CourtListener 10759269•People v. Marshall CA4/3
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Filed 12/16/25 P. v. Marshall CA4/3
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, G064075
v. (Super. Ct. No. 23NF2829)
TOMMY ANTHONY MARSHALL, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County,
Lewis W. Clapp, Judge. Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for
resentencing.
Stephanie L. Gunther, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Daniel
Rogers, Alana Cohen Butler and Amanda Lloyd, Deputy Attorneys General,
for Plaintiff and Respondent.
* * *
A jury convicted defendant Tommy Anthony Marshall of one
count of domestic battery causing injury with two prior convictions involving
violence. The trial court sentenced Marshall to the upper term of five years
based on multiple aggravating factors listed in the probation report. As to
two of the aggravating factors, the court had found them true at a court trial
conducted in Marshall’s absence pursuant to his counsel’s stipulation to
waive Marshall’s right to a jury trial on the aggravating factors. However,
the other two aggravating factors the court relied upon at sentencing had
never been proven true, including one aggravating factor that was never
charged in the information and one that had been charged but then dismissed
by the prosecutor.
On appeal, Marshall asserts multiple errors in connection with
his sentence. First, he contends the trial court prejudicially erred because he
was entitled to a jury finding on the aggravating factors and he did not
personally waive that right. Second, Marshall contends that, in imposing the
upper term, the court improperly relied on unproven aggravating factors.
We agree with both contentions. Accordingly, we vacate
Marshall’s sentence, remand the matter for full resentencing, and otherwise
affirm the judgment.1
1
Marshall also contends the court failed to consider as mitigating
factors his childhood trauma and mental health issues. Because we instruct
the trial court to conduct a full resentencing hearing, we do not address
Marshall’s additional contention that the court failed to consider as
mitigating factors his childhood trauma and mental health issues.
2
FACTUAL SUMMARY AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
After punching his long-time girlfriend in the face causing a
substantial injury to her eye, Marshall was charged in an amended
information with one felony count of domestic battery causing injury with a
2
prior conviction involving violence. (Pen. Code, § 273.5, subds. (a), (f)(1).)
The amended information also alleged four factors in aggravation
pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 4.421 (rule 4.421): (1) defendant
“engaged in violent conduct that indicates a serious danger to society” (rule
4.421(b)(1)); (2) defendant had “prior convictions as an adult or sustained
petitions in juvenile delinquency proceedings” that are “numerous or of
increasing seriousness” (rule 4.421(b)(2)); (3) defendant “served a prior prison
term in prison or county jail under section 1170(h)” (rule 4.421(b)(3)); and
(4) “defendant’s prior performance on probation, mandatory supervision,
postrelease community supervision, or parole was unsatisfactory” (rule
4.421(b)(5)). The information also alleged Marshall had suffered two prior
strike convictions.
On March 12, 2024, the jury found Marshall guilty of the crime
charged. Several days later, on March 15, 2024, the trial court held a court
trial to determine the truth of the two prior strike allegations. Defense
counsel appeared at the court trial on behalf of Marshall pursuant to section
2
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
3
3
977. The court found one of the prior strike allegations not true, and the
other prior strike allegation true, and then it struck that strike for purposes
4
of sentencing only.
During that same court trial, the prosecutor raised the issue of
the factors in aggravation alleged in the amended information, and the court
and counsel discussed whether to try them on the spot. Both the prosecutor
and Marshall’s counsel agreed to do so, and Marshall’s counsel stated he was
willing to stipulate to a court trial on the factors in aggravation.
Pursuant to that stipulation, the court and the parties proceeded
to try the factors in aggravation. The prosecutor dismissed the first two
aggravating factors alleged in the amended information, i.e., that Marshall
engaged in violent conduct that indicates a serious danger to society and had
numerous prior convictions.5 That left only the third and fourth alleged
aggravating factors, i.e., that defendant had served a prior prison term and
had performed unsatisfactorily on probation or parole. The prosecution’s
evidence in support of those two aggravating factors consisted of a rap sheet
and a certified abstract of judgment that showed Marshall had served three
3
Marshall was in custody and not present at the court trial.
Section 977 requires the physical presence of the defendant during specified
portions of the trial, including “at the arraignment, at the time of plea,
during the preliminary hearing, during those portions of the trial when
evidence is taken before the trier of fact, and at the time of the imposition of
sentence.” (Id., subd. (b)(1); see also § 1043 [requiring presence of defendant
at trial with limited exceptions].)
4
Marshall does not appeal this aspect of his sentencing.
5
Although the prosecutor dismissed these two aggravating
factors, the trial court nevertheless made a superfluous finding they were not
true.
4
years in prison and reflected his performance on probation in two earlier
cases. Based on this evidence, the trial court found the two aggravating factor
allegations true.
At that point, the prosecutor evidently had misgivings about the
court adjudicating those allegations, stating his belief that Marshall “is
entitled to a jury trial on [the aggravating factor allegations].” The prosecutor
therefore suggested an on-the-record jury trial waiver from defense counsel
(who had earlier stipulated to a court trial). The court then asked Marshall’s
counsel: “[D]o you waive having a jury trial on these factors in aggravation?”
Counsel responded, “I do, yes.”
The sentencing hearing took place over a month later, on April
19, 2024. Marshall was present. The trial court sentenced Marshall to the
upper term of five years. But in doing so, the court did not reference its prior
findings on the factors in aggravation. Instead, the court referred to the
aggravating circumstances described in the probation report and made the
following findings: (1) “the crime did involve the threat of great bodily harm
inasmuch as he struck the victim with a closed fist near her eye and it
resulted in a fairly significant injury” and the “Court believes that that was
violent conduct,” (2) “[Marshall’s] prior convictions are numerous,”
(3) “[Marshall] served prior prison terms in 1990, 1994, 1999, the year 2007
and the year 2016,” and (4) “his prior performance on probation and
mandatory supervision or parole was considered unsatisfactory.” After
reciting these findings, the court stated, “for all of those reasons, the Court
believes that the upper term is warranted.”
Marshall timely appealed.
5
DISCUSSION
I.
FULL RESENTENCING IS REQUIRED
While this appeal was pending, the California Supreme Court
6
decided People v. Wiley (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1069 (Wiley). Pursuant to the
principles articulated in Erlinger v. United States (2024) 602 U.S. 821, our
high court held “a defendant is entitled to a jury trial on all aggravating
facts, other than the bare fact of a prior conviction and its elements, that
expose the defendant to imposition of a sentence more serious than the
statutory provided midterm.”7 (Wiley, at p. 1086, fn. omitted.) Even in cases
where the inquiry into whether an aggravating factor is true is
straightforward, defendant is entitled to a jury trial. (Id. at p. 1084.)
This right to a jury trial is constitutionally guaranteed by the
Sixth Amendment. (Wiley, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 1078.) Therefore, any
waiver of the right to a jury trial must be personally expressed by the
defendant in open court. (Cal. Const., art. I, § 16; People v. French (2008) 43
Cal.4th 36, 46–47.) Even a defendant who failed to object to a court trial on
6
Marshall submitted a letter brief informing this court of the
Wiley decision and its relevance to his appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule
8.254.) The Attorney General did not respond.
7
In Erlinger v. United States (2024) 602 U.S. 821, the United
States Supreme Court held that, under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments,
“[v]irtually ‘any fact’ that ‘“increase[s] the prescribed range of penalties to
which a criminal defendant is exposed”’ must be resolved by a unanimous
jury beyond a reasonable doubt (or freely admitted in a guilty plea).” (Id. at
pp. 834–835.) An exception allows a trial court to “find only ‘the fact of a prior
conviction.’ [Citation.] Under that exception, a judge may ‘do no more,
consistent with the Sixth Amendment, than determine what crime, with
what elements, the defendant was convicted of.’” (Id. at p. 838.)
6
these factors is not precluded from “‘asserting on appeal that he was denied
his constitutional right to a jury trial.’” (People v. French, at p. 46.)
The Wiley decision makes clear Marshall was entitled to a jury
trial on the two remaining aggravating factors alleged by the prosecution—
that he had served a prior prison term (rule 4.421(b)(3)) and had performed
unsatisfactorily on probation, mandatory supervision, or parole (rule
4.421(b)(5)). (Wiley, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 1083 [a defendant is entitled to a
jury finding on the aggravating fact that the defendant performed
unsatisfactorily on probation even, hypothetically, if there was a finding that
that the “defendant had violated his probation several times”].) Because the
trial court made findings on both factors in Marshall’s absence, without
obtaining a personal waiver from him of his right to a jury trial, the sentence
based on those findings cannot stand.
Moreover, in imposing the upper term, the trial court relied on
additional aggravating factors listed in the probation report—including that
the crime involved the threat of great bodily harm and Marshall served
numerous prior prison terms. That, too, was error. Neither of these factors
had been proven true. (See § 1170, subd. (b)(2) [“The court may impose a
sentence exceeding the middle term only when there are circumstances in
aggravation of the crime that justify the imposition of a term of
imprisonment exceeding the middle term and the facts underlying those
circumstances have been stipulated to by the defendant or have been found
true beyond a reasonable doubt at trial”].) Indeed, the prosecution had never
even alleged great bodily harm as an aggravating factor, and it had dismissed
the allegation that Marshall had served numerous prior prison terms prior to
the sentencing hearing.
7
II.
REVERSAL IS REQUIRED UNDER CHAPMAN
“When a defendant is deprived of a jury trial on aggravating facts
used to justify imposition of an upper term sentence, the reviewing court
[8]
must apply the Chapman standard of review. [Citations.] Under that
standard, ‘a sentence imposed under . . . section 1170[, subdivision ](b) must
be reversed and remanded unless the reviewing court concludes beyond a
reasonable doubt that a jury, applying that same standard, would have found
true all of the aggravating facts upon which the court relied to conclude the
upper term was justified, or that those facts were otherwise proved true in
compliance with the current statute.’” (Wiley, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 1087.)
“Lack of a jury trial is not harmless under Chapman if ‘the record contains
evidence that could rationally lead to a contrary finding’ with respect to the
aggravating fact at issue.” (Ibid.)
If we find prejudice as to any one of the aggravating factors,
reversal is required and it is unnecessary to address the additional
aggravating factors relied upon by the trial court. (People v. Lynch, supra, 16
Cal.5th at p. 776.)
Applying the Chapman standard to one of the aggravating factors
the court found true—that Marshall performed unsatisfactorily on probation,
mandatory supervision, post-release community supervision or parole (rule
4.421(b)(5))—we find the error was prejudicial. A determination of this factor
requires the fact finder to review Marshall’s performance on probation or
parole. But here, as in Wiley, the evidence reveals a “mixed performance on
probation.” (Wiley, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 1091.) Marshall’s rap sheet states
8
Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 (Chapman).
8
in some instances he did not perform satisfactorily on probation, but it also
identified a number of occasions on which he earned “early dismissal from
probation,” including in 2006, 2021, and 2022, which at the very least
suggests satisfactory performance on probation in several other instances. As
the Supreme Court explained in Wiley, while this conflicting evidence may
have been sufficient to support a finding that Marshall performed
unsatisfactorily on probation or parole, “that is not the proper inquiry when
assessing prejudice under Chapman. [Citation.] Instead, we must ask
‘whether any rational fact finder could have come to the opposite conclusion.’”
(Wiley, at p. 1090.) Based on the little evidence presented at the court trial on
the aggravating factors, we conclude a rational fact finder could. We certainly
cannot “‘“‘conclude with confidence that, had the issue been submitted to the
jury, the jury would have assessed the facts in the same manner as did the
trial court.’”’” (Ibid.)
Further, the trial court erred by relying on aggravating factors
that were never tried and proven to be true, including a factor that was never
alleged in the information (the crime involved great bodily harm), and a
factor that had been alleged but was dismissed by the prosecutor (numerous
prior convictions).9 It is hard to see how we could find that error harmless, as
9
In discussing the nature of the crime and concluding it involved
great bodily harm, the court also stated the defendant’s conduct was
“violent.” We do not read this as a finding by the court under rule 4.421(b)(1)
that “[t]he defendant has engaged in violent conduct that indicates a serious
danger to society.” The prosecutor had already dismissed rule 4.421(b)(1) as
an aggravating factor, and in ruling on whether to strike the prior strike
conviction, the trial court had already found that “[t]he current offense
doesn’t actually . . . indicate a great degree of danger to the community or to
society.” Even if we were to assume the court did make such a finding,
however, it would not change the outcome of this appeal.
9
the parties were not put on notice of the need to make a full evidentiary
showing on these factors. To be clear: We do not fault the parties for not
presenting evidence addressing aggravating factors that were not at
issue. But given the lack of notice to the parties of the need to present such
evidence, we cannot conclude beyond a reasonable doubt a jury would have
found those factors true beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v. Lynch, supra,
16 Cal.5th at p. 775 [“‘The reviewing court cannot assume that the record
reflects all of the evidence that would have been presented to the jury, or that
the defendant had the same incentive and opportunity at a sentencing
hearing to contest the aggravating circumstance’”].)
“Because we cannot find the omission of a jury trial harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt as to every aggravating fact relied upon by the
trial court to impose an upper term, [Marshall’s] sentence must be reversed.”
(People v. Lynch, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 776.)
On remand, the People may elect to try before a jury the truth of
the two remaining aggravating circumstances that Marshall “served a prior
term in prison or county jail under section 1170(h)” (rule 4.421(b)(3)); and his
“prior performance on probation, mandatory supervision, postrelease
community supervision, or parole was unsatisfactory” (rule 4.421(b)(5)). The
trial court shall resentence Marshall in accordance with current law. We
express no opinion on the issue of the court’s consideration of any mitigating
circumstances.
10
DISPOSITION
The sentence is vacated, and the matter is remanded for full
resentencing consistent with this opinion. The judgment is otherwise
affirmed.
GOODING, J.
WE CONCUR:
MOORE, ACTING P. J.
SANCHEZ, J.
11
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