People v. Gonzalez CA4/3

CourtListener 10759270Calctapp16 déc. 2025

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Filed 12/16/25 P. v. Gonzalez CA4/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent, G064546

v. (Super. Ct. No. FWV1100266)

LEONARDO GONZALEZ, OPINION

Defendant and Appellant.

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Bernardino
County, Ingrid Adamson Uhler, Judge. Reversed and remanded with
instructions.
Andrea S. Bitar, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Arlene A. Sevidal, Assistant Attorney General,
Eric A. Swenson and Monique Myers, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff
and Respondent.
Leonardo Gonzalez appeals from an order entered after a
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resentencing hearing under Penal Code section 1172.75. Section 1172.75
retroactively invalidated prison prior enhancements under former section
667.5, subdivision (b), and required trial courts to conduct a full resentencing
of defendants whose prison terms included such an enhancement.
Gonzalez was originally sentenced in 2012 to 117 years in prison
for various crimes and enhancements, including firearm enhancements, a
gang enhancement, and a prison prior enhancement. Gonzalez was
resentenced in 2024. The trial court struck the prison prior as well as the
gang enhancement. The court, however, declined to strike the firearm
enhancements, finding Gonzalez posed a risk to public safety.
On appeal from his resentencing hearing, Gonzalez’s appointed
counsel filed a brief asserting there were no arguable issues to pursue and
asking the court to follow the procedure outlined in People v. Delgadillo
(2022) 14 Cal.5th 216, 231–232 (Delgadillo). We advised appellant of his right
to file a supplemental letter or brief, which he did, and pursuant to the
discretion granted in Delgadillo, we undertook an independent review of the
record.
After our review, we asked the parties to brief the following issue:
“Did the trial court abuse its discretion under Penal Code section 1385 in
declining to strike or dismiss firearm enhancements alleged in connection
with counts one through four of the first amended information, or in declining
to strike the punishments therefrom? (See Pen. Code, §§ 1172.75, subd. (d)(1),
1385, subds. (b)(1), (c)(2), & (c)(2)(B), and 12022.53, subd. (g); People v.

1
All further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal
Code.

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Gonzalez (2024) 103 Ca1.App.5th 215; People v. Williams (2018) 19
Cal.App.5th 1057, 1062–1063.)”
The parties filed briefs responding to our question, and both sides
agreed the trial court abused its discretion by focusing exclusively on the
danger Gonzalez posed at the time of his resentencing, rather than also
considering the danger he might pose to society upon his eventual release if
the court were to dismiss the firearm enhancements. Because the trial court
applied the wrong legal standard to determine the public safety risk Gonzalez
might pose, we reverse its ruling and remand for resentencing in accordance
with this opinion.
STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In December 2011, a jury found Gonzalez guilty of attempted
murder (counts 1 through 3), shooting at an inhabited dwelling (count 4),
kidnapping (count 5), imprisonment by violence (count 6), corporal injury to
spouse (count 7), and being a felon in possession of a firearm (count 8). On
each of the three attempted murder counts, the jury also found true the
special allegation that Gonzalez personally used a firearm (§ 12022.53, subd.
(b)), personally and intentionally discharged a firearm (§ 12022.53, subd. (c)),
and committed the offense for the benefit of and at the direction of a criminal
street gang. (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(C).) The court also found true allegations
that Gonzalez had suffered two prior convictions for purposes of section
667.5, subdivision (b).

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The trial court sentenced Gonzalez to an indeterminate term of
15 years to life in prison on each of the three attempted murder counts
(counts 1 through 3). In addition, the court sentenced him to another 20 years
on each attempted murder count for personal and intentional discharge of a
firearm (§ 12022.53, subd. (c)). The court imposed, but stayed, another 10
years on each attempted murder count for personal use of a firearm
(§12022.53, subd. (b)) and imposed, but also stayed, an additional 10-year
sentence for the criminal street gang allegation. (§ 186.22, subd (b)(1)(C).)
The court also imposed a determinate term totaling 12 years on the other
charges, which included a one-year prison prior enhancement under section
667.5, subdivision (b).2 In total, Gonzalez, who was 29 years old at the time,
was sentenced to 117 years to life. This court affirmed Gonzalez’s conviction
on appeal. (See People v. Gonzalez (Aug. 7, 2014, G049832) [nonpub. opn.].)
In 2024, a resentencing stipulation form was filed under section
1172.75, and the court set a resentencing hearing. At the hearing, the court
considered the full panoply of punishments imposed on Gonzalez. The court
made significant modifications to the sentence. It (1) struck the gang
enhancements from counts 1, 2, 3, and 8, (2) struck the one-year prison prior
as required under section 1172.75, and (3) reduced the sentences on each of
the attempted murder counts from 15 years to 7 years. It did not, however,
reduce the 20-year firearm enhancements on each of the attempted murder
counts. Thus, Gonzalez was resentenced to 21 years to life plus 70 years in
prison.

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The court struck the first prior conviction for purposes of
sentencing.

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In declining to strike the firearm enhancements, the trial court
gave the following explanation: “And in regards to my review of the
presentence investigation report, I’m going to indicate that the Court is
convinced by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant posed a public
safety risk, and I am not going to use my discretion to either strike or lower
any of the gun enhancements that were imposed and found true by the
jurors. [¶] I’ll indicate that he shot into an inhabited dwelling based on—it
appears that it was retaliatory based on the previous domestic violence
between himself and his girlfriend, and this was his former girlfriend’s home
that was shot at. There were children as well as adults within the home. [¶]
In regards to the presentence investigation report, it does indicate that the
defendant was identified as a gang member with reported ties to the Mexican
Mafia. He had a history of criminal threats, false imprisonment, and
possession of a controlled substance while armed. Those were his criminal
convictions prior to the incident before the Court. [¶] He had the means and
revengeful intent to cause lethal harm to the victims. Based on his conduct, it
will be indicated that the present matter showed callousness and criminal
sophistication, making him a serious and immediate risk to the community
and the victims. [¶] So based on the charged offenses, based on his previous
convictions and his background and association with the Mexican Mafia, I do
believe that he poses a public safety [sic], and I am going to—by clear and
convincing evidence, I’m convinced that he does pose a public safety [sic], and
I’m not going to use any additional discretion to lower or strike any
additional enhancements under the 12022.53.”
This appeal focuses only on the trial court’s refusal to dismiss or
strike the 20-year firearm enhancements on each of the three attempted
murder counts.

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DISCUSSION
I.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
“In reviewing the trial court’s determination that dismissal of
Gonzalez’s firearm enhancement would endanger public safety, we apply an
abuse of discretion standard of review.” (People v. Gonzalez (2024) 103
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Cal.App.5th 215, 225 (Gonzalez).) A trial court abuses its discretion when it
bases its decision on “‘an incorrect legal standard.’” (Ibid.)
II.
APPLICABLE LAW
“Section 1172.75, subdivision (a), provides, ‘Any sentence
enhancement that was imposed prior to January 1, 2020, pursuant to
subdivision (b) of Section 667.5, except for any enhancement imposed for a
prior conviction for a sexually violent offense . . . is legally invalid.’ The
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation is required to identify for the
sentencing courts all persons ‘currently serving a term for a judgment that
includes an enhancement described in subdivision (a)’ (§ 1172.75, subd. (b)),
and if a sentencing court verifies a defendant was sentenced under an invalid
enhancement, the court ‘shall recall the sentence and resentence the
defendant’ (§ 1172.75, subd. (c)).” (People v. Garcia (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th
848, 855.) This was what prompted the trial court to resentence Gonzalez.
“‘By its plain terms, section 1172.75 requires a full resentencing,
not merely that the trial court strike the newly “invalid” enhancements.’
[Citations.] [¶] Section 1172.75, subdivision (d)(1), states that the

3
The appellant in this matter shares the same name as the
appellant in Gonzalez; we are aware of no familial relationship between the
two.

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resentencing ‘shall result in a lesser sentence than the one originally imposed
as a result of the elimination of the repealed enhancement, unless the court
finds by clear and convincing evidence that imposing a lesser sentence would
endanger public safety,’ and further, resentencing ‘shall not result in a longer
sentence than the one originally imposed.’ In addition, the sentencing court
‘shall apply the sentencing rules of the Judicial Council and apply any other
changes in law that reduce sentences or provide for judicial discretion so as to
eliminate disparity of sentences and to promote uniformity of sentencing.’
(§ 1172.75, subd. (d)(2).) ‘The court may consider postconviction factors,
including but not limited to, the disciplinary record and record of
rehabilitation of the defendant while incarcerated, evidence that reflects
whether age, time served, and diminished physical condition, if any, have
reduced the defendant’s risk for future violence, and evidence that reflects
that circumstances have changed since the original sentencing so that
continued incarceration is no longer in the interest of justice.’” (People v.
Garcia, supra, 101 Cal.App.5th at pp. 855–856, fn. omitted.)
Here, the trial court conducted the required full resentencing
and, in addition to striking the now-invalid one year prison prior, it made
significant modifications in other aspects of the sentence. The court, however,
declined to strike or reduce Gonzalez’s three firearm enhancements based on
what it found was clear and convincing evidence that Gonzalez posed or poses
a danger to public safety. The question before us is whether the court
considered the proper factors in making that determination. We conclude it
did not.

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III.
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY DECLINING TO STRIKE THE
FIREARM ENHANCEMENTS BASED SOLELY ON GONZALEZ’S PAST OR CURRENT
DANGEROUSNESS
In between Gonzalez’s original sentencing and his section
1172.75 hearing, the Legislature made changes to section 1385 to give
sentencing courts greater discretion in imposing enhancements. “Effective
January 1, 2022, Senate Bill No. 81 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) amended section
1385 to include subdivision (c). (Stats. 2021, ch. 721.) Section 1385(c)(1)
provides that ‘[n]otwithstanding any other law, the court shall dismiss an
enhancement if it is in the furtherance of justice to do so, except if dismissal
of that enhancement is prohibited by any initiative statute.’ (§ 1385(c)(1); see
Stats. 2021, ch. 721.) Section 1385(c)(2) provides as follows: ‘In exercising its
discretion under this subdivision, the court shall consider and afford great
weight to evidence offered by the defendant to prove that any of the
mitigating circumstances in subparagraphs (A) to (I) are present. Proof of the
presence of one or more of these circumstances weighs greatly in favor of
dismissing the enhancement, unless the court finds that dismissal of the
enhancement would endanger public safety. “Endanger public safety” means
there is a likelihood that the dismissal of the enhancement would result in
physical injury or other serious danger to others.’” (People v. Mendoza (2023)
88 Cal.App.5th 287, 295.)
Among the mitigating circumstances is section 1385, subdivision
(c)(2)(B): “Multiple enhancements are alleged in a single case. In this
instance, all enhancements beyond a single enhancement shall be dismissed.”
(Ibid.) In Gonzalez’s case, the District Attorney alleged numerous firearm
enhancements under section 12022.53, subdivisions (b) and (c), in addition to

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the gang enhancements and prison priors. Therefore, on resentencing, the
trial court was required to consider and afford great weight to the presence of
multiple enhancements in exercising its discretion whether to strike them.
The California Supreme Court recently clarified how the trial
court is to conduct this analysis: “Stated simply, if the court does not conclude
that dismissal would endanger public safety, then mitigating circumstances
strongly favor dismissing the enhancement. But ultimately, the court must
determine whether dismissal is in furtherance of justice. This means that,
absent a danger to public safety, the presence of an enumerated mitigating
circumstance will generally result in the dismissal of an enhancement unless
the sentencing court finds substantial, credible evidence of countervailing
factors that ‘may nonetheless neutralize even the great weight of the
mitigating circumstance, such that dismissal of the enhancement is not in
furtherance of justice.’” (People v. Walker (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1024, 1036.)
Although the trial court here did not explicitly state it was
exercising its discretion pursuant to section 1385, it did acknowledge it had
“additional discretion to lower or strike any additional enhancements.” And it
indicated it would not exercise its discretion to reduce or strike firearm
enhancements because it concluded Gonzalez posed a risk to public safety. It
appears the court was attempting to perform the analysis required by section
1385, subdivision (c).
In doing so, however, the trial court misconstrued the statute’s
definition of “endanger[ing] public safety.” The court can decline to dismiss
an enhancement based on public safety if “there is a likelihood that the
dismissal of the enhancement would result in physical injury or other serious
danger to others.” (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2), italics added.) As Gonzalez recently
held, current dangerousness is “an appropriate factor [for the court] to

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consider” in this analysis. (Gonzalez, supra, 103 Cal.App.5th at p. 228.) But it
is not the only factor. Instead, as Gonzalez explained, “a crucial part of the
inquiry is how the dismissal of the enhancement will impact the length of the
defendant’s sentence. A currently dangerous defendant who will be released
from prison within a short timeframe might be found by the trial court to
pose a greater danger to the public than a defendant who is currently
dangerous but who has no prospect of release from prison until he is elderly.
[Citation.] Further, an inquiry into whether public safety will be endangered
by the dismissal of an enhancement for a defendant serving a lengthy
indeterminate sentence should also take into account that the defendant’s
release from prison is contingent on review by the Board of Parole Hearings
(and for murder convictions, by the Governor), who will have the opportunity
to assess the defendant’s dangerousness at that time.” (Ibid., italics added.)
It appears the trial court did not take these factors into account.
Instead, the court made its conclusions based on the presentence
investigation report, the charged offenses, Gonzalez’s prior convictions, and
his “background and association with the Mexican Mafia.” There was no
analysis of Gonzalez’s postconviction record, or anything post-dating the
conviction itself. The court did not evaluate how old Gonzalez would be when
he would become eligible for parole under the significantly revised sentence
the court was imposing and whether, at that point in his life, he would still
pose a danger to public safety.
Gonzalez’s indeterminate sentence as the result of his
resentencing is 21 years to life, and his determinate sentence is 70 years, for
a total of 91 years to life. At the time of his original sentencing, Gonzalez was
29 years old, but by the time he was resentenced in 2024, he was 41 years
old. The firearm enhancements comprise 60 years of his determinate

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sentence. If the enhancements were to be stricken, Gonzalez would become
eligible for parole at around the age of 59. To assess public safety risk for
purposes of section 1385, the court must analyze whether there is a likelihood
Gonzalez will still pose a danger at the time of his potential release under the
revised sentence, if the 60 years of firearms enhancements were removed. On
remand, the trial court should conduct this analysis in exercising its
discretion under both sections 1172.75 and 1385, as well as addressing any
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other issues it deems appropriate regarding the sentence.
DISPOSITION
The resentencing order is reversed and the matter remanded for
a new resentencing hearing consistent with this opinion.

GOODING, J.

WE CONCUR:

DELANEY, ACTING P. J.

SCOTT, J.

4
In the respondent’s brief, the Attorney General pointed out two
other potential defects in the sentence, including an allegedly invalid stay of
the firearm enhancements under section 12022.53, subdivisions (b) and (c);
and the dismissal of only one type of gang enhancement rather than all gang
enhancements. These potential errors were not brought to the trial court’s
attention and were not briefed here by appellant, so we do not address them
here. They should be addressed on remand.

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