CourtListener 10758470•People v. Ruiz CA2/7
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Filed 12/15/25 P. v. Ruiz CA2/7
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SEVEN
THE PEOPLE, B340216
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BA516537)
v.
RAFAEL RUIZ,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Ray G. Jurado, Judge. Conditionally reversed
and remanded with directions.
Monique Hemli-Munoz, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Noah P. Hill, Supervising Deputy
Attorney General, Eric J. Kohm and Lauren Sanchez, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
1
______________________________
Rafael Ruiz appeals from the judgment entered after he
pleaded no contest to one count of assault with a deadly weapon.
Ruiz contends the trial court abused its discretion in denying his
request for pretrial mental health diversion under Penal Code
section 1001.361 because substantial evidence does not support
the court’s finding he was likely to commit a super strike if
released. We agree and conditionally reverse the judgment. We
remand for the court to consider whether mental health diversion
is appropriate in this case in light of the goals of the mental
health diversion statute set forth in sections 1001.35 and
1001.36.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. The Assault
On the morning of July 14, 2023 Alejandra Cortez was
sitting on a bench waiting for the bus when Ruiz crossed the
street and came up behind her.2 Cortez recognized Ruiz from
seeing him around the neighborhood. Cortez was watching
something on her phone when she “felt like a blow” causing pain
to the area between her neck and shoulder. She stood up, turned
around, and saw Ruiz running off. No one else was around.
Cortez initially did not see an injury on her body. But when she
tried to rub her shoulder area, her “hand got stuck with what
1 Further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2 We include Cortez’s testimony from the preliminary
hearing because the trial court considered the testimony in
denying Ruiz’s motion for mental health diversion.
2
[Ruiz] had injured [her] with,” which she described as a metal
knife (the blade) without the handle. As soon as she felt the
knife, she took it out and “tossed it” near the bus stop. Cortez
described the knife as having a three-to-four-inch metal blade.
Cortez observed she had sustained a “cut” on the area of
her neck and shoulder area, and “something was hanging from
there. And there was some blood coming out, not much.” Cortez
indicated the cut was one to two inches long. Cortez received
medical attention, including putting glue on the area, but she did
not receive stitches. She was also given medication for the pain
and had one follow-up visit with a doctor.
On April 4, 2024 the People filed an information charging
Ruiz with a single count of assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245,
subd. (a)(1).)
B. Ruiz’s Motion for Mental Health Diversion and Denial of
the Motion
On May 2, 2024 Ruiz filed a motion for mental health
diversion pursuant to section 1001.36. In his motion Ruiz
argued that he had no prior criminal record and had been
consistently receiving drug and psychiatric treatment in an
inpatient dual diagnosis treatment program (at the
Community Based Social Services Program with monthly
psychiatric visits to the Brownstone Wellness Center),
including individual and group drug treatment sessions, 12-
step meetings, and psychiatric medication management.
Ruiz submitted a report from Dr. Daniel King, who
conducted an evaluation of Ruiz; interviewed Ruiz’s mother
and the program director of the drug treatment program;
and reviewed the police reports and body camera footage
from the incident, a 2023 psychiatric report, and Ruiz’s
3
medical records. Records from Brownstone reflected that in
2023 Ruiz was diagnosed with schizophrenia with a prior
history of bipolar disorder, and he was prescribed an
antipsychotic medication.
At the time Dr. King spoke with him, Ruiz was
30 years old and had been using methamphetamine since he
was 14 years old. Ruiz reported he had been diagnosed with
schizophrenia in 2021. At the time of the offense he was “on
a binge” and was using methamphetamine daily. He was
“not in a good place” and “didn’t know what [he] was doing.”
He had a knife because he feared “dangerous people out
there,” and he had a delusion he needed to become a
gangster and steal Cortez’s purse. He said he wanted to
“scare [Cortez] to give [him] the purse,” but when he went to
scare her with a “fake strike,” he accidentally hit her. Ruiz
had previous physical altercations with family and friends
who were also using methamphetamine. But according to
Ruiz, he had never used a weapon against someone, never
seriously injured someone, and never assaulted someone
without provocation. He added, “I don’t like starting fights.”
As of May 2024, Ruiz had been in the inpatient
treatment program for nine months. The program director
reported that Ruiz was compliant with program rules,
interacted normally with others, and “was motivated to
remain abstinent from drugs.” Ruiz reported that he had
previously attended the same drug rehabilitation program a
year earlier but dropped out after two or three months when
“charges” against him were dropped. Ruiz stated he felt
more motivated to participate in the program this time and
4
was maintaining his abstinence because it was a “good place
to be” and “I can feel the damage that meth is doing to me.”
Dr. King provided opinions with respect to four
criteria for mental health diversion. First, Ruiz suffered
from a “stimulant use disorder, amphetamine-type
substance,” which was a mental disorder identified in the
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders—
Fifth Edition (DSM-5). Ruiz also met the criteria for
schizophrenia and/or major depressive order. Second, Ruiz’s
mental health condition played a significant role in his
commission of the charged offense given Ruiz’s account of
the crime, which was corroborated by police body camera
footage and the recovery of methamphetamine in Ruiz’s
possession at the time of his arrest.
Third, Dr. King opined that Ruiz would respond to
mental health treatment, noting that Ruiz had maintained
his abstinence since attending the residential drug
treatment program for the prior nine months and had been
taking his psychiatric medication. Further, Ruiz was
motivated to maintain his sobriety and stability. Thus, “[i]f
he develops a strong relapse prevention plan and has
support to help him adhere to this plan after he leaves the
residential program, there is a good chance he will be able to
maintain abstinence with reduced supervision and
structure.”
Finally, with respect to the question, “Does the
defendant pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public
safety,” Dr. King opined: “If he remains abstinent, no.”
Dr. King explained, “Based on all of the information I have
reviewed I do not have any reason to believe he would
5
engage in unprovoked violence when not under the influence
of drugs. I am unaware of any prior conviction for a violent
offense. His mother denied observing violence or threats of
violence. The program director did not report that he had
been violent in the program. However, if he relapses and
uses methamphetamine his risk of harming others would
significantly increase. There is an increased risk of violence
for any person when under the influence of stimulants or
alcohol.” Dr. King recommended Ruiz complete the one-year
inpatient drug treatment program, continue to attend
weekly individual and group psychotherapy, and upon his
discharge live in a place with the lowest risk of relapse
triggers, potentially with his mother.
On May 17, 2024 the trial court held a hearing on
Ruiz’s motion for mental health diversion. The People did
not file a written opposition but opposed the motion at the
hearing, arguing Ruiz posed an unreasonable risk of danger
and was not suitable for mental health diversion under
section 1001.36. The prosecutor argued Ruiz came up to an
“innocent lady” (Cortez) while she was sitting on the bench
and stabbed her “very close to her neck,” causing a two-inch
stab wound. Further, Dr. King had performed a “minimal
interview” of Ruiz, and despite Ruiz’s deep psychological
problems, Dr. King based his opinion on Ruiz’s treatment for
narcotics.
The trial court expressed its concerns with mental
health diversion, noting that according to Dr. King, if Ruiz
relapsed in his drug use, he would have an increased risk of
harming others. Further, the court continued, Ruiz had
stated to Dr. King “that about 90 percent of the physical
6
altercations he’s been involved in have involved use of
methamphetamine.” The court also raised a concern
whether Ruiz would respond to treatment given that a year
earlier he had dropped out of the same drug treatment
program. In addition, the court noted the report stated
Ruiz’s insight into his own mental health problems was
“questionable.”
Ruiz’s attorney responded that the standard for
dangerousness was whether the defendant was likely to
commit a super strike while being treated in the community,
so the law contemplates the defendant is receiving
treatment. Moreover, Dr. King found Ruiz had insight into
his methamphetamine use, had been taking his prescribed
medication, and had been receiving treatment in the
community for nine months without any problems. Ruiz
also had a “full service partnership” that would provide more
comprehensive support through the Department of Mental
Health.3
After hearing argument of counsel, the trial court
denied Ruiz’s motion, explaining, “based on the nature of the
offenses reflected in the preliminary hearing transcript,
despite the fact that Mr. Ruiz has been doing well in the
program, I still find, based on those facts, that he will pose
an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety in that he
3 Ruiz’s counsel also noted that Ruiz had not been arrested
before, and there was no record of any charges being brought
against him. Counsel stated that it appeared Ruiz incorrectly
reported that he had previously been in the drug treatment
program but had dropped out, which she confirmed with Ruiz’s
mother.
7
will likely or may commit a super strike, that is, murder, if
treated in the community.” The court added that it would
not have any objection to probation with a treatment
program, but given the violence by Ruiz, “which could have
resulted in death,” it denied the motion.
C. Ruiz’s No Contest Plea and Sentencing
On July 30, 2024 Ruiz pleaded no contest to assault
with a deadly weapon. The trial court sentenced Ruiz to the
middle term of three years in state prison, suspended
execution of the sentence, and placed Ruiz on formal
probation for two years on the condition he complete a one-
year dual diagnosis residential drug treatment
rehabilitation program in the program he was currently
enrolled in.
Ruiz timely appealed, and the trial court granted his
request for a certificate of probable cause.4
DISCUSSION
A. Governing Law and Standard of Review
Section 1001.36 gives trial courts the discretion to grant
pretrial diversion for individuals suffering from certain mental
health disorders. (People v. Frahs (2020) 9 Cal.5th 618, 626;
People v. Whitmill (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1138, 1147-1148
(Whitmill).) Under pretrial diversion, the trial court may
4 A defendant may appeal the denial of pretrial diversion
following a plea of guilty or no contest by obtaining a certificate of
probable cause. (People v. Whitmill (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1138,
1147; People v. Padfield (1982) 136 Cal.App.3d 218, 228.)
8
postpone prosecution at any time in the judicial process, either
temporarily or permanently, to allow the defendant to undergo
mental health treatment. (Frahs, at p. 626; Vaughn v. Superior
Court (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 124, 133 (Vaughn); Whitmill, at
p. 1148.) “The Legislature intended the mental health diversion
program to apply as broadly as possible.” (Whitmill, at p. 1149;
see Frahs, at p. 632.)
Under section 1001.36, a defendant must be both eligible
and suitable for mental health diversion. A defendant is eligible
under section 1001.36, subdivision (b), if (1) the defendant has
been diagnosed by a qualified mental health expert with a mental
disorder as identified in the most recent edition of the DSM; and
(2) the defendant’s mental disorder was a significant factor in the
commission of the charged offense. (See Vaughn, supra,
105 Cal.App.5th at p. 133; Sarmiento v. Superior Court (2024)
98 Cal.App.5th 882, 891 (Sarmiento).)
The statute specifies four factors that must be met for a
defendant to be suitable for diversion: (1) in the opinion of a
qualified mental health expert the defendant’s mental disorder
would respond to treatment; (2) the defendant consents to
diversion and agrees to waive his or her speedy trial rights;
(3) the defendant agrees to comply with treatment requirements;
and (4) if treated in the community, the defendant will not pose
an “unreasonable risk of danger to public safety” as defined in
section 1170.18. (§ 1001.36, subd. (c)(1)-(4); Sarmiento, supra,
98 Cal.App.5th at pp. 891-892.) Section 1001.36, subdivision (e),
places the burden on the defendant “to make a prima facie
showing that the defendant will meet the minimum requirements
of eligibility for diversion and that the defendant and the offense
9
are suitable for diversion.” (See Vaughn, supra, 105 Cal.App.5th
at p. 134.)
“An unreasonable risk of danger to public safety as defined
in section 1170.18, subdivision (c), means ‘“an unreasonable risk
that the [defendant] will commit a new violent felony”’ within the
meaning of section 667, subdivision (e)(2)(C)(iv), which felonies
are ‘colloquially referred to as “super strikes.”’ [Citation.] ‘Those
super strikes are murder, attempted murder, solicitation to
commit murder, assault with a machine gun on a police officer,
possession of a weapon of mass destruction, any serious or violent
felony punishable by death or life imprisonment, or any sexually
violent offenses or sexual offense committed against minors
under the age of 14.’” (Gomez v. Superior Court (2025)
113 Cal.App.5th 671, 679; accord, Whitmill, supra,
86 Cal.App.5th at p. 1149; People v. Moine (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th
440, 449-450 (Moine).) “Thus, the risk of danger is narrowly
confined to the likelihood the defendant will commit a [super
strike].” (Moine, at p. 450; accord, Gomez, at p. 690.)
If the defendant makes a prima facie showing that he or
she meets all the statutory eligibility and suitability criteria, the
court still has discretion to deny diversion. (Vaughn, supra,
105 Cal.App.5th at p. 134; Sarmiento, supra, 98 Cal.App.5th at
p. 892.) However, “this “‘residual’” discretion must be exercised
‘“consistent with the principles and purpose of the governing
law.”’ [Citations.] That purpose includes a strong legislative
preference for treatment of mental health disorders because of
the benefits of such treatment to both the offending individual
and the community. Where the court chooses to exercise this
residual discretion to deny diversion, its statement of reasons
should reflect consideration of the underlying purposes of the
10
statute and explain why diversion would not meet those goals.”
(Sarmiento, at pp. 892-893; accord, Vaughn, at p. 135.)
We review the trial court’s decision to grant or deny a
motion for mental health diversion for abuse of discretion.
(Vaughn, supra, 105 Cal.App.5th at p. 135; Whitmill, supra,
86 Cal.App.5th at p. 1147.) A court abuses its discretion when it
makes an arbitrary decision by applying the wrong legal
standard or bases its decision on express or implied factual
findings that are not supported by substantial evidence.
(Vaughn, at p. 135; Whitmill, at p. 1147.)
B. Substantial Evidence Does Not Support the Trial Court’s
Finding Ruiz Was Likely To Commit a Super Strike
Ruiz contends substantial evidence does not support the
trial court’s finding that he was likely to commit a super strike
given that he had no prior criminal history, the instant offense
was not a super strike, and Ruiz successfully completed nine
months of the inpatient drug treatment and rehabilitation
program. The Attorney General argues there was sufficient
evidence given the nature of the offense—that Ruiz cut Cortez
with a knife without provocation and could have killed her.5 We
agree with Ruiz.
It is undisputed that Ruiz had not previously been
convicted of a violent offence—or any offense. The trial court
relied heavily on the fact that although Dr. King opined Ruiz was
not likely to commit a super strike, Dr. King acknowledged the
risk that Ruiz would harm another person “would significantly
increase” if he relapsed in his methamphetamine use. But
5 The Attorney General does not dispute that Ruiz meets the
other section 1001.36 eligibility and suitability factors.
11
Dr. King observed that Ruiz had successfully completed nine
months of the drug treatment program (and over a year by the
time of the hearing), he was motivated to stay sober and found
the program “beneficial,” and he had been taking his psychiatric
medication. Dr. King believed there was a “good chance” Ruiz
would maintain his sobriety and stability if he had a strong
relapse prevention plan and support from his family. And Ruiz
had that support—his mother had a close relationship with him
and visited him every day or two while he was in the program. In
addition, Ruiz had in place a comprehensive support plan
through the Department of Mental Health.
Moreover, even if Ruiz were to relapse and commit an act of
violence, there was no evidence to support the trial court’s finding
that Ruiz would commit murder or another super strike offense.
Notwithstanding the Attorney General’s dramatic
characterization of the current offense as one in which Ruiz “used
a knife to slice near the throat of an unsuspecting woman,” which
“could have easily resulted in death,” Ruiz did not inflict a
significant injury. He used the knife on Cortez’s shoulder,
without injuring her throat. Ruiz reported that he intended to
scare Cortez but accidentally cut her. With respect to the
severity of the injury, Cortez did not initially know that she had
been cut, and there was some blood, but “not much.” The wound
healed with application of glue, and Cortez had one follow-up
medical visit. After Ruiz cut Cortez, he did not continue to act
violently against her and instead ran away. The police later
located Ruiz, and he was detained “without incident.” Moreover,
although Ruiz had been using methamphetamine since he was 14
and admitted he got into physical altercations with friends and
family who were also using methamphetamine, the altercations
12
never rose to the level of a violent crime, nor was he ever
prosecuted for any crime. Nothing in the record suggests that if
Ruiz were to relapse following a one-year inpatient dual
diagnosis treatment program, he would become more violent than
he had been for the prior 16 years and commit murder. The fact
Dr. King was not prepared to state 100 percent that Ruiz would
remain sober does not alone support a finding that Ruiz would
commit murder if he relapsed.
The decision in Whitmill, supra, 86 Cal.App.5th 1138 is
directly on point. There, a veteran diagnosed with posttraumatic
stress disorder with substance abuse issues was out with his
girlfriend and a friend of the girlfriend; the defendant was not
feeling well, and when the friend started to approach him, he
fired a gunshot into the air and threatened to kill his girlfriend.
(Id. at pp. 1142-1145.) The defendant had no history of
committing violent crimes yet the trial court denied mental
health diversion because, as here, the mental health expert
provided a qualified opinion that the defendant would not pose an
unreasonable risk of danger to public safety, but only if “‘he
abstains from substance abuse.’” (Id. at pp. 1145-1146.) The
Court of Appeal concluded substantial evidence did not support
the trial court’s finding the defendant would not be able to
abstain from using drugs, noting the defendant found his
substance abuse treatment “‘helpful,’” he was “‘very willing’” to
participate in further treatment, he relapsed only after learning
of a family member’s cancer diagnosis, and the expert believed
the defendant would be able to learn to exercise control over his
behavior in the future. (Id. at pp. 1152-1153.) As discussed,
Dr. King was similarly optimistic that Ruiz would be able to
13
maintain his sobriety and stability following further treatment
for his mental health disorders.
Further, providing Ruiz an opportunity to obtain treatment
in a dual diagnosis treatment program is consistent with the
intent of the mental health diversion statute. As the Whitmill
court explained, providing treatment for a defendant facing
mental health and substance abuse issues “goes hand in hand
with the stated purpose of the mental health diversion statute as
set forth in section 1001.35—to keep people with mental
disorders from entering and reentering the criminal justice
system while protecting public safety. . . . [Citation.] That [the
expert] reported [defendant] has benefitted from treatment in the
past and opined that any risk to the community by [defendant]
could be mitigated by treatment suggests that [defendant] is the
type of person for whom the Legislature designed the option of
diversion.” (Whitmill, supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at p. 1152; see
People v. Williams (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 990, 1004-1005 [“we
emphasize that our trial courts must give serious consideration to
this critical alternative [of treatment], for the good not just of
mentally ill offenders but, ultimately, society at large”].)
The holding in Moine, supra, 62 Cal.App.5th 440 is also
instructive. The defendant there was charged with three
assaults in connection with a fistfight with a patient in the
waiting room of an urgent care center and two counts of making
criminal threats in connection with an incident a year later in a
medical provider’s waiting room in which the defendant became
angry with the staff and threatened that he could get his gun and
return and kill everyone there. (Id. at pp. 444-445.) The trial
court denied the defendant’s motion for mental health diversion
on the basis he posed an unreasonable risk of committing a super
14
strike, but the Court of Appeal reversed, concluding the record
did not meet the “high standard” of dangerousness, observing the
defendant had no prior convictions for violent felonies; the
current offenses were violent but not super strikes; two
psychiatrists had opined the defendant posed a low risk for a
future assault; and nothing else in the record supported a finding
the defendant would commit a super strike. (Id. at pp. 444, 450-
451; see Gomez v. Superior Court, supra, 113 Cal.App.5th at
p. 690 [reversing denial of mental health diversion where
defendant had no criminal history, pending charge of robbery was
not a super strike, and defendant had been out in the community
for approximately a year following the offense with no evidence
he had committed another crime].) Ruiz, like the defendants in
Moine and Gomez, had no prior convictions and no other indicia
that he would prospectively commit a super strike.
People v. Brown (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 113, relied on by
the Attorney General, is distinguishable. In Brown, the
defendant violently assaulted a neighbor with a metal cane,
causing serious injuries, after the neighbor knocked on his door
and accused him of stealing a doorstop. (Id. at p. 117.) A
psychiatrist opined that Brown did not pose an unreasonable risk
to the public if he took his psychiatric medication and avoided
alcohol but conceded that if the defendant was not compliant, he
could “‘become quite deteriorated.’” (Id. at p. 118.) The Court of
Appeal affirmed the trial court’s denial of diversion, observing
the defendant “invoked extreme physical violence against a
vulnerable victim in response to a relatively minor altercation,”
and he continued to believe he was the victim, raising an
inference he could react similarly or more severely in response to
a perceived conflict in the future. (Id. at p. 124.) The Attorney
15
General likens Ruiz’s cutting of Cortez’s shoulder to the vicious
beating inflicted by the defendant in Brown, but this
characterization ignores that Ruiz cut Cortez in a less violent
manner, was seeking to scare her based on his paranoid delusion,
and had successfully responded to treatment of the mental
disorder that resulted in his delusion.6
Although we agree the trial court abused its discretion in
finding Ruiz ineligible for mental health diversion because he
was likely to commit a super strike, the court has not yet
exercised its residual discretion to decide, “‘“consistent with the
principles and purpose of the governing law”’” and the “strong
legislative preference for treatment of mental health disorders,”
whether mental health diversion is appropriate here. (See
Sarmiento, supra, 98 Cal.App.5th at p. 892.) In some cases, the
appellate courts have ordered the trial court to grant the
6 The Attorney General also attempts to distinguish
Whitmill and Moine on the basis that in both cases there was
evidence the defendants had cooperated with the police or
apologized, showing they were not violent. In Whitmill, supra,
86 Cal.App.5th at page 1154, the Court of Appeal found the
defendant’s “compliant nonviolent behavior” after firing the gun
(throwing the gun away instead of firing it at the friend,
girlfriend, or police officer, then turning himself into the officer)
mitigated any inference he was likely to commit a super strike.
(Ibid.) And in Moine, supra, 62 Cal.App.5th at pages 445 to 446,
the defendant immediately apologized to the staff member after
making the threat, and two psychiatrists opined that given the
defendant’s lack of prior treatment for his mental disorder, he
posed a low risk for a future assault. In this case there was also
evidence after the incident that Ruiz did not pose a high risk:
Ruiz voluntarily dropped the knife, ran away, and subsequently
was arrested without incident.
16
defendant’s motion for mental health diversion instead of
requiring further consideration of the motion. (See, e.g.,
Whitmill, supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at p. 1156 [reversing judgment
with directions for trial court to grant motion for mental health
diversion to “‘avoid the unnecessary delay occasioned by yet
[another] hearing’”]; People v. Williams, supra, 63 Cal.App.5th at
p. 1005 [same].) Because the trial court denied mental health
diversion based solely on its finding that Ruiz was likely to
commit a super strike, we remand for the court to exercise its
residual discretion to decide whether to grant or deny Ruiz’s
motion. If the court again denies the motion, “its statement of
reasons should reflect consideration of the underlying purposes of
the statute and explain why diversion would not meet those
goals.” (Sarmiento, at p. 893; accord, Vaughn, supra,
105 Cal.App.5th at p. 135.)7
DISPOSITION
The judgment is conditionally reversed. We remand for the
trial court to conduct a new hearing to consider Ruiz’s motion for
mental health diversion limited to the question whether the court
should exercise its residual discretion to deny diversion, unless
there are changed circumstances that affect Ruiz’s eligibility or
suitability for diversion. If the court decides to exercise its
7 Because the People did not contend in the trial court that
any other section 1001.36 eligibility or suitability requirements
were not met, on remand the only issue before the court will be
whether to exercise its discretion to deny mental health
diversion, unless there are changed circumstances affecting
Ruiz’s eligibility or suitability for diversion.
17
residual discretion, it must provide a statement of reasons
reflecting its consideration of the underlying purposes of the
statute and why diversion would not meet those goals, and the
court shall reinstate the judgment. If the court grants diversion,
it shall refer Ruiz to a mental health diversion program.
FEUER, J.
We concur:
MARTINEZ, P. J.
STONE, J.
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