Aparicio v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Bd. CA2/8

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Filed 12/5/25 Aparicio v. Workers’ Compensation Appeals Bd. CA2/8
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION EIGHT

TEOFILO APARICIO, B343586

Petitioner, (W.C.A.B. Nos. ADJ8471459,
ADJ10571336)
v.

WORKERS’ COMPENSATION
APPEALS BOARD, KING
FISH, INC., et al.,

Respondents.

Petition for a writ of review from a decision of the Workers’
Compensation Appeals Board. Annulled and remanded.
Solov & Teitell and Karen Phung for Petitioner.
Allison J. Fairchild for Respondent Workers’ Compensation
Appeals Board.
Kirk, Myers, Palta & Izurieta, Jeffrey Myers and Kirk Mori
for Respondents King Fish, Inc. and Liberty Mutual Insurance
Company.
Law Offices of Bradford & Barthel and Louis A. Larres for
Respondents King Fish, Inc. and American Casualty Company of
Reading, Pennsylvania.
____________________

The question presented in this matter is whether the
decision of the Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board (Board)
finding that Teofilo Aparicio’s stroke did not arise out of and
occur in the course of his employment is supported by substantial
evidence. The record reveals that the medical evaluators were
not provided with witness statements that were more
contemporaneous with the stroke and inconsistent with
testimony given at trial. Because Aparicio is incapacitated and
cannot recount the events himself, these contemporaneous
statements were necessary for an adequate medical evaluation.
Without them, the medical opinions fail to constitute substantial
evidence to support the Board’s determination.
Recognizing this evidentiary gap, the Board itself requested
annulment and remand for further development of the record.
Despite objections from the employer’s insurers, we grant the
petition. We annul the Board’s decision and remand for further
development of the record.
Undesignated statutory references are to the Labor Code.
Factual and Procedural Background
Teofilo Aparicio had a stroke on Saturday, November 19,
2011 while he was working as a kitchen helper at King Fish, a
restaurant and market. Aparicio was deemed incompetent as a
result of the stroke and his wife, Maria Vasquez, was appointed
guardian ad litem and trustee.

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Vasquez’s Testimony
As Aparicio could not provide information regarding the
events of that day, Vasquez provided her version of events.
Vasquez dropped Aparicio off at work that morning and
everything was normal. One of Aparicio’s coworkers, “Pita,”
called Vasquez to tell her that Aparicio was taken to the hospital
by ambulance. Vasquez went to the restaurant to pick up
Aparicio’s keys and cell phone and talked to Pita, who told
Vasquez where Aparicio was taken. Pita told Vasquez that
Aparicio complained of a headache and fainted. Pita told
Vasquez that she suggested that an ambulance be called because
Aparicio had been sitting for two hours.
Aparicio had surgery for the stroke. He remained at the
hospital for two months and then was transferred to a
convalescent home.
Employer Witness Testimony
The owner of King Fish, Jon Kagawa, testified before the
workers’ compensation judge (WCJ) that he called 911 about five
to seven minutes after Aparicio was placed in a chair and that
the ambulance arrived approximately five minutes later.
Kagawa confirmed that he gave two earlier statements. Kagawa
did not remember when the first statement was taken but the
second statement was taken a few months prior to trial which
took place on July 23, 2019. According to Kagawa’s second
statement, Aparicio’s fall occurred at approximately 8:00 a.m.
prior to the store’s opening at 9:00 a.m. Kagawa testified that
the second statement was taken seven years after the incident
and he may have made a mistake on the times. During Kagawa’s
testimony, Aparicio’s counsel demanded the actual witness
statements and the WCJ ordered defendant to provide the parties

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with the recorded defense witness statements discussed in a
November 19, 2018 investigation report.
Kagawa confirmed that Saturday morning was a day fish
shipments were received. Aparicio assisted in unloading fish and
would not lift anything over 50 pounds. However, Kagawa could
not recall if there was a morning delivery on the day of Aparicio’s
stroke.1
Ramon Acosta, the supervisor, saw Aparicio fall to the
ground and went to assist him, sitting him up on the floor.
Acosta testified that Aparicio fell around 9:30 a.m. or 10:00 a.m.
and had been at work for about three hours. Acosta testified that
Kagawa spoke with Aparicio and called 911 about five minutes
after the fall. When the paramedics arrived, Acosta stated that
Aparicio was able to speak with the paramedics.
Acosta remembered that he possibly gave two statements.
Acosta recalled his statement of October 15, 2018 and telling the
interviewer that the incident took place before the store was open
between 8:20 a.m. and 9:00 a.m. However, Acosta stated that he
was confused because the store was already opened when the
incident occurred. Acosta believed that the incident occurred at
10:00 a.m. Acosta also confirmed that his other statement in
2012 indicated that the incident occurred before 9:30 a.m., later
corrected to be at 9:00 a.m. While those statements were taken
closer in time to the incident, Acosta stated that he now

1 Although Kagawa did not recall if there was a fish delivery
on the day of Aparicio’s stroke at the time of trial, in an earlier
statement, Kagawa confirmed that Aparicio “looked good,
actually loaded, [he] believe[d] they had actually been in one of
the trucks earlier in the day and was able to do everything and
just without any warning just went down.”

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remembered that the incident occurred between 9:30 a.m. and
10:00 a.m.
Like Kagawa, Acosta confirmed that fish was delivered on
Saturday mornings. Acosta also did not recall if there was a
delivery the morning of Aparicio’s stroke. However, if there was
a delivery, two people would have unloaded the truck and used a
dolly or a rolling cart. Acosta did not remember Aparicio
unloading a delivery truck on the day of the incident.
Medical Evidence
Paul J. Grodan, M.D. was a qualified medical evaluator2 in
internal medicine and cardiovascular issues. Dr. Grodan noted
that Aparicio had preexisting hypertension and a lack of
appropriate treatment. Therefore, the predominant causation
was nonindustrial. However, with reasonable medical
probability, Dr. Grodan opined that the acute precipitating event
with acute onset of headache at work (thus having an industrial
nexus) and the neurologic residuals were related to occupational
injury. Dr. Grodan opined that the hypertensive heart disease
was entirely nonindustrial. However, Dr. Grodan deferred his
final opinion “to review of coworker’s testimony or statement, if
available. According to one of the coworkers there was a 2-hour
delay before calling 911. That would be, as Dr. Gorinstein
indicated, a factor responsible for the very pessimistic outcome.”

2 A qualified medical evaluation is performed by a qualified
medical evaluator (QME), a medical specialist whose function is
to resolve medical disputes in workers’ compensation cases. (Lab.
Code, § 4062.2, subd. (a).) If a party requests a three-member
QME panel, each party may strike one name from the panel and
the remaining QME serves as the medical evaluator. (Id., subds.
(b) & (c).)

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While Dr. Grodan found no industrial nexus to
hypertension, he stated that blood pressure could suddenly rise
with a specific stimulus and therefore the work activity could not
be ruled out. Dr. Grodan found industrial apportionment could
not exceed 20 percent given that the hypertension was
nonindustrial.
Dr. Grodan explained that Aparicio’s severe complications
arose from the approximately two-hour delay in calling the
paramedics. Dr. Grodan stated that, had Aparicio received
medical treatment within the first several hours, his residual
deficit would have been substantially less. However, if the
paramedics were called immediately, then the spontaneous
occurrence caused by preexisting hypertensive disease would be
considered nonindustrial unless there was something that
instantaneously aggravated the hypertension, such as an
altercation, reprimand, or being upset over something.
Israel Gorinstein, M.D., the QME in neurology, initially
found industrial causation due to the delay in treatment. Dr.
Gorinstein deferred to Dr. Grodan, the internal medicine
specialist, to define the role of stress, physical or emotional, to
development or to aggravation of hypertension.
After reviewing Dr. Grodan’s evaluation, Dr. Gorinstein
revised his apportionment opinion, agreeing that, given the
uncertainty of the timing of events and onset of symptoms, 20
percent of the resulting permanent disability was apportioned to
the industrial untimely medical care and 80 percent was
apportioned to the nonindustrial preexisting untreated
hypertension.
After review of trial testimony from Kagawa and Acosta,
Dr. Gorinstein found no industrial causation based on Kagawa’s

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and Acosta’s account of events. Specifically, Dr. Gorinstein
observed that Vasquez was not present but Kagawa and Acosta
were and indicated that paramedics were called immediately.
The WCJ’s Rulings
The WCJ found that Aparicio did not sustain injury arising
out of and occurring in the course of employment in the form of a
stroke. The WCJ noted the conflict in the testimonies of Vasquez
on the one hand and Kagawa and Acosta on the other, but
observed that Aparicio did not present Pita, who called Vasquez,
as a witness to bolster Vasquez’s version of events.
Although Kagawa and Acosta testified consistently at trial,
the WCJ stated that they were “unclear” because of their earlier
statements regarding when Aparicio fainted and when 911 was
called and aid was provided. The WCJ acknowledged the
documentary evidence obtained from the fire department showed
the time of the 911 call, the arrival, the change in Aparicio’s
condition upon paramedic evaluation, and transport to the
hospital.
The WCJ concluded that Vasquez’s testimony was largely
hearsay and, though admissible, was not corroborated by any
other evidence. Based on the documentary evidence of the fire
department that Aparicio was able to communicate when the
paramedics arrived, the WCJ further concluded that there was no
delay between Aparicio’s fall and the rendering of medical care.
Aparicio filed a petition for reconsideration arguing that he
was entitled to any reasonable inference pursuant to the policy of
liberal construction. The petition contended that a reasonable
inference was that Aparicio was engaged in strenuous activity
leading up to his stroke and fall (such as carrying items off a
truck weighing up to 40 pounds) and that there was a delay by

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the employer in providing medical attention given the
contradictory prior witness statements by Kagawa and Acosta.
In the alternative, the petition argued that further development
of the record was necessary, given Dr. Grodan’s statement that
he would finalize his opinion upon review of witness statements,
which were never provided to the doctor. The petition observed
that Dr. Gorinstein was not provided those statements as well.
The petition lastly claimed that the stroke should have been
compensable by the fact that Aparicio suffered an idiopathic
condition and fell while at work.
The WCJ recommended that reconsideration be denied.
The Board granted reconsideration and then issued an
opinion and decision after reconsideration denying
reconsideration and adopting and incorporating the WCJ report.
Petition for a Writ of Review and Board Response
Aparicio filed this timely petition for a writ of review.
King Fish filed an answer asserting that Aparicio’s position
was based in large part on hearsay testimony provided by
Vasquez which was not corroborated.
The Board took the uncommon step to respond to the
petition. The Board admitted that the record in the case, as it
currently stood, lacked substantial evidence to support the
decision and that the WCJ and Board should have ordered
further development of the record to fully adjudicate the issues.
The Board quoted to the WCJ’s summary of testimony where it
stated that Kagawa’s and Acosta’s testimony “became unclear”
regarding the chronology of events. The Board noted that the
WCJ excluded the prior inconsistent statements even though the
WCJ had already permitted them to be used for the purpose of
impeachment.

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The Board also noted that Kagawa, Acosta, and another
employee, Gladys Lopez, gave second statements to an
investigation service. These statements were ordered to be
produced, but were not uploaded into the electronic system nor
provided to the medical evaluators for review. The Board
therefore requested that the decision be annulled and the matter
remanded to the Board for further proceedings to address the
evidentiary issues and to ensure full development of the
evidentiary record “in accordance with the due process rights of
all parties.”
The parties were provided an opportunity to respond to the
Board’s request for remand. Both American Casualty Company
of Reading, Pennsylvania and Peerless Indemnity Insurance
Company, insurers for King Fish, filed objections to the Board’s
request for remand. We granted writ of review.
Analysis
Standard of Review
When determining whether the Board’s conclusion was
supported by substantial evidence, the evidence must be
considered in light of the entire record. (§ 5952, subd. (d);
LeVesque v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeals Bd. (1970) 1 Cal.3d 627,
637.) “Medical reports and opinions are not substantial evidence
if they are known to be erroneous, or if they are based on facts no
longer germane, on inadequate medical histories and
examinations, or on incorrect legal theories.” (Hegglin v.
Workmen’s Comp. Appeals Bd. (1971) 4 Cal.3d 162, 169.)
The Board’s Decision is Not Supported by Substantial
Medical Evidence
The medical opinions here fail the substantial evidence test
because the evaluators themselves identified missing evidence as

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necessary for their analysis. Dr. Grodan deferred his final
opinion “to review of coworker’s testimony or statement, if
available,” and Dr. Gorinstein likewise noted that “more detailed
and documented information is missing” regarding the events of
the day. An opinion explicitly dependent on unavailable evidence
cannot constitute substantial evidence under section 5952.
The Board adopted and incorporated the WCJ’s report
when it affirmed the WCJ’s decision. The WCJ relied on the trial
testimony of Kagawa and Acosta in conjunction with the
paramedic report to conclude that there was no delay in calling
911. The WCJ disregarded Vasquez’s testimony by finding it
“somewhat unreliable since it is primarily based on hearsay.”
The WCJ also disregarded the allegedly prior inconsistent
statements made by Kagawa and Acosta regarding when Aparicio
fainted and when 911 was called.
The WCJ’s report, which the Board adopted and
incorporated, shows that the WCJ’s decision was based on the
fact that the paramedic report indicated that Aparicio was able to
communicate when the paramedics arrived but became aphasic
during his transport to the hospital. The WCJ then discussed the
possibility of Aparicio unloading fish with another person and
found that the testimony “hardly rose to the level warranting any
type of a reasonable inference of what occurred.” Thus, the WCJ
concluded that Aparicio’s “stroke was found to be non-industrial,
the evidence that a 2 hours delay in the applicant receiving
treatment is based on hearsay evidence and not supported by the
evidence presented.”
Nowhere in the medical evidence submitted with the
petition does a medical provider indicate that the inability to
speak would have occurred contemporaneously with the onset of

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the stroke. Additionally absent in the record is a medical opinion
that would preclude a fainting incident two hours prior to
Aparicio becoming unable to speak and going into a comatose
state. The WCJ’s conclusion that there was no delay in medical
treatment because Aparicio’s aphasia occurred while he was with
the paramedics is not supported by substantial medical evidence.
Indeed, Dr. Gorinstein also indicated that the headache was the
beginning of the stroke. Dr. Gorinstein also discussed the
possibility of the progression of a “sentinel headache,” which
represented an early sign of brain hemorrhage, to the
catastrophic illness suffered by Aparicio, demonstrating that the
incident may have been progressing for some time before Aparicio
could not speak.
The chronology of events in these allegedly inconsistent
statements was necessary to determine whether the disability
caused by the stroke was at least in part connected to the
employment. As observed by the Board in its response to the
petition, the prior statements provided by Kagawa, Acosta and
Lopez, though mentioned throughout, were not in the record.
More importantly, those statements were never provided to
the medical evaluators. Dr. Grodan’s opinion was two-fold:
(1) there was insufficient information to determine whether the
stroke was caused by the employment, and (2) if there was a
delay in medical aid, then the resulting disability was in part
caused by the delay. As to his first opinion, Dr. Grodan expressly
requested witness statements, reporting that the “final opinion
will have to be deferred to review of coworker’s testimony or
statement, if available.” The first opinion involved whether there
was any event at work that may have caused his nonindustrial
hypertension to rise, resulting in the stroke. Without witness

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information, Dr. Grodan could not opine on the issue and, as the
record reflects, Dr. Grodan was not provided any witness
statements, even those of Kagawa and Acosta at trial.
As to his second opinion, Dr. Grodan found that, if there
was no delay, then the stroke was not industrial. Dr. Grodan
opined without reviewing any witness testimony, even those
provided at trial, that if the paramedics were called immediately,
there would be no industrial nexus unless there was an event
that instantaneously aggravated the hypertension, such as an
altercation, being reprimanded or being upset over something.3
Dr. Gorinstein also initially had no confirmation or
description of events on the day of the accident when Aparicio
arrived at work until the 911 call. Dr. Gorinstein stated that
“[a]t this time more detailed and documented information is
missing regarding any unusual severity of headache, pace of
progression, timing of headache, any associated symptomatology
such as speech abnormality or unilateral weakness or numbness,
any evidence of taking medication for headaches, or any request
by the patient for help,” and he could not determine whether a
lay person could determine that urgent medical help was
necessary.

3 Dr. Grodan also testified that if Aparicio did some heavy
lifting, blood pressure may be raised which could destabilize
plaque in the artery in the brain and cause bleeding. Indeed,
Kagawa’s March 29, 2020 statement indicated that Aparicio did
in fact load or unload a truck that day. The record does not
contain a medical opinion as to whether unloading 40 to 50 pound
boxes of fish would be “heavy” activity that could trigger a spike
in blood pressure to initiate a stroke for a man in his seventies.

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After these statements of uncertainty, Dr. Gorinstein
issued his final opinion based only on the trial testimony
provided by Kagawa and Acosta, where they both discussed the
potential that their earlier statements may have been wrong. Dr.
Gorinstein relied on Kagawa’s and Acosta’s testimony that there
was no delay in calling 911 but he did not have the benefit of the
more contemporaneous statements provided by Kagawa, Acosta
and Lopez. Without review of the statements, both at trial and
earlier, the medical opinions are based on an incomplete history
and cannot constitute substantial medical evidence.
The Board Had a Duty to Develop the Record
When an injured worker is incapacitated and cannot
provide his own account, contemporaneous witness statements
become essential to accurate medical evaluation. Here, both
medical evaluators explicitly identified missing witness
information as necessary for their analysis, yet these
statements—despite being in the employer’s possession and
ordered produced—were never provided to the medical
evaluators.
The Board has requested annulment of its decision to
further develop the record. The Board generally “may not leave
undeveloped matters which its acquired specialized knowledge
should identify as requiring further evidence.” (Kuykendall v.
Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 396, 404; West
v. Industrial Acc. Com. (1947) 79 Cal.App.2d 711, 719 (West).)
The Board’s power to develop the record is appropriately
exercised when there is insufficient medical evidence in the
record upon which to base a determination. (Tyler v. Workers’
Comp. Appeals Bd. (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 389, 394–395 (Tyler).)
“A medical opinion is not substantial evidence if it is based on an

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inadequate history, speculation or guess.” (State Comp. Ins.
Fund v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th
1311, 1315.) “The principle of allowing full development of the
evidentiary record to enable a complete adjudication of the issues
is consistent with due process in connection with workers’
compensation claims.” (Tyler, supra, at p. 394.)
In Tyler, the appellate court held that the Board was
empowered to direct that the record be developed to remedy an
evidentiary gap in the record. (Tyler, supra, 56 Cal.App.4th at
pp. 394–395.) The Board’s power to order further development of
the record has been repeatedly reaffirmed by the courts,
including the Supreme Court. (Lundberg v. Workmen’s Comp.
Appeals Bd. (1968) 69 Cal.2d 436, 440; King v. Workers’ Comp.
Appeals Bd. (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 1640, 1649; West, supra,
79 Cal.App.2d at p. 719.) One example of when “the Board may
act to develop the record with new evidence” is “if, for example, it
concludes that neither side has presented substantial evidence on
which a decision could be based, and even that this principle may
be appropriately applied in favor of the employee.” (San
Bernardino Community Hospital v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd.
(1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 928, 937–938.)
In this matter, the medical reporting indicated that Dr.
Grodan did not review any witness statements and Dr.
Gorinstein did not review statements made by witnesses closer in
time to Aparicio’s stroke. These statements were requested by
Dr. Grodan to determine whether there was any industrial
causation for the stroke. Dr. Gorinstein deferred to Dr. Grodan
as the internal medicine specialist as to whether the employment
had a role in the development or aggravation of hypertension.
These statements were in King Fish’s possession and ordered

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produced to the parties. It is unclear whether production was
made to Aparicio. It is certain that these statements were not
provided to the medical evaluators. The omission of these more
contemporaneous accounts of the events leading up to the fall
and stroke demonstrates the inadequate history provided to the
QMEs. Given the WCJ’s characterization of Kagawa’s and
Acosta’s testimony as “unclear,” the Board’s decision is not
supported by substantial medical evidence from either side and
the Board had a duty to develop the record.
DISPOSITION
The Board’s opinion and decision after reconsideration is
annulled and the matter is remanded to the Board for further
development of the record.

WILEY, J.
We concur:

STRATTON, P. J.

VIRAMONTES, J.

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