CourtListener 10760251•Tani v. Lin CA2/4
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Filed 12/17/25 Tani v. Lin CA2/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
UTOMO TANI, B338821
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 22STCV30356)
v.
KAM CHOI LIN, et al.,
Defendants and
Appellants.
APPEAL from order of the Superior Court of the County of
Los Angeles, Stephanie M. Bowick, Judge. Reversed.
West Themis Law, Sally S. Chan and Karen K. Tso for
Defendants and Appellants.
Midway Law Firm and Joseph C. Crudo for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
This is a dispute among the shareholders, management,
and employees of Golden Partner Global Investment Inc., doing
business as the NBC Seafood Restaurant (the Restaurant). The
parties accuse one another of fraud and misappropriation of
corporate funds. Plaintiff and respondent Utomo Tani, the
Restaurant’s president and a shareholder, filed this action
seeking relief including the involuntary dissolution of the
Restaurant pursuant to Corporations Code, section 1800.1 The
trial court granted Tani’s motion for a preliminary injunction and
appointment of a receiver. Defendants and appellants Kam Choi
Lin (Lin), Chang Ho Chen (Chen), Wei Lin Zheng (Zheng), Wai
Hung Szeto (Szeto), and Yan Xian Li (Li)—shareholders and/or
employees of the Restaurant—appeal from this order.
We agree with appellants that the orders must be reversed.
Tani failed to serve the Restaurant with the summons and
complaint, and therefore, the orders as to the Restaurant are
void. The trial court also abused its discretion in awarding
injunctive relief and appointing a receiver. Substantial evidence
did not support the court’s finding that Tani owned 33 1/3 percent
or more of the Restaurant’s outstanding shares, a statutory
prerequisite to his dissolution claim.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. The Restaurant
The Restaurant was formed in 2008. According to the
articles of incorporation, Tani was the president and chief
financial officer and Chen was the secretary. The Restaurant’s
directors were Tani, Chen, Lin, Zheng, Szeto, and another
1 Undesignated statutory references in this opinion are to the
Corporations Code.
2
individual, Kent Tran (Tran). Shares in the Restaurant were
issued as follows:
Name No. Shares Consideration Percentage
Lin 37,500 $375,000 41.6%
Tani 20,000 $200,000 22.2%
Tran 17,500 $175,000 19.4%
Chen 5,000 $50,000 5.55%
Zheng 5,000 $50,000 5.55%
Szeto 5,000 $50,000 5.55%
Lin, the Restaurant’s manager, and Li, its financial
manager and bookkeeper, reported to Tani and provided him
with quarterly financial reports. The other shareholder
defendants worked in the Restaurant’s management and day-to-
day operations.
B. The Complaint and Cross-Complaints2
Tani’s complaint asserted causes of action for breach of
fiduciary duty, various fraud theories, conversion, constructive
trust, unjust enrichment, inspection of records, and involuntary
dissolution of the Restaurant pursuant to section 1800.
Appellants, he alleged, made misrepresentations to outside
accountants about the Restaurant’s finances to usurp corporate
opportunities and deprive the Restaurant of income. He alleged
that appellants violated his right to compensation by refusing to
pay him bonuses.
2 The pleadings are not included in the appellate record.
However, the trial court summarized relevant parts of the complaint
and cross-complaints in the order that is the subject of this appeal.
3
In the complaint, Tani alleged that he was authorized to
sue for involuntary dissolution of the Restaurant as “a
shareholder who holds shares representing not less than Thirty-
Three and one-third percent (33 1/3%) of the total number of
outstanding shares.” He alleged that grounds existed for
involuntary dissolution of the Restaurant pursuant to
section 1800, subdivision (b) in that “Defendants have engaged in
persistent and pervasive fraud, mismanagement, and abuse of
authority resulting in persistent unfairness toward” Tani.
Further, the Restaurant’s property was “being misapplied or
wasted by Defendants” to his detriment. Tani named the
Restaurant as a “Nominal Defendant” and did not serve it with
the summons or complaint.
The shareholder defendants cross-complained against Tani,
alleging claims for breach of fiduciary duty, accounting,
declaratory relief, conversion, several fraud theories, unjust
enrichment, inspection of records, and breach of oral contract. Li
filed her own cross-complaint asserting claims for retaliation,
discrimination, hostile work environment, and intentional
infliction of emotional distress.
C. Motion for Preliminary Injunction and Appointment
of a Receiver
1. Tani’s Motion and Evidence
Tani moved for a preliminary injunction “to maintain [the]
status quo” of the Restaurant and to prohibit defendants from
“collecting cash or distributing cash” from the business. He also
moved for the appointment of a receiver.
Tani declared that he owned “41.67% of all issued and
outstanding shares of ownership” in the Restaurant. He
4
explained that his initial ownership of 20,000 shares “equaled
22.2%” of the 90,000 issued shares, as indicated in the
Restaurant’s articles of incorporation. However, “[o]n or about
January 1, 2021,” he “reached an agreement” with Tran “to
acquire his shares in the” Restaurant. He attested he “gave
notice to all other shareholders and directors” of this agreement
at a special meeting on January 1, 2021. He stated that notice of
the special meeting was waived by the Restaurant’s board of
directors, and “[m]inutes of the Special Meeting confirm that it
was approved by all [Restaurant] board members for a transfer of
[Tran’s] stock holdings in the [Restaurant] from himself to me.”
Tani offered a single document to prove he received the
shares from Tran, which we will refer to as the “January 2021
Minutes.” Though titled “Minutes of Special Meeting of
Stockholders of Golden Partner Global Investment Inc[.],” (some
capitalization omitted) the document’s opening paragraph recites
that “[a] special meeting of the stockholders of SUMMER ROLLS
INC was held” at the Restaurant on January 1, 2021. The
minutes state Tani, the president, chaired the meeting, Chen
acted as secretary, and Lin, Tran, Zheng, and Szeto were present.
Tani suggested that the board authorize the “[t]ransfer [of] 19.4%
of ownership” from “KENT TRAN to UTOMO TANI.” The
minutes indicate that the board approved the transfer and
directed the president and secretary to transfer the shares.
The January 2021 Minutes refer to an appended
document titled “Waiver of Notice of Special Meeting of
Stockholders of Golden Partner Global Investment Inc[.]” (Some
capitalization omitted.) This document states that the directors
and stockholders “agree and consent that the special meeting of
stockholders be held” at the Restaurant on January 1, 2021, for
5
the purpose of “Transfer of stock ownership.” It bears the
purported signatures of Tani and Tran, as directors, on August
24, 2021, and the purported signatures of Lin, Chen, Zheng, and
Szeto, as directors, on various dates in October 2021.
Tani averred that, in April 2022, he formed a belief that
appellants were “syphoning at least $250,000 in cash” from the
Restaurant each quarter. John Luna, a certified public
accountant, provided declarations in which he attested to
reviewing several years of the Restaurant’s tax returns, bank
records, and internal cash records. He described discrepancies in
the gross revenue reported in tax returns for the same year and
between bank statements and tax returns.
Luna also described reviewing documents that indicated
large cash transfers were made. On May 25, 2023, a new account
at Universal Bank was opened with an initial deposit of $200,000
that had been transferred from the Restaurant’s Cathay Bank
account. Chen, Szeto, Lin, and Tran were among the new
account’s signers. The following month, two international wire
transfers were made from the account, each around $35,000.
Luna also described diminishing cash receipts and cash deposits
between 2017 and 2022.
2. Opposition of the Shareholder Defendants
The shareholder defendants3 opposed the motion on
multiple grounds. Relevant to this appeal, they argued that the
Restaurant had not been served with the summons and
complaint, and therefore, the court lacked jurisdiction over it.
3 No opposition was filed on behalf of Li.
6
The shareholder defendants also argued that Tani failed to
demonstrate a likelihood of succeeding on his dissolution claim
because he did not satisfy section 1800’s ownership requirement.
They argued that the January 2021 Minutes of “Summer Rolls
Inc.” were not credible evidence of a transfer of Tran’s shares to
Tani. Tran furnished a declaration in which he described the
minutes as a “forgery, fake, or falsely manipulated
document . . . .” He denied attending a meeting on January 1,
2021, and denied agreeing to transfer his shares to Tani or
anyone else.
3. Trial Court’s Order
After a hearing, the trial court granted the motion. The
court rejected appellants’ jurisdiction arguments. It found that
Tani showed a likelihood of prevailing on his dissolution claim,
and specifically, that Tani had “demonstrated he owns not less
than 33 1/3 percent” of the Restaurant’s shares. The court
further found uncontroverted evidence that Lin, Chen, and Szeto
opened a bank account and transferred cash from the Restaurant
into it, as well as evidence of other possible misappropriations of
cash and misrepresentations concerning cash flow.
The trial court also found that “the balance of harm weighs
substantially in favor of granting injunctive relief,” as “[t]here
has been a complete breakdown of the relationship between the
directors and shareholders of the [Restaurant], internal
dissention [sic] in the [Restaurant], mismanagement of the
[Restaurant], allegations of fraud as well as abuse of authority,
and the protection of the rights and interest of shareholders is in
jeopardy.”
7
The court’s preliminary injunction provided: “1. The status
quo of the business of [the Restaurant] must be maintained; [¶]
2. Any named defendant or any other person or entity controlled
by a named defendant is prohibited from collecting or taking any
cash derivative of restaurant operations of the [the Restaurant];
and [¶] 3. All defendants and any person or entity controlled by a
named defendant is prohibited from taking any monetary
compensation from income derivative of restaurant operations of
[the Restaurant].”
The trial court appointed a receiver “to take over defined
areas of the Restaurant” pursuant to section 1803. The court
found that “absent the appointment of a receiver, the interests of
the [Restaurant] and its shareholders will suffer pending the trial
and determination of the complaint for involuntary dissolution.”
It found “substantial mistrust and intense animosity between the
shareholders” in that both sides believe the other is harming the
Restaurant’s interests by misappropriating cash or committing
fraud. “There is a clear dispute regarding cash and shareholder
holdings, and accounting related to the Restaurant.”
The receiver was ordered to access and control the
Restaurant’s bank and financial records; collect income and pay
its costs, expenses, vendors, and employees; control cash
transactions, payments, and deposits, and pay taxing authorities.
Shortly thereafter, the trial court issued a separate order
appointing Kevin Singer as receiver and directing him to take
possession and control the Restaurant and all of its records;
manage the business; “control all revenue, inventories and
payable[s]” of the Restaurant; and “retain all decision making
over” it.
8
Appellants appealed. Tani did not file a respondent’s
brief.4
DISCUSSION
A. Governing Law
1. Preliminary Injunctions
“In determining whether to issue a preliminary injunction,
the trial court considers two related factors: (1) the likelihood
that the plaintiff will prevail on the merits of its case at trial, and
(2) the interim harm that the plaintiff is likely to sustain if the
injunction is denied as compared to the harm that the defendant
is likely to suffer if the court grants a preliminary injunction.”
(14859 Moorpark Homeowner’s Assn. v. VRT Corp. (1998) 63
Cal.App.4th 1396, 1402 (14859 Moorpark).) “‘The latter factor
involves consideration of such things as the inadequacy of other
remedies, the degree of irreparable harm, and the necessity of
preserving the status quo.’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.)
“We reverse an order granting a preliminary injunction if
the trial court has abused its discretion in ruling on one of the
pertinent factors.” (14859 Moorpark, supra, 63 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1403.) “[W]e do not reweigh conflicting evidence or assess
witness credibility, we defer to the trial court’s factual findings if
substantial evidence supports them, and we view the evidence in
4 Tani did not file a respondent’s brief by the deadline provided by
California Rules of Court, rule 8.360(c)(2), and we issued a notice of
default. Tani’s attorney requested, and we granted, an extension of his
time to file a respondent’s brief. He did not, however, file a brief.
Appellants filed a request pursuant to rule 8.220(a) that we deem his
right to file a brief forfeited, and that the appeal be submitted for
decision on the record and the opening brief. We deny this request as
moot.
9
the light most favorable to the court’s ruling.” (City of Corona v.
AMG Outdoor Advertising, Inc. (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 291, 298–
299.) “To the extent the plaintiff’s likelihood of prevailing on the
merits turns on legal rather than factual questions, however, our
review is de novo.” (Id. at p. 299.)
2. Involuntary Dissolution of a Corporation (§ 1800)
Section 1800 “gives the superior court jurisdiction over an
action for the involuntary dissolution of a corporation.” (Gold v.
Gold (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 791, 804 (Gold).) A verified
“complaint for the involuntary dissolution of a corporation may be
filed by . . . shareholders who hold shares representing not less
than 33 1/3 percent of the equity of the corporation.” (Kline
Hawkes California SBIC v. Superior Court (2004) 117
Cal.App.4th 183, 188 (Kline); § 1800, subd. (a)(2).)
The statute sets forth six grounds for involuntary
dissolution. Tani appears to have relied on subdivision (b)(4), of
section 1800, which provides: “Those in control of the corporation
have been guilty of or have knowingly countenanced persistent
and pervasive fraud, mismanagement or abuse of authority or
persistent unfairness toward any shareholders or its property is
being misapplied or wasted by its directors or officers.”
3. Appointment of A Receiver (§ 1803)
Upon the filing of a complaint for dissolution of a
corporation, “[t]he powers granted to the superior court include
the appointment of a receiver . . . .” (Gold, supra, 114
Cal.App.4th at p. 804.) A receiver may be appointed to take
charge of the corporation’s property and business if the court “has
reasonable grounds to believe that unless a receiver of the
10
corporation is appointed the interests of the corporation and its
shareholders will suffer pending the hearing and determination
of the complaint . . . .” (§ 1803.)
“The appointment of a receiver is a drastic remedy, may
involve unnecessary expense and hardship and courts carefully
weigh the propriety of such appointment in exercising their
discretion to appoint a receiver particularly if there is an
alternative remedy.” (Hoover v. Galbraith (1972) 7 Cal.3d 519,
528.) We review an order appointing a receiver for abuse of
discretion. (City of Crescent City v. Reddy (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th
458, 466.) “An abuse of discretion is demonstrated if the court's
decision was not supported by substantial evidence or the court
applied an improper legal standard or otherwise based its
determination on an error of law.” (Ibid.) We review factual
findings for substantial evidence. (Ibid.) We uphold the trial
court’s findings unless they so lack evidentiary support that they
are unreasonable. (Ibid.)
B. Contentions of Error
Appellants make numerous arguments on appeal. Among
others, they argue that the trial court’s orders were void because
the Restaurant was not served with the summons and complaint.
Further, they argue that Tani failed to demonstrate he owned
33 1/3 percent or more of the Restaurant’s outstanding shares, a
statutory prerequisite to his dissolution claim. Because these
claims of error require reversal of the trial court’s orders, we do
not address their remaining arguments.
11
C. The Orders Against the Restaurant Are Void Because
the Restaurant Was Not Served With the Summons
and Complaint
Appellants argue that the preliminary injunction and
receiver appointment orders were void against a party that was
never served with a summons and complaint. Whether a
judgment is void due to lack of service is a question of law that
we review de novo. (JHVS Group, LLC v. Slate (2024) 107
Cal.App.5th 30, 36 (JHVS).)
When a shareholder seeks to dissolve a corporation, it seeks
to end the corporation’s legal existence. The corporation is
named as a party so that it can defend itself. (See, e.g., Stuparich
v. Harbor Furniture Manufacturing, Inc. (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th
1268, 1272–1273 [affirming summary judgment in favor of
corporation named as defendant in involuntary dissolution
action]; Stumpf v. C.E. Stumpf & Sons, Inc. (1975) 47 Cal.App.3d
230, 232 [corporation named as sole defendant in involuntary
dissolution action appealed from judgment decreeing its
dissolution]; see Friedman, Cal. Practice Guide: Corporations
(The Rutter Group, July 2025 Update), ¶ 8:831 and Form 8:K
[form involuntary dissolution complaint naming corporation as
the sole defendant].) The corporation has a statutory right to
avoid dissolution and appointment of a receiver by purchasing
the plaintiffs’ shares at their fair value. (See generally, § 2000;
Friedman, Cal. Practice Guide: Corporations, supra, ¶ 8:861.)
Initiating the buyout procedure supplants a cause of action for
involuntary dissolution. (Schrage v. Schrage (2021) 69
Cal.App.5th 126, 137.)
Here, Tani named the Restaurant as a “nominal
defendant,” a designation used in shareholder derivative
12
litigation, not dissolution actions.5 Putting aside how he named
the Restaurant as a defendant, it is undisputed that Tani did not
serve the Restaurant with the summons or complaint. Tani
admitted he never served the Restaurant with “any paperwork in
the case,” and the register of actions reveals no proof of service of
the summons and complaint on the Restaurant.
Service of a party is necessary to obtain jurisdiction over it.
(JHVS, supra, at p. 36; Code Civ. Proc., § 410.50.) In JHVS, the
borrowers and purchasers of land sued multiple defendants and
obtained a preliminary injunction to stop a pending foreclosure
sale. (JHVS, supra, at p. 35.) The enjoined parties included the
Slates, the mortgagees/sellers, but the uncontested record
demonstrated that they were never served with the summons
and complaint. (Id. at p. 37.) The JHVS court concluded that
there is “no factual basis upon which it can be said that JHVS
met the statutory requirements for obtaining personal
jurisdiction over the Slates,” and “[t]he trial court’s actions
against the Slates, including the preliminary injunction order,
are thus void on their face.” (Ibid.)
In this case, Tani obtained a preliminary injunction that
requires the “status quo of the business of [the Restaurant]” to be
“maintained.” He also procured the appointment of a receiver
who was ordered initially to take over the Restaurant’s collection
of income, its spending, and its banking activity and later, its
entire operations. Because Tani never served the Restaurant,
5 A derivative action is “filed on behalf of the corporation for
injury to the corporation for which it has failed or refused to sue.”
(Friedman, Cal. Practice Guide: Corporations, supra, ¶ 6:598.) In such
cases, the corporation may be named as a nominal defendant.
13
the trial court had no jurisdiction over the Restaurant when it
made these orders, and as to the Restaurant, the orders are void.
The trial court was incorrect to the extent it implied that it
had jurisdiction over the Restaurant through the appearance of
certain shareholders, officers, and directors. A corporation in its
corporate rights and liabilities is as distinct from the persons
composing it “‘as an incorporated city is from an inhabitant of
that city.’ [Citations.]” (Merco Construction Engineers, Inc. v.
Municipal Court (1978) 21 Cal.3d 724, 729–730.) “[A]
corporation, unlike a natural person, cannot represent itself
before courts of record in propria persona, nor can it represent
itself through a corporate officer, director or other employee who
is not an attorney. It must be represented by licensed counsel in
proceedings before courts of record.” (CLD Construction, Inc. v.
City of San Ramon (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 1141, 1145.) We find
nothing in the record to indicate appellants entered a general
appearance for the Restaurant.
D. Substantial Evidence Did Not Support the Finding
That Tani Satisfied Section 1800’s Ownership
Requirement
The trial court’s injunction was premised upon its finding
that Tani showed a likelihood of prevailing on his dissolution
claim, and the order appointing a receiver presumed that Tani
had asserted a viable claim for involuntary dissolution that
would be determined at trial. An essential element of a cause of
action for involuntary dissolution is that the plaintiff “hold
shares representing not less than 33 1/3 percent of the equity of
the corporation.” (Kline, supra, 117 Cal.App.4th at p. 188;
§ 1800, subd. (a).) This requirement is “strictly construed.”
14
(Cardoza v. Millington (1956) 142 Cal.App.2d 26, 34 [discussing
section 1800’s predecessor statutes, §§ 4650, et seq.].)
The trial court found sufficient evidence that Tani satisfied
the percentage ownership requirement because his declaration
showed he “‘own[s] 41.67% of all issued and outstanding shares of
ownership in the Company.’” Appellants, the court found, “do not
make any objection to this evidence other than asserting, without
a sufficient evidentiary basis, that the January 1, 2021, minutes
for a special meeting of ‘Summer Rolls Inc.’ whereby Plaintiff
received a 19.4% transfer of ownership in ‘Summer Rolls Inc.’ is
‘falsified and forged.’” (Italics added.) Appellants “do not
explain . . . why [Tani’s] ownership interest in an entity other than
the [Restaurant] is relevant [to] the question of whether Plaintiff
may bring suit pursuant to Corporations Code section 1800,
subdivision (a)(2) for purposes of dissolution of the [Restaurant].”
(Italics added.) Appellants argue that, in so finding, the trial
court rejected the very evidence Tani offered to prove his
ownership percentage exceeded the statutory threshold. We
agree.
Tani declared that it was “[t]he transfer of KENT TRAN’s
stock to [him that] increased [his] stock holdings in the
[Restaurant] to 37,500 shares — a 41.67% interest in the total
issued and outstanding shares in the [Restaurant].” He
substantiated his conclusory statement with only the January
2021 Minutes. The trial court deemed the minutes irrelevant
because they reflected a transfer of shares “in an entity other
than the” Restaurant. Having made this determination, the trial
court was left without a sufficient basis for finding that Tani
owned more than his original 22.2 percent interest. (See Jewish
Defense Organization, Inc. v. Superior Court (1999) 72
15
Cal.App.4th 1045, 1055 [“Declarations are insufficient to support
the assertions for which they are offered if they consist primarily
of vague assertions of ultimate facts rather than specific
evidentiary facts permitting a court to form an independent
conclusion on the issue”].)
We conclude that substantial evidence did not support the
trial court’s finding that Tani satisfied section 1800, subdivision
(a)’s ownership requirement. Accordingly, the trial court abused
its discretion in finding that he demonstrated a likelihood of
success on the merits of his dissolution claim as necessary for the
issuance of a preliminary injunction. Further, because Tani
failed to establish his standing to assert a dissolution cause of
action, the trial court abused its discretion in appointing a
receiver. (See Rondos v. Superior Court (1957) 151 Cal.App.2d
190, 195 [“‘Where a complaint fails by its allegations to show that
the conditions required by law have been complied with[,] an
order for the appointment of a receiver is void for all purposes’”].)
16
DISPOSITION
The orders granting a preliminary injunction and
appointing a receiver are reversed. The cause is remanded to the
trial court for further proceedings consistent with the views
expressed in this opinion. Appellants are awarded their costs on
appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL
REPORTS
MORI, J.
We concur:
ZUKIN, P. J.
COLLINS, J.
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