CourtListener 10754670•Miller v. Defirmian CA2/8
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Filed 12/12/25 Miller v. Defirmian CA2/8
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION EIGHT
LANI MILLER, B340309
Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 22STCV32356)
v.
JUDITH DEFIRMIAN,
Defendant and Respondent.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County. Lee S. Arian, Judge. Affirmed.
Peggi A. Gross for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Calendo Puckett Sheedy, Christopher M. Sheedy; Pollak,
Vida & Barer, Daniel P. Barer, and Karen M. Stepanyan for
Defendant and Respondent.
**********
Plaintiff and appellant Lani Miller filed this action alleging
she was the victim of an unprovoked attack by Joanna Davis, the
adult daughter of defendant and respondent Judith Defirmian.
The attack occurred at a birthday party defendant hosted for
Davis at the pool area of the condominium complex where
plaintiff and defendant both reside. In the trial court, defendant
successfully moved for summary judgment on plaintiff’s cause of
action for premises liability. Plaintiff now appeals, contending
there were triable issues on the foreseeability of Davis becoming
violent at the party and assaulting third parties.
Based on our independent review of the record, we conclude
summary judgment was properly granted in defendant’s favor.
Plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact that defendant
engaged in active misfeasance or was in a special relationship
with plaintiff such that defendant owed her a duty to warn of
foreseeable criminal acts by third parties. We therefore affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
1. The complaint
Plaintiff brought this action against defendant and Davis
alleging claims for premises liability, negligence, negligent and
intentional infliction of emotional distress, false imprisonment,
assault, and battery. Defendant was named only in the first
cause of action for premises liability. The remaining causes of
action were stated against Davis who is not a party to this
appeal.
Plaintiff alleged she and defendant are residents of the
same condominium complex in Marina del Rey known as the
Marina Strands Colony 2 (Marina Strands). On July 9, 2022,
defendant held a birthday party for Davis at the pool area of the
Marina Strands with live music and a bartender serving alcoholic
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drinks. Plaintiff alleged defendant knew Davis was a threat to
other residents of the complex like plaintiff because Davis had
been “very aggressive” with other residents in the past, had
alcohol and anger management issues, and had previously
violated rules governing the condominium complex. Plaintiff
alleges it was foreseeable to defendant that her daughter would
act out at a party with alcohol. When plaintiff walked into the
pool area during the party, she was “viciously attacked” by Davis,
who jumped on plaintiff, forced her to the ground, and bit her
three times causing serious injuries.
2. Defendant’s motion for summary judgment
Defendant moved for judgment on plaintiff’s first cause of
action for premises liability, arguing there was no evidence
defendant breached any duty owed to plaintiff. (Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 437c, subds. (o) & (p)(2).)1
Defendant presented excerpts from her deposition
testimony in support of her motion. Defendant said she had
owned her condominium at the Marina Strands for almost
30 years. Her adult daughter, Davis, was not a resident of the
complex but visited several times a month. Defendant held
parties for her daughter at the Marina Strands in the past
without incident.
Prior to the birthday party on July 9, 2022, defendant had
never seen plaintiff before and did not know her. She first
noticed plaintiff that day when she saw her videotaping the party
guests with her cell phone. Defendant asked plaintiff to stop but
also told her she was welcome to stay and have something to eat.
1 All further undesignated section references are to the Code
of Civil Procedure.
3
Plaintiff told defendant she would videotape whatever she
wanted. Defendant testified plaintiff eventually pushed her and
that is when the altercation between plaintiff and Davis occurred.
Defendant denied knowing of any prior incidents between
her daughter and any resident of the Marina Strands. Defendant
also testified Davis did not, to her knowledge, have any problems
with drinking alcohol or using drugs, and she never observed
Davis acting out after drinking. Defendant said Davis was a very
loving daughter and she was not an aggressive person.
Defendant was unaware Davis had a restraining order issued
against her in 1995.
Defendant also presented excerpts of the deposition of
Benjamin Schick, one of the party guests and the president of the
Marina Strands homeowners’ association. Schick said he was
unaware of any prior physical altercations between Davis and
any Marina Strands resident, and, as president, he believed he
would have been made aware of any such incidents had they
occurred. On July 9, 2002, he was having a beer and talking with
other guests when the altercation between plaintiff and Davis
occurred.
3. Plaintiff’s opposition
Plaintiff argued defendant’s separate statement was
procedurally defective because it stated conclusions of law
instead of issues of fact, and that material triable issues existed
on defendant’s duty to warn and defendant’s breach of that duty.
In support of her opposition, plaintiff submitted her own
declaration, as well as various deposition excerpts and several
exhibits.
In her declaration, plaintiff explained she had lived at the
Marina Strands for over 10 years and was familiar with the rules
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for using the pool area of the complex. On July 9, 2022, hearing
loud music, she went to the pool area with her dog and saw that a
party was ongoing. In addition to the live music, there were
bartenders serving alcohol from glass bottles. Plaintiff
understood these to be rule violations for the complex, so she took
pictures and a short video with her phone. She said Davis
confronted her, struck her, and pushed her to the ground. Davis
climbed on top of her and bit her three times before being pulled
off by another person. Plaintiff said defendant did nothing to
stop the attack.
In the excerpt from defendant’s deposition, defendant
admitted she did not have written permission for the party on
July 9, 2022. Defendant described the altercation between her
daughter and plaintiff as upsetting. She said plaintiff was the
violent one, kicking her daughter repeatedly, pulling out her hair
and causing her to bleed. But defendant conceded that Davis was
the one who had to be “pulled” off plaintiff by another family
member.
Plaintiff also presented excerpts from Davis’s deposition in
which Davis admitted she had three previous arguments with
other residents of the Marina Strands complex. Two involved
unnamed neighbors yelling at her about where she parked when
she visited her mother and the third occurred when her mother
was having some remodeling done at her condominium. Davis
testified she told her mother about the incident because the
individual was yelling at and harassing her mother’s contractors.
Davis said she told the individual, who she believed was named
Linda, to leave. Davis said on the day of the party, she had a
“sip” of wine before the altercation with plaintiff occurred. She
otherwise had been drinking water and coffee. She recalled there
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was alcohol being served from glass bottles, but that the drinks
were poured into plastic cups for the guests. Davis denied
kicking plaintiff during the altercation and said she could not
recall if she bit her.
Plaintiff also presented copies of court records which she
requested the court judicially notice. The records showed Davis
had a prior record of driving on a suspended license in 1989,
1991, and 1994, a conviction for petty theft in 1997, and for
drinking alcohol on the beach in Malibu in 2000. Additional
court records from 1995 showed that Davis and her then
boyfriend also had a three-year civil restraining order issued
against them for having harassed the ex-girlfriend of Davis’s
boyfriend.
Plaintiff’s evidence also included declarations from two
other Marina Strands’ residents, Sheri Magid and Rita
Montgomery, and from defendant’s former husband, Mark
Strong. Magid said that several years before the party, she tried
to speak with Davis about where she was parking her car when
she visited because it was making it difficult for Magid to use the
driveway. Magid said Davis cursed at her and “ran after [her].”
Montgomery stated that, on an unspecified date, defendant had
spoken angrily to her about reporting Davis to the homeowners’
association over a parking dispute. Montgomery said she had no
idea what defendant was talking about. Strong attested that,
while he was still married to defendant, Davis told them that she
used drugs. He also said both he and defendant were aware
Davis had unspecified anger management issues.
4. Defendant’s reply
Defendant submitted additional evidence in support of her
reply brief, including her own declaration. Defendant said her
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divorce from Strong had been “acrimonious” and she denied that
Davis ever told her she used drugs, either alone or in Strong’s
presence. Defendant also denied ever seeing behavior by her
daughter that was erratic or hotheaded, and she reaffirmed her
prior statement that she was unaware of her daughter ever being
in a physical altercation with anyone prior to July 2022.
Defendant also filed written objections to plaintiff’s evidence.
5. The trial court’s ruling
The hearing on defendant’s motion was held on June 26,
2024. After entertaining argument, the court granted
defendant’s motion, stating there was no evidence demonstrating
defendant had knowledge of prior assaultive behavior by her
daughter. The court also issued a written order fully explaining
its ruling.
In its written order, the trial court agreed with plaintiff
that defendant’s separate statement was poorly drafted.
However, the court explained the separate statement adequately
identified the supporting evidence on the relevant issues, and
therefore the court resolved the motion on its merits. The court
granted plaintiff’s request to take judicial notice of the court
records plaintiff submitted as exhibits. With respect to the
parties’ written objections to evidence, the court overruled
“[d]efendant’s objection No[s]. 1–5, and 10.” The court made no
other rulings on evidentiary objections, stating that the parties
“did not make any other objections to evidence that were material
to the Court’s ruling.”
The trial court found plaintiff failed to raise triable issues
of fact regarding whether defendant had any prior knowledge of
Davis having violent altercations with neighbors or prior
knowledge of any similar incidents in which Davis physically
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assaulted anyone. The court also concluded plaintiff failed to
raise a material factual dispute as to the foreseeability of any
risk associated with hosting the birthday party for Davis.
The granting of the summary judgment motion disposed of
all issues as to defendant. Judgment was therefore entered in
defendant’s favor on July 15, 2024.
This appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff argues reversal is warranted because the trial
court improperly resolved disputed issues of fact and made
credibility determinations in ruling on defendant’s motion.
Plaintiff also contends the evidence demonstrated there were
material issues of disputed fact on the foreseeability of Davis
becoming violent and assaulting third parties like plaintiff.
We disagree.
1. Standard of review
“Summary judgment is appropriate where ‘all the papers
submitted show that there is no triable issue as to any material
fact.’ ” (Garcia v. D/AQ Corp. (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 902, 906;
see also § 437c, subd. (c).) We independently review the trial
court’s decision granting summary judgment, considering all the
evidence presented in the moving and opposing papers, except
that to which objections were made and sustained. (Gonzalez v.
Mathis (2021) 12 Cal.5th 29, 39; Garcia, at p. 907.) The trial
court here did not sustain any objection to evidence. We
therefore consider all of the evidence presented below in
exercising our independent review of the record. (§ 437c, subd. (c)
[a court determining whether papers demonstrate triable issue
must “consider all of the evidence set forth in the papers, except
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the evidence to which objections have been made and sustained
by the court”]; Reid v. Google, Inc. (2010) 50 Cal.4th 512, 534.)
2. The trial court’s written order
We need not resolve whether the trial court improperly
made credibility determinations and weighed the evidence in
resolving defendant’s motion. We are not bound by the trial
court’s stated reasons for granting summary judgment.
We review the trial’s court ruling, not its rationale. (AMN
Healthcare, Inc. v. Aya Healthcare Services, Inc. (2018)
28 Cal.App.5th 923, 934; Moua v. Pittullo, Howington, Barker,
Abernathy, LLP (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 107, 112.) As we explain,
based on our independent review of the evidentiary record, we
conclude summary judgment was properly granted in defendant’s
favor.
3. Plaintiff’s opposition fails to raise a triable issue on
her premises liability claim against defendant
A defendant is entitled to summary judgment if the
defendant demonstrates either that an essential element of the
plaintiff’s cause of action cannot be established, or that there is a
complete defense. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subds. (o) & (p)(2).)
“The elements of a cause of action for premises liability are the
same as those for negligence: duty, breach, causation, and
damages.” (Castellon v. U.S. Bancorp (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th
994, 998.) Summary judgment was proper here because of the
absence of evidence on the element of duty.
The existence and scope of a duty is a question of law for
the court, which makes it “ ‘particularly amenable to resolution
by summary judgment.’ ” (Regents of University of California v.
Superior Court (2018) 4 Cal.5th 607, 618 (Regents).) As a general
rule, each person, including the owner or possessor of land, owes
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“a duty to act with reasonable care under the circumstances.
[Citations.] However, ‘one owes no duty to control the conduct of
another, nor to warn those endangered by such conduct.’ ” (Id. at
p. 619; see also Civ. Code, § 1714, subd. (a).)
If a person engages in misfeasance that increases the peril
faced by others, a duty may be imposed. But, “ ‘[a] person who
has not created a peril is not liable in tort merely for failure to
take affirmative action to assist or protect another unless there is
some relationship between them which gives rise to a duty to
act.’ ” (Regents, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 619.)
A special relationship and a duty to warn or protect may be
found to exist “if the defendant has a special relationship with
the potential victim that gives the victim a right to expect
protection. [Citations.] The relationships between common
carriers and their passengers, or innkeepers and their guests, are
classic examples of this type of special relationship.” (Regents,
supra, 4 Cal.5th at pp. 619–620.) Similarly, “[i]t is established
that business proprietors such as shopping centers, restaurants,
and bars owe a duty to their patrons to maintain their premises
in a reasonably safe condition, and that this duty includes an
obligation to undertake ‘reasonable steps to secure common areas
against foreseeable criminal acts of third parties that are likely to
occur in the absence of such precautionary measures.’ ” (Delgado
v. Trax Bar & Grill (2005) 36 Cal.4th 224, 229; accord, Peterson v.
San Francisco Community College Dist. (1984) 36 Cal.3d 799,
807.)
Plaintiff asserts a special relationship exists here but fails
to cite to any authority imposing a duty to protect or warn on a
private homeowner under similar factual circumstances.
Plaintiff argues imposition of a duty is appropriate because
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defendant had knowledge of Davis’s propensity for violence and
acted negligently in hosting a party for Davis that included
alcohol. We are not persuaded.
Melton v. Boustred (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 521 (Melton)
analyzed the duty of a homeowner for injuries sustained at a
house party. The defendant there held a party at his home and
advertised an open invitation to attend the party on a public
social media site. (Id. at p. 527.) The party featured live music
and alcoholic drinks. (Ibid.) Three partygoers were attacked and
stabbed by a group of unknown attendees, and they sued the
homeowner for damages. The plaintiffs argued the homeowner
created an out-of-control and dangerous party atmosphere, failed
to limit or screen attendees, and failed to provide any security.
(Id. at pp. 527, 536–540.)
Melton affirmed a judgment of dismissal in favor of the
homeowner, holding that no legal duty arose because there were
no facts demonstrating misfeasance or a special relationship.
(Melton, supra, 183 Cal.App.4th at p. 533.)
Melton explained the homeowner had not engaged in active
misfeasance. The violence that harmed the plaintiffs there “was
not ‘a necessary component’ ” of the defendant’s party. (Melton,
supra, 183 Cal.App.4th at p. 535.) While the party had been
widely broadcast and grew into a large party with individuals
consuming alcohol, the defendant homeowner took no action to
encourage the violent criminal behavior ultimately engaged in by
some of the attendees. (Ibid.) The defendant “merely invited
people—including unknown individuals—to attend a party at his
house.” (Ibid.; see also Civ. Code, § 1714, subd. (b) [“furnishing of
alcoholic beverages is not the proximate cause of injuries
resulting from intoxication”].)
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Melton also concluded the plaintiff had not alleged facts
supporting “the existence of any special relationship recognized
by law that would trigger a legal duty on defendant’s part to
protect them.” (Melton, supra, 183 Cal.App.4th at p. 536.) In
order to impose a duty on a landowner to protect against the
criminal conduct of a third party, “ ‘an extraordinarily high
degree of foreseeability is required.’ ” (Ibid.) Furthermore, to
establish foreseeability and impose a duty for “third party
criminal conduct, our authorities have consistently required
actual knowledge—not constructive, inferential, or knowledge by
association.” (Hanouchian v. Steele (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 99,
111.)
Here, plaintiff’s evidence does not show defendant created
an unreasonable risk of harm, nor does it support imposition of a
duty based on a special relationship. At most, plaintiff presented
evidence that defendant hosted a small, casual party for her
adult daughter at which alcohol was served. Plaintiff presented
no evidence Davis had a history, known to defendant, of acting
aggressively after drinking alcohol, or of otherwise engaging in
physical altercations with others. Plaintiff only presented
evidence that Davis had engaged in some verbal altercations with
a couple of her mother’s neighbors, may have used drugs in the
past, and over 25 years ago had suffered some minor convictions
and infractions. Nothing in the record demonstrates a physical
assault by Davis was reasonably foreseeable to defendant.
Our Supreme Court has explained that summary judgment
is no longer considered a disfavored remedy but rather, an
effective way to weed out those cases for which trial on the merits
is not warranted. (Perry v. Bakewell Hawthorne, LLC (2017)
2 Cal.5th 536, 542.) This is one such case.
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DISPOSITION
The judgment in favor of defendant and respondent Judith
Defirmian is affirmed. Defendant shall recover costs of appeal.
VIRAMONTES, J.
WE CONCUR:
STRATTON, P. J.
WILEY, J.
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