People v. Wilson CA1/5

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Filed 12/9/25 P. v. Wilson CA1/5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule
8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

THE PEOPLE, A170683
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. (San Francisco City and County
ZURI A. WILSON, Super. Ct. Nos. CRI-13028170,
SCN225664)
Defendant and Appellant.

In 2021, we reversed Zuri A. Wilson’s murder conviction
based on the prosecution’s unlawful withholding of exculpatory
evidence under Brady v. Maryland (1963) 373 U.S. 83 (Brady).
(See People v. Wilson (Jan. 19, 2021, A157230) [nonpub. opn.]
(Wilson).) On remand, after the trial court denied Wilson’s
motion to dismiss the indictment based on the Brady error, a jury
convicted Wilson in a new trial. Wilson now asserts that, to
remedy the Brady error, the court should have either dismissed
the indictment or, at a minimum, issued an instruction informing
the jury about the prosecution’s misconduct. Further, he
contends that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing the
prosecution’s ballistics expert to opine that cartridge casings
found at the crime scene were fired from a gun found at an
apartment associated with Wilson. We affirm.

1
BACKGROUND

1.

The background facts are primarily taken from this court’s
unpublished opinion in Wilson, supra, A157230. In 2019, Wilson
was tried and convicted for the murder of Shawnte Otis, who was
shot and killed by two assailants outside a public housing project
in San Francisco. (Ibid.; See Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a)1.)

The victim’s aunt witnessed the shooting and was able to
describe one of the two shooters: a light-skinned black male who
was 5 feet 9 inches to 6 feet 1 inch tall. Physical evidence from
the scene indicated that the shooters used a nine-millimeter
pistol and a .45-caliber handgun with RWS brand ammunition.
Shortly after the shooting, an eyewitness reported seeing two
men run to a charcoal-colored Nissan parked nearby and drive
away.

Wilson came to the police’s attention because he was
recorded on a surveillance video driving a gray Nissan near the
crime scene a couple hours before the shooting. The police
subsequently concluded from his cell phone records that his
phone was in the vicinity of the shooting the same afternoon and
that the phone left the area after the shooting. Searches of an
apartment on Montoya Street in San Pablo, which the police
believed was associated with Wilson, turned up a nine-millimeter
pistol as well as .45-caliber RWS brand bullets. The apartment
had multiple beds and closets, and a lease, bills, and other
documents seized by the police contained the names of several
individuals other than Wilson.

At his trial, Wilson argued that the prosecution’s evidence
was entirely circumstantial and failed to prove that he was one of
the assailants. Wilson, a light-skinned black male who is 5 feet 7

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2
inches tall, did not entirely match the description given by Otis’s
aunt. The prosecution introduced no physical evidence that
connected him to the crime. DNA testing on the nine-millimeter
gun and the RWS ammunition excluded Wilson as a source of the
DNA. Instead, the DNA of one of his associates, Vernon C., was
found on the nine-millimeter pistol and the DNA of an unknown
female was found on the bullets. Further, although Wilson
sometimes stayed at the Montoya Street apartment, there was
evidence that other people had access to the apartment, including
Vernon C. The police never identified the second shooter.

2.

In his earlier appeal, we reversed Wilson’s conviction
because the prosecution’s failure to disclose exculpatory evidence
until halfway through the trial prejudiced his case and violated
his due process rights under Brady, supra, 373 U.S. 83. (Wilson,
supra, A157230.) The evidence withheld by the prosecution
consisted of eight pages of the lead police investigator’s
chronological report dating from late 2013 and 2014, which
detailed steps taken to investigate the shooting. (See Wilson,
supra, A157230.)

Our 2021 decision held that entries in the chronological
report relating to three areas of investigation were both favorable
to Wilson and material to his case. (See Wilson, supra, A157230.)
First, the chronological report contained evidence that another
individual, Quinten M., had a motive to kill Otis based on an
ongoing, violent feud between the two. (Ibid.) A San Francisco
Police Department sergeant believed that, a few months before
Otis was murdered, Quinten M. had hired two shooters, Stephone
B. and David H., to murder Otis’s cousin in San Francisco. (Ibid.)
Police believed that Quinten M. ordered the hit on Otis’s cousin
in retribution for Otis’s murder of Quinten M.’s cousin. (Ibid.)
The police excluded Stephone B. and David H. as suspects in
Otis’s killing, however, because cell phone numbers they had

3
been using five months earlier were not documented as being in
the vicinity at the time of the crime. (Ibid.)

Second, the chronological report contained entries about a
suspect named Jacque B., another associate of Quinten M.’s, who
matched the description of the shooter provided by Otis’s aunt.
(See Wilson, supra, A157230.) Jacque B. was known to use a
nine-millimeter pistol with an extended magazine, and a
confidential informant had reported that Jacque B. was the
second shooter along with Wilson. (Ibid.) The lead investigating
officer wrote in the chronological report: “ ‘It should be noted that
Jacque B[.] fits the description of the 2nd shooter, which is unique
as the 2nd shooter was tall, skinny, and a light skinned [black
male]. The 2nd shooter also used a 9mm pistol with an extended
magazine.’ ” (Ibid.)

Third, the chronological report contained the name and
address of Kenneth L., one of the leaseholders of the Montoya
Street apartment, whom the defense had been unable to locate by
the time of the first trial. (See Wilson, supra, A157230.)
Kenneth L. had told police that he had sublet the apartment to a
woman who provided access to Wilson, and he provided the
woman’s name. (Ibid.)

The evidence of other suspects and the tenants of the
Montoya Street apartment withheld by the prosecution could
potentially have been used by the defense to counter the
prosecution’s case on the identity of the shooters and undermine
the prosecution’s theory that the nine-millimeter pistol belonged
to Wilson. (See Wilson, supra, A157230.) But by the time the
information was disclosed in 2019, in the middle of the trial, we
held, “the prosecution had already presented 16 of its 19
witnesses, and it was too late for the defense to track down
multiple leads and multiple individuals, at least one of whom was
dead, and reconfigure the defense’s theory of the case
midstream.” (Ibid.) Given the heavily circumstantial nature of

4
the prosecution’s case, with no motive, no DNA evidence
connecting Wilson to the crime, and no second shooter, we held
that the withholding of the evidence until mid-trial undermined
our confidence in the outcome of the trial. (Ibid.) As a result, we
reversed the judgment and remanded the case for further
proceedings in the trial court. (Ibid.)

3.

Under section 1262, the reversal of a judgment against a
criminal defendant is “deemed an order for a new trial, unless the
appellate court shall otherwise direct.” On remand, however,
Wilson filed a motion to dismiss the indictment with prejudice.
He asserted that because the prosecution’s delay precluded him
from effectively investigating the exculpatory material at issue, it
was impossible for him to receive a fair trial, so “dismissal [wa]s
the only appropriate remedy.” He also asserted that dismissal
was necessary because the prosecution’s withholding of the
evidence constituted “ ‘outrageous government misconduct.’ ”
The People argued in opposition that the delayed disclosure was
unintentional and a new trial is the proper remedy for a Brady
violation. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss, reasoning
that Wilson had failed to justify such an “extreme sanction.”

Wilson also filed a motion to exclude expert testimony that
cartridge casings recovered from the crime scene were fired from
the nine-millimeter gun found in the Montoya Street apartment.
He argued that firearm toolmark evidence—based on comparison
of physical markings left on expended cartridge casings by
guns—is not generally accepted by the relevant scientific
community and is therefore inadmissible under the test in People
v. Kelly (1976) 17 Cal.3d 24 for expert opinions that are based on
new scientific techniques. As relevant here, he also contended
that the prosecution expert’s opinion that the recovered
cartridges were fired from a specific gun is not supported by the
material relied upon by the expert, and so is inadmissible under

5
Evidence Code sections 801, subdivision (b), and 802. Wilson’s
motion relied on detailed declarations from two experts as well as
academic studies criticizing the validity of firearm toolmark
analysis based on concerns including the lack of scientific studies
documenting the underlying theory, the employment of subjective
criteria, and the error rate.

In opposing Wilson’s motion, the People argued that their
expert’s opinion was supported by accepted techniques and they
submitted a competing expert declaration supporting the validity
of firearm toolmark analysis. In addition, the People represented
that their ballistics expert would not state their opinions to any
specific degree of scientific or statistical certainty, make claims
that their opinion is “infallible,” or “use the unqualified term
‘match.’ ” Further, the People asserted that their expert would
“not testify that their opinion ‘is to the exclusion of all other
firearms,’ instead, their testimony will be that they ‘cannot
exclude all other firearms,’ as they have not tested every firearm
in the world.”

The trial court accepted the People’s proposed limitations
on the scope of the expert’s testimony and denied Wilson’s
motion.

The second trial, as described by Wilson, was largely “a
repeat of the first” trial. As relevant here, Megan Pytlik, the
People’s expert firearm and toolmark examiner, testified about
her examination of the nine-millimeter cartridge casings
recovered from the crime scene. After comparing one of those
casings to casings produced from test-firing the nine-millimeter
pistol from the Montoya Street apartment, she testified that it
was her subjective opinion that the casings were fired from the
same gun. The defense did not put on any new evidence based on
the disclosure of the information in the chronological report.

The jury in the second trial found Wilson guilty of first
degree murder (§ 187, subd. (a); count one) and unlawful
6
possession of a firearm by a felon (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1); count
two).2 As to count one, the jury found true the allegations that
Wilson personally and intentionally discharged a firearm and
personally used a firearm in the commission of the offense (§§
12022.53, subd. (d), 12022.5, subd. (a)); the jury also found true
the alleged special circumstance that the murder was committed
by means of lying in wait (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(15)).

The trial court sentenced Wilson to life without the
possibility of parole as to count one and a consecutive term of 25
years to life for the firearm allegation pursuant to section
12022.53, subdivision (d). The court struck the additional
firearm allegation pursuant to section 12022.5, subdivision (a).
As to count two, the court imposed but stayed the term of two
years in prison.

DISCUSSION

A.

Wilson challenges the trial court’s denial of his motion to
dismiss the indictment based on the prosecution’s Brady error.
Whether we review the issue independently or for abuse of
discretion, we conclude that the trial court correctly denied the
motion. (Compare People v. Uribe (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 836,
857 (Uribe) [independently reviewing the trial court’s granting of
a motion to dismiss for outrageous government misconduct on
remand after appellate reversal for Brady error] with People v.
Velasco-Palacios (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 439, 445 [reviewing
motion to dismiss for prosecutorial misconduct for abuse of
discretion] and People v. Jenkins (2000) 22 Cal.4th 900, 951
(Jenkins) [recognizing that “courts have broad discretion in
determining the appropriate sanction for discovery abuse”].)

2 For purposes of count two, Wilson had admitted to having

prior felony convictions.
7
1.

Wilson asserts that “a retrial is inadequate to resurrect
appellant’s right to a fair trial” and “[t]he only fair remedy at this
point is dismissal.”

When the prosecution has committed a Brady violation, the
trial court has discretion to determine an appropriate remedy to
ensure that the defendant receives a fair trial. (See People v.
Fultz (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 395, 432 (Fultz) [after affirming the
trial court’s findings of Brady error and other prosecutorial
misconduct, remanding the case to the trial court “because it is in
the best position to fashion a remedy adequate to ensure
defendant’s fair trial”]; see also Jenkins, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p.
951.) Although a new trial is usually the most serious remedy for
a Brady violation, additional or alternative remedies may be
necessary where a new trial, without more, will not ensure that
the trial will be a fair one. (See People v. Kasim (1997) 56
Cal.App.4th 1360, 1382, 1387 (Kasim); Virgin Islands v. Fahie
(3d Cir. 2005) 419 F.3d 249, 254-255). For example, outright
dismissal may be appropriate in Brady cases where a fair trial is
impossible due to the prosecution’s “gross and intentional”
misconduct. (People v. Garcia (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 1169, 1183;
see Fultz, at p. 431; see also People v. Ramirez (2006) 141
Cal.App.4th 1501, 1503, fn. 1 [recognizing that “bad faith Brady
errors may warrant dismissal”]; Uribe, supra, 199 Cal.App.4th at
p. 841 [“A court may dismiss an information in an extreme case
to address outrageous governmental conduct”]; Jenkins, at p. 951
[recognizing that “appropriate” sanctions for the prosecution’s
suppression of evidence may include dismissal].) Section 1054.5,
subdivision (c), which addresses sanctions for discovery violations
in a criminal case, similarly recognizes the “judicial power to
dismiss charges for a Brady violation.” (People v. Gutierrez
(2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 343, 352.)

8
However, “[d]ismissal of charges is an extraordinary
remedy . . . reserved for the few cases where conduct by the
prosecution has completely eliminated the possibility of a fair
retrial.” (Kasim, supra, 56 Cal.App.4th at p. 1387; see United
States v. Pasha (D.C. Cir. 2015) 797 F.3d 1122, 1139 (Pasha)
[“dismissal is appropriate only as a last resort, where no other
remedy would cure [the] prejudice against a defendant” caused by
a Brady violation]; Mendibles v. Superior Court (1984) 162
Cal.App.3d 1191, 1198 (Mendibles) [“lesser sanctions must be
utilized by the trial court,” in lieu of dismissal, “unless the effect
of the prosecution’s conduct is such that it deprives defendant of
the right to a fair trial”].) Remedies for Brady error short of
dismissal may include, in the context of a new trial, striking
prosecution evidence, excluding a prosecution witness,
instructing the jury about the prosecution’s misconduct, levying a
monetary sanction, or other mitigating measures. (Pasha, at p.
1139; United States v. Cloud (9th Cir. 2024) 102 F.4th 968, 981;
Jenkins, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 951.) Similarly, where a party
has improperly withheld evidence in violation of section 1054.5,
the court may order remedies including “delaying or prohibiting
the testimony of a witness or the presentation of real evidence,
continuance of the matter,” instructing the jury about the
untimely disclosure, “or any other lawful order.” (§ 1054.5, subd.
(b); see also Mendibles, at p. 1198 [“in the exercise of its
discretion the court may consider a wide range of sanctions which
our courts have imposed in response to prosecutorial violation of
discovery orders”]; CALJIC No. 2.28 [“Failure to Timely Disclose
Evidence”].)

Here, in denying the motion to dismiss, the trial court
properly recognized that “[t]he remedy of dismissal . . . is
extraordinary,” concluding that it requires “some showing . . .
beyond what has been made here to justify that extreme
sanction.” Wilson does not assert that the violation here was
intentional or in bad faith, nor would the record support such a
9
conclusion. When the trial court conducted a hearing, during the
first trial, on the circumstances of the prosecution’s delayed
disclosure, the court found no evidence that the prosecution
intentionally withheld evidence, and Wilson’s former trial counsel
agreed.

Even accepting for the moment that there may be
circumstances short of bad faith Brady error in which dismissal
is an appropriate remedy, we are unpersuaded that the record
here justifies dismissal.

Wilson’s argument for dismissal rests on the premise that
once the withheld pages of the chronological report were disclosed
in April 2019—three years after the prosecution became aware of
the material—the information was stale and effective
investigation of any potential leads was impossible for purposes
of a retrial. But the record provides weak support for Wilson’s
premise. In support of his motion to dismiss, Wilson submitted a
two-page declaration from a defense investigator, Keith
McArthur, stating that, by 2022, he was able to locate Kenneth
L., a tenant at the Montoya Street apartment, and Jacque B., a
potential suspect, but Kenneth L. had no additional information
to share about his former subtenant and Jacque B. declined to
cooperate with the investigation. Without additional information
from Kenneth L. about his subtenant, McArthur was unable to
locate her. Further, McArthur was unable to locate Stephone B.,
one of the two alleged assassins hired by Quinten M., and the
other assassin, David H., had died in 2016. Based on this
evidence, Wilson asserts that it was “impossible” to effectively
investigate the leads from the chronological report.

Although the passage of time can make it more difficult to
effectively investigate sources of exculpatory evidence, McArthur
was able to speak to two key witnesses—Kenneth L. and Jacque
B. Even though the interviews did not turn out to be fruitful, it
does not appear that either witness asserted an inability to recall

10
the relevant facts. Nor is there reason to believe in the
circumstances here that Jacque B., as a potential suspect, would
have been more likely to cooperate had the defense team been
able to contact him before the first trial. And as Wilson’s
attorney candidly acknowledged in the trial court, it would not be
realistic to expect that David H. and Stephone B.—even if the
defense were able to interview them—would simply confess to the
crime, rather than invoking their right to remain silent.

Moreover, apart from McArthur’s abbreviated declaration,
the record contains a dearth of information about investigative
avenues Wilson pursued based on the chronological report.
Wilson has not pointed to any evidence that effective
investigation of those leads, beyond the limited efforts described
in McArthur’s declaration, was impossible based on the passage
of time. Once the withheld records were disclosed, it was the
defense’s obligation to conduct a diligent investigation prior to
any retrial. (Cf. People v. Superior Court (Johnson) (2015) 61
Cal.4th 696, 715 [“ ‘when information is fully available to a
defendant at the time of trial and his only reason for not
obtaining and presenting the evidence to the Court is his lack of
reasonable diligence, the defendant has no Brady claim.’ ”].)

The record here indicates that, after the withheld portions
of the chronological report were first disclosed in 2019, the People
made the entire police file available to Wilson’s defense team in
October 2021, over two years before the 2024 retrial. Wilson’s
attorneys reviewed the police file and received copies of all
materials they flagged. In addition, the People provided
information to the defense about Quinten M.’s whereabouts, as
well as information about a female associate of his.

At the time of the Brady hearing in Wilson’s first trial,
counsel asserted to the trial court that had they received the
information about David H. and Stephone B. prior to trial, apart
from speaking to them, the defense “would have spoken to the

11
police[,] . . . gotten their RAP sheet and investigated the
homicide” allegedly connected to the feud between Otis and
Quinten M. “and see where it went.” Defense counsel
represented that “[a]s a defense lawyer, I would look to [the]
other [suspects]. And if police had reason to believe he could be
the second killer, I would want to push for discovery. We’d bring
discovery motions. We would do what we could do to flush it out
on. . . all three of these [suspects]. . . . [¶] Why is he a suspect to
the police and why did he stop being a suspect? Who is he? Who
is he related to? Is he connected to this area of the city, this
project?”

In our 2021 opinion, we noted, with respect to the team of
assassins associated with Quinten M., that “[t]he information
would have allowed the defense to discover the police reports and
track down witnesses. In addition, it would have enabled the
defense to investigate whether the modus operandi, location,
physical descriptions of the men hired by Quinten M. or other
circumstances of the cousin’s murder provide circumstantial
evidence that the same perpetrators were involved here.”
(Wilson, supra, A157230.)

Further, the withheld pages of the chronological report
contained numerous entries about investigative steps that the
lead investigating officer took, particularly with respect to Jacque
B., including searches conducted on his residence and phone,
interviews with his girlfriend, and information about his
girlfriend’s phone and social media accounts as well as Jacque
B.’s social media account. The chronological report also noted
information about persons allegedly murdered as part of Otis’s
feud with Quinten M., including specific dates, victim’s names,
and locations, as well as the names of the police officers who
provided the information to the lead investigating officer. All of
this information should have been accessible to Wilson’s defense

12
team, either as part of the police file they reviewed or through
other records requests to law enforcement agencies.

Despite the availability of numerous potential investigative
avenues apart from speaking to David H. and Stephone B.
themselves, the record lacks concrete evidence of any other
avenue that was closed to Wilson, notwithstanding diligent
efforts, because of the prosecution’s delayed disclosure. The
record does not reveal whether no efforts beyond those described
in McArthur’s declaration were undertaken by the defense,
whether further investigative steps were taken but the additional
information obtained was not helpful to Wilson’s defense, or
whether further efforts led to dead ends due to the passage of
time. Under these circumstances, the record falls short of
establishing that a fair trial was impossible because the
prosecution’s delay prevented Wilson from conducting an
effective follow-up investigation based on the withheld evidence.
The trial court did not err in denying the motion to dismiss.

2.

In the alternative, Wilson argues that the trial court should
have issued a curative instruction that informed the jury of the
prosecution’s Brady violation. (See, e.g., CALJIC No. 2.28.)
However, Wilson never requested a special jury instruction in
connection with his second trial, so the claim is forfeited3 (See

3 Wilson’s reply brief argues that even though his attorney

never requested the instruction at issue here, the trial court had
a sua sponte duty to issue it because “[h]aving rejected the
request for dismissal, it was obligated to find some other remedy”
for the Brady violation, and the trial court could not “simply
decide to do nothing, as this trial court did.” But Wilson
mischaracterizes the trial court’s action. Although the trial court
denied the request for a dismissal, the court afforded Wilson a
remedy in the form of a new trial. Further, Wilson does not
argue on appeal that we can review the instructional claim
13
People v. McGowan (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 1099, 1105
[explaining that “the burden of requesting supplemental . . .
instructions falls on the defendant, and failure to request such
instructions waives the contention of error”].) In a supplemental
brief, Wilson contends that his trial lawyer rendered ineffective
assistance by failing to request a jury instruction on the Brady
violation. Based on the record before us, we disagree.

To prevail, Wilson must show that his attorney’s
performance was deficient and that the error prejudiced his
defense, depriving him of a fair trial. (See Strickland v.
Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687.) But ineffective assistance
of counsel claims rarely succeed on direct appeal because the
appellate record seldom reflects trial counsel’s reasoning for an
action or omission. (See People v. Mickel (2016) 2 Cal.5th 181,
198 (Mickel).) In a direct appeal, the defendant must point to
“affirmative evidence that counsel had ‘ “ ‘no rational tactical
purpose’ ” ’ ” for the challenged action or omission. (Ibid; see also
People v. Mendoza Tello (1997) 15 Cal.4th 264, 267 (Mendoza
Tello).)

Wilson argues that the trial court should have instructed
the jury that the prosecution violated his constitutional rights by
withholding evidence from the defense, and that “the evidence
the prosecution failed to disclose suggested other suspects had a
motive to kill [Otis] and showed the possibility that the defendant
was not involved in this homicide.”4 As Wilson notes, his trial

despite his forfeiture under the substantial rights doctrine. (See,
e.g., People v. Choyce (2025) 18 Cal.5th 86, 107-108.)
4 Wilson asserts that “the trial court should have instructed

the jury that, 1) the prosecution had a duty to provide discovery
in a timely manner, that they violated that duty and withheld
evidence from the defense for a period of three years, 2) that this
dereliction of duty violated the defendant’s right to due process
and a fair trial, 3) that the evidence the prosecution failed to
disclose suggested other suspects had a motive to kill [Otis] and
14
counsel should have known that a jury instruction was a
potential remedy for Brady error because his prior attorney
requested a similar instruction in the first trial. According to
Wilson, “[c]learly, there was no downside to such an instruction.”

But the record here does not affirmatively rule out such a
downside. By the time of the second trial, Wilson’s defense team
had an opportunity to review the entire police file, including any
basis the police had for believing that Jacque B., Stephone B., or
David H. were involved in the shooting, as well as any reasons for
ultimately excluding them as suspects. For example, after
reviewing the police record, the defense elected not to present any
evidence concerning Jacque B. at the second trial, even though an
informant claimed he was one of the shooters. Although we do
not know what information the defense team gleaned about
Jacque B. from reviewing the police file, we know that they
ultimately determined that it was not helpful enough to the
defense to outweigh any potential pitfalls. Yet a jury instruction
that informed the jury that the withheld evidence “showed the
possibility that the defendant was not involved in this homicide”
could have invited the prosecution to introduce evidence
concerning Jacque B. to show that even if he was one of the two
shooters, it did not rule out Wilson’s involvement as the second
shooter. The prosecution could have potentially introduced
evidence that the reason the police investigated Jacque B. as a
potential suspect was that they received a tip that he was the
other shooter with Wilson; and the prosecution could have
introduced evidence explaining why the police decided they did
not have sufficient evidence to conclude Jacque B. was involved.

showed the possibility that the defendant was not involved in this
homicide, and 4) that the jury must consider this information in
determining whether appellant is guilty of the charges in this
case.”
15
Unlike Wilson’s trial counsel, we do not have the benefit of
having reviewed the entire police file and the results from any
follow-up investigation, so we cannot know the full scope of
potential drawbacks that may have been raised by the instruction
now advanced by Wilson. Faced with a silent record, we will not
assume that there was no satisfactory explanation for his trial
counsel’s actions. (See Mendoza Tello, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p.
267.)

B.

Wilson next contends that in his second trial, the trial court
abused its discretion in allowing the prosecution’s ballistics
expert to offer her opinion that a bullet recovered from the crime
scene was fired from the nine-millimeter pistol found in the
Montoya Street apartment. We disagree.

1.

At Wilson’s second trial, Megan Pytlik, the People’s
ballistics expert, testified that firearms identification “is a
discipline of forensic science that has as its primary purpose to
determine whether a bullet or a cartridge case were fired from a
particular firearm; or if there is no firearm, whether a group of
bullets or a group of cartridge cases were fired from the same
unknown firearm.” When asked how it was possible to determine
whether a bullet or cartridge was fired from a specific gun, Pytlik
explained that “[w]hen firearms are manufactured, there are
microscopic imperfections that are left on the interior surfaces of
the gun as a result of the manufacturing process.” According to
Pytlik, the tools used to manufacture firearms undergo
“microscopic” changes over time because “with each pass of a
piece of tooling machinery[,] on a microscopic level the surface of
that tool is changing.” Such changes in the tooling “result[] in
microscopic imperfections on each firearm that are specific to
that gun.” When ammunition is fired from a gun, the
ammunition—which is made of softer metal than the gun—
16
“comes into contact with the[] machined portions of the gun,”
causing “microscopic imperfections from [the] manufacturing” of
the gun to be “left on the fired ammunition components.”

Pytlik testified that she examined nine 9-millimeter
cartridge cases, observing them using a comparison microscope
that allowed her to view “two items simultaneously in the same
field of view.” Examining two cartridge cases side by side under
the microscope, she looked for “agreement” between the pattern
of striations on each cartridge. Relying on close-up photographs
of the cartridge cases that were entered into evidence and
projected on a screen for the jury, Pytlik testified that for each of
the nine cartridge cases, she observed “agreement of striations . .
. between each of the” nine cases in an area called “ ‘the firing pin
aperture shear mark.’ ” As a result of her observations, Pytlik
testified that it was her “opinion” that the nine cases were fired
from the same gun.

Pytlik further testified that she examined and tested a
nine-millimeter semi-automatic pistol. She test-fired the gun
into a water tank, which allowed her to recover the test-fired
cartridge cases and bullets from the gun. When she compared
the test-fired cartridge cases to one of the nine cartridge cases
recovered from the crime scene, she observed “sufficient
agreement” in the striations in the firing pin aperture shear
mark area to allow her to form the “opinion that these cartridge
cases were fired in the same firearm.” The prosecution put into
evidence the photographs that Pytlik took of the microscope
comparison she performed between the test-fired cartridge case
and the cartridge case recovered from the scene, and the
photographs were displayed to the jury during her testimony.

Pytlik acknowledged that “ultimately my decision about
whether I see enough agreement” to determine that a cartridge
case was fired from a particular firearm “is a subjective decision”
that is “based on my training, knowledge and experience.” Pytlik

17
explained: “[A]s part of my training, I looked at hundreds of items
that I knew were fired from the same gun, and I also looked at
hundreds of items that I knew were fired from different guns; and
in that way I learned what level of agreement can I expect to see
between two items from the same source, what level of
disagreement can I expect to see between items that have a
different source; and then on top of that, as a worst-case scenario,
I also look at items that were fired from consecutively
manufactured firearms.” According to Pytlik, “when I see
sufficient agreement, it means that what I’m seeing is consistent
with the agreement I’ve seen in the 10s of thousands of cartridge
cases that I examined, that were fired from the same gun, that it
exceeds the agreement that I have ever seen in two items
produced by different tools, different firearms.”

On cross-examination, Pytlik testified that her
methodology does not result in a “statistical calculation
concerning the likelihood of the [nine]-millimeter handgun
having fired th[e] [nine]-millimeter casings.” Further, there was
no minimum number of duplicated marks between two items
required for her to find “sufficient agreement” to reach an opinion
that the items were fired from the same gun. She explained:
“[u]ltimately my decision about whether I see enough agreement .
. . is subjective.”

Pytlik acknowledged that she was not able to say that the
nine-millimeter gun she tested was “the only possible firearm”
that could have fired the nine-millimeter cartridge cases
recovered from the scene. She explained, “[t]heoretically I cannot
exclude every firearm in the world” because it was not possible to
test every firearm in the world, “but . . . based on the amount of
agreement that I saw, in my opinion, I would not expect there to
be another firearm that would leave that much agreement.”
Pytlik later added that “[t]he amount of agreement demonstrated
in that comparison was textbook -- I would classify it as a large,

18
large amount of agreement, an easy conclusion to reach . . . .
[T]here was a significant amount of agreement.”

When asked if she could point to any studies supporting the
theory that “every single firearm leaves a different marking on
every bullet,” Pytlik described two “objective,” computer-aided,
academic studies “show[ing] that known-matched scenarios,
where items were fired from the same gun, demonstrate more
similarity than items that were fired from different firearms.”
Pytlik also acknowledged that other studies from the National
Research Council of the National Academy of Sciences and the
President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology
(PCAST) had criticized the field of firearm toolmark
identification for reasons including the subjectivity of the
opinions of toolmark examiners and the lack of objective
methodology.

Following Pytlik’s testimony, Gerald Andrew Smith, a
supervising criminalist at the same laboratory, testified that he
verified her work in this case. Specifically, he looked at the same
pieces of evidence that Pytlik examined, and, after examining
them under his microscope, he reached “the same exact opinion”
as Pytlik. Smith testified that he was aware of Pytlik’s
conclusion at the time he conducted his review, and he
acknowledged that such a non-blind review process could have a
“biasing effect” on the evaluation.

2.

Wilson does not argue on appeal that firearm toolmark
analysis is subject to the test set forth in Kelly, supra, 17 Cal.3d
24, for the admissibility of expert evidence based on new
scientific techniques, nor could he. (See People v. Cowan (2010)
50 Cal.4th 401, 470-471 (Cowan) [concluding that Kelly was
inapplicable to firearm toolmark analysis because the method
was neither a new scientific technique nor one that was
“ ‘unusually difficult for laypersons to evaluate’ ”].) Instead, he
19
contends that the trial court erred under Evidence Code sections
801 and 802 in allowing Pytlik to offer testimony that was the
“[f]unctional [e]quivalent of a [c]onclusion that the [c]rime [s]cene
[c]asings [c]ould [o]nly [h]ave been [f]ired by the [g]un” recovered
from the Montoya Street apartment. We will not overturn the
trial court’s decision to admit expert testimony unless it is “ ‘so
irrational or arbitrary that no reasonable person could agree with
it.’ ” (See Sargon Enterprises, Inc. v. University of Southern
California (2012) 55 Cal.4th 747, 773 (Sargon).)

In Sargon, our Supreme Court explained that trial courts
perform an important “gatekeep[ing]” function. (Sargon, supra,
55 Cal.4th at p. 771.) Under Evidence Code section 801,
subdivision (b), expert testimony must be “[b]ased on matter
(including h[er] special knowledge, skill, experience, training, and
education) perceived by or personally known to the witness or
made known to h[er] at or before the hearing, whether or not
admissible, that is of a type that reasonably may be relied upon
by an expert in forming an opinion . . . , unless an expert is
precluded by law from using such matter as a basis for h[er]
opinion.” Under Evidence Code section 802, the trial court may
require that a witness who is offering an opinion be examined
about the basis for the opinion, and the court may inquire into
whether the basis supplied “actually supports the expert’s
reasoning.” (Sargon, at p. 771.) The trial court must exclude
expert evidence if it is based on material that cannot be
reasonably relied upon, it is based on reasons unsupported by the
material relied upon, or it is speculative. (Id. at pp. 771-772.) In
performing this function, the trial court does not resolve scientific
disputes or rule on the expert opinion’s persuasiveness, but
instead “must simply determine whether the matter relied on can
provide a reasonable basis for the opinion or whether that
opinion is based on a leap of logic or conjecture.” (Id. at p. 772.)

20
Wilson relies on People v. Azcona (2020) 58 Cal.App.5th
504, 514 (Azcona), which held that a trial court erred in allowing
a ballistics expert to testify that the projectiles in question “came
from the same gun, ‘to the practical exclusion of all other guns.’ ”
The expert in Azcona testified that if he sees six matching marks
in a row, the match is “ ‘much more than can ever happen by
random chance,’ ” and that, with respect to the degree of scientific
certainty, “ ‘[i]t would be in the billions to be wrong on this.’ ” (Id.
at pp. 510, 515; id. at p. 519 [conc. opn. of Greenwood, P.J.].) The
only support for the expert’s claim of scientific certainty was that
he had “ ‘done numerous studies on the subject trying to see what
can happen by random chance.’ ” (Id. at p. 514.) Azcona held
that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing this
testimony because “[s]uch a purportedly infallible conclusion is a
leap too far from what the underlying method allowed.” (Ibid.)
Although the expert provided support for the conclusion that the
projectiles probably came from the same firearm, he provided no
basis for presenting his conclusion as a “scientific certainty.”
(Ibid.)

We disagree that Pytlik effectively testified “to a scientific
certainty” that the casings recovered from the crime scene were
fired from the gun found at the Montoya Street apartment.
Unlike the expert in Azcona, Pytlik did not portray her opinion as
objective truth or attempt to quantify her level of certainty.
Pytlik was clear that her opinion was entirely subjective, there
was no objective threshold for determining when there was
“sufficient agreement,” and there was no statistical calculation
indicating the level of accuracy of her conclusion. She also
admitted that she could not say that there was no other firearm
that could have fired the casings in question, although she
asserted that it would be impossible for her to rule out all other
firearms because she could not test every other firearm in the
world.

21
It is true that Pytlick also conveyed confidence in her
opinion, classifying the level of agreement as “textbook” and
stating that she would not expect to see the same level of
agreement if the casings were fired with a different gun. But her
admittedly subjective opinion was logically supported by “matter
(including [her] special knowledge, skill, experience, training, and
education) perceived by or personally known to” Pytlik. (Evid.
Code, § 801, subd. (b); see Azcona, supra, 58 Cal.App.5th at p. 514
[concluding that although “there was no basis to present it as a
scientific certainty,” the ballistics expert’s testimony provided
“support for the opinion that the projectiles likely came from the
same gun”].) It was primarily based on Pytlik’s experience
examining tens of thousands of casings, including items for which
there was known agreement and those for which there was
known disagreement. (See People v. Valencia (2021) 11 Cal.5th
818, 831, fn. 13 [“expert witnesses may acquire knowledge
through their own experimentation, observations and personal
experience”].) Her opinion was also logically supported to some
extent by her testimony about computer-aided academic studies.
(See id. at p. 831 [explaining that “ ‘experts may relate
information acquired through . . . study of learned treatises,
etc.’ ”].) Further, Pytlik showed the jury photographs of the
casings that she compared, indicating the areas of purported
agreement that she relied upon in forming her opinion. (Cf.
Cowan, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 471 [explaining that the toolmark
expert showed photographs including “the test-fired bullets and
the recovered bullets to the jury and identified the points of
similarity he found”].)5 The trial court’s conclusion that Pytlik’s

5 Because Wilson did not put the exhibits relied upon by

Pytlik into the appellate record, we are unable to review them.
Where the appellate record is inadequate for review, “ ‘ “[i]f any
matters could have been presented to the court below which
would have authorized the order complained of, it will be
presumed that such matters were presented.” ’ ” (Jameson v.
22
opinion had a sufficient basis to be presented to the jury was
neither arbitrary or irrational. (See Sargon, supra, 55 Cal.4th at
pp. 772-773.)

Ultimately, the jury was presented with the parties’
competing views about the validity of firearm toolmark evidence,
and it was the jury’s task to evaluate that evidence, taking into
account the subjective nature of Pytlik’s assessment of the
casings she examined.6 (See Cowan, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 471.)

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

BURNS, J.
WE CONCUR:

JACKSON, P. J.
CHOU, J.

People v. Wilson (A170683)

Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 609 (Jameson); see also People v.
Hooper (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 685, 696 [explaining that in a
challenge to the trial court’s admission of evidence, “[t]he burden
is on the appellant to demonstrate error,” citing Jameson, at pp.
608-609].)
6 The trial court also allowed the defense to put on its own

experts on the validity of firearm toolmark analysis, denying the
prosecution’s motion to exclude defense experts. However, the
defense ultimately did not present those witnesses at trial.
23

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