People v. Johnson CA1/1

CourtListener 10754095Calctapp11 déc. 2025

Texte intégral

Filed 12/11/25 P. v. Johnson CA1/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not
certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not
been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
A171462
v.
DARRYL JOHNSON, (San Mateo County
Super. Ct. No. 21NF-008659)
Defendant and Appellant.

After appointed counsel filed a brief identifying no arguable issues on
appeal following the procedures approved by People v. Delgadillo (2022)
14 Cal.5th 216, Darryl Johnson filed a supplemental brief1 challenging the
denial of his motions to modify his sentence. He also asked this court to
“grant [his] direct appeal.” We affirm the trial court’s order.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Johnson was charged in 2021 with second degree robbery (Pen. Code
§ 212.5, subd. (c)),2 misdemeanor possession of drug paraphernalia (Health
and Saf. Code, § 11364), and misdemeanor possession of burglary tools.

1 In his brief, defendant spells his first name Darrell.
As the
Felony Abstract of Judgment submitted with his notice of appeal
identifies him as Darryl Johnson, this is the name we use.
2 All undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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(§ 466.) The pleading further alleged he employed a dangerous or deadly
weapon (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)), had suffered two prior “strike” convictions
(§ 1170.12), and had suffered two serious or violent felony convictions (§ 667,
subd. (a)(1)). A jury returned verdicts of guilt on the robbery and drug
charges, and found the arming enhancement true. Johnson was sentenced in
July of 2022 to 12 years in prison, calculated as the sum of the middle-term
for robbery doubled (§ 1170.12, subd. (c)(1)), plus a one-year consecutive term
for the arming enhancement (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)), and a five-year
consecutive term for one of the two enhancements per section 667,
subdivision (a). Another five-year term for a prior serious felony
enhancement was stayed.
Johnson appealed the convictions. (See People v. Johnson (May 29,
2024, No. A166220) [nonpub. opn.].) In May 2024, a panel of this division
determined the trial court had erred in staying, rather than dismissing,
Johnson’s second five-year term for a prior serious felony enhancement. A
limited remand was ordered to allow the trial court either to strike the
second enhancement or to strike the punishment for the enhancement. The
judgment was otherwise affirmed.
In June 2024, Johnson filed his first motion for modification of his
sentence. The motion sought relief under Senate Bill No. 81 (2021–2022 Reg.
Sess.) (Senate Bill No. 81) which—effective January 1, 2022 (seven months
before Johnson’s sentencing hearing)—amended section 1385 “to provide
guidance regarding the exercise of discretion in dismissing sentencing
enhancements.” (People v. Anderson (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 233, 238; Stats.
2021, ch. 721, § 1.)
On July 18, 2024, Johnson filed two additional motions to modify his
sentence. The first invoked the relief afforded by Senate Bill No. 1393 (2017–

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2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill No. 1393), which authorized trial courts to
strike prior serious felony convictions (§ 667, subd. (a)) for sentencing
purposes. (Stats. 2018, ch. 1013, §§ 1, 2.) The second motion claimed
eligibility for resentencing pursuant to sections 1172.1 and 1170.12.
On July 25, 2024, the trial court denied Johnson’s three ex parte
motions. The court reasoned that it “lack[ed] jurisdiction to consider [them]
due to the pending appeal” in docket A166220, which “divest[ed] the trial
court of jurisdiction to make or vacate any order affecting the judgment
pending determination of the appeal and issuance of the remittitur.” A few
days later, on July 31, 2024, the remittitur in A166220 issued.3
Following the limited remand, in August 2024, the trial court struck
one enhancement pursuant to section 667, subdivision (a)(1).
DISCUSSION
Johnson’s notice of appeal, filed in propria persona, challenges the
“order of denial for S.B. 81 [and] 1393,” a reference to the motion filed in June
2024 and one of the two motions filed on July 18, 2024. The motion based on
sections 1172.1 and 1170.1 is not addressed by the notice of appeal.4
Handwriting on the notice of appeal also asserts that Johnson “has no ‘appeal
pending’ ” in A166220 and that “this court has jurisdiction to consider [his]
motions. Please ‘reconsider the [denials].’ ”

3 On our own motion, we take judicial notice of the remittitur in

A166220.
4 A defendant has no right to file his own petition for resentencing relief

under section 1172.1. (§ 1172.1, subd. (c).) To be eligible, a person must
await an action initiated by the court or other designated governmental
entity. (§ 1172.1, subd. (a)(1).) If a person files his own resentencing request,
the trial court’s failure to act on the request does not implicate the person’s
substantial rights and is not appealable. (People v. Brinson (2025)
112 Cal.App.5th 1040, 1046.)

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After his counsel identified no issues for appeal, Johnson filed his own
supplemental brief. In it, he asks this court to grant both his supplemental
brief and the “direct appeal,” issue an order to show cause as to why relief
should not be granted, “remand this case back to the trial court for further
proceedings,” and, lastly, find that his appellate attorney provided ineffective
assistance of counsel by filing a Delgadillo brief when he should have “moved
. . . to dismiss [Johnson’s] direct appeal.”5 None of these claims are
meritorious.
First, the trial court did not err by denying Johnson’s motions to modify
his sentence on the grounds it lacked jurisdiction to consider them. “Subject
to limited exceptions,” once an appeal is filed, jurisdiction over the case
passes to “the appellate court until determination of the appeal and issuance
of the remittitur.’ ” (People v. Burhop (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 808, 813.) Any
order the trial court might have attempted to make before issuance of the
remittitur would have been null and void. (People v. Alanis (2008)
158 Cal.App.4th 1467, 1472–1473.) This is because the remittitur operates to
“ ‘transfer[] jurisdiction back to the inferior court so that it may act upon the
case again, consistent with the judgment of the reviewing court.’ ” (People v.
Burhop, supra, 65 Cal.App.5th at p. 813.)
In this case, the remittitur from Johnson’s direct appeal in A166220
had not yet issued when the court addressed the motions. This meant the
appellate court still held jurisdiction and the trial court was not free to act on
the case. Without jurisdiction, the court was obliged to deny the motions for
the reasons it stated.

5 “The filing of a supplemental brief . . . does not compel an independent

review of the entire record to identify unraised issues” (People v. Delgadillo,
supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 232) but the appellate court maintains discretion to do
so (id. at p. 233, fn. 6).

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Johnson mistakenly appears to argue the trial court was wrong because
“on July 18, 2024, [he filed] a [motion] for resentencing pursuant to [Senate
Bill No.] 1393.” The date he filed the motion preceded the remittitur by 13
days. The decision on the motion occurred six days before the remittitur
issued. The trial court’s decision was correct. And Johnson does not offer
any other reason why the trial court was wrong to deny his motions. Nor
does he argue why he is entitled to relief under Senate Bill No. 1393. He
simply recites the bill’s function without describing how it applies to his case.
Johnson next argues his appellate counsel provided ineffective
assistance “when he/she failed to notify [him he] ha[d] no arguable claims
and should have moved appellant to dismiss his direct appeal.” These claims
are unclear. First, Johnson cites U.S. v. Mannino (2000) 212 F.3d 835, a case
that found counsel deficient for overlooking a meritorious sentencing issue.
(Id. at p. 845.) But the error Johnson raises concerning his attorney’s
performance is disproven by the record. His attorney did notify him. A
declaration attached to the Delgadillo brief indicates that counsel
communicated to Johnson “that a brief on his behalf [had] been filed
according to the procedures outlined in [Delgadillo].” Counsel additionally
informed Johnson of his right to file a letter or supplemental brief to raise
any issues he chose to call to the court’s attention, which Johnson elected to
submit. Further, to assist Johnson in that effort, he was provided a copy of
the record and his counsel’s Delgadillo brief, the contents of which indicated
that counsel found no arguable issues for appeal after conducting a thorough
review of the record. While Johnson may disagree with his attorney’s
assessment, that does not—by itself—constitute ineffective assistance of
counsel. The Delgadillo brief did not waive Johnson’s ability to raise his own

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issues on appeal; it invited his supplemental brief and asked this court to
conduct its own review of the record to guard against possible error.
Johnson claims his attorney should have “moved appellant to dismiss
his direct appeal.” Here, it is unclear which case Johnson references as his
direct appeal: docket A166220 (the direct appeal from his jury trial) or the
present appeal from his denied motions. Either way, he provides no basis
upon which to evaluate the merits of the dismissal he seeks. Johnson makes
no meaningful attempt to explain how or why counsel’s alleged failure to act
was constitutionally deficient or how that deficiency prejudiced his defense.
(Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687; People v. Centeno (2014)
60 Cal.4th 659, 674–675 [“ ‘Unless a defendant establishes the contrary, we
shall presume that “counsel's performance fell within the wide range of
professional competence and that counsel’s actions and inactions can be
explained as a matter of sound trial strategy” ’ ”].) Independently, we find no
support in the record or the supplemental brief for Johnson’s claims.
Johnson’s brief next declares “[t]he legislation’s intent is to reduce the
prison population and to return the jurisdiction back to the trial court
pursuant to AB-600 [Assembly Bill No. 600 (2023–2024 Reg. Sess.)] and
Assembly Bill No. 2942.” He states, “It clearly raises the constitutionality of
these laws especially when these laws do not apply to similarly situated
individuals. The Equal Protection Clause forbids this type of action[] in civil
and criminal matters.” These statements provide no guidance concerning the
constitutional provision Johnson cites. He does not explain the result he
seeks and how it is supported by the law or by the facts of his case. The lack
of any coherent, developed argument on this point causes us to deem it
forfeited. (Pizarro v. Reynoso (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 172, 181 [the failure to

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provide coherent organization forfeits consideration of those arguments on
appeal].)
Johnson closes his supplemental brief by listing other relief he wants
but which we cannot provide. For example, he asks this court to grant his
direct appeal. If, by this, he refers to the issues decided in A166220, we have
no authority to modify that earlier opinion. Additionally, without
explanation or citation to authority, Johnson requests that we issue an order
to show cause as to why relief should not be granted and “remand this case
back to the trial court for further proceedings.” But he does not identify what
such an order and remand would require of the trial court. Nor does he cite
legal authority to support the requests, and we see none that applies to his
case.
“On appeal, we presume that a judgment or order of the trial court is
correct, ‘ “[a]ll intendments and presumptions are indulged to support it on
matters as to which the record is silent, and error must be affirmatively
shown.” ’ ” (People v. Giordano (2007) 42 Cal.4th 644, 666.) As an appellant
shouldering the burden of persuasion, here it was Johnson’s responsibility to
show error. (People v. JTH Tax, Inc. (2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 1219, 1237.)
“ ‘[O]ne cannot simply say the court erred, and leave it up to the appellate
court to figure out why.’ ” (Ibid.; Meridian Financial Services, Inc. v. Phan
(2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 657, 684 [court of appeal “is not required to develop the
parties’ arguments or search the record for supporting evidence and may
instead treat arguments that are not developed or supported by adequate
citations to the record as waived”].) This is the problem for most of Johnson’s
claims, as discussed above. He has not met his burden to show error by the
trial court, and we treat his undeveloped points as waived. (Nelson v.

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Avondale Homeowners Assn. (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 857, 862.) Our own
independent review finds no error with the trial court’s rulings.
DISPOSITION
The trial court’s order is affirmed.

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_________________________
Smiley, J.

WE CONCUR:

_________________________
Humes, P.J.

_________________________
Langhorne Wilson, J.

People v. Johnson A171462

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