CourtListener 10749389•People v. Wilson CA4/1
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Filed 12/8/25 P. v. Wilson CA4/1
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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D084613
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. (Super. Ct. No. SCD145049)
THANDIEW SHARIF WILSON,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Melinda J. Lasater, Judge. Affirmed.
Susan S. Bauguess, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Arlene A.
Sevidal, and Arlyn Escalante, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
Thandiew Sharif Wilson appeals the order denying his petition to
vacate his murder conviction and to resentence him on his other convictions.
He was found guilty of murder based on his involvement in the commission of
felonies during which his brother fatally shot the victim. Wilson contends the
evidence was insufficient to prove he was a major participant in the felonies
and acted with reckless indifference to human life. We disagree and affirm
the challenged order.
I.
BACKGROUND
A. Facts
On July 6, 1999, Wilson, his brother, and another member of the
Lincoln Park criminal street gang went to a motel room for a party hosted by
Henry Mabry, a member of a rival gang. Several other guests were already
there. Wilson and his companions sang rap songs that insulted Mabry’s
gang. Mabry felt disrespected and became angry. Wilson and his
companions reacted similarly when Mabry insulted their gang. Mabry told
Wilson and his companions to leave the motel room, and they left.
Wilson and his companions later returned under the false pretense of
retrieving an item they left behind. Upon reentering the motel room,
Wilson’s brother pulled out a gun and told the guests to get on the floor and
to surrender their jewelry and other valuables. Wilson himself demanded
property from one guest and rummaged through Mabry’s duffle bag.
Wilson and his companions realized Mabry was asleep on the bed and
began beating him severely as they called out, “Lincoln Park.” When one of
them snatched chains from his neck, Mabry woke up and fought back.
Wilson continued to punch Mabry while Wilson’s brother struck Mabry with
the gun. Wilson’s brother fired a shot into the bed. Mabry continued to fight
with Wilson and overpowered him. Wilson’s brother shouted, “Get off my
brother,” and then fatally shot Mabry in the head while he said, “Lincoln
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Park nigger.” Wilson and his companions ran out of the motel room and
drove away. The following morning, Wilson learned he was wanted for
questioning in the murder and took a bus to Texas.
B. Criminal Action
Wilson was charged with first degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd.
(a); undesignated section references are to this code), residential burglary
(§§ 459, 460), robbery (§ 211), and six counts of attempted robbery (§§ 21a,
211). Firearm and gang enhancements were alleged as to all counts.
(§§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1), 12022.53, subds. (b)–(e), 12022.5, subd. (a)(1), 12022,
subd. (a)(1).) As special circumstances, it was alleged the murder occurred
during the commission or attempted commission of burglary and robbery.
(§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(A), (G).)
The case proceeded to a jury trial. Witnesses testified to the events
summarized in part I.A., ante. A gang expert testified the primary activities
of the Lincoln Park gang included robberies, homicides, and assaults with a
deadly weapon. (See § 186.22, subds. (e)(1)(A)–(C), (f).) The expert also
testified a gang member who was disrespected in front of others would feel a
need to respond with violence. The jury found Wilson guilty on all counts and
found true all attached allegations.
The superior court sentenced Wilson in September 2002. For the
murder, the court imposed a term of life without the possibility of parole plus
a term of 25 years to life for the firearm enhancement. (§§ 190.2, subd. (a),
12022.53, subds. (d), (e)(1).) The court imposed and stayed execution of
prison terms for the attempted robbery of Mabry and the attached
enhancements (§ 654) and imposed concurrent prison terms for all other
crimes and enhancements (§ 669, subd. (a)).
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C. Section 1172.6 Proceeding
On January 1, 2019, legislation took effect that, among other things,
narrowed the scope of liability for felony murder by amending section 189.
(Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 3.) As amended, section 189 imposes felony murder
liability on a person who: (1) was the actual killer; or (2) with intent to kill,
aided and abetted the actual killer; or (3) was a major participant in the
felony and acted with reckless indifference to human life. (Id., subd. (e).)
The legislation added a new statute authorizing a person convicted of felony
murder to petition to vacate that conviction and to be resentenced on any
remaining convictions if the person could not be convicted of felony murder
under the amended statute had it been in effect at the time of the killing.
(Former § 1170.95, enacted by Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 4, amended by Stats.
2021, ch. 551, § 2, and renumbered § 1172.6 by Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.)1
Later that month, Wilson, acting on his own behalf, filed a form petition
alleging he could not now be convicted of felony murder under any of the
three criteria.
After a summary denial of the petition and reversal on appeal, Wilson
was appointed counsel, and the parties stipulated he had stated a prima facie
case for relief. The parties filed competing briefs. The People argued Wilson
remained liable for felony murder despite the amendments to section 189,
either because he had an intent to kill when he aided and abetted his brother
in killing Mabry or because he was a major participant in the underlying
felonies and acted with reckless indifference to human life. (Id., subd. (e)(2),
(3).) Wilson argued he was entitled to relief under section 1172.6 because the
1 The amendments are not relevant to this appeal. We shall cite the
current version of the statute (§ 1172.6) in this opinion even though Wilson
filed his petition under the former version (§ 1170.95).
4
People could not prove he acted with malice or with reckless indifference to
human life as a major participant in the underlying felonies.
The trial court held an evidentiary hearing. The parties stipulated the
court could review the reporter’s transcripts of Wilson’s trial. The People
relied on those transcripts and presented no additional evidence. Wilson
called only one witness, his brother. On direct examination, the brother
admitted he and Wilson were members of the Lincoln Park criminal street
gang. Wilson’s brother said that on the night of the murder he had a gun in
his pocket, started a fight with Mabry, and shot him. He testified Wilson did
not know he had a gun and was not in the motel room when he fought with
and shot Mabry. On cross-examination, Wilson’s brother testified he headed
the “Murder Crew” subset of the Lincoln Park criminal street gang in 1999,
he “would normally carry a gun” to places he might encounter members of
rival gangs, and one “could assume that [he] had a gun.” He also testified
Wilson knew he headed the Murder Crew. After Wilson’s brother was
excused, the parties presented their arguments, and the court took the
matter under submission.
The trial court issued a written order denying Wilson’s section 1172.6
petition. The court reviewed the evidence and made findings of fact. The
court then used a pattern jury instruction (CALCRIM No. 540B) to consider
the factors identified in People v. Banks (2015) 61 Cal.4th 788 (Banks) and
People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522 (Clark) as relevant to determining
whether Wilson was guilty of felony murder as a major participant in the
felonies who acted with reckless indifference to human life. The court found
beyond a reasonable doubt that he was.
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II.
DISCUSSION
Wilson contends sufficient evidence does not support the trial court’s
factual findings on some of the Banks and Clark factors. He asks us to
reverse the order denying his section 1172.6 petition and to remand the
matter with directions to the trial court to grant it.
A. Standard of Review
When an appellant attacks an order denying relief under section 1172.6
after an evidentiary hearing, we review the trial court’s factual findings for
substantial evidence. (People v. Emanuel (2025) 17 Cal.5th 867, 885
(Emanuel).) We review the record in the light most favorable to the order to
determine whether it contains evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of
solid value from which the court could have found beyond a reasonable doubt
that the defendant is guilty of murder under a theory that is legally valid
under current law. (Ibid.; People v. Nieber (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 458, 476
(Nieber).) We presume in support of the order every fact the trial court
reasonably could have deduced from the evidence and must accept inferences
the court reasonably might have drawn from circumstantial evidence.
(People v. Edwards (2013) 57 Cal.4th 658, 715; People v. Montanez (2023)
91 Cal.App.5th 245, 271 (Montanez).) We will not reweigh the evidence and
will not reverse the order unless under no hypothesis is there sufficient
evidence to sustain the court’s factual findings. (People v. Thomas (2023)
14 Cal.5th 327, 378; People v. Cody (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 87, 112–113.)
B. Wilson’s Liability for Felony Murder Under Current Law
The scope of liability for felony murder was narrowed after Wilson was
convicted of that offense, and his conviction under the former, broader felony-
murder rule is subject to vacation if he could not be convicted under the
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current, narrower rule. (§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(3); People v. Strong (2022)
13 Cal.5th 698, 707–709.) As pertinent to this case, current law imposes
liability for felony murder on a person who “was a major participant in the
underlying felony and acted with reckless indifference to human life, as
described in subdivision (d) of Section 190.2.” (§ 189, subd. (e)(3).) Section
190.2, subdivision (d) subjects to death or imprisonment for life without the
possibility of parole a person “who, with reckless indifference to human life
and as a major participant, aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces, solicits,
requests, or assists in the commission of a felony enumerated in paragraph
(17) of subdivision (a) which results in the death of some person or persons,
and who is found guilty of murder in the first degree therefor.” The reference
in section 189 to section 190.2 codified the understanding of the major
participant and reckless indifference elements set out in Banks, supra,
61 Cal.4th 788, and Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th 522. (Strong, at p. 710.) Hence,
like the parties and the trial court, we review the record under the legal
principles established by Banks and Clark to determine whether it contains
substantial evidence that Wilson was a major participant who acted with
reckless indifference to human life in the commission of the burglary,
robbery, and attempted robberies during which Mabry was killed.
1. Major participant
The major participant element focuses on “the defendant’s personal role
in the crimes leading to the victim’s death.” (Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th at
p. 801.) To qualify as a major participant, the “defendant must have been
actively and substantially involved in the events leading up to [the] murder.”
(Ibid.) His “personal involvement must be substantial, greater than the
actions of an ordinary aider and abettor to an ordinary felony murder.” (Id.
at p. 802.) To determine whether a defendant was a major participant in a
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felony that resulted in a death, the Banks court identified five factors for the
trier of fact to consider. (Id. at p. 803.) “No one of these considerations is
necessary, nor is any one of them necessarily sufficient. All may be weighed
in determining the ultimate question, whether the defendant’s participation
‘in criminal activities known to carry a grave risk of death’ [citation] was
sufficiently significant to be considered ‘major’ [citation].” (Ibid.) As we
discuss below, four of the Banks factors support the trial court’s finding that
Wilson was a major participant in the felonies during which Mabry was shot
dead, and one factor is neutral.
The first Banks factor asks, “What role did the defendant have in
planning the criminal enterprise that led to one or more deaths?” (Banks,
supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 803.) The record contains no direct evidence on who
planned the crimes that led to Mabry’s death, but circumstantial evidence
indicated Wilson was involved in the planning. Wilson was at the motel room
when he and his companions exchanged gang insults with Mabry, and he
returned with them later when they reentered Mabry’s motel room under a
false pretense and his brother took out a gun and demanded guests surrender
their valuables. Wilson himself demanded property from one guest and
searched through Mabry’s duffle bag. From those circumstances, the trial
court reasonably could infer, as it did, that Wilson knew his brother was
“very upset” at having been “disrespected” by Mabry and agreed with his
brother to settle the score with Mabry by returning to the motel room “to use
force and violence to steal.” This factor supports the court’s finding Wilson
was a major participant.
The second Banks factor asks, “What role did the defendant have in
supplying or using lethal weapons?” (Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 803.)
There was no evidence Wilson himself used a weapon in the burglary,
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robbery, or attempted robberies or that he supplied the gun his brother used
during those crimes and the related murder. The trial court’s statement that
Wilson “knew the circumstances they were getting into and reasonably would
know his brother would have to have protection so they could accomplish the
goal,” though perhaps true, is irrelevant to whether Wilson supplied or used
weapons. This factor is therefore neutral as to whether Wilson was a major
participant in the crimes that led to Mabry’s death.
The third Banks factor asks, “What awareness did the defendant have
of particular dangers posed by the nature of the crime, weapons used, or past
experience or conduct of the other participants?” (Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th at
p. 803.) The trial court found Wilson “knew his brother was armed”; “entered
the [m]otel room with the intent to commit robbery”; and, as a member of the
same gang as his companions, “would reasonably understand the dangers
involved,” “particularly . . . because they were outnumbered.” The record
supports those findings. There was evidence at trial that Wilson and his
companions belonged to the same gang; Mabry and his guests outnumbered
them; and, after being disrespected by rival gang member Mabry, they left
the motel room and returned to rob him. No direct evidence established
Wilson knew his brother had a gun before they returned to the motel room.
But circumstantial evidence, which is as sufficient as direct evidence to
support a finding (People v. Nguyen (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1015, 1055),
established that knowledge. There was more than the fraternal relationship,
which Wilson correctly notes was insufficient to prove he knew his brother
was armed. At the evidentiary hearing, Wilson’s brother testified Wilson
knew the brother headed the Murder Crew subset of their gang and “[one]
could assume that [he] had a gun” whenever he went somewhere he might
encounter a rival gang member. Since Wilson’s brother returned to the motel
9
room to rob rival gang member Mabry for disrespecting him, one could
assume he had a gun. In any event, Wilson knew his brother was armed no
later than shortly after they reentered the motel room, when the brother
displayed the gun and demanded the guests hand over their valuables. The
brother later used the gun to strike Mabry and to fire a shot into the bed. “As
the crimes unfolded, [Wilson] could observe additional warning signs of
danger to the victims.” (Montanez, supra, 91 Cal.App.5th at p. 274.) This
factor therefore supports the finding he was a major participant in the crimes
that led to Mabry’s death. (Ibid.; In re Harper (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 450, 462
(Harper) [defendant’s knowledge accomplice had gun and violent tendency
supported third Banks factor]; In re McDowell (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 999,
1013 (McDowell) [defendant’s knowledge he and accomplice were
outnumbered supported inference he knew situation could quickly turn
deadly].)
The fourth Banks factor asks, “Was the defendant present at the scene
of the killing, in a position to facilitate or prevent the actual murder, and did
his or her own actions or inaction play a particular role in the death?”
(Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 803.) The record contains testimony from
several eyewitnesses that Wilson was in the motel room from the time the
robbery and attempted robberies began through the time the murder
occurred. Witnesses testified Wilson participated in the physical attack on
Mabry during which his necklaces were stolen and continued to beat him
until Wilson’s brother shot him dead. There is no evidence Wilson did
anything to restrain his brother or to help Mabry. To the contrary, it appears
Wilson’s actions provoked his brother to shoot Mabry when he gained the
advantage in the fight with Wilson. Wilson thus correctly points out the
record does not support the trial court’s finding that Wilson “prevented
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Mabrey [sic] from being able to defend himself.” But the record does support
the court’s findings that Wilson facilitated the violence that led to Mabry’s
death and “[t]here was no indication he was surprised by the escalation in
violence.” Wilson contends he could not have prevented the shooting because
he was unable to calm his brother down during their absence from the motel
room. He cites nothing in the record to support the contention, however, and
we found no indication he could have done nothing to defuse the situation.
Rather, the record shows the brothers collaborated in the violent crimes
during which Mabry was killed. Because Wilson’s own “actions played a role
in the murder,” this factor supports the trial court’s finding he was a major
participant. (Harper, supra, 76 Cal.App.5th at p. 462; see In re Loza (2017)
10 Cal.App.5th 38, 50 (Loza) [finding “particularly significant” in major
participant analysis defendant’s presence at scene, involvement in robbery,
and failure to attempt to prevent shootings or to assist victims].)
The fifth and final Banks factor asks, “What did the defendant do after
lethal force was used?” (Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 803.) Testimony of
eyewitnesses that Wilson and his companions ran out of the motel room and
drove off together after his brother shot Mabry and Wilson’s own testimony
he went to Texas the next day support the trial court’s finding he fled the
state after the shooting. The same testimony also indicates Wilson willingly
participated in the crimes and was conscious of guilt. (See People v. Hill
(1967) 67 Cal.2d 105, 120 [flight may indicate consciousness of guilt]; In re
Lynette G. (1976) 54 Cal.App.3d 1087, 1095 [flight with accomplices may
support aiding and abetting liability].) This factor supports the court’s major
participant finding. (See Harper, supra, 76 Cal.App.5th at pp. 462–463
[defendant’s continuing with robbery and fleeing state after accomplice killed
victim supported major participant finding].)
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2. Reckless indifference to human life
We next consider whether the record contains substantial evidence that
Wilson “acted with reckless indifference to human life” in the crimes that
ended in Mabry’s death. (§ 189, subd. (e)(3).) This element focuses on
whether the defendant “ ‘knowingly engag[ed] in criminal activities known to
carry a grave risk of death.’ ” (Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 616.) Acting
with reckless indifference to human life requires conscious disregard of the
substantial and unjustifiable risk the actions create. (Id. at p. 617; Banks,
supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 801.) To determine whether a defendant acted with
such reckless indifference in a felony that resulted in a death, the Clark court
identified five factors for the trier of fact to consider. (Id. at pp. 618–621.)
The Clark factors “ ‘significantly overlap’ ” the Banks factors, and as with the
Banks factors, “ ‘no one of [the Clark] considerations is necessary, nor is any
one of them necessarily sufficient.’ ” (Clark, at pp. 615, 618.) We analyze
each of the Clark factors below and conclude that, when considered as a
whole, they support the trial court’s finding on reckless indifference.
The first Clark factor is the defendant’s own use of weapons, knowledge
of others’ use of weapons, and the number of weapons used. (Clark, supra,
63 Cal.4th at p. 618.) It is undisputed that only one weapon was used in the
crimes that resulted in Mabry’s death and that Wilson’s brother used it. The
brother used a gun to demand Mabry’s guests turn over their jewelry and
other valuables, to beat Mabry, to fire a shot into the bed, and finally to shoot
Mabry dead. Wilson insists there was no proof he knew his brother had a
gun before they went to Mabry’s motel room either time. As we noted when
discussing the third Banks factor, however, circumstantial evidence supports
the trial court’s finding Wilson knew his brother was armed before they
returned to the motel room. Even if he did not have such advance knowledge,
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he knew his brother had a gun before the fatal shooting because shortly after
they reentered Mabry’s motel room the brother displayed the gun to start the
robbery that resulted in Mabry’s death. (See Montanez, supra,
91 Cal.App.5th at p. 281 [defendant’s presence at scene and proximity to
accomplices with guns supported inference defendant was aware of guns];
McDowell, supra, 55 Cal.App.5th at p. 1013 [knowledge of gun may be
acquired during commission of felony that leads to death].) Wilson’s
awareness a gun would be used in the felonies, though insufficient by itself to
establish reckless indifference to human life (Clark, at p. 618), supports a
finding of reckless indifference (Montanez, at p. 281; Nieber, supra,
82 Cal.App.5th at p. 479).
The second Clark factor is the defendant’s physical presence at the
crime scene and opportunities to restrain the accomplices or to aid the
victims. (Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 619.) This factor is substantially
similar to the fourth Banks factor we discussed above. As we noted there, the
trial evidence showed Wilson was in the motel room when all the crimes
occurred, actively participated in the robberies and attempted robberies, was
struggling with Mabry when he was fatally shot, and did nothing to prevent
the shooting or to aid Mabry after he was shot. The trial record thus
supports the trial court’s findings that Wilson was “near [Mabry] when the
killing occurred” and that he had “an opportunity to stop the killing or to help
[Mabry].” Wilson does not dispute the former finding, but he does dispute the
latter. He contends it was “unlikely” he could have controlled the actions of
his brother, who was the only one armed; and it would have been “difficult” to
aid Mabry, who was larger and was fighting back when he was shot. Wilson
cites no evidence to support these contentions, and we reject them. As we
explained in connection with the fourth Banks factor, Wilson’s brother used
13
lethal force when Mabry got the advantage in the fight with Wilson. Had
Wilson stopped fighting, he might have defused the situation. We conclude
the evidence on this factor “strongly support[s] a finding [Wilson] acted with
reckless indifference to human life.” (Nieber, supra, 82 Cal.App.5th at p. 479
[defendant was present at and participated in robbery, did not intervene to
prevent murder, and rendered no aid to victims]; see People v. Williams
(2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 652, 664 [defendant’s flight with accomplices from
scene of attempted robbery after accomplice shot victim and without attempt
to aid victim supported reckless indifference finding].)
The third Clark factor is the duration of the felony that resulted in the
death. (Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 620.) As the trial court noted, the
exact duration of the robbery and attempted robberies is not clear from the
record, but they lasted less than 15 minutes. Wilson claims that period was
too short to provide an opportunity to prevent the murder or to aid Mabry.
We disagree. The robbery during which Mabry was shot dead was not “a
purely spontaneous crime of opportunity” in which “events occurred rapidly
within a short timeframe” (People v. Giuffreda (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 112,
128) or an “unexpected and unplanned” encounter in which “events unfurled
in rapid succession once the encounter began” (People v. Keel (2022)
84 Cal.App.5th 546, 560), such as would weigh against a reckless indifference
finding. After Wilson and his companions left the motel room the first time,
they planned to return to rob Mabry for having disrespected them. The
period they were in Mabry’s motel room the second time, though brief, was
long enough for Wilson “to do something to deescalate the situation”
(McDowell, supra, 55 Cal.App.5th at p.1014), such as stop fighting with
Mabry, “yell at [his brother] to stop” after he fired the first shot, “demand
14
that they leave, distract [his brother], or attempt to calm [him]” (Loza, supra,
10 Cal.App.5th at p. 54).
In any event, whether Wilson had an opportunity to stop the killing or
to aid Mabry is not the focus of the third Clark factor. That factor instead
looks at “whether a murder came at the end of a prolonged period of restraint
of the victims by defendant” during which “ ‘there [was] a greater window of
opportunity for violence’ [citation], possibly culminating in murder.” (Clark,
supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 620.) “A lengthy interaction between perpetrators and
victims of a felony may increase the risk of resistance, conflict, and violence.”
(Emanuel, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 886.) The interaction in this case was not
lengthy and did not include a prolonged period of victim restraint. We agree
with Wilson that the amount of time it took to complete the robbery “did
nothing to heighten the risk of violence beyond that inherent in the robbery
itself.” (Ibid.) “The Clark factor concerning duration of the crime therefore is
neutral in this case.” (Ibid.)
The fourth Clark factor is the defendant’s knowledge of the likelihood
accomplices would kill. (Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 621.) The trial court
found Wilson “knew how upset his brother was and the significance of being
disrespected in their gang culture,” “participated in the culture himself,” and
“knew revenge was the goal.” Those findings are supported by eyewitnesses’
trial testimony about the exchange of gang insults between Wilson’s group
and Mabry and their respective angry reactions and by the gang expert’s trial
testimony that homicide was one of the primary activities of the gang to
which Wilson and his brother belonged and that a gang member would tend
to respond with violence when disrespected in front of others. In addition,
when Wilson and his brother returned to the motel room to rob Mabry,
Wilson saw his brother take out a gun, demand guests surrender their
15
jewelry and other valuables, hit Mabry with the gun, and fire a round into
the bed. Knowledge of an accomplice’s likelihood of using lethal force may
arise during commission of the felony (In re Scoggins (2020) 9 Cal.5th 667,
681 (Scoggins)), and Wilson’s brother’s “actions ‘just before the shooting [of
Mabry] would have indicated that [he] was likely to engage in lethal
violence’ ” (McDowell, supra, 55 Cal.App.5th at p. 1014). We conclude
Wilson’s knowledge of his brother’s potential use of lethal violence supports
the finding that Wilson acted with reckless indifference to human life. (Ibid.;
In re Parrish (2020) 58 Cal.App.5th 539, 544 [defendant knew one accomplice
was fellow gang member and wanted to bring gun to robbery].)
The fifth and final Clark factor focuses on the defendant’s efforts to
minimize the risk of violence in the commission of the felony. (Clark, supra,
63 Cal.4th at p. 621.) The trial court found Wilson made no such efforts and
“instead jumped on Mabrey [sic] after his brother had hit him in the head
with the gun and[,] along with [their other companion], beat Mabrey [sic]
severely. His brother shot Mabrey [sic] when Mabrey [sic][,] who was a
larger, stronger man[,] started to fight back.” Wilson objects that in making
those findings the trial court “appears to have conflated the risk of violence
during the robbery itself, ‘[r]ather than analyze the facts identified by the
trial court as relevant to the minimization of risk during the planning
stage.’ ” (Quoting Emanuel, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 887.) We think the
objection is well taken. “Efforts at the planning stage to minimize the
potential for violence . . . are viewed as a distinct factor from efforts to
restrain confederates once the felony is underway.” (Id. at pp. 887–888.)
Wilson is thus correct that the trial court failed to address this factor
properly under Emanuel because it did not “consider the presence or absence
16
of evidence relating to each relevant factor on its own merits before
considering the evidence in its totality.” (Id. at p. 888.)
The trial court’s conflation of the second and fourth Clark factors,
however, does not require the reversal and remand for reconsideration under
Emanuel that Wilson requests. He has identified no evidence that in
planning the robbery in which Mabry was killed he took steps to reduce the
potential for violent conflict, and we have found none. For example, there
was no evidence Wilson planned or agreed to participate in an unarmed
robbery in a public place during the daytime (Emanuel, supra, 17 Cal.5th at
p. 887; Scoggins, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 683) or a robbery that called for the
use of an unloaded gun (Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at pp. 621–622). Rather, as
the trial court noted in its factual findings, Wilson agreed to participate in a
violent robbery knowing that his brother (a fellow gang member) was armed
and wanted revenge for the disrespect they had been shown by Mabry (a rival
gang member) and that Mabry and the guests in his motel room significantly
outnumbered Wilson’s group. Those findings show “the objective risk of
violence posed by the crime and reasonably anticipated by [Wilson] [was]
graver than the risk of violence inherent in any violent felony.” (Emanuel, at
p. 889.) With those findings and no evidence of any efforts by Wilson to
reduce the obvious risk of lethal violence in the planned robbery of Mabry,
the trial court could not have found the fifth Clark factor weighed against a
finding he acted with reckless indifference to human life. (See Montanez,
supra, 91 Cal.App.5th at p. 284 [fifth Clark factor “mitigates culpability”];
McDowell, supra, 55 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1013–1014 [when robbery plan posed
obvious risks of lethal violence, failure to try to minimize risk supported
reckless indifference finding].)
17
3. Conclusion
The record shows the trial court conducted the required “ ‘fact-
intensive, individualized inquiry’ into where [Wilson’s] conduct falls on the
spectrum of culpability” for nonkiller felony murderers. (Emanuel, supra,
17 Cal.5th at p. 883.) The court considered the evidence introduced at
Wilson’s trial and at the evidentiary hearing on his section 1172.6 petition in
light of the factors identified in Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th 788, and Clark,
supra, 63 Cal.4th 522, and, based on the totality of the circumstances, found
he was guilty of murder as a “major participant” who “acted with reckless
indifference to human life” in the felonies during which Mabry was killed
(§ 189, subd. (e)(3)). For the reasons discussed above, we are satisfied the
record contains substantial evidence to support those findings. Because the
legislative changes that narrowed the scope of felony-murder liability and
took effect after Wilson was convicted do not relieve him of liability for
Mabry’s murder, the trial court did not err in denying his petition to vacate
the murder conviction. (§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(3); People v. Hill (2024)
100 Cal.App.5th 1055, 1076; Nieber, supra, 82 Cal.App.5th at p. 479; People
v. Bascomb (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 1077, 1091.)
18
III.
DISPOSITION
The order denying the petition for relief under section 1172.6 is
affirmed.
IRION, J.
WE CONCUR:
O’ROURKE, Acting P. J.
DO, J.
19
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