People v. O'Connor CA6

CourtListener 10749184Calctapp8 déc. 2025

Texte intégral

Filed 12/8/25 P. v. O’Connor CA6

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE, H051978
(Monterey County
Plaintiff and Respondent, Super. Ct. No. 23CR008161)

v.

TERRIC O’CONNOR,

Defendant and Appellant.

The Monterey County District Attorney charged defendant Terric
O’Connor1 with assault with a deadly weapon (Pen. Code,2 § 245, subd. (a)(1);
count 1) and criminal threats (§ 422, subd. (a); count 2). O’Connor made a
motion to represent himself, (Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806
(Faretta)), which the trial court denied. A jury subsequently found O’Connor
guilty on count 2 and acquitted him of count 1. The court suspended
imposition of sentence and placed O’Connor on two years of formal probation.

1 Although defendant’s appellate briefs refer to him as “Terric

O’Conner,” the amended information referred to defendant as “Terric
O’Connor” and noted two aliases, Terric Russell O’Connor and Terrance
Russell Connors. We refer to defendant by the name used in the amended
information.
2 All further unspecified statutory references are to the Penal Code.
One of the probation conditions required O’Connor to submit to a period of up
to 10 days of flash incarceration if he violates the conditions of his probation.
On appeal, O’Connor contends the trial court erred in denying his
Faretta motion. In addition, O’Connor asserts that the flash incarceration
probation condition violates section 1203.35, subdivision (a)(1) because the
court imposed it “without his waiver.” In the alternative, O’Connor
maintains his defense counsel provided ineffective assistance at sentencing
by failing to object to the imposition of the flash incarceration probation
condition.
For the reasons stated below, we reject O’Connor’s contentions and
affirm the judgment.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND3
A. Facts
On October 8, 2023, Monterey Police Department Officer Amanda
Arrollo was dispatched to Abrego Street where she spoke with A. Wark, who
told her he had been attacked by O’Connor near Don Dahvee Park. Wark
stated O’Connor had swung an axe at him several times (striking Wark in the
arm once) and threatened to kill him.
B. Procedural Background
1. Charges; Faretta Motion
On October 10, 2023, the Monterey County District Attorney charged
O’Connor by complaint with assaulting Wark with a deadly weapon (an axe)
(§ 245, subd. (a)(1); count 1), threatening Wark (§ 422, subd. (a); count 2), and
misdemeanor resisting, obstructing, or delaying Officer Arrollo in the

3 We set forth the facts from the trial evidence in the light most

favorable to the jury’s verdict. (People v. Luo (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 663, 668,
fn. 2; People v. Campbell (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 463, 469.)
2
discharge of her duties (§ 148, subd. (a)(1); count 3). At arraignment, the
trial court appointed counsel to represent O’Connor.
On October 20, 2023, the trial court conducted a preliminary
examination of O’Connor and held him to answer. The district attorney
charged O’Connor by information with the same counts that had been alleged
in the complaint.
In November 2023, the trial court declared a doubt as to O’Connor’s
mental competency. The court suspended the proceedings and requested a
referral under section 1368 for a section 1369 examination. After reviewing
the section 1369 report, the court found O’Connor competent to stand trial
and reinstated criminal proceedings.
On December 6, 2023, the trial court arraigned O’Connor on the
information, and O’Connor entered a not guilty plea.
On January 10, 2024, O’Connor requested to represent himself and
filed in the trial court a Faretta waiver form.
O’Connor stated on the Faretta waiver form that his name is “Terric
O.T.F. O’Connor.”4 He crossed out the words “I understand,” which appear in
each of the paragraphs on the form enumerating his constitutional rights and
the court’s advice and recommendations. In addition, he crossed out the
words “I understand” or “understand” in each of the paragraphs setting forth
the risks and disadvantages of proceeding as a self-represented litigant.
O’Connor wrote “X”s in the boxes on the form that asked for his initials to
indicate he understood and agreed with each of the foregoing paragraphs. He
did not provide his biographical information or fill out the charges and

4 Although the Attorney General speculates in his respondent’s brief

that “ ‘O.T.F.’ may be a social media acronym for ‘only the family,’ ” the
record does not explain its meaning. O’Connor does not provide any
information about the meaning of “O.T.F.” in his appellate briefing.
3
consequences section of the form. On the signature line, O’Connor wrote
“O.T.F.” (but did not include his first or last name) and wrote under the
signature line, “under duress reservation of rights U.C.C. 1-308.”5 (Some
capitalization omitted.)
That same day, the trial court conducted a hearing on O’Connor’s
Faretta motion. The court asked O’Connor if he would be ready to go to trial
on the scheduled date, and O’Connor responded that he did not understand
the question. When the court asked O’Connor which part of the question he
did not understand, O’Connor repeated that he did not understand the
question and continued by saying that he did not understand why he was
“being held here against [his] will under duress and threat.” The court
observed O’Connor’s Faretta waiver form included the use of “X”s where the
defendant had been instructed to provide his initials, the use of the initials
“O.T.F.” without O’Connor’s first or last name in the signature line, and the
phrase “under duress reservation of rights UCC 1-308” in the signature line.
(Some capitalization omitted.) O’Connor responded, “Without prejudice, yes.”
The court stated that it was not sure if O’Connor signed the waiver, and
O’Connor responded, “Yes, I did.”
The trial court further observed that O’Connor crossed out the words “I
understand” in the paragraphs setting forth his constitutional rights, the
dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, and the court’s
advisements and recommendations. The court asked O’Connor to explain
what he meant by crossing out “I understand.” O’Connor responded, “I
comprehend. I do not understand.” The court followed up by asking, “You do

5 By contrast, when O’Connor subsequently completed and signed (on

February 28, 2024) the prohibited persons relinquishment form, his signature
appears to reflect his full name, and he initialed the form where indicated.
4
not understand?” O’Connor replied, “I comprehend very well.” When the
court asked O’Connor to explain the distinction, O’Connor responded that he
did “not understand why [he’s] here” and that he does “not understand out of
anyone’s authority outside of [his] creator.”
The trial court asked whether O’Connor understood that he possessed
the constitutional rights listed on the Faretta waiver form. O’Connor
responded that he “comprehend[ed]” but did not state what he
comprehended. O’Connor stated he has “multiple rights given to [him] by
[his] creator, not by . . . [¶] . . . [¶] . . . this court.” The court asked him
“What about these rights here that are on this paper[?]” and O’Connor
responded that “[t]hose are also listed in all the rights that [he has] from [his]
creator. [His] rights are given to [him] by [his] creator, not by a court, not by
a politician, not by a cop, not by a court or any corporation.”
Referencing the constitutional rights set forth on the Faretta waiver
form, the trial court asked O’Connor, “you are telling me that you [do] or do
not understand those rights?” O’Connor responded, “I comprehend. I have
rights.” The court asked O’Connor, “Do you understand the rights that are
specifically listed on this paper?” O’Connor responded, “I comprehend I have
rights.” The court asked again, “Do you understand the rights you have on
this paper?” O’Connor responded, “I comprehend I have rights, and I
comprehend what was written on that paper.”
The trial court denied O’Connor’s Faretta motion, stating that it did
“not have any knowledge that the defendant [understood] the state
constitutional rights and the federal constitutional rights, and [did not] have
any acknowledgment from him that he understands any of the other
advisement[s] on this.” O’Connor responded, “I understand I have rights. Is
that what you want to hear?” The court responded, “No, I’ve given you more

5
than enough opportunity to explain whether you understand or don’t
understand.”
On January 17, 2024, the district attorney filed an amended
information. The amended information charged O’Connor with assault on
Wark with a deadly weapon (an axe) (§ 245, subd. (a)(1); count 1), and
criminal threats against Wark (§ 422, subd. (a); count 2). O’Connor pleaded
not guilty to both counts.
2. Jury Trial; Verdict; Sentencing
A jury found O’Connor not guilty on count 1 and guilty on count 2.
The probation officer’s sentencing report recommended that the trial
court place O’Connor on two years of formal probation, subject to several
conditions, including, as relevant here, probation condition No. 22. That
condition reads, “The [d]efendant agrees to waive the right to a court hearing
and accept a period of up to 10 days of flash incarceration imposed by the
probation officer for any violation of the conditions of probation. If the
[d]efendant does not agree to accept a recommended period of [f]lash
[i]ncarceration, the probation officer is authorized to address the violation by
filing a declaration of revocation with the court. ([§] 1203.35[])” (hereafter,
“probation condition No. 22” or the “flash incarceration probation condition”).
That same day, the trial court conducted a sentencing hearing.
O’Connor’s counsel did not object to the recommended probation conditions
but noted that O’Connor would “probably . . . have difficulty complying” with
the conditions because of O’Connor’s “political and/or philosophical views”
which cause him to have “difficulty dealing with authority.” The court
suspended imposition of sentence and placed O’Connor on formal probation
for two years. The court recited the probation conditions it was imposing by
referencing the numbered conditions set forth in the probation report but did

6
not orally recite each probation condition. The probation conditions included
probation condition No. 22.
The trial court asked O’Connor if he understood and accepted the terms
and conditions of probation. O’Connor initially responded that the court
“read a whole lot of page numbers, but I don’t know what it says.” The court
told O’Connor that the probation conditions and the corresponding numbers
were “all in the copy of the probation report.” The court offered to read the
probation conditions out loud and suggested, in the alternative, that
O’Connor’s defense counsel give O’Connor counsel’s copy of the probation
report. O’Connor responded, “I can read very well.” The court again asked
O’Connor if he understood and accepted the terms and conditions of
probation. O’Connor responded, “Yep.”6
II. DISCUSSION
On appeal, O’Connor argues the trial court erred in denying his Faretta
motion because (1) the court did not find him to be too disruptive to exercise
his right to self-representation and (2) he voluntarily, knowingly, and
intelligently waived his right to counsel. O’Connor maintains that, despite
his “defiance and belief that he was a ‘sovereign citizen’ who was not subject
to the court’s jurisdiction,” he read and signed the Faretta waiver form and
“repeatedly stated that he ‘comprehended’ the rights he was waiving.”

6 On March 26, 2024, O’Connor requested the deletion of probation

condition Nos. 9 and 10, which, respectively, ordered him not to use alcohol or
marijuana and ordered him to submit to a field sobriety test at any time. His
application for modification of probation did not mention the flash
incarceration probation condition. On May 1, 2024, the trial court conducted
a hearing on the request for modification of probation conditions and
modified two conditions to delete the references to “ ‘alcohol’ ” and
“ ‘marijuana.’ ” The court stated that all other terms and conditions of
probation remained in effect.
7
O’Connor asserts with respect to the flash incarceration probation
condition that the trial court erred in imposing this condition because it did
so without obtaining a waiver from O’Connor, in violation of section 1203.35,
subdivision (a)(1). In the alternative, he contends his defense counsel
provided ineffective assistance in failing to object to the imposition of this
probation condition.
The Attorney General argues O’Connor’s answers to and annotation of
the Faretta waiver form, combined with his statements during the Faretta
hearing, indicated that his waiver of counsel was not unequivocal, knowing,
or voluntary. The Attorney General contends that O’Connor forfeited his
right to appeal the flash incarceration probation condition by failing to timely
object to it. He further contends that O’Connor’s ineffective assistance of
counsel argument fails because O’Connor accepted the probation conditions
and therefore waived his right to a preincarceration hearing in accordance
with section 1203.35, subdivision (a)(1).
A. Faretta Motion
1. Legal Principles and Standard of Review
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees
criminal defendants the right to represent themselves if the defendant
knowingly and intelligently elects to relinquish his or her right to counsel
and “many of the traditional benefits associated with” that right. (Faretta,
supra, 422 U.S. at p. 835; People v. Marshall (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1, 20
(Marshall).)
“ ‘A trial court must grant a defendant’s request for self-representation
if three conditions are met. First, the defendant must be mentally
competent, and must make his request knowingly and intelligently, having
been apprised of the dangers of self-representation. [Citations.] Second, he

8
must make his request unequivocally. [Citations.] Third, he must make his
request within a reasonable time before trial.’ ” (People v. Stanley (2006) 39
Cal.4th 913, 931–932 (Stanley); Faretta, supra, 422 U.S. at p. 835.)
We review de novo whether the defendant’s invocation of the right to
self-representation and waiver of the right to counsel were knowing,
intelligent, and unequivocal. (People v. Orosco (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 348,
358; People v. Miranda (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 978, 984 (Miranda); People v.
Best (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 747, 762, fn. 6 (Best).) In doing so, we must
“review the entire record—including proceedings after the purported
invocation of the right of self-representation.” (Marshall, supra, 15 Cal.4th at
p. 24; Miranda, at p. 984.) We “must indulge every reasonable inference
against waiver of the right to counsel.” (Marshall, at p. 20; Stanley, supra, 39
Cal.4th at p. 933; People v. Ruffin (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 536, 545.)
“Erroneous denial of a Faretta motion is reversible per se.” (People v.
Dent (2003) 30 Cal.4th 213, 217; Best, supra, 49 Cal.App.5th at p. 756.)
2. Analysis
The parties do not dispute O’Connor’s competence or the timeliness of
his Faretta motion. The issue on appeal is whether O’Connor made his self-
representation request knowingly, intelligently, and unequivocally.
“A knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel is required
before a criminal defendant is allowed to represent himself. [Citation.] The
defendant should be made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-
representation so the record shows he is making an informed choice with his
eyes wide open. [Citation.] The purpose of this requirement is to determine
whether the defendant in fact understands the significance and consequences
of his decision and whether that decision is voluntary.” (Miranda, supra, 236
Cal.App.4th at p. 984.) In other words, “the defendant must ‘actually

9
. . . understand the significance and consequences’ of the decision, and the
decision must be ‘uncoerced.’ ” (People v. Stewart (2004) 33 Cal.4th 425, 513;
see also Best, supra, 49 Cal.App.5th at pp. 759–760; People v. Silfa (2001) 88
Cal.App.4th 1311, 1323 (Silfa).)
O’Connor maintains that, regardless of whether he completed the
Faretta form “ ‘properly’ or used magic words,” he “repeatedly stated that he
‘comprehended’ the rights he was waiving,” and the trial court erred by
denying his Faretta motion.
We are not persuaded. O’Connor struck out the words “I understand”
or “understand” from each of the constitutional rights, dangers and
disadvantages of self-representation, and court advisements and
recommendations enumerated on the Faretta waiver form. While “[t]he
advisements in the form . . . may not be used to disqualify individuals who do
not understand each nuance of the complex subject matter presented” (Silfa,
supra, 88 Cal.App.4th at p. 1322), we nevertheless must review “the entire
record to determine whether the defendant knowingly and intelligently
waived the right to counsel.” (People v. Burgener (2009) 46 Cal.4th 231, 241.)
The trial court’s questions regarding O’Connor’s Faretta waiver form
did not challenge O’Connor’s “ ‘technical legal knowledge.’ ” (Silfa, supra, 88
Cal.App.4th at p. 1323, quoting Faretta, supra, 422 U.S. at p. 836.) Rather,
the court referred to O’Connor’s responses on the form as part of its inquiry
into whether O’Connor understood the risks of self-representation. The court
also focused on whether O’Connor understood the rights he would be waiving
and, therefore, whether he was knowingly and intelligently waiving those
rights.
The trial court asked O’Connor why he had crossed out the words “I
understand” in the paragraphs setting forth his constitutional rights and the

10
advisements and warnings regarding self-representation. O’Connor replied,
“I comprehend. I do not understand.” Asked by the court to clarify the
distinction between comprehension and understanding, O’Connor responded
that, although he “comprehend[ed]” and “comprehend[ed] very well,” he did
“not understand” why he was before the court and did “not understand” the
authority of the court, politicians, the police, corporations, and any other
person or entity. When the court asked specifically if O’Connor understood
that he has the rights listed on the Faretta waiver form, O’Connor responded,
“I comprehend I have rights, and I comprehend what was written on that
paper.”
The trial court directly asked O’Connor three times whether he
understood the constitutional rights on the form. O’Connor attested only to
being able to read the form and to having rights. At no point did O’Connor
state that he understood the rights on the form. (Contra, Best, supra, 49
Cal.App.5th at pp. 752–753 [“The court . . . asked defendant whether she
understood [the enumerated risks of self-representation]. Defendant
indicated she understood each of these things.”]; id. at p. 753 [When “asked if
she understood” her rights, defendant “answered, ‘Yes, I do.’ ”].) To the
contrary, O’Connor deliberately crossed out the phrase “I understand”
accompanying each of the enumerated constitutional rights on the form.
Taken together, O’Connor’s written annotation of the form and his responses
to the court gave no assurance that O’Connor understood his constitutional
rights.
In addition, O’Connor wrote under the initials “O.T.F.” on the signature
line of the Faretta waiver form the phrase “under duress reservation of rights
U.C.C. 1-308.” (Some capitalization omitted.) He reiterated during the
hearing that he was reserving his rights. Given O’Connor’s repeated and

11
express reservation of his rights while purporting to waive his rights, we
conclude O’Connor’s asserted waiver was not unequivocal. (See, e.g., Stanley,
supra, 39 Cal.4th at pp. 929–931, 933.)
We cannot conclude on the record before us that O’Connor knowingly
and intelligently waived his constitutional rights.
O’Connor asserts “the trial court was understandably displeased by
[his] defiance and belief that he was a ‘sovereign citizen’ who was not subject
to the court’s jurisdiction.” He argues that his “adherence to such an ideology
was not a valid basis for refusing to accept his waiver.” In support of this
argument, O’Connor relies on the following statement in United States v.
Neal (9th Cir. 2015) 776 F.3d 645, 658 (Neal): “ ‘Neal clearly endorsed the
“sovereign citizen” ideology. Neal’s request to represent himself could not be
denied solely because he adhered to such beliefs.’ ”
O’Connor does not cite any evidence in the record to support his
contention that the trial court’s denial of his Faretta motion was based, in
whole or in part, on his adherence to “sovereign citizen” ideology. Nor does
the record support his assertion. As discussed in greater detail post, the
court determined from O’Connor’s completed form and his answers to the
court’s questions that O’Connor did not understand the rights set forth on the
form.
Moreover, Neal is distinguishable on its facts. The Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals concluded Neal’s Faretta waiver was knowing and intelligent
because “Neal consistently assured the court that he understood what he was
being told” (Neal, supra, 776 F.3d at p. 658) and “assured the court . . . that
he understood the pitfalls of representing himself.” (Ibid.) O’Connor
expressed no similar understanding of his constitutional rights.

12
Based on our independent examination of the record, we decide
O’Connor did not knowingly, intelligently, or unequivocally waive his right to
counsel. The trial court did not err in denying O’Connor’s motion to
represent himself.
B. Flash Incarceration Probation Condition
“ ‘[F]lash incarceration’ is a period of detention in a county jail due to a
violation of an offender’s conditions of probation or mandatory supervision.
The length of the detention period may range between 1 and 10 consecutive
days.” (§ 1203.35, subd. (b).) “In any case in which the court grants
probation . . ., the county probation department is authorized to use flash
incarceration for any violation of the conditions of probation . . . if, at the time
of granting probation . . ., the court obtains from the defendant a waiver to a
court hearing prior to the imposition of a period of flash incarceration.
Probation shall not be denied for refusal to sign the waiver.” (Id., subd.
(a)(1).) O’Connor asserts the trial court erred by failing to secure an explicit
waiver.
The Attorney General maintains that O’Connor forfeited his argument
on appeal by failing to object in the trial court to the imposition of probation
condition No. 22. O’Connor responds that the issue is preserved on appeal
because it is an unauthorized sentence as a result of the court’s failure to
obtain his waiver. In support of his argument, O’Connor cites the minute
order from the sentencing hearing.
We agree with the Attorney General that the unauthorized sentence
exception does not apply here. As O’Connor acknowledges, the unauthorized
sentence exception applies when “the errors present[] ‘pure questions of law’
[citation], and [are] ‘ “clear and correctable” independent of any factual issues
presented by the record at sentencing.’ ” (People v. Smith (2001) 24 Cal.4th

13
849, 852.) Our Supreme Court has held that “claims deemed waived on
appeal involve sentences which, though otherwise permitted by law, were
imposed in a procedurally or factually flawed manner.” (People v. Scott
(1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 354.) O’Connor’s argument turns on whether O’Connor
waived a pre-flash incarceration court hearing during sentencing. This
question is predominantly factual, and he has forfeited his argument on
appeal by failing to object in the trial court. (Id. at p. 351.)
Even if O’Connor had not forfeited this issue on appeal, it lacks merit.
During the sentencing hearing, the trial court identified the probation
conditions it was imposing, including probation condition No. 22, by reference
to their numbers and stated that those numbers were taken from the
probation report. Probation condition No. 22, as set forth in the probation
report, stated: “The [d]efendant agrees to waive the right to a court hearing
and accept a period of up to 10 days of flash incarceration imposed by the
probation officer for any violation of the conditions of probation. If the
[d]efendant does not agree to accept a recommended period of [f]lash
[i]ncarceration, the probation officer is authorized to address the violation by
filing a declaration of revocation with the court. ([§] 1203.35[]).” The court
informed O’Connor of the source of the probation conditions and asked him if
he wanted the court to read the conditions out loud or if he would like to read
his counsel’s copy of the probation report. O’Connor responded that he could
“read very well.” Although it is not clear from the record if O’Connor then
read the probation conditions set forth in the probation report, when the
court asked him again if he understood and accepted the probation terms and
conditions, O’Connor responded in the affirmative.
The flash incarceration probation condition in the probation report
contained language that the defendant agrees to waive the right to a court

14
hearing. In contrast, the sentencing hearing’s minute order O’Connor relies
on to support his argument only partially reflects probation condition No. 22.
More specifically, it omitted the waiver language present in the version in the
probation report.7 Nevertheless, the trial court expressly stated on the record
that it was imposing the probation conditions set forth in the probation
report, and O’Connor personally, orally accepted the probation conditions as
set forth in the probation report. Having thus obtained O’Connor’s waiver,
the court imposition of the flash incarceration probation condition did not
violate section 1203.35, subdivision (a)(1). We discern no error in the trial
court’s imposition of the flash incarceration probation condition.8
III. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.

7 Probation condition No. 22, as set forth in the sentencing hearing

minute order, reads as follows: “Accept a period of up to ten days of flash
incarceration imposed by the [p]robation [o]fficer for any violation of
probation. If you do not agree to accept a recommended period of flash
incarceration, the [p]robation [o]fficer may file a declaration or revocation
request with the court ([§] 1203.35).”
8 In light of this conclusion, we do not reach O’Connor’s argument that

we should excuse on appeal his failure to object in the trial court to the
condition based on ineffective assistance of counsel.
15
______________________________________
Danner, J.

WE CONCUR:

____________________________________
Greenwood, P. J.

____________________________________
Kulkarni, J.*

H051978
People v. O’Connor


Judge of the Santa Clara County Superior Court, assigned by the
Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

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