CourtListener 10754094•People v. Johnson CA2/7
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Filed 12/11/25 P. v. Johnson CA2/7
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SEVEN
THE PEOPLE, B322580
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. MA073696)
v.
DEONTA DARRELL JOHNSON,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Daviann L. Mitchell, Judge. Affirmed.
Mark Yanis, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Noah P. Hill and Heidi Salerno,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
________________________
INTRODUCTION
Deonta Darrell Johnson appeals his conviction and
sentence for the murder of John Ruh. He argues that the trial
court erroneously admitted hearsay statements from his
accomplice Denmonne Lee, improperly instructed the jury it
could consider “anything that [it] observed about the defendant
while in the courtroom,” and that the court coerced the jury into
reaching a guilty verdict. As to his sentence, Johnson argues
that the trial court abused its discretion by denying the People’s
motion to dismiss Johnson’s special circumstance and firearm
enhancements.
We affirm. The trial court did not err by admitting Lee’s
statements as statements against Lee’s penal interest, nor did
the court coerce the deadlocked jury. While the court erroneously
instructed the jury it could consider “anything that [it] observed”
about Johnson during trial, the error was not structural error or
federal constitutional error but instead was state law error, and
Johnson does not demonstrate prejudice on this record.1 We
further conclude that Johnson’s claim of sentencing error is moot.
1 As further explained in the discussion, we previously issued
an order to show cause returnable in the trial court based on
Johnson’s petition for writ of habeas corpus alleging that the
judge’s answer to the jury’s question violated the federal
constitution and the California Racial Justice Act (Pen. Code,
§ 745). We express no opinion on the outcome of that habeas
petition, which includes consideration of evidence outside the
appellate record in this case.
2
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. The Information
On September 3, 2019, Johnson was charged with murder
(Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a))2 with the special circumstance of
robbery (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)). The information further alleged
Johnson personally used (§ 12022.53, subd. (b)) and intentionally
discharged a firearm (§ 12022.53, subd. (c)), resulting in death or
great bodily injury (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)).3
B. The Trial Evidence
Johnson was tried by jury. At trial, the People introduced
evidence demonstrating the following. On February 18, 2018,
Ruh was working as a clerk at The Dairy, a convenience store in
Lancaster. Around 8:00 a.m., Johnson and Lee entered the store
and asked Ruh for a cigarette. Lee handed Ruh a dollar.
Johnson stepped behind the sales counter and showed Ruh a gun,
saying, “Get to the register, right now. [Expletive], I’ll shoot
you.” Ruh replied, “With what? . . . A pellet gun?” Johnson shot
Ruh once, but the gun jammed. Johnson cleared the jam and
shot Ruh two more times. Johnson attempted to open the
register, and he and Lee left The Dairy. Ruh sustained three
gunshot wounds and died at the scene.
2 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
3 The information also alleged Johnson committed the crime
for the benefit of a criminal street gang (§ 186.22,
subds. (b)(1)(C), (b)(4)), but this allegation was dismissed on the
People’s motion before trial.
3
Using images of Johnson and Lee from surveillance footage
near The Dairy, the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department
created a wanted flyer and held a press conference in March 2018
“seeking the public’s assistance in trying to identify the[se] two
individuals.” About one week later, the sheriff’s department
received a call from Lee’s girlfriend at the time, Monae Hawkins.
Hawkins identified Lee as one of the suspects depicted on the
flyer, and she told law enforcement that Lee had admitted to her
he was the person on the flyer. Hawkins also reported that Lee
told her Johnson was the shooter, although Hawkins only
provided Johnson’s first name and his nickname, “Fat Boy.”
Hawkins testified at trial that she was dating Lee at the
time and knew Johnson through Lee. At the time of the shooting,
Hawkins, Johnson, and Lee were all living in Lee’s mother’s
home. Sometime after the shooting, when Lee and Hawkins were
alone at Lee’s mother’s house, Lee showed Hawkins a photo from
the wanted flyer and asked, “Does that look like me?” Hawkins
told Lee that it did look like him, and the other photo on the flyer
looked like Johnson. A few days later, Lee showed Hawkins the
flyer again while the two were in the car at a gas station and
asked again whether the photo looked like him. Hawkins
repeated that the photo looked like Lee.
Lee then told Hawkins what happened the day the man
was killed at The Dairy. Lee stated that “Fat Boy said, ‘Let’s go
hit a liq at The Dairy,’” meaning “let’s go rob a [liquor] store.”
Lee said that Fat Boy wanted to rob The Dairy “[b]ecause there’s
an old man that worked there” and “[h]e thought that would be
easy.” Lee described that he and Johnson “walked to the store,”
Lee brought his gun, and Lee “handed the gun to Fat Boy.” Lee
and Johnson went into the store, and Johnson told Ruh to “put
4
his hands up,” Ruh complied, “and Fat Boy just shot him, I guess,
just for no reason.” Hawkins testified that, according to Lee, “Fat
Boy told him, ‘I’m just going to use the gun to scare the clerk,’”
“[b]ut instead, like, he shot him.” Lee told Hawkins he was
“scared” when Johnson shot Ruh.
Hawkins did not ever hear Johnson talk about what
happened at The Dairy. Hawkins asked Johnson at Lee’s
mother’s house “if he killed that man,” and Johnson responded,
“‘Yeah, you know I did,’ and chuckled.”
Hawkins was aware that Lee had a gun, and she saw the
gun “a lot of times” before and after the shooting took place. She
testified that Lee’s mother disposed of the gun sometime after the
shooting.
Hawkins testified that she reported Lee’s statements to the
police by calling the number on the wanted flyer. Hawkins
acknowledged that she later spoke with Lee and his lawyer and
told them her report to police was false. Hawkins testified she
was “scared” because Lee asked her to speak to his lawyer and
Lee wrote a “weird song” about Hawkins saying she “snitched”
and threatening to “shoot [her] through [her] eyes.” But after
Hawkins recanted to Lee’s lawyer, she contacted police again and
told them her recantation was “a lie.”
After Johnson impeached Hawkins’s testimony, the People
introduced as a prior consistent statement a recording and
transcript of Hawkins’s call on March 13 reporting Lee to the
police. The People similarly introduced a recording and
transcript of a police interview with Hawkins on April 23, where
she confirmed the details of her earlier report.
5
Johnson did not testify and introduced no evidence in his
defense. Lee, who was separately tried in juvenile proceedings,
invoked his Fifth Amendment right not to testify at Johnson’s
trial.
C. Johnson’s Conviction and Sentence
The jury convicted Johnson of first degree murder, finding
the special allegations true. Johnson was sentenced to a life term
without the possibility of parole.
Johnson timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
A. Lee’s Hearsay Statements Were Admissible
Johnson argues Lee’s statements about the shooting were
improperly admitted as hearsay through Hawkins’s testimony.
He asserts Lee’s statements were inadmissible as declarations
against penal interest because the statements were unreliable
and not against Lee’s penal interest. Johnson further contends
the admission of these statements violated the confrontation
clause of the Sixth Amendment.
1. Additional Procedural History
Before trial, the People indicated that Hawkins would
testify as to Lee’s statements about the robbery. The People
sought to introduce these hearsay statements as declarations
against Lee’s penal interest because Lee “admitted that he was
part of a felony murder plot to rob The Dairy that turned into a
murder,” and the statements were trustworthy because they were
“made to his girlfriend, not to law enforcement.”
6
Johnson objected, arguing Lee’s statements were not
trustworthy because they showed Lee’s “desire to get the gun out
of [his] hand and into somebody[] else[’s].” Johnson argued that,
when Lee made the statements to Hawkins, he “was worried that
there’s a flyer that looks like him and he might be sometime soon
thereafter arrested,” so he wanted to “make sure that it’s known
he’s not the one that fired the bullet that killed the individual.”
In Johnson’s view, Lee had “tremendous incentive to do that . . .
the minute he starts becoming worried that he is possibly being
sought in a murder situation.”
The court ruled that Lee’s hearsay statements were
admissible through Hawkins’s testimony. The court deemed the
statements trustworthy because Lee was “speaking from personal
knowledge” and “talking to his girlfriend when she didn’t even
initiate the conversation,” and the statements were made “in
confidence and [within an] intimate relationship.” The court also
noted that although Lee named Johnson as the shooter, “the
videotape [of the shooting] corroborates Mr. Lee,” because the
shooter and the non-shooter were of “distinctly different sizes,”
and Johnson’s counsel conceded that the shooter did not “have a
build similar to Mr. Lee.” The court further ruled that Lee’s
statements were not testimonial within the meaning of the
Sixth Amendment.
2. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by
Concluding Lee’s Statements Were Declarations
Against Penal Interest
a. Governing Law and Standard of Review
Evidence Code section 1230 provides, in relevant part:
“Evidence of a statement by a declarant having sufficient
7
knowledge of the subject is not made inadmissible by the hearsay
rule if the declarant is unavailable as a witness and the
statement, when made . . . so far subjected him to the risk of . . .
criminal liability . . . that a reasonable man in his position would
not have made the statement unless he believed it to be true.” To
secure admission of a hearsay statement against the declarant’s
penal interest, “[t]he proponent of such evidence must show that
the declarant is unavailable, that the declaration was against the
declarant’s penal interest when made and that the declaration
was sufficiently reliable to warrant admission despite its hearsay
character.” (People v. Duarte (2000) 24 Cal.4th 603, 610-611
(Duarte).) Here, Johnson and the People agree Lee was
unavailable as a witness because he had invoked his Fifth
Amendment right against self-incrimination.
“[T]he rationale underlying the [declaration against penal
interest] exception is that ‘a person’s interest against being
criminally implicated gives reasonable assurance of the veracity
of his statement made against that interest,’ thereby mitigating
the dangers usually associated with the admission of out-of-court
statements.” (People v. Grimes (2016) 1 Cal.5th 698, 711
(Grimes).) Accordingly, the focus of the exception “is the basic
trustworthiness of the declaration.” (People v. Frierson (1991)
53 Cal.3d 730, 745 (Frierson).) “‘The decision whether
trustworthiness is present requires the court to apply to the
peculiar facts of the individual case a broad and deep
acquaintance with the ways human beings actually conduct
themselves in the circumstances material under the exception.
Such an endeavor allows, in fact demands, the exercise of
discretion.’” (Ibid.) “We review the application of the statement
against interest exception to the particular facts of a case for
8
abuse of discretion, but whether a trial court has correctly
construed Evidence Code section 1230 is a question of law that
we review de novo.” (People v. Flinner (2020) 10 Cal.5th 686, 735
(Flinner).)
b. Against Declarant’s Interest
Johnson argues Lee’s statements were not truly against his
penal interest because “they primarily served to minimize his
own culpability” while “placing the great weight of the blame for
the crime” on Johnson.
The California Supreme Court has stated that a hearsay
statement that is “‘in part inculpatory and in part exculpatory
(e.g., one which admits some complicity but places the major
responsibility on others)’” does not qualify as a statement against
penal interest. (Duarte, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 612.) This is
because “‘declarations against penal interest may contain self-
serving and unreliable information’” in an “‘attempt[] to shift
blame or curry favor.’” (Id. at pp. 611-612, quoting Williamson v.
United States (1994) 512 U.S. 594, 603 (Williamson).) “Whether
a statement is self-inculpatory or not can only be determined by
viewing the statement in context.” (People v. Lawley (2002)
27 Cal.4th 102, 153 (Lawley); see Duarte, at p. 612.) “‘The
question . . . is always whether the statement was sufficiently
against the declarant’s penal interest “that a reasonable person
in the declarant’s position would not have made the statement
unless believing it to be true,” and this question can only be
answered in light of all the surrounding circumstances.’”
(People v. Cortez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 101, 127 (Cortez), quoting
Williamson, at pp. 603-604.)
9
The trial court did not abuse its discretion by determining
that Lee’s statements were against his penal interest. Lee
admitted to joining Johnson in the robbery of The Dairy and
giving Johnson his gun to threaten the victim. Although Lee
stated Johnson was the shooter and he did not know that
Johnson would kill Ruh, Lee’s statements implicated himself in
the robbery, placed himself at the scene of the murder, and
identified his firearm as the murder weapon. (See People v.
Smith (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 766, 792 (Smith) [statements
disserved declarant’s penal interest by “put[ting] her at the scene
of a burglary, robbery, and murder” and showing “she was there
to assist [defendant] and was willing to follow his directions,”
despite “portray[ing] [declarant] as the more passive
participant”]; People v. Wilson (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 271, 276
[statement that declarant hid the gun that defendant had used to
shoot victims was against her penal interest, and “[t]he fact that
the statement is also disserving to [defendant] does not render
the statement unreliable and inadmissible”]; cf. People v. Vasquez
(2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 609, 624-628 [statement not against
penal interest where declarant disclaimed any involvement in the
robbery and assault by defendant].) At the time, as far as Lee
knew, police had not identified the suspects in the murder, and
they were asking the public for information. (See Cortez, supra,
63 Cal.4th at p. 127 [declarant’s knowledge of the ongoing
criminal investigation may demonstrate that his statement is
against his penal interest if the statement could lead to his
apprehension].) Given these circumstances, the trial court did
not abuse its discretion by determining a reasonable person in
Lee’s position would not have made the statements unless he
believed them to be true. (See ibid.)
10
Johnson argues that Lee’s statements were far more
inculpatory of Johnson than Lee, “[b]ecause Lee took minimal
responsibility for the robbery and put all the blame for the
murder on [Johnson].” Johnson asserts that “Lee knew he was in
trouble and was trying to find a way to minimize his criminal
exposure.” But “the fact a hearsay statement portrays the
declarant as a more minimal participant in a crime by itself does
not require exclusion or end our analysis. . . . Only when there is
both blame shifting by the declarant and other circumstances
suggest some improper motive for the blame shifting have courts
found admission of a hearsay statement error.” (Smith, supra,
12 Cal.App.5th at p. 792; see People v. Gordon (1990) 50 Cal.3d
1223, 1252 (Gordon) [rejecting defendant’s argument that a
statement against penal interest was “untrustworthy” and
“exculpatory” because “the criminal liability that the statement
risks is not the highest,” where the declarant’s liability was
“significant nonetheless” and other circumstances indicated
reliability], overruled on another point in People v. Edwards
(1991) 54 Cal.3d 787, 835.) As we discuss further in the following
section, Johnson does not identify any particular circumstances
suggesting that Lee had a motive to lie to Hawkins or shift blame
to Johnson during their conversation. (See Cortez, supra,
63 Cal.4th at p. 128 [affirming admission of statements where
“the context in which [declarant] made the statements . . . does
not suggest that [he] was trying to improve his situation with
police”]; cf. People v. Gallardo (2017) 18 Cal.App.5th 51, 74-75
(Gallardo) [statements were not against penal interest where
they were given in response to “leading questions or narrative
statements by . . . informants” and declarant “complained that
11
law enforcement and a ‘snitch’ were trying to pin all of the blame
for the offenses on him”].)
c. Sufficiently Trustworthy and Reliable
Johnson similarly argues that Lee’s statements were
untrustworthy and unreliable because they were self-serving.
“‘In determining whether a statement is truly against interest
within the meaning of Evidence Code section 1230, and hence is
sufficiently trustworthy to be admissible, the court may take into
account not just the words but the circumstances under which
they were uttered, the possible motivation of the declarant, and
the declarant’s relationship to the defendant.’” (Grimes, supra,
1 Cal.5th at p. 711; Frierson, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 745.)
The trial court did not abuse its discretion by determining
Lee’s statements were trustworthy and reliable under the
circumstances in which they were made. Lee made the
statements to his then girlfriend Hawkins when the two were
alone at his home, then alone in the car. (See Flinner, supra,
10 Cal.5th at p. 736 [statements “sufficiently reliable” where
declarant “made the statements to a close friend, first at an
intimate dinner and then in the privacy of his home”]; Cortez,
supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 128 [“the context in which [declarant]
made the statements—a conversation with a close family member
in an apartment he frequented—does not suggest that [declarant]
was trying to improve his situation with police” and instead
“‘promoted truthfulness’”]; Smith, supra, 12 Cal.App.5th at p. 793
[statements that “were informal and made in the presence of
friends” possessed “a great deal of reliability”].) Hawkins did not
ask Lee about the robbery; instead, Lee raised the topic by
showing her the wanted flyer and volunteering the story. (See
12
People v. Arceo (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 556, 577 [affirming
admission of statements that “were not made in a custodial
context,” but in “‘“the most reliable circumstance,”’ that is, ‘“one
in which the conversation occurs between friends in a noncoercive
setting that fosters uninhibited disclosures”’”].)
Johnson relies on Williamson, supra, 512 U.S. 594, Duarte,
supra, 24 Cal.4th 603, People v. Robinson (1991) 229 Cal.App.3d
1620, and People v. Shipe (1975) 49 Cal.App.3d 343 as
“authorities requir[ing] exclusion of Lee’s statements because
they were only relatively inculpatory while placing far greater
blame on [Johnson].” These cases, however, involved statements
made in police custody. (See Williamson, at pp. 596-597, 601;
Duarte, at pp. 611, 614; Robinson, at pp. 1623, 1625; Shipe, at
p. 353.) As the California Supreme Court has noted, “the entire
rationale underlying the against penal interest hearsay exception
‘breaks down in a situation where a declarant in police custody
seeks to exculpate himself by implicating another suspect.’”
(Duarte, at p. 618.) Because Lee’s statements were made under
different noncustodial circumstances, these cases offer no support
for Johnson’s argument.
Johnson also cites Lawley, supra, 27 Cal.4th 102 and
People v. Smith (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 914, overruled on another
ground as recognized in People v. Garcia (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th
261, 291-292. Johnson argues that these cases demonstrate that
“a statement made to a friend or acquaintance” is not always
trustworthy or reliable. (See Lawley, at p. 152 [declarant
speaking to fellow prison inmate]; Smith, at p. 919 [declarant
speaking to girlfriend].) But in both cases, the hearsay
statements at issue were not “specifically disserving of [the
declarant’s] interests” and were inadmissible for that reason.
13
(Lawley, at p. 154; see Smith, at p. 922.) By contrast, as stated,
the trial court here did not abuse its discretion by concluding that
Lee’s statements to Hawkins were specifically disserving of Lee’s
penal interest.
Finally, Johnson argues that the trial court misapplied
Evidence Code section 1230 by finding that Lee’s statements
were reliable because they were corroborated by the surveillance
video of the shooting. In the related context of the Sixth
Amendment right to confrontation, the United States Supreme
Court has rejected that “evidence corroborating a hearsay
statement may properly support a finding that the statement
bears . . . trustworthiness guarantees,” “since this would permit
admission of presumptively unreliable statements, such as those
made under duress, by bootstrapping on the trustworthiness of
other evidence at trial.” (Idaho v. Wright (1990) 497 U.S. 805,
806.) Even if the trial court erred by considering the surveillance
video in assessing the reliability of Lee’s statements, “‘“we review
the ruling, not the court’s reasoning and, if the ruling was correct
on any ground, we affirm.”’” (People v. Brooks (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1,
39; see People v. Chism (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1266, 1295, fn. 12
[affirming on a different “theory of admissibility” that the trial
court did not abuse its discretion by admitting certain evidence].)
Here, as stated, the trial court also determined that Lee’s
statements were reliable and trustworthy because they were
spontaneously made to his girlfriend in a private setting. We
affirm the court’s decision to admit the statements on this basis.
14
3. Admitting Lee’s Statements Did Not Violate the
Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment
a. Governing Law and Standard of Review
The Sixth Amendment protects a criminal defendant’s right
to “confront[] . . . the witnesses against him.” (U.S. Const., 6th
Amend.) “‘If a hearsay statement is being offered by the
prosecution in a criminal case,’” and the declarant is unavailable
for cross-examination, “‘[a]dmission of such a statement violates
the right to confrontation if the statement is testimonial.’”
(People v. Fayed (2020) 9 Cal.5th 147, 168; accord, People v.
Sanchez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 665, 680.)
Testimonial statements are those “given in the course of an
interrogation or other conversation whose ‘“primary purpose . . .
is to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later
criminal prosecution.”’” (People v. Rangel (2016) 62 Cal.4th 1192,
1214 (Rangel); accord, People v. Silveria and Travis (2020)
10 Cal.5th 195, 291, fn. 26.) “‘[T]he question is whether, in light
of all the circumstances, viewed objectively, the “primary
purpose” of the conversation was to “creat[e] an out-of-court
substitute for trial testimony.”’” (Rangel, at pp. 1214-1215.)
Specifically, “[t]he statements and actions of both the declarant
and [recipient] provide objective evidence of the primary purpose”
of the conversation. (Michigan v. Bryant (2011) 562 U.S. 344,
367.) We independently review whether a statement was
testimonial. (See People v. Ramirez Ruiz (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th
809, 825; People v. Nelson (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 1453, 1466.)
The trial court did not err by concluding Lee’s statements
were not testimonial under the circumstances. “‘[S]tatements
made to someone who is not principally charged with uncovering
and prosecuting criminal behavior are significantly less likely to
15
be testimonial than statements given to law enforcement
officers.’” (Rangel, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 1214.) This is because
“the confrontation clause addresse[s] the specific concern of ‘[a]n
accuser who makes a formal statement to government officers’
because that person ‘bears testimony in a sense that a person
who makes a casual remark to an acquaintance does not.’”
(People v. Gutierrez (2009) 45 Cal.4th 789, 812-813.) Further,
there is no evidence that, when privately speaking to his
girlfriend, Lee “anticipated his statements would ‘“be used
prosecutorially.”’” (Gallardo, supra, 18 Cal.App.5th at p. 68 [no
confrontation clause violation]; see Crawford v. Washington
(2004) 541 U.S. 36, 51 [“casual remark to an acquaintance” is not
testimonial]; Gutierrez, at pp. 812-813 [declarant’s statement to a
family member not testimonial].) There is also no indication that
Hawkins sought Lee’s statements for the purpose of creating
evidence to prosecute Lee or Johnson because Hawkins did not
ask any questions and merely responded to Lee’s questions about
the wanted flyer. Given these circumstances, Lee’s remarks were
not testimonial, and their admission did not violate the
confrontation clause.
B. The Trial Court Erred by Telling the Jury It Could
Consider “Anything that [It] Observed” Regarding Johnson,
but Johnson Does Not Demonstrate Prejudice
Johnson argues the trial court violated his Sixth and
Fourteenth Amendment rights by affirmatively answering a
question from the jury during deliberations that it could use
“anything that [it] observed about the defendant while in the
16
courtroom.” We agree the court erred, but conclude Johnson has
not demonstrated prejudice based on the record before us.4
1. Additional Procedural History
During jury deliberations, the jury sent the court a
question asking, “Can we use anything that we observed about
the defendant while in the courtroom?” The court held the
following colloquy with Johnson’s counsel and the prosecution:
Court: My belief is the answer is yes. Jury instruction
CALCRIM 222 tells them: You must disregard
anything you saw or heard when court was not
in session even if it was done or said by one of
the parties or witnesses.
4 While his appeal was pending, Johnson filed a petition for
writ of habeas corpus in this court. The petition alleged the trial
court’s instruction to the jury violated the Fifth, Sixth, and
Fourteenth Amendments, as well as the California Racial Justice
Act (§ 745). The petition included new evidence outside the trial
record, including a juror statement about the jury’s deliberations.
We issued an order to show cause on Johnson’s habeas
petition returnable in the trial court, where the proceedings are
ongoing. Because the habeas petition is based on a different
record than the one before us, we make no determination on the
merits of Johnson’s habeas petition. (See In re Figueroa (2018)
4 Cal.5th 576, 587 [“Habeas relief may be warranted when the
invalidity of a judgment is not apparent from the record on
appeal.”]; In re Carpenter (1995) 9 Cal.4th 634, 646 [“Appellate
jurisdiction is limited to the four corners of the record on
appeal.”].)
17
We were always in session when the jury was
present. We were always here and everything
was done on the record. . . . I think the answer
is yes.
[Prosecutor]: I agree.
Court: One of the issues is . . . the shooter, I think, is
left handed; is that correct?
[Prosecutor]: Yes.
Court: And I believe the defendant at times was
writing notes and he did have access to water.
So they could have observed if he was right
handed or left handed. I don’t specifically
recall seeing him writing, but I do remember
him having notes. They could have observed
his tattoos. They can observe his general build.
He’s a large man and they called him Fat Boy.
And that’s no disrespect to you, but that was
the nickname that was used attributed to him
and he’s physically a large man.
So I think that’s all fair game. It’s no different
than doing an ID and showing a picture and
letting them look at the defendant, and say,
does this look like him to me? They don’t have
to rely specifically on the testimony only, they
can use their own observations of what’s going
on.
So I think the simple answer is yes.
18
[Defense Your Honor, I do not know of any case law,
counsel]: statutory law, that would establish that the
answer to the juror’s question would be no. So
I don’t have any argument to make on that in
that way. The defense would submit at this
time.
The trial court responded “Yes” to the jury’s question.
2. Governing Law and Standard of Review
The Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments guarantee a jury
verdict “based on evidence received in open court.” (Sheppard v.
Maxwell (1966) 384 U.S. 333, 351; see id. at p. 362; see also
Taylor v. Kentucky (1978) 436 U.S. 478, 485; Turner v. Louisiana
(1965) 379 U.S. 466, 472.) This principle “‘goes to the
fundamental integrity of all that is embraced in the
constitutional concept of trial by jury.’” (People v. Nesler (1997)
16 Cal.4th 561, 578 [“‘Due process means a jury capable and
willing to decide the case solely on the evidence before it.’”].) Due
process prohibits a conviction based on “outside influence”
(Sheppard, at p. 351; see Turner, at pp. 473-474) or “on grounds
of official suspicion, indictment, continued custody, or other
circumstances not adduced as proof at trial” (Taylor, at p. 485).
“‘The touchstone of due process is fundamental fairness’”
(People v. Lemcke (2021) 11 Cal.5th 644, 655 (Lemcke)), but “‘the
category of infractions that violate “fundamental fairness”’” is
‘“very narrow[]’” (Estelle v. McGuire (1991) 502 U.S. 62, 73
(Estelle)). This is because “‘[b]eyond the specific guarantees
enumerated in the Bill of Rights, the Due Process Clause has
limited operation.’ [Citations.] The Bill of Rights speaks in
explicit terms to many aspects of criminal procedure, and the
19
expansion of those constitutional guarantees under the open-
ended rubric of the Due Process Clause invites undue
interference with both considered legislative judgments and the
careful balance that the Constitution strikes between liberty and
order.” (Medina v. California (1992) 505 U.S. 437, 443 (Medina);
see Marshall v. Lonberger (1983) 459 U.S. 422, 438, fn. 6 [due
process does not entail “a finely tuned review of the wisdom of
state evidentiary rules”].)
“A jury instruction may ‘“so infuse[] the trial with
unfairness as to deny due process of law.”’ [Citation.] However,
‘“not every ambiguity, inconsistency, or deficiency in a jury
instruction rises to the level of a due process violation. The
question is ‘“whether the ailing instruction . . . so infected the
entire trial that the resulting conviction violates due process.”’”’”
(Lemcke, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 655; accord, People v. Huggins
(2006) 38 Cal.4th 175, 192; see Donnelly v. DeChristoforo (1974)
416 U.S. 637, 643 [“‘it must be established not merely that the
instruction is undesirable, erroneous, or even “universally
condemned,” but that it violated some right which was
guaranteed to the defendant by the Fourteenth Amendment”’].)
If the instruction is ambiguous, “we inquire ‘whether there is a
reasonable likelihood that the jury has applied the challenged
instruction in a way’ that violates the Constitution.” (Estelle,
supra, 502 U.S. at p. 72.) We consider the jury instruction “‘“in
the context of the instructions as a whole and the trial record.”’”
(Lemcke, at p. 655.)
Evidence of a defendant’s physical appearance is not
constitutionally protected. Under the Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination, a criminal defendant cannot be
compelled to testify at trial (see Spielbauer v. County of Santa
20
Clara (2009) 45 Cal.4th 704, 714), and his decision not to testify
may not be cited as evidence of guilt (see Griffin v. California
(1965) 380 U.S. 609, 615). But the Fifth Amendment affords “‘no
protection against compulsion to submit to fingerprinting,
photographing, or measurements, to write or speak for
identification, to appear in court, to stand, to assume a stance, to
walk, or to make a particular gesture.’” (United States v. Dionisio
(1973) 410 U.S. 1, 6.) Accordingly, as the trial court noted, the
Constitution does not prohibit a jury from considering a
defendant’s physical appearance in connection with the trial
evidence. (See Schmerber v. California (1966) 384 U.S. 757, 763-
764 (Schmerber) [comparing defendant’s facial features with
photographic evidence]; accord, People v. Montalvo (1971)
4 Cal.3d 328, 335 [ascertaining defendant’s age as an element of
the crime].)
But a nontestifying defendant’s demeanor or conduct in the
courtroom does not generally constitute evidence of guilt. (See
People v. Garcia (1984) 160 Cal.App.3d 82, 91 (Garcia); accord,
People v. Bloom (2022) 12 Cal.5th 1008, 1048; People v. Boyette
(2002) 29 Cal.4th 381, 434 (Boyette) [comment on “defendant’s
courtroom demeanor” as evidence of guilt is “improper . . . unless
such comment is simply that the jury should ignore a defendant’s
demeanor”]; People v. Prince (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 848, 855; but
see People v. Foster (1988) 201 Cal.App.3d 20, 25 [defendant’s
“throat-slitting gesture” toward a witness during trial was
admissible and relevant to consciousness of guilt].) This is
because “a defendant’s nontestimonial conduct in the courtroom
does not fall within the definition of ‘relevant evidence’ as that
which ‘tends logically, naturally, [or] by reasonable inference to
prove or disprove a material issue’ at trial. [Citations.] Neither
21
can it be properly considered by the jury as evidence of
defendant’s demeanor since demeanor evidence is only relevant
as it bears on the credibility of a witness. (Evid. Code, § 780.)”
(Garcia, at p. 91; accord, Boyette, at p. 434.) Drawing attention to
a nontestifying defendant’s behavior or demeanor may also
“infringe[] on the defendant’s right not to testify” under the Fifth
Amendment. (Boyette, at p. 434; accord, People v. Heishman
(1988) 45 Cal.3d 147, 197, abrogated on another ground by
People v. Diaz (2015) 60 Cal.4th 1176, 1190, 1195.)
We review de novo a constitutional claim on undisputed
facts. (See People v. Frazier (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 858, 864; see
In re Taylor (2015) 60 Cal.4th 1019, 1035 [“‘[w]hen the
application of law to fact is predominantly legal, such as when it
implicates constitutional rights . . . [our] review is de novo”’].) We
address the applicable harmless error standard in the discussion
below.
3. The Court’s Response to the Jury’s Question Was
Erroneous5
Here, the jury could draw several “‘permissible inferences’”
from its observations of Johnson during trial. (People v. Albarran
(2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 214, 229 (Albarran); accord, People v.
5 Although Johnson did not object to the instruction at trial,
he argues that the instruction affected his substantial rights.
(See § 1259 [appellate court may “review any instruction
given . . . even though no objection was made thereto in the lower
court, if the substantial rights of the defendant were affected
thereby”]; People v. Mitchell (2019) 7 Cal.5th 561, 580
[“[defendant] claims that the flawed instructions deprived him of
due process, and because this would affect his substantial rights
if true, his claim is not forfeited”].)
22
Fuiava (2012) 53 Cal.4th 622, 697; see People v. Coneal (2019)
41 Cal.App.5th 951, 972.) As the trial court noted in its colloquy
with counsel, the jury could consider Johnson’s “tattoos,” his
“general build,” and whether he was “right handed or left
handed” in determining Johnson’s guilt. To the extent the court’s
answer to the jury’s question allowed the jury to consider
Johnson’s physical appearance in this manner, the trial court did
not err. (See Garcia, supra, 160 Cal.App.3d at p. 91, fn. 7 [a jury
may “view[] the defendant’s physical appearance to see if it
comports with a physical description given by a witness or to
determine if the physical appearance of a defendant supports a
factual finding that must be made by the trier of fact”].)
To be sure, the court did not so instruct the jury and the
jury did not merely ask whether it could consider Johnson’s
physical appearance for identification purposes, but rather
whether it could consider “anything that [it] observed about the
defendant while in the courtroom.” The court should have
advised the jury that it could not consider Johnson’s behavior or
demeanor in court as evidence of his guilt because Johnson did
not testify, and thus his demeanor was not relevant to the
matters at trial. (See Garcia, supra, 160 Cal.App.3d at
pp. 91-92.) The court’s answer to the jury’s question was thus
erroneous as it failed to advise the jury that Johnson’s behavior
or demeanor was irrelevant. (See id.)
The California Constitution provides that “trial error does
not merit reversal of a judgment unless ‘the error complained of
has resulted in a miscarriage of justice.’” (People v. Lightsey
(2012) 54 Cal.4th 668, 699.) “‘Error that occurs during the
presentation of the case to the jury is generally trial error; an
error that erroneously adds to or subtracts from the record before
23
the jury can “be quantitively assessed in the context of the other
evidence presented in order to determine whether its admission
was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” [Citations.] A court
in such circumstances can meaningfully ask “whether the guilty
verdict actually rendered in this trial was surely unattributable
to the error.”’” (People v. Anzalone (2013) 56 Cal.4th 545, 553-554
(Anzalone).) If the error is constitutional, we apply the standard
of Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 and must “reverse
the conviction unless the People can demonstrate that the error
was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” (People v. Reese (2017)
2 Cal.5th 660, 671; see Chapman, at p. 26.) If it was state law
error, under People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818 (Watson) the
error is generally harmless unless “the defendant has
demonstrated that it is ‘“reasonably probable that a result more
favorable to the appealing party would have been reached in the
absence of the error.”’” (People v. Gonzalez (2018) 5 Cal.5th 186,
195 (Gonzalez); see Watson, at p. 836.)
By contrast, “‘certain errors, by their nature, result in a
“miscarriage of justice” within the meaning of the California
harmless-error provision requiring reversal without regard to the
strength of the evidence received at trial.’” (In re Christopher L.
(2022) 12 Cal.5th 1063, 1073, quoting People v. Cahill (1993)
5 Cal.4th 478, 493.) Structural error may result from “a violation
of state law or federal constitutional law.” (Gonzalez, supra,
5 Cal.5th at p. 196.) Examples include “deprivation of the right
to counsel,” “denial of the right to trial by an impartial judge,”
when a party is not permitted to “present its entire case before
the trier of fact,” and “improper discrimination in jury selection.”
(In re Christopher L., at p. 1073.) Structural errors “are those
that go to the very construction of the trial mechanism” and
24
“require[] per se reversal because it cannot be fairly determined
how a trial would have been resolved if the grave error had not
occurred. For example, it would be impossible to divine how a
trial would have proceeded if a defendant had been allowed
counsel or the trial judge not been biased.” (Ibid.) There is a
“strong presumption” that an error is susceptible to harmless
error analysis, with structural error being a “rare case.”
(Anzalone, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 554.)
Based on the record presently before us (and as further
explained below), the trial court’s error was not structural, but
susceptible to harmless error analysis because it was state law
instructional error or at most involved evidentiary error that
merely “erroneously adds to or subtracts from the record before
the jury.” (Anzalone, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 553.) Indeed, the
California Supreme Court has consistently analyzed similar
claims for harmless error. (See People v. Houston (2012)
54 Cal.4th 1186, 1223 [prosecutor’s comment on nontestifying
defendant’s “demeanor or behavior” was harmless “under the
applicable federal or state standard of review”]; Boyette, supra,
29 Cal.4th at p. 437 [same].)
a. Structural Error
Johnson asserts the court’s instruction constituted
structural error and reversal is mandatory. He contends the
instruction permitted the jury to use “unadmitted pseudo-
evidence to decide [his] guilt” “after evidence had closed, the
parties made their arguments, and [Johnson] had no chance to
respond.”
In support, Johnson relies heavily on a federal appellate
case, United States v. Noushfar (9th Cir. 1996) 78 F.3d 1442
25
(Noushfar). In that case, the district court “allowed the jury to
take to the jury room fourteen tapes that had not been played in
the courtroom” without any instructions. (Id. at p. 1444.) The
tapes contained “many potentially incriminating conversations
with the defendants” from an undercover investigation. (Ibid.)
The Ninth Circuit reversed the defendant’s conviction, based on a
likely confrontation clause violation and a violation of “one of the
most fundamental tenets of our justice system: that a defendant’s
conviction may be based only on the evidence presented during
the trial.” (Id. at p. 1445.) The court determined the error was
structural because it “violate[d] the basic framework of the trial
system, which requires that evidence be presented and tested in
front of the jury, judge and defendant.” (Ibid.)
The error in Noushfar differs from the error in this case. In
Johnson’s case, there was no additional substantive evidence
introduced to the jury during deliberation and no subversion of
the regular trial process. Rather, the jury asked and was
instructed that it could consider information about Johnson that
it had previously observed firsthand in open court. (See People v.
Gurule (2002) 28 Cal.4th 557, 598, fn. 8 [“‘It is a fundamental
assumption of the adversary system that the trier of fact observes
the accused throughout the trial, while the accused is either on
the stand or sitting at the defense table.’”], quoting Riggins v.
Nevada (1992) 504 U.S. 127, 142; accord, Garcia, supra,
160 Cal.App.3d at p. 91, fn. 7 [it is “routine practice” for a jury to
“view[] the defendant’s physical appearance”].) For these
reasons, we reject Johnson’s claim of structural error and review
for harmless error.
26
b. Federal Constitutional Error
Johnson next argues the court’s instruction violated his
federal due process rights by rendering the trial fundamentally
unfair. (See People v. Sullivan (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 524, 549
[“‘it is the appellant’s burden to affirmatively demonstrate
error’”]; accord, People v. Sanghera (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 1567,
1573.) But as stated, the federal Constitution does not require
“‘an exclusion of [a defendant’s] body as evidence when it may be
material.’” (Schmerber, supra, 384 U.S. at p. 763.)
Although evidence of Johnson’s courtroom demeanor or
behavior was not legally relevant, the consideration of such
evidence does not necessarily violate federal due process. (See
Andrew v. White (2025) 604 U.S. 86, 93, fn. 3 (Andrew) [noting
that the United States Supreme Court precedent has not held
“that the introduction of all irrelevant evidence violates the Due
Process Clause,” but “rather, that due process protects
defendants from the introduction of evidence so prejudicial as to
affect the fundamental fairness of their trials”].) On the record
before us, there is no indication the jury’s potential consideration
of Johnson’s behavior or demeanor was “so prejudicial as to affect
the fundamental fairness of [his] trial[].” (Id. at p. 93, fn. 3; see
id. at p. 87 [allowing habeas claim to proceed based on allegation
that “irrelevant” evidence of defendant’s “sex life and about her
failings as a mother and wife” violated due process]; People v.
Garcia (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 302, 315-316 [“potentially
inflammatory” evidence of defendant’s “sexual orientation was
not relevant to motive or any other issue in the case,” violating
due process]; Albarran, supra, 149 Cal.App.4th at pp. 228, 230
[similar, as to “irrelevant” evidence “identifying other gang
members and their unrelated crimes,” which was “extremely and
27
uniquely inflammatory”].) Without any similar inflammatory or
prejudicial evidence of Johnson’s demeanor or conduct appearing
in the appellate record before us, we cannot conclude there was a
“‘reasonable likelihood’” that the jury applied the trial court’s
response to the jury’s question in a way that violated Johnson’s
federal due process rights. (Estelle, supra, 502 U.S. at p. 72.)
Citing United States v. Carroll (4th Cir. 1982) 678 F.2d
1208, Johnson argues the court’s instruction violated his
constitutional rights. In Carroll, the prosecutor argued in closing
that the defendant was guilty of a bank robbery because, during
the trial, the defendant and his attorney examined photographs
of the bank in evidence. (Id. at p. 1209.) The prosecutor argued
that the defendant “knew more about the pictures than the
lawyer did,” and “the reason he knew so much about those
pictures is because he was in the bank there at the robbery.”
(Ibid.) The appellate court reversed the conviction, holding that
the Fifth and Sixth Amendments are violated when “the
prosecutor describes the courtroom behavior of a defendant who
has not testified, and then goes on to tell the jury that it may
consider that behavior as evidence of guilt.” (Id. at p. 1210.) The
court concluded that the prosecutor’s comment infringed on the
defendant’s “right to counsel, including the right to assist his
counsel in his own defense.” (Id. at p. 1209.)
Unlike the prosecutor in Carroll, here the trial court did
not identify or emphasize any specific instances of Johnson’s
behavior or demeanor and then tell the jury it could consider
such evidence as evidence of his guilt. Nor can the trial court’s
one word answer (“Yes”) to the jury’s question be reasonably
construed as casting aspersions on Johnson’s exercise of his
constitutional rights not to testify and to participate in his
28
defense. (See Medina, supra, 505 U.S. at p. 443 [in the context of
criminal procedure, due process operates to secure “‘the specific
guarantees enumerated in the Bill of Rights’”].)
c. Johnson Demonstrates State Law Error, but
Not Prejudice under Watson
As stated, to the extent the court’s answer to the jury’s
question allowed the jury to consider irrelevant demeanor or
conduct evidence, Johnson has demonstrated state law error only.
(See Garcia, supra, 160 Cal.App.3d at p. 91 [“a defendant’s
nontestimonial conduct in the courtroom does not fall within the
definition of ‘relevant evidence’”]; accord, Boyette, supra,
29 Cal.4th at p. 434; see Evid. Code, §§ 350 [“No evidence is
admissible except relevant evidence.”], 780, subd. (a) [demeanor
evidence relevant to testifying witness].) For state law errors, we
review for prejudice under the Watson standard: whether the
defendant has demonstrated “‘that it is reasonably probable that
a result more favorable to [him] would have been reached in the
absence of the error.”’ (See People v. Hernandez (2011) 51 Cal.4th
733, 746.) “‘“[A] ‘probability’ in this context does not mean more
likely than not, but merely a reasonable chance, more than an
abstract possibility.”’” (Richardson v. Superior Court (2008)
43 Cal.4th 1040, 1050 (Richardson).)
On the record before us, Johnson does not show prejudice.
As noted, Johnson does not identify any particular instance of his
conduct or demeanor during the proceedings that might have
influenced the jury’s verdict, such as a disruption or emotional
display, or interactions with others. (See, e.g., Boyette, supra,
29 Cal.4th at p. 434 [defendant “smiling and waving” at jury];
Garcia, supra, 160 Cal.App.3d at p. 87 [defendant “jeering or
29
making facial motions of jest” during the trial].) Additionally, as
the trial court identified during its colloquy with counsel outside
the presence of the jury, the prosecutor argued in closing that
Johnson had “distinctive tattoos on his wrist on his right hand”
and that surveillance footage depicted the shooter “pulling and
tugging” on his right sleeve to “basically cover[] up his entire
hand.” The prosecutor further argued that the jury should
“consider” that the shooter was “left-handed.” The prosecutor
focused on Johnson’s physical characteristics, and it would be
speculative to conclude the jury saw or relied on something not
reflected in the record. (Cf. People v. Hendrix (2022) 13 Cal.5th
933, 946 [considering “whether the nature of the evidence leaves
us ‘“in serious doubt as to whether the error affected the
result”’”].)
Johnson argues that he suffered prejudice “because the jury
hung and eventually found [him] guilty, [and] there is more than
a reasonable probability that, with the court’s permission, at
least one juror used unadmitted uncrossed ‘evidence’” of his
demeanor or conduct. Without any indication in the record before
us that the jury used or perceived such evidence and considered it
for an improper purpose, however, Johnson has not demonstrated
a “reasonable chance” that the trial court’s erroneous instruction
contributed to the verdict. (Richardson, supra, 43 Cal.4th at
p. 1051; cf. People v. Peters (1972) 23 Cal.App.3d 522, 535
[introduction of irrelevant evidence was harmless where the
jury’s interpretation of the evidence was “a matter of
speculation”].)
30
C. The Trial Court’s Instruction Directing Further Jury
Deliberation was Not Erroneous
Johnson next argues the court delivered a coercive
instruction when the jury announced it could not reach a verdict.
We determine the trial court did not err.
1. Additional Procedural History
On the second day of jury deliberations, the jury sent the
court a note that it was unable to reach a verdict. Defense
counsel asked the court to declare a mistrial, and the prosecutor
asked the court to order further deliberations. The court noted it
did not think the jury had “been deliberating for a long time,” and
“[t]hey’ve asked for no assistance, no read back, they have not
asked for anything from the court.” The court indicated it would
instruct the jury to keep deliberating using the “Moore Whaley
instruction” from People v. Moore (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 1105
(Moore) and People v. Whaley (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 968
(Whaley). Defense counsel reviewed and did not object to this
instruction.
The jury subsequently requested and received readback of
Hawkins’s trial testimony. The jury then returned a guilty
verdict on all counts.
2. Governing Law and Standard of Review
“‘Except as provided by law, the jury cannot be discharged
after the cause is submitted to them until they have agreed upon
their verdict and rendered it in open court, unless by consent of
both parties . . . or unless, at the expiration of such time as the
court may deem proper, it satisfactorily appears that there is no
reasonable probability that the jury can agree.” (§ 1140.) “The
31
determination whether there is reasonable probability of
agreement rests in the sound discretion of the trial court.”
(People v. Miller (1990) 50 Cal.3d 954, 994.) “‘Although the court
must take care to exercise its power without coercing the jury
into abdicating its independent judgment in favor of
considerations of compromise and expediency [citation], the court
may direct further deliberations upon its reasonable conclusion
that such direction would be perceived “‘as a means of enabling
the jurors to enhance their understanding of the case rather than
as mere pressure to reach a verdict on the basis of matters
already discussed and considered.’”’” (People v. Debose (2014)
59 Cal.4th 177, 209 (Debose).) The trial court may not improperly
coerce a deadlocked jury by singling out jurors in the minority to
reconsider their views, expressing an opinion that a verdict
should be reached, indicating that the case will be retried if the
jury could not agree, or emphasizing the costs of the trial and
retrial. (See People v. Reed (2018) 4 Cal.5th 989, 1015; People v.
Hinton (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 655, 660 (Hinton).) Rather, the
trial court should “convey[] that jurors d[o] not need to reach a
verdict, and that they should not acquiesce in a verdict with
which they d[o] not agree.” (Reed, at p. 1016.)
We review the trial court’s direction to a deadlocked jury
for abuse of discretion. (See Debose, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 209;
accord, People v. Breaux (1991) 1 Cal.4th 281, 319 (Breaux).)
“Any claim that the jury was pressured into reaching a verdict
depends on the particular circumstances of the case.” (People v.
Pride (1992) 3 Cal.4th 195, 265; accord, Breaux, at p. 319.)
32
3. The Trial Court’s Instruction Was Not Coercive
Johnson argues the instruction “expressly communicated to
[the] jurors, especially the dissenters, that the court expected
them to reach a verdict,” it “discouraged the dissenting jurors
from holding their positions, and it minimized the importance of
the dissenting juror(s)’ positions and the seriousness of the
consequences to the defendant.” Johnson concedes, however, that
“the instructions here did not expressly single out dissenting
jurors” and “the court acknowledged that the jury might not be
able to reach a verdict.” For instance, the court’s instruction
stated: “You should try to agree on a verdict if you can. Each of
you must decide the case for yourself but only after you have
discussed the evidence with the other jurors.” Johnson also
acknowledges that a “nearly identical” instruction was upheld in
Moore, supra, 96 Cal.App.4th 1105, but he contends that Moore
was wrongly decided.
First, we note that Johnson forfeited any objection to the
instruction given by the trial court. (See People v. Butler (2009)
46 Cal.4th 847, 882, fn. 18 [holding forfeited a claim of coercive
deadlock instruction and noting “that defense counsel’s failure to
object tends to ‘indicate[] that the potential for coercion argued
now was not apparent to one on the spot’”].) Second, Johnson
provides no persuasive basis to depart from Moore. (See Whaley,
supra, 152 Cal.App.4th at p. 982 [rejecting defendant’s argument
that “Moore was wrongly decided and should not be followed”];
Hinton, supra, 121 Cal.App.4th at p. 661 [describing Moore
instruction as “a model for how to instruct the jury following its
initial deadlock”].)
33
Further, under the circumstances presented, the court’s
instruction was not coercive. The instruction did not single out
jurors in the minority and did not emphasize the costs of the trial
or a potential retrial. (See Breaux, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 320 [no
abuse of discretion where “[t]he judge made no threats, no
statements that could be interpreted as exerting undue pressure
on any juror”]; cf. Hinton, supra, 121 Cal.App.4th at pp. 659-660
[coercive instruction to “instruct[] jurors holding a minority
position to question that position in light of the majority’s view”
and “indicate[] the case would be retried if the jury could not
agree”].) Moreover, the deadlock instruction stated that the
jurors should try to reach a verdict “if you can do so without . . .
violence to your own individual judgment.” The court
emphasized that “[b]oth the People and the defendant are
entitled to [the] individual judgment of each juror.” (See Breaux,
at p. 320 [judge “did not indicate that a verdict had to be reached
and reminded the jurors of their right to an individual opinion”];
People v. Sheldon (1989) 48 Cal.3d 935, 960 [same].)
D. Johnson’s Claim of Sentencing Error Based on Special
Directive 20-08 is Moot
Johnson also argues the trial court abused its discretion by
declining to consider Special Directive 20-08 when it denied the
People’s motion to dismiss Johnson’s special circumstance and
firearm enhancements. He requests that “the matter should be
remanded for the court to consider Special Directive 20-08 in
deciding whether to grant the prosecutor’s motion.”
Section 1385 authorizes the trial court to “dismiss an
enhancement if it is in the furtherance of justice to do so.”
(§ 1385, subd. (c)(1).) At the time of Johnson’s sentencing in
34
2022, former Los Angeles County District Attorney George
Gascon had issued Special Directive 20-08, “instruct[ing] deputy
district attorneys in pending cases to move to dismiss or
withdraw sentence enhancement allegations” under section 1385.
(Nazir v. Superior Court (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 478, 486 (Nazir).)
Before Johnson’s trial, the People moved to “dismiss all alleged
special circumstances, sentencing enhancements, alleged strikes
(if any) and alleged allegations” in Johnson’s case pursuant to
Special Directive 20-08. The trial court denied the People’s
motion, stating it would not consider “what may happen in the
future with Mr. Gascon’s policies” but “only the case that’s before
me,” and that it determined dismissal was not in the interests of
justice.
Johnson’s claim of error is now moot. On December 3,
2024, newly elected Los Angeles County District Attorney
Nathan Hochman issued Special Directives 24-04 and 24-05,
which rescinded Special Directive 20-08.6 We can no longer
provide Johnson with the relief he requests because Special
Directive 20-08 is no longer in effect and would not bear on the
trial court’s sentencing decision on remand. (See In re D.P.
(2023) 14 Cal.5th 266, 276 [“A case becomes moot when events
‘“render[] it impossible for [a] court, if it should decide the case in
favor of [appellant], to grant him any effect[ive] relief.”’”];
6 On our own motion, we take judicial notice of Special
Directives 24-04 and 24-05. (See Nazir, supra, 79 Cal.App.5th at
p. 487, fn. 2 [judicially noticing special directive under Evid.
Code, § 452, subd. (c), as a policy of an executive agency].)
35
cf. Ghost Golf, Inc. v. Newsom (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 88, 97
[appeal was moot where executive order at issue was rescinded].)7
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
MARTINEZ, P. J.
We concur:
SEGAL, J. FEUER, J.
7 As the trial court erred only in one respect, and this error
was nonprejudicial, we reject Johnson’s claim of cumulative error.
(See People v. Thomas (1992) 2 Cal.4th 489, 544 [cumulative
error claim “must fail” when based on one “nonprejudicial”
error].)
36
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