In re D.R. CA1/5

CourtListener 10754805Calctapp12 déc. 2025

Texte intégral

Filed 12/12/25 In re D.R. CA1/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

In re D.R., a Person Coming Under
the Juvenile Court Law.
A171253
THE PEOPLE,
(City & County of San Francisco
Plaintiff and Respondent, Super. Ct. No. JW23-6046)
v.
D.R.,
Defendant and Appellant.

Defendant D.R. appeals the juvenile court’s restitution order,
contending that the court made various errors and that Welfare and
Institutions Code1 section 730.6, subdivision (b)(3), which recently abolished
joint and several liability for restitution in juvenile wardship cases, applies
retroactively to her case. We agree that remand is warranted to correct
calculation errors as to the restitution awarded to two of the three victims.
As to the third victim, we disagree that her restitution award should be
vacated because D.R. is no longer on probation. We, however, agree that
reversal of that award and remand are required because the court failed to

1 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code

unless otherwise specified.

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consider D.R.’s brief below challenging her liability for restitution to this
victim. Finally, on remand, the court is to apply the current version of
section 730.6, subdivision (b)(3), in apportioning liability for all restitution
amounts between D.R. and her co-participant. We therefore decline to
address whether that version applies retroactively.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Procedural History
In March 2023, an amended juvenile wardship petition (Welf. & Inst.
Code, § 602, subd. (a)) was filed against D.R., alleging that she assaulted
M.C. with force likely to produce great bodily injury (Pen. Code, § 245, subd.
(a)(4); counts I & II), assaulted a public transit passenger, L.O., with force
likely to produce great bodily injury (id., § 245.2; count III), and battered L.O.
(id., § 243.3; count IV). The petition further alleged that D.R. personally
inflicted great bodily injury (id., § 12022.7, subd. (a)) with respect to counts
III and IV.
D.R. admitted to two of the assault counts; one against M.C and one
against L.O. She also admitted the allegation that she inflicted great bodily
injury on L.O. The juvenile court found a factual basis for the admissions
and dismissed the other counts and allegations with a Harvey2 waiver as to
victim restitution. The court found the admitted charges to be felonies and
declared D.R. a ward of the court. It set the maximum time of confinement to
5 years 8 months and placed D.R. on probation and in a foster home.
On June 20, 2023, D.R. stipulated to $9,925 in restitution to victim L.O.
for her medical expenses. At the May 7, 2024 restitution hearing, D.R.
contested her liability for restitution to a third victim, E.K., on the grounds
that her injuries were caused by D.R.’s co-participant, J.A. The juvenile court

2 People v. Harvey (1979) 25 Cal.3d 754.

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deferred this issue for further briefing. D.R. submitted a brief on the issue
but the court did not receive or consider it before ordering D.R. to pay
restitution to E.K.
Following the final restitution hearing, the juvenile court awarded an
additional $6,800 to L.O. for lost wages, for a total of $16,725 in restitution to
her. It also ordered D.R. to pay $3,203.93 in restitution to M.C. and
$19,523.25 in restitution to E.K. (comprised of $16,801.25 for medical
expenses, $225 for a locksmith, and $2,497 for the San Francisco Fire
Department). The order did not specify what expenses the restitution award
to M.C. covered. Finally, the court held D.R. and J.A. jointly and severally
liable for all restitution amounts pursuant to section 730.6.
D.R. timely appealed. Two weeks later, the juvenile court terminated
D.R.’s probation successfully. A separate order of restitution and abstract of
judgment was subsequently filed on behalf of each of the three victims.
Those orders included an award of 10-percent interest on the restitution
amounts from the date of sentencing.
B. Facts3
1. Train Incident (L.O.)
On December 15, 2022, D.R. and J.A. were seen “pouring water on
what appeared to be marijuana on the floor while riding a Muni train.” L.O.
was sitting across from them and “asked” them “to stop pouring water as it
began to flow towards her. A verbal altercation ensued and [J.A.] splashed
water on [L.O.] then threw the water bottle hitting [L.O.] in the head. The
encounter escalated as [L.O.] stood up and swung her bag in an effort to
protect herself. [J.A.] and [D.R.] struck [L.O.] in the face several times.” L.O.

3 The summary of facts is taken from the February 12, 2023 police report

and the March 1, 2023 probation report.

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fell to the ground and J.A. pepper sprayed her in the face. At that point, D.R.
and J.A. got off the train and fled. L.O. “was treated at [the hospital] for a
concussion and fractured left cheek among other injuries.”
2. Scooter Incident (E.K. and M.C.)
On February 12, 2023, E.K. was walking towards Dolores Park with
her husband, M.C., when “she heard a female voice yell ‘move bitch!’ from
behind her.” E.K. turned around and saw D.R. and J.A. approaching them on
a motorized scooter. M.C. “was fearful [D.R. and J.A.] were going to hit them
while they were walking so he put out his arms to block them.” D.R. and J.A.
were knocked off the scooter and D.R. began attacking M.C. When E.K. tried
to intervene, J.A. “grabbed her by the hair and punched her four to five times
in the face.” M.C. got away from D.R. and ran to try to protect E.K., but D.R.
“continued her attack on him and struck him again from behind with what he
thought was closed fists.” At this point, bystanders got involved and stopped
the attack. E.K. suffered a fracture to her left orbital wall while M.C.
sustained scratches and bruises on his face and head.
II. DISCUSSION4
A. Law and Standard of Review
“It is the intent of the Legislature that a victim of conduct for which a
minor is found to be [a ward of the juvenile court] who incurs an economic
loss as a result of the minor’s conduct shall receive restitution directly from
that minor.” (§ 730.6, subd. (a)(1).) “[A] victim of a minor’s crime has a
constitutional and statutory right to restitution” (In re J.V. (2014) 231
Cal.App.4th 1331, 1335), and the court “shall order full restitution unless it
finds compelling and extraordinary reasons for not doing so, and states them
on the record” (§ 730.6, subd. (b)(1)). This statute parallels the earlier

4 We grant D.R.’s unopposed request for judicial notice.

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enacted Penal Code section 1202.4, which requires full victim restitution in
adult criminal cases. (Luis M. v. Superior Court (2014) 59 Cal.4th 300, 304.)
“Restitution has long been considered a valid condition of probation.” (People
v. Carbajal (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1114, 1121 (Carbajal).)
The juvenile court may order a minor who is placed on probation to pay
restitution based on uncharged conduct so long as that conduct is
“ ‘reasonably related either to the crime of which the defendant is convicted
or to the goal of deterring future criminality.’ ” (In re S.O. (2018) 24
Cal.App.5th 1094, 1101–1102; see also § 730, subd. (b) [when a ward is placed
on probation, the court “may impose and require any and all reasonable
conditions that it may determine fitting and proper to the end that justice
may be done and the reformation and rehabilitation of the ward enhanced”].)
This mirrors restitution in the adult context “insofar as the pertinent
restitution statutes set the proverbial ceiling when the minor is incarcerated,
but set only the floor when the minor is placed on probation.” (In re S.O., at
p. 1102.)
Restitution orders are generally reviewed for abuse of discretion. (In re
S.O., supra, 24 Cal.App.5th at p. 1098.) “However, where the specific issue is
whether a court has the authority to issue restitution, we review that
question of law independently. [Citation.] And where the specific issue is
whether the court’s factual findings support restitution, we review those
findings for substantial evidence.” (Ibid.)
B. Evidentiary and Calculation Errors
1. L.O.’s Restitution
D.R. contends that L.O.’s restitution award should be reduced from
$16,725 to $9,875 because the juvenile court erroneously “double-counted”
her claim for lost wages. The People agree that the amount should be

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reduced but argue that it should be reduced to $9,925—the sum stipulated to
by D.R.’s counsel below. The People do not, however, dispute that $9,875 is
the correct restitution amount.5 Instead, the People assert that D.R. forfeited
any objection to the miscalculation. Even though that may be so, we can
discern no tactical reason for the stipulation to the erroneous amount and the
People offer none. (Cf. In re M.V. (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 1495, 1528 [“ ‘When
a claim of ineffective assistance is made on direct appeal, and the record does
not show the reason for counsel’s challenged actions or omissions, the
conviction must be affirmed unless there could be no satisfactory
explanation’ ”].) We therefore find that any failure to object to the erroneous
restitution calculation constituted ineffective assistance of counsel and
correct the amount of restitution awarded to L.O. to $9,875. (See ibid. [“The
due process right to effective assistance of counsel extends to minors in
juvenile delinquency proceedings”].)
2. M.C.’s Restitution
Similarly, D.R. contends that M.C.’s restitution award should be
reduced from $3,202.93 to $819.11 because there is no evidence to support
any amount greater than $819.11. The People again do not dispute this but
argue that D.R. forfeited this claim by failing to object below. The record as
to this issue is confusing to say the least. M.C. submitted a restitution claim
for $819.11. At an April 2024 hearing, J.A.’s counsel referenced a $3,202.93
amount that J.A. was “willing to stipulate” to but it was unclear as to which
victim. The juvenile court later stated that J.A. had “stipulated to the
amount of $3,203.93” with respect to “the scooter incident.” At the next

5 L.O.’s restitution claim included $400 for eyeglasses, $6,832 in lost

income, and $2,693 in medical expenses, for a total of $9,925. The invoices
attached to her claim, however, show that her medical expenses were
actually $2,643, which resulted in the $50 error.

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hearing the following month, the court noted that the “$3,203.93” amount
was what “[J.A.] was ordered to pay . . . to [E.K.]” but later corrected itself
and noted, “That looks to me like the [$]3,200 was requested by [M.C.].”
D.R.’s counsel did not object to the juvenile court’s above comment.
D.R. argues, however, that she did not forfeit any objection to M.C.’s
restitution awarded because she “was not on reasonable notice that the court
might award $3,202.93 in restitution to M.C. before [it] issued its final
restitution order.” But even assuming that D.R.’s counsel had adequate
notice that the court might award more than $819.11 to M.C., any failure to
object constituted ineffective assistance of counsel for the same reasons we
stated above with respect to L.O.’s restitution amount. M.C.’s restitution
award should therefore be corrected to $819.11.
3. E.K.’s Restitution
Lastly, D.R. contends that E.K.’s $19,523.25 restitution award should
be vacated because substantial evidence does not support “that D.R.’s conduct
was a substantial factor contributing to E.K.’s injuries.” Alternatively, D.R.
argues that a remand for reconsideration of E.K.’s restitution is required
because the juvenile court did not consider D.R.’s arguments regarding her
lack of liability for E.K.’s injuries. The People concede that remand is
appropriate so the court may consider those arguments. But D.R. goes on to
argue that remand would be futile because she is no longer on probation and
therefore cannot be ordered to pay any restitution to E.K. as she was never
charged with a crime against E.K. We agree that remand is warranted
because the court failed to consider D.R.’s arguments in the first instance.6

6 At the final restitution hearing, the juvenile court invited the parties to

submit briefs addressing whether D.R. was responsible for E.K.’s injuries.
D.R. submitted a timely brief but the court did not receive or consider it

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We disagree that restitution should be vacated based on a lack of substantial
evidence or because D.R. is no longer on probation now.
When a minor is placed on probation, a juvenile court may impose
restitution for uncharged conduct “as long as ‘the restitution condition [is]
reasonably related either to the crime of which the defendant is convicted or
to the goal of deterring future criminality.’ ” (In re S.O., supra, 24
Cal.App.5th at p. 1101.) “California courts have long interpreted the trial
courts’ discretion to encompass the ordering of restitution as a condition of
probation even when the loss was not necessarily caused by the criminal
conduct underlying the conviction.” (Carbajal, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 1121.)
“That a defendant was not personally or immediately responsible for the
victim’s loss does not render an order of restitution improper.” (In re I.M.
(2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 1195, 1209.)
Here, there is substantial evidence that the injuries E.K. sustained
were reasonably related to D.R.’s admitted assault against M.C., E.K.’s
husband. E.K. and M.C. were walking together when D.R. and J.A.
approached them from behind on a scooter and M.C. put his arms out to
avoid being hit. After falling off the scooter, D.R. immediately began hitting
M.C. while E.K. and J.A. initially stood off to the side. E.K. then tried to
intervene to stop D.R.’s attack, which prompted J.A. to start hitting her and
pulling her hair. E.K.’s injuries were therefore reasonably related to D.R.’s
assault against her husband. Ordering D.R. to pay E.K.’s restitution is also
reasonably related to deterring future criminality by D.R. because E.K.’s
injuries arose from a physical attack that D.R. started.

before issuing its restitution order. D.R. subsequently filed a request for
another hearing with the brief attached but the court denied it without
explanation.

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Although E.K.’s restitution award is supported by substantial evidence,
as the People concede, remand for reconsideration of that award is still
necessary. The juvenile court did not receive or consider D.R.’s timely brief
objecting to E.K.’s restitution claim. And if the court considered the
arguments in that brief, it is possible the court may have exercised its
discretion differently in awarding restitution to E.K.
Nonetheless, D.R. contends that remand would be futile because she is
no longer on probation and can no longer be ordered to pay restitution to E.K.
as a condition of probation for any uncharged conduct. We are unpersuaded.
D.R. is correct that restitution ordered under section 730.6, subdivision (a)(2),
is limited to “all determined economic losses incurred as the result of the
minor’s conduct for which the minor was found to be a person described in
Section 602.” (§ 730.6, subd. (b)(1).) But this limitation does not apply to
restitution awarded as a condition of probation like E.K.’s restitution award.
(In re. S.O., supra, 24 Cal.App.5th at p. 1101.) That the juvenile court failed
to consider all of D.R.’s arguments against that award does not alter the fact
that the court had a legal basis for imposing the award in the first place.
Indeed, the court, on remand, may conceivably reaffirm its original award
after considering the arguments in D.R.’s earlier brief.
Ultimately, D.R. seeks to absolve herself of any liability for restitution
validly imposed as a condition of probation solely because her probation
ended before we could decide this issue on appeal. This contravenes the
purpose behind restitution awarded as a condition of probation—“to deter
future criminality.” (In re S.O., supra, 24 Cal.App.5th at p. 1101.) It also
prevents a victim from recovering restitution to which he or she is
constitutionally entitled (see Cal. Const., art. I, § 28, subd. (b), par. (13))
through the enforcement of that award as a civil judgment (Pen. Code,

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§ 1214, subd. (b) [“Any portion of a restitution order that remains unsatisfied
after a defendant is no longer on probation . . . is enforceable by the victim” as
a civil judgment]; see People v. Anderson (2010) 50 Cal.4th 19, 29 [like
mandatory restitution, restitution ordered as a condition of probation “serves
the purposes of both criminal rehabilitation and victim compensation”]).
Here, after the termination of D.R.’s probation, E.K.’s restitution award was
reduced to a judgment, which E.K. has the right to enforce as the victim.7
D.R.’s reliance on People v. Koontzy (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 268 is
misplaced. In Koontzy, the trial court did not determine the amount of
restitution before the defendant’s probation terminated. Nonetheless, the
court awarded restitution in a specified amount more than two years after
the defendant’s probation had ended. (Id. at p. 272.) We concluded that the
court lacked authority to order the defendant to pay a specified amount of
restitution as a condition of probation after probation had been terminated.
(Ibid.) By contrast, the juvenile court in this case did properly order D.R. to
pay a specified amount of restitution as a condition of probation. And in
remanding, we are not asking the court to impose any new restitution
conditions after probation has ended. Instead, we are only asking the court
to reconsider the amount of restitution that it did properly award as a
condition of probation after considering arguments it should have considered
at the time of the original award. Moreover, the juvenile court can only
eliminate or reduce the restitution award to E.K. on remand, rather than
increase the amount of that award like the trial court did in Koontzy. We see
no reason why the court cannot do so on remand especially where, as here,
the victim may still enforce the restitution award—which has already been

7 D.R. does not challenge the enforceability of E.K.’s restitution order as a

civil judgment, which survives the termination of her probation.

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reduced to an order—as a civil judgment despite the termination of
probation. (See Pen. Code, § 1203.1, subd. (a)(3) [“The restitution order shall
be fully enforceable as a civil judgment forthwith and in accordance with
Section 1202.4 of the Penal Code”]; see also In re S.O., supra, 24 Cal.App.5th
at pp. 1100–1101 [applying the trial court’s greater latitude in imposing
probation conditions under Penal Code section 1203.1 to juvenile cases]; In re
T.C. (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 837, 847 [same].)
C. Joint and Several Liability
Effective January 1, 2025, the Legislature amended section 730.6 to
add the following provision: “For the purposes of victim restitution, each
minor shall be held severally liable, and shall not be held jointly and severally
liable as co-offenders. The court shall apportion liability based on each
minor’s percentage of responsibility or fault for all economic losses included
in the order of restitution. The aggregate amount of apportioned liability for
all minors involved shall not exceed 100 percent in total.” (§ 730.6, subd.
(b)(3), italics added; Stats. 2024, ch. 805, § 6.) Relying on In re Estrada
(1965) 63 Cal.2d 740, D.R. contends that this new provision applies
retroactively because it “mitigates possible punishment for the class of
juveniles placed on probation on condition they pay restitution imposed with
joint and several liability.” The People initially countered that victim
restitution is not punishment and is therefore not subject to retroactive
application under In re Estrada. But in its supplemental brief, the People
now concede that section 730.6, subdivision (b)(3), would apply if we remand
the matter for a new restitution hearing.
Because we conclude that the juvenile court’s restitution order must be
remanded to correct the amount of restitution awarded to L.O. and M.C. and
to reconsider the restitution awarded to E.K., we need not decide whether

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section 730.6, subdivision (b)(3), is ameliorative legislation that applies
retroactively. On remand, the court shall apply section 730.6, subdivision
(b)(3), and apportion liability for victim restitution based on D.R.’s percentage
of responsibility or fault. (In re W.R. (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 284, 292–293 [a
new statute applies prospectively on remand, regardless of whether it applies
retroactively].)
D. Interest Award
Finally, D.R. contends that the juvenile court erred in awarding
interest in the restitution orders because it did not provide D.R. with notice
or an opportunity to be heard on those awards. We agree that D.R. should
have been provided with notice prior to the interest awards and remand so
the court may consider any arguments by D.R. against those awards in the
first instance.
D.R. goes on to argue, however, that remand would be futile because
“the juvenile court will not have authority to award interest on remand
because any loss relating to interest was ascertainable at the original
hearing.” In support, D.R. cites section 730.6, subdivision (b)(1), which
states, “[i]f the amount of loss cannot be ascertained at the time of
sentencing, . . . the amount shall be determined at the direction of the court
at any time during the term of the commitment or probation.” But that
statutory provision does not apply here because the court not only
ascertained the amount of interest owed to the victims at the time of
sentencing, it actually awarded those amounts in its restitution orders. We
therefore see no reason why the court, on remand, cannot reconsider the
amount of interest that it previously awarded after hearing D.R.’s
arguments. (See In re S.E. (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 795, 809–810 [juvenile has

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“ ‘[a] duty to provide full restitution to their victims,’ ” which includes
interest for the loss of use of their money for expenses incurred].)
The California Constitution provides that “[r]estitution shall be
ordered from the convicted wrongdoer in every case, regardless of the
sentence or disposition imposed, in which a crime victim suffers a loss,”
unless compelling and extraordinary reasons exist to the contrary. (Cal.
Const., art. I, § 28, subd. (b), par. (13)(B); Welf. & Inst. Code, § 730.6, subd.
(b)(1); Pen. Code, § 1202.4, subd. (f).) Courts have consistently held that
awarding victims full restitution is of the utmost importance. (People v.
Keichler (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 1039, 1046 [“ ‘[t]he intent of the voters is
plain’ ”: restitution should be afforded to every victim].) Indeed, the
legislative purpose of ensuring full restitution to victims would be frustrated
if a juvenile court’s jurisdiction to reconsider interest that was already
awarded is extinguished on remand.
And from a practical perspective, “[i]f the appellate court remands the
matter to the juvenile court after jurisdiction has been terminated . . . , the
juvenile court shall . . . assume jurisdiction to the extent necessary to follow
the directions of the appellate court.” (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 800, subd. (g).)
There is no distinction between jurisdiction over the amount of restitution
versus jurisdiction over the interest awarded on that amount because that
interest is part of the overarching restitution award. (In re S.E., supra, 46
Cal.App.5th at p. 809; Pen. Code, § 1202.4, subd. (f)(3)(G); see Welf. & Inst.
Code, § 730.6, subd. (b)(1).) Given the unequivocal mandate of the California
Constitution and the legislative intent behind the relevant statutes, we find
that the juvenile court retains authority to reconsider its award of interest
on remand, after providing D.R. with an opportunity to be heard. (Cf. In re
Brittany L. (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 1381, 1390–1391 [court should, after

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considering appellant’s challenges to the validity of losses, “determine the
amount which will fully reimburse the victims for all economic loss”].)
III. DISPOSITION
The judgment is reversed and the matter is remanded to the juvenile
court to correct L.O.’s restitution award to $9,875 and M.C.’s restitution
award to $819.11, and to consider D.R.’s arguments regarding E.K.’s
restitution award. The court shall further consider any arguments by D.R.
regarding its interest awards to the three victims. Finally, the court shall
apply section 730.6, subdivision (b)(3), in apportioning liability for any
restitution that is ordered on remand.

CHOU, J.

We concur.

JACKSON, P. J.
SIMONS, J.

A171253/ P. v. D.R.

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