ever again.”
The court added, “To prey on a 16-year-old vulnerable child like
that, to lure her to her own suicide, to take her up on the idea of killing her,
to bash her head against the concrete, to do the one thing she asked not to
have happen the night before on those text exchanges which was a sexual
assault, and, of course, you topped it off by leaving her for dead.”
The court ended with this: “And the cherry on top, truly the icing
on the cake is your utter lack of remorse all the way through to the end. Our
last contact with each other will be you demonstrating that you have no
remorse for [the victim], no remorse for what you did, referring to the jury’s
verdict as a wrongful conviction in the probation report. Needless to say, I
will be giving you the maximum possible punishment.”
DISCUSSION
At the time of Gregg’s sentencing, former section 1170 permitted
the trial court to select any of three terms—lower, middle, or upper—as
defendant’s determinate sentence. But since an amendment to section 1170
became effective on January 1, 2022, courts’ sentencing discretion has been

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“constrained by a presumption against the upper term.”1 (Lynch, supra,
16 Cal.5th at p. 774.) As section 1170, subdivision (b)(1) sets forth, “When a
judgment of imprisonment is to be imposed and the statute specifies three
possible terms, the court shall, in its sound discretion, order imposition of a
sentence not to exceed the middle term, except as otherwise provided in
paragraph (2).”
Paragraph (2) specifies when a trial court may impose the upper
term: “The court may impose a sentence exceeding the middle term only
when there are circumstances in aggravation of the crime that justify the
imposition of a term of imprisonment exceeding the middle term and the facts
underlying those circumstances have been stipulated to by the defendant or
have been found true beyond a reasonable doubt at trial by the jury or by the
judge in a court trial.” (§ 1170, subd. (b)(2).) In Lynch, the California
Supreme Court interpreted paragraph (2) as follows: “By referring to
aggravating circumstances ‘that justify the imposition of’ an upper term
sentence [citation], the statute contemplates all of the aggravating
circumstances that the court actually relies on to justify the sentence, not
some subset of those circumstances. [Citation.] It then specifies that the facts
underlying ‘those circumstances,’ i.e., the same circumstances the trial court
relies on to ‘justify the imposition of’ an upper term sentence, must be proven
as the statute requires.” (Lynch, supra, 16 Cal.5th at pp. 759–760.)
Accordingly, section 1170, subdivision (b) “operates in such a manner as to
trigger the Sixth Amendment jury trial right with respect to every

1 The 2022 amendment “applies retroactively to defendants,” such

as Gregg, “whose judgments were not final on direct appeal at the time the
statute took effect.” (Lynch, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 742.)

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aggravating fact . . . the trial court uses to justify an upper term sentence.”
(Lynch, at p. 768.)
In reviewing a resentencing case where the trial court applied the
former version of section 1170, subdivision (b), the appellate court must
consider prejudicial error under Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18.
(Lynch, supra, 16 Cal.5th at pp. 742–743.) “[A] Sixth Amendment violation
occurs when the trial court relies on unproven aggravating facts to impose an
upper term sentence, even if some other aggravating facts relied on have
been properly established. The violation is prejudicial unless an appellate
court can conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that a jury would have found
true all of the aggravating facts relied upon by the trial court to justify an
upper term sentence, or that those facts were otherwise proved true in
compliance with the current statutory requirements.” (Lynch, supra,
16 Cal.5th at p. 768.)
Lynch “cautioned that a prejudice analysis following a change in
the law respecting proof of aggravating circumstances ‘can be problematic.
The reviewing court cannot assume that the record reflects all of the evidence
that would have been presented to the jury, or that the defendant had the
same incentive and opportunity at a sentencing hearing to contest the
aggravating circumstance. [Citation.] . . . “Many of the aggravating
circumstances described in the rules require an imprecise quantitative or
comparative evaluation of the facts.”’” (Lynch, supra, 16 Cal.5th at pp. 775–
776.)
Here, we find prejudicial error under Chapman as to one of the
aggravating factors that the trial court found to be true: “The defendant has
engaged in violent conduct that indicates a serious danger to society.” (Cal.
Rules of Court, rule 4.421(b)(1). The jury instruction for this aggravating

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factor requires: “1. The defendant has engaged in violent conduct; [¶] AND
[¶] 2. The violent conduct, considered in light of all the evidence
presented[ and the defendant’s background], shows that the defendant is a
serious danger to society.” (CALCRIM No. 3234.) CALCRIM No. 3234
elaborates: “You may not find the allegation true unless all of you agree that
the People have proved that the defendant’s violent conduct was distinctively
worse than that posed by an ordinary commission of the underlying crime
and that the violent conduct, considered in light of all the evidence presented[
and the defendant’s background], shows that the defendant is a serious
danger to society.”
A determination of this factor involves the fact finder to engage
in a comparative and qualitative evaluation of Gregg’s conduct, including his
background, which makes it generally “‘“‘difficult for a reviewing court to
conclude with confidence that, had the issue been submitted to the jury, the
jury would have assessed the facts in the same manner as did the trial
court.’”’” (People v. Wiley (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1069, 1090.) Thus, given the
record here, we find the error to be prejudicial under Chapman.
We need not address the other aggravating factors found to be
true by the trial court. “Because we cannot find the omission of a jury trial
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt as to every aggravating fact relied upon
by the trial court to impose an upper term,” Gregg’s “sentence must be
reversed.” (Lynch, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 776.)

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DISPOSITION
The sentence is vacated and the matter is remanded for litigation
of the aggravating circumstances, after which the trial court is ordered to
conduct a full resentencing consistent with this opinion. In all other aspects,
the judgment is affirmed.

MOTOIKE, ACTING P. J.

WE CONCUR:

MOORE, J.

SCOTT, J.

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