CourtListener 10754105•People v. Bauer CA3
Texte intégral
Filed 12/11/25 P. v. Bauer CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Lassen)
----
THE PEOPLE, C101274
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. Nos. CR038986,
2021-CR0050264)
v.
RYAN ROBERT BAUER,
Defendant and Appellant.
Following remand from this court for a full resentencing, the trial court sentenced
defendant Ryan Robert Bauer to an aggregate term of nine years four months. In this
second appeal, defendant raises three issues. First, he contends the trial court abused its
discretion when it denied his Romero motion to strike his prior burglary conviction.1 He
also contends defense counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to
1 People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497 (Romero).
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investigate and provide additional evidence of the genesis of his drug addiction and his
mental health issues, which would have supported the Romero motion and persuaded the
court to impose a lower term. Finally, defendant contends that the trial court erred when
it failed to award him credits for his actual days in custody. We agree the trial court
miscalculated defendant’s credits and will remand with directions for the court to
recalculate his credits and correct the abstract of judgment. In all other respects, we
affirm the judgment.
I. BACKGROUND
Shortly after midnight on May 17, 2021, defendant smashed through the glass of
Gregory and Kimberly’s front door while they were home with their children. (People v.
Bauer (Jul. 10, 2023, C095770) [nonpub. opn.] (Bauer I).)2 Once inside, defendant
placed Gregory in a headlock. (Ibid.) Gregory escaped and defendant barricaded himself
inside the home. (Ibid.) When law enforcement arrived and tried to arrest defendant, he
struggled, kicking one officer in the leg. (Ibid.) After his arrest, defendant agreed to
speak with law enforcement and admitted that he used methamphetamine about an hour
before the incident. (Ibid.)
A. Original Sentencing
Defendant pled guilty to one count of false imprisonment by violence (Pen. Code,
§ 236),3 two counts of felony vandalism (§ 594, subd. (a)), two counts of obstructing an
officer (§ 69), one count of misdemeanor battery (§ 242), and one count of misdemeanor
trespass (§ 602.5, subd. (b)). Defendant also admitted a prior strike conviction, which
stemmed from the burglary of his parents’ home in 2015. (§ 667, subds. (b)-(i).)
2 We construed defendant’s request for judicial notice as a motion to incorporate by
reference the records in case Nos. C095770 and C082385, and as such granted the
request.
3 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2
Before sentencing, defendant submitted a statement to the probation officer and a
letter to the trial court recounting the history of his substance abuse, including
information of an accident that amputated two of his fingers and the ensuing treatment
that led to his addiction to substances. While the matter was pending, defendant
contacted Delancy Street Foundation about their drug treatment program. They provided
several options to interview him. Ultimately, defendant did not attend the program.
Before sentencing defendant, the trial court reviewed the victims’ statement, the
probation officer’s report and recommendation, a letter from Delancey Street Foundation,
defendant’s written statement attached to the probation officer’s report, and the letter
defendant submitted directly to the court. The court also heard testimony from the
responding officers, both of whom described the offense as one of the most extreme they
have experienced based on how terrified the victims were, and the amount of damage
done to the home in such a short period of time. The court believed defendant had “a
self-induced methamphetamine psychosis.” It also believed defendant deserved a prison
sentence for what he did. The trial court sentenced defendant to an aggregate term of 12
years 10 months imprisonment. (Bauer I, supra, C095770.) Defendant appealed.
On appeal, we remanded for a full resentencing with instructions for the trial court
to stay the sentence on either the vandalism count for the damage to the front door or the
trespass count under section 654. (Bauer I, supra, C095770.) We also instructed the trial
court to “further exercise its sentencing discretion under all applicable law.” (Ibid.)
B. Resentencing
On remand, the judge who imposed defendant’s original sentence conducted his
resentencing. As part of the resentencing, the trial court considered defendant’s Romero
motion to strike his burglary conviction. Defendant’s motion argued that he fell outside
the spirit of the Three Strikes Law because he is not a violent career criminal. Not only
did he lack a “significant violent criminal history,” his prior strike was nine years old and
stemmed from the burglary of his parents’ home for a small amount of money.
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At the hearing, defense counsel also raised concerns about defendant’s mental
health at the time of the current offense, arguing that defendant “was basically out of his
mind. He was not coherent. He was not rational. He was paranoid.” “[I]t’s not an
excuse, but for basically what I would consider a paranoid state of mind based on drug
use, he would never have been in that house.” Defense counsel contrasted those
circumstances with defendant’s current demeanor, noting that now that defendant is
“clean and sober,” “he seems very coherent, logical.”
The People opposed the motion to dismiss, noting that the prior strike conviction
was “not incredibly old,” defendant was properly advised when he pled guilty to it, and
he was not a youthful offender. While the People speculated defendant was “in some sort
of drug induced psychosis” at the time of the offense, the People objected to what it
viewed as an attempt to use defendant’s substance abuse issues to avoid responsibility for
the burglary and the current offense. “[E]ven if he wants to use his drug addiction as the
excuse or explanation for why he burglarized his parent’s home, he should not be
afforded the same opportunity to keep using that as an excuse for future criminal
behavior because it shows his inability or unwillingness to learn from his mistakes.”
Defense counsel disagreed that defendant was “blaming anything on the drugs.”
Rather, his reaction to drugs was “a fact of what happened” that the court “should take
into account.” Defense counsel asked the court to strike the burglary conviction and
sentence defendant to the upper term of three years on the false imprisonment by
violence count, eight months consecutive on one count of obstructing an officer, and
concurrent sentences on the remaining counts for an aggregate sentence of four years four
months.
The trial court denied the Romero motion. In doing so, the court considered the
circumstances of the current felony, noting the impact on the “completely innocent
victims, that in the middle of the night, somebody is breaking into their house and they
have small children.” The court also considered the circumstances of defendant’s prior
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strike conviction and the burglary of his parents’ home. It also reviewed defendant’s
prior adult history, focusing on several opportunities defendant had to obtain help with
his substance abuse problems after the burglary—Teen Challenge and Delancey Street
Foundation. The court noted if defendant had availed himself of these opportunities to
turn his life around, it would have been “much more inclined to consider granting the
Romero motion than not.” But, “[h]e didn’t do that.” “[A]nd that decision was, in the
Court’s opinion, a huge mistake.”
After it denied the motion to strike the burglary conviction, the court stayed the
sentence for the trespass conviction and imposed an aggregate sentence of nine years four
months. The court also imposed various fines and fees.
Defendant noted, and the court agreed, that the abstract of judgment did not
include defendant’s credits for 437 days. The court scheduled a post report hearing to
calculate defendant’s presentence credits where it determined defendant had 267 actual
days plus 266 conduct credit days for a total of 533 days of presentence credits. The
court did not calculate defendant’s actual days in custody following the original
sentencing. Defendant timely appealed.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Romero Motion
Defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion when it denied his Romero
motion because his prior and current felonies—burglary and false imprisonment, which
were directly related to his drug use, were not “intentionally violent.” Combined with his
background, character, and prospects, he claims this nonviolent criminal history
supported dismissing the strike. We find there was no abuse of discretion.
We review a trial court’s refusal to dismiss a prior strike conviction for abuse of
discretion. (People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 374.) We do not reverse a trial
court’s exercise of discretion just “ ‘ “because reasonable people might disagree. ‘An
appellate tribunal is neither authorized nor warranted in substituting its judgment for the
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judgment of the trial judge.’ ” ’ ” (Id. at p. 377.) Rather, a trial court abuses its
discretion only when “its decision is so irrational or arbitrary that no reasonable person
could agree with it.” (Ibid.)
As an initial matter, to the extent defendant argues that the trial court should have
applied the factors in section 1385, subdivision (c) when it considered his motion to
dismiss the prior conviction, we reject that argument. The mitigating factors of section
1385, subdivision (c) do not apply to alternative sentencing schemes like the Three
Strikes Law. (People v. Burke (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 237, 243-244.)
The essential question the trial court must answer when considering a motion to
dismiss a prior strike allegation is whether defendant falls outside the spirit of the Three
Strikes Law. (People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 161.) In answering that
question, the court considers: (1) the nature and circumstances of the current felony; (2)
the nature and circumstances of the prior strike offenses; and (3) the particulars of a
defendant’s background, character, and prospects for the future. (Ibid.) In the absence of
an affirmative record to the contrary, we presume the trial court considered all relevant
factors. (People v. Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 378.)
Here, the record shows that the trial court considered the relevant factors when it
denied defendant’s motion. It considered the circumstances of the current felony, noting
the impact on the “completely innocent victims.” It also considered the circumstances of
defendant’s prior strike conviction for the burglary of his parents’ home. And it
considered defendant’s background, character, and prospects. Specifically, the court
reviewed defendant’s prior adult history and focused on several opportunities defendant
had to obtain help with his substance abuse problems after his burglary conviction. The
court explained that it would have been “much more inclined to consider granting the
Romero motion than not” if defendant had availed himself of these opportunities. It was
a “huge mistake” for defendant not to have done so.
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The record showed that defendant continued to engage in the substance abuse with
increasingly serious consequences to innocent victims and had made no meaningful
attempt to address his substance abuse problems through the opportunities available to
him. Based on its consideration of the relevant factors, the trial court determined
defendant was not outside the spirit of the Three Strikes Law. We find no abuse of
discretion.
B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Defendant contends defense counsel was ineffective in failing to investigate and
provide evidence regarding his mental health, the origin of his drug addiction—his
ADHD treatment as a child and the addiction that followed the amputation of his two
fingers at age 19—and all available information about his social history. He claims this
additional “mitigating information . . . likely would have swayed the court to dismiss the
prior strike, or otherwise reduce [defendant’s] sentence.” We disagree.
To establish constitutionally inadequate representation, a defendant must show
that (1) counsel’s performance was deficient and (2) that counsel’s deficient performance
prejudiced the defense. (Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687
(Strickland).) Counsel’s performance is deficient if it fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness “under prevailing professional norms. (Id. at p. 688.) To prove prejudice,
a defendant “must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” (Id. at p.
694.) Prejudice must be established based on facts in the record, not speculation as to the
effect of the errors or omissions of counsel. (People v. Montoya (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th
1139, 1151.) When a defendant challenges a sentence, the question is “whether there is a
reasonable probability that, absent the errors, the [court] . . . would have concluded that
the balance of aggravating and mitigating circumstances” did not warrant the sentence
imposed. (Strickland, supra, at p. 695.)
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A defendant must prove both deficient conduct and prejudice to be successful on a
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. (People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 333.)
Therefore, if a defendant makes an insufficient showing as to either prong, we may reject
a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel without addressing both components.
(Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 697.)
Here, we conclude defendant cannot meet his burden to establish prejudice
because the record demonstrates that it is not reasonably probable the trial court would
have granted the Romero motion or imposed a lower term even if defense counsel
provided more evidence at the resentencing about the origin of defendant’s addiction or
his mental health. (Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at pp. 694-695.) Therefore, we need not
address whether defense counsel’s performance was deficient. (Id. at p. 697.)
As the original sentencing judge, the trial court judge was familiar with defendant
and his history. The court stated that it looked at defendant’s “prior adult history” and
noted that defendant had opportunities to attend Teen Challenge and the Delancey Street
program but did not do so. The information about defendant’s adult history and his
failure to engage in the treatment programs was only included in the probation officer’s
report prepared for the original sentencing hearing, suggesting the trial court reviewed
that report before resentencing him. Information about the origin of defendant’s drug
addiction—pain management for the amputation of two of his fingers—and his mental
health was included in the same probation officer’s report and the attachments, which
also included two letters from defendant explaining his history.
Defendant has not shown there was additional information about the origin of his
drug addiction and his mental health that could have been provided that was not already
included in the original probation officer’s report and its attachments. More importantly,
he has not shown how including additional information would have persuaded the court
to grant the Romero motion and impose a lower sentence.
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Crucial to the trial court’s decision was defendant’s failure to take advantage of
programs that would have addressed his substance abuse problems and the extent of the
harm he caused to “completely innocent victims” because he failed to do so. Defendant’s
speculation about the significance of the origin of his drug addiction runs headlong into
the court’s determination that he had not seriously sought treatment for his drug addiction
regardless of how or why it started. Therefore, to the extent there was additional
information defense counsel could have provided about how defendant’s drug addiction
began or his mental health, the record does not show there is a reasonable probability that
the information would have changed the trial court’s decision. (Strickland, supra,
466 U.S. at p. 695.)
Defendant also appears to argue that if the court had more information about his
history of trauma, specifically the amputation of his fingers at the age of 19 and his
ADHD treatment as a child, section 1170, subdivision (b)(6)(A) would have required the
court to impose the lower term. Section 1170, subdivision (b)(6)(A) requires courts to
impose the lower term if a defendant’s “psychological, physical, or childhood trauma”
was a “contributing factor in the commission of the offense,” unless the court determines
the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances. As noted, the
court referenced information that was contained only in the original probation officer’s
report, suggesting it reviewed the report, and defendant’s statement detailing his trauma
history was attached to that report. More importantly, defendant has not shown how this
history of trauma was a contributing factor to the current offense—breaking into an
innocent family’s home in the middle of the night at age 35 or 36 while under the
influence of substances and assaulting the father, which is what the statute requires. (§
1170, subd. (b)(6)(A).)
In sum, because defendant has not met his burden to establish prejudice from
defense counsel’s alleged failure to investigate and provide additional evidence about his
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drug addiction history or mental health, his claim for ineffective assistance of counsel
fails. (Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 687.)
C. Custody Credits
Defendant contends, and the People concede, that the trial court erred when it
failed to award defendant credit for actual days in custody from the original sentencing to
the date of his resentencing. We agree.
Section 2900.1, specifies that “when a sentence is modified while in progress, the
‘time’ already served ‘shall be credited upon any subsequent sentence [the defendant]
may receive upon a new commitment for the same criminal act or acts.’ ” (People v.
Buckhalter (2001) 26 Cal.4th 20, 37.) “[H]aving modified defendant’s sentence on
remand, [the trial court] was obliged, in its new abstract of judgment, to credit him with
all actual days he had spent in custody, whether in jail or prison, up to that time.” (Ibid.)
We note that although the court held a post sentencing hearing to calculate
presentence custody credits on April 23, 2024, defendant’s sentence was pronounced and
imposed on April 2, 2024. Defendant is entitled to credit for actual days in custody, up to
and including the day of sentencing, April 2, 2024. (People v. Smith (1989)
211 Cal.App.3d 523, 527.) Therefore, we remand with instructions for the trial court to
calculate defendant’s credits, including his actual days in custody from the day after his
original sentencing to the date of resentencing and amend the abstract of judgment to
reflect his credits.
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III. DISPOSITION
The case is remanded for the trial court to calculate defendant’s custody credits.
The trial court shall amend the abstract of judgment to reflect the custody credits,
including for actual time served, and forward a certified copy of the amended abstract of
judgment to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. The judgment is
otherwise affirmed.
/S/
RENNER, J.
We concur:
/S/
ROBIE, Acting P. J.
/S/
WISEMAN, J.*
* Retired Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, assigned by
the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
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