CourtListener 10754098•People v. Harris CA2/7
Texte intégral
Filed 12/11/25 P. v. Harris CA2/7
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has
not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SEVEN
THE PEOPLE, B338194
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. MA076215)
v.
ADONIS B. HARRIS,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Lisa Strassner, Judge. Vacated and
remanded, with directions.
John L. Staley, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Christopher G. Sanchez and Shezad H.
Thakor, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
________________________
INTRODUCTION
Adonis B. Harris appeals the superior court’s resentencing
determination under Penal Code section 1172.75 on his 2019
conviction for possession of a controlled substance while in a
custodial facility. That sentence was imposed consecutive to a
2013 sentence for manslaughter, which he is currently serving,
and which does not contain a legally invalid enhancement.1
Because Harris is not yet eligible for section 1172.75
resentencing, we reverse and vacate the resentencing order.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Conviction and Sentence
In 2013, Harris was convicted and sentenced to a 42-year
prison term for voluntary manslaughter, which he is currently
serving, and which does not contain a prior prison term
enhancement. In 2019, Harris was charged with two counts of
possessing a controlled substance in a custodial facility (§ 4573.6,
subd. (a)). The 2019 information alleged that Harris had two
prior strike convictions for serious and/or violent felonies (§§ 667,
subd. (d), 1170, subd. (h)(3), 1170.12, subd. (b)) and that he had
suffered a prior prison term within the meaning of section 667.5,
subdivision (b).2
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2 Harris was convicted of burglary in 2009 and sentenced to
two years. For purposes of the 2019 information, this conviction
constituted Harris’s second strike conviction (in addition to the
2013 manslaughter conviction) and qualified as a prior prison
term under section 667.5, subdivision (b).
2
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Harris pleaded no contest to
both counts of possession and admitted the section 667.5,
subdivision (b), prior prison term enhancement. Harris agreed to
an aggregate sentence of six years, which was comprised of an
upper term sentence of four years on the first count, one year on
the second count (one-third the midterm of three years), and one
year for the section 667.5, subdivision (b), enhancement. The
People dismissed the prior strike allegations pursuant to the plea
agreement. Harris’s 2019 sentence was to run consecutive to his
2013 sentence.
B. Section 1172.75 Resentencing Proceedings
In November 2022, the California Department of
Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) identified Harris as
eligible for resentencing under Senate Bill No. 483. Through
appointed counsel, Harris argued that under Senate Bill No. 483,
the court must strike his section 667.5, subdivision (b),
enhancement as legally invalid. Harris further argued the court
should conduct “a full resentencing hearing” and “select the low
term of two (2) years for . . . an aggregate term of imprisonment
of three (3) years.” In support of the low term, Harris argued he
had “suffered significant childhood trauma” and cited his
participation in educational and mental health programs while
incarcerated.
The People agreed “the one-year sentence imposed
pursuant to Penal Code section 667.5(b) should be stricken,” but
in their opposition brief the People “oppose[d] any further
resentencing beyond the striking of one year.” The People argued
that additional resentencing would endanger public safety in
light of Harris’s criminal history, including 11 juvenile
3
adjudications and convictions spanning from 2002 to 2019, and
Harris’s prison disciplinary record of “37 violations, most of which
are classified as ‘serious’ violations.”
At the resentencing hearing, Harris asserted the court
should also resentence him for his 2013 voluntary manslaughter
conviction. Harris argued “[h]e was serving time on that case
when he picked up this one, so technically it’s one sentence or one
term” and thus subject to the full resentencing required by
Senate Bill No. 483. The court rejected Harris’s request,
reasoning that “it’s not technically one term. . . . They are
different case numbers, different jurisdictions. The court does
not have jurisdiction on that case nor does the court have any
indication that he was serving any one-year state prison priors on
that 42-year sentence that he’s currently still serving.”
The court stated it would strike Harris’s section 667.5,
subdivision (b), enhancement on his 2019 conviction as “now
invalid under SB 483.” But “based upon the current charges, his
prior crimes and conduct in prison,” the court declined to “further
reduce his sentence beyond the one-year prior . . . find[ing]
defendant to be a danger to public safety, and a lesser sentence
would endanger public safety.” The court reimposed the upper
term of four years on the base possession count, plus one year on
the second possession count, for a total of five years.
Harris timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
A. Governing Law and Standard of Review
In January 2022, Senate Bill No. 483 (2021-2022 Reg.
Sess.) retroactively invalidated all prior prison term
4
enhancements under section 667.5, subdivision (b), except those
enhancements based on a conviction for a sexually violent
offense. (See People v. Green (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 365, 368;
accord, People v. Rogers (2025) 108 Cal.App.5th 340, 348, fn. 5.)
The bill created former section 1171.1, now section 1172.75,
“establish[ing] a mechanism to provide affected defendants a
remedy for those legally invalid enhancements.” (People v.
Burgess (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 375, 380.)
Resentencing under section 1172.75 begins when CDCR
identifies a defendant in custody “currently serving a term for a
judgment that includes an enhancement” under section 667.5,
subdivision (b). (§ 1172.75, subd. (b).) Once the court “verif[ies]”
that “the current judgment includes [such a] sentencing
enhancement[,] . . . the court shall recall the sentence and
resentence the defendant.” (§ 1172.75, subd. (c).) Beyond
striking the invalid section 667.5, subdivision (b), enhancements,
section 1172.75 requires a full resentencing when a defendant is
statutorily eligible for relief. (See People v. Espino (2024)
104 Cal.App.5th 188, 195, review granted Oct. 23, 2024, S286987;
accord, People v. Monroe (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 393, 402.)
We review the interpretation of a statute de novo. (See
People v. Jimenez (2020) 9 Cal.5th 53, 61.) When interpreting
statutes, our goal is to “‘“‘ascertain the intent of the enacting
legislative body so that we may adopt the construction that best
effectuates the purpose of the law.’”’” (People v. Albillar (2010)
51 Cal.4th 47, 54-55.) “‘“[W]e begin with the plain, commonsense
meaning of the language used by the Legislature. [Citation.] If
the language is unambiguous, the plain meaning controls.”’”
(People v. Johnson (2013) 57 Cal.4th 250, 260.) “‘“We must
harmonize ‘the various parts of a statutory enactment . . . by
5
considering the particular clause or section in the context of the
statutory framework as a whole.’”’” (People v. Lewis (2021)
11 Cal.5th 952, 961.) We also review a defendant’s eligibility for
resentencing under section 1172.75 de novo. (See People v. Tang
(2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 1003, 1007.)
B. Harris Is Currently Ineligible for Section 1172.75
Resentencing
The People argue Harris was ineligible for section 1172.75
resentencing because “he was not currently serving a sentence
with a prior prison term enhancement—as he was, and still is,
serving his sentence for voluntary manslaughter.” The People
request “remand to the superior court with instructions to
reinstate his original sentence.” Harris concedes that he was
“sentenced to 42 years in state prison for [his] 201[3]
[manslaughter] conviction” and that he “will not commence
serving the judgment for [his] 2019 conviction until he has served
the judgment for [his] 201[3] conviction.”3
As stated, section 1172.75 authorizes resentencing for
“those persons in [CDCR] custody currently serving a term for a
judgment that includes an enhancement” under section 667.5,
subdivision (b). (§ 1172.75, subd. (b).) When CDCR identifies
such a defendant for resentencing, “the court shall review the
judgment and verify that the current judgment includes a
sentencing enhancement [under section 667.5, subdivision (b)]. If
the court determines that the current judgment includes [such]
3 Harris’s briefing asserts that he was convicted of
manslaughter in 2011, but the probation report documents that
Harris was arrested in 2011 for that case and subsequently
convicted in 2013.
6
an enhancement . . . , the court shall recall the sentence and
resentence the defendant.” (§ 1172.75, subd. (c).) Courts have
held this language precludes resentencing defendants who have
already served the judgment that includes a section 667.5,
subdivision (b), enhancement and are currently serving a
sentence on a different judgment for an in-prison offense. (See
People v. McKean (2025) 115 Cal.App.5th 46, 53, 56 (McKean);
People v. Escobedo (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 440, 451 (Escobedo).)
The parties have not cited any case addressing eligibility
for section 1172.75 resentencing where the defendant has yet to
serve the sentence on the judgment that includes a section 667.5,
subdivision (b), enhancement. As in McKean and Escobedo, we
conclude that under the plain language of section 1172.75, a
defendant is eligible for resentencing only “if the court
determines that the current judgment includes an enhancement”
under section 667.5, subdivision (b).4 (§ 1172.75, subd. (c).)
While the statutory language is clear, Senate Bill No. 483’s
4 In this case, CDCR identified Harris as eligible for
resentencing, and the People conceded at the resentencing
hearing that the superior court should strike Harris’s “one-year
sentence imposed pursuant to Penal Code section 667.5(b).”
Despite the People’s position in the superior court that Harris
was eligible for resentencing, we conclude this argument is not
forfeited because the superior court was required to verify
Harris’s eligibility under section 1172.75, subdivision (c), before
ordering resentencing. (See § 1172.75, subd. (c).) Further, we
may review an unauthorized sentence regardless of whether an
objection or argument was raised in the trial court. (See People v.
Smith (2001) 24 Cal.4th 849, 852; accord, In re Sheena K. (2007)
40 Cal.4th 875, 887.) Harris does not argue, and we need not
decide, whether the People are estopped from raising the
argument on appeal.
7
statement of legislative purpose further confirms its intended
application to “all persons currently serving a term of
incarceration in jail or prison for the[] repealed sentence
enhancements.” (See Escobedo, supra, 95 Cal.App.5th at p. 451.)
For these reasons, we conclude a defendant who is not yet serving
a sentence for a judgment that includes a section 667.5,
subdivision (b), enhancement is ineligible for section 1172.75
resentencing relief until the defendant begins serving the affected
sentence.
Harris contends he is presently eligible for resentencing
because his “201[3] and 2019 sentences should be viewed as a
single judgment for purpose of applying section 1172.75.” This
argument is foreclosed by precedent. The California Supreme
Court has held that “new crimes committed while in prison are
treated as separate offenses and begin a new aggregate term.”
(People v. Langston (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1237, 1242; accord,
Escobedo, supra, 95 Cal.App.5th at p. 452 [rejecting argument
that an original prison term and a consecutive term for an in-
prison offense are considered together for § 1172.75 resentencing
purposes]; In re Tate (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 756, 764-765.)
Under this rule, Harris’s sentence for manslaughter remains
distinct from his sentence for possession of a controlled
substance. As the superior court found, Harris’s manslaughter
judgment did not contain any prior prison term enhancements
under section 667.5, subdivision (b), and Harris does not argue
that this determination was erroneous or that his manslaughter
conviction is independently eligible for section 1172.75 relief.
Harris also argues that “there is no dispute that [he] should
not serve the sentences for the prior prison term enhancement[]
imposed at the 2019 sentencing hearing.” In his view, it would be
8
an “absurd result” if resentencing relief is denied because his
enhancement is “invalid under current law” and “the Legislature
has expressed a clear desire that defendants in [his] situation
should not have to serve time for prior prison term
enhancements.” As stated, however, both the plain language and
the legislative intent are clear that section 1172.75 applies only
to those “currently serving a term for a judgment that includes
an enhancement” under section 667.5, subdivision (b).
(§ 1172.75, subd. (b).) Harris does not offer a persuasive contrary
interpretation of the statutory language or address the legislative
history.
Harris further argues that, if he is not eligible for
resentencing at this time, there is “no avenue available to him to
have the prior prison term enhancements stricken when he starts
serving his sentence for the 2019 conviction.” Harris contends
that CDCR must initiate the resentencing process under
section 1172.75, its duty to identify eligible defendants concluded
on July 1, 2022, and the statutory provision states that all
resentencing “shall be completed” by December 31, 2023. (See
§ 1172.75, subds. (b)(2), (c)(2).) But that deadline is directory
rather than mandatory. (See People v. Cota (2025)
112 Cal.App.5th 1118, 1129-1131, review granted Oct. 1, 2025,
S292637.) Additionally, Harris may choose to file a petition for a
writ of habeas corpus to request relief from the invalid prior
prison term enhancement once he begins serving his sentence for
possession of a controlled substance. (See Escobedo, supra, 95
Cal.App.5th at p. 449 [while § 1172.75 does not authorize a
freestanding motion for resentencing, “‘[a] defendant who is
serving a longer sentence than the law allows may challenge the
sentence in a petition for writ of habeas corpus’”].)
9
DISPOSITION
The order of resentencing is vacated, and on remand the
court is directed to reinstate Harris’s original sentence.
MARTINEZ, P. J.
We concur:
SEGAL, J. STONE, J.
10
Vous vous demandez comment ce texte s’applique à votre situation ?
Consultation gratuite, sans engagement
Décrivez votre situation. Notre équipe vous recontactera par e-mail pour votre consultation.
Poursuivez vos recherches dans ChatGPT ou Claude
Connectez Omnilex pour rechercher dans le corpus juridique depuis votre assistant IA.