Malinowski v. Martin CA1/3

CourtListener 10747736Calctapp4 déc. 2025

Texte intégral

Filed 12/4/25 Malinowski v. Martin CA1/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

KAMILA MALINOWSKI,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
A172705
v.
JUSTIN MARTIN, (San Mateo County
Super. Ct. No. 21-FAM-01531)
Defendant and Respondent.

Kamila Malinowski filed a petition under the Domestic Violence
Prevention Act (DVPA; Fam. Code, § 6200 et seq.)1 to include her two
children as protected parties under an existing domestic violence restraining
order (DVRO) against the children’s father, Justin Martin. After a heavily
litigated case, the trial court denied the petition, concluding Malinowski did
not demonstrate that Martin committed domestic violence against the
children. Thereafter, the court granted Martin’s request for $204,687.97 in
attorney fees and costs pursuant to section 6344, which permits the court to
award fees and costs to a prevailing respondent who shows by a
preponderance of the evidence that the DVPA petition was frivolous or solely
intended to abuse, intimidate, or cause unnecessary delay, and the court

1 Further unspecified statutory references are to this code.

1
determines that the petitioner has, or is reasonably likely to have, the ability
to pay the award. (§ 6344, subds. (b), (c).)
On appeal from the section 6344 award, Malinowski contends the trial
court erred because (1) the action was not frivolous or brought in bad faith;
(2) the court wrongfully gave res judicata effect to a prior family court order
that did not involve any domestic violence claims under the DVPA; (3) the
court ignored Malinowski’s evidence of her inability to pay; and (4) the
amount of the fee award was excessive and unsupported by competent billing
records and attorney declarations. We agree, in part, with the last contention
and conclude the amount of the award attributable to legal services
performed by one of Martin’s attorneys was unsupported by competent
evidence. Accordingly, we will reverse the order and remand for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
This case has a complicated history in the lower court and several prior
appeals in this court, including two published decisions: Malinowski v.
Martin (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 681 (Malinowski I); Malinowski v. Martin
(2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 559 (Malinowski II). A detailed recitation of the
underlying facts is set forth in Malinowski I and II. The following
background, adapted in part from those opinions, is limited to the facts
relevant to this appeal.
Malinowski and Martin were married in September 2013 and have two
children, I.M. and J.M. In September 2018, Malinowski filed for dissolution
of marriage (case No. 18-FAM-02115) (the dissolution action) and also
petitioned for a domestic violence temporary restraining order (DVTRO)
against Martin protecting herself, the children, and her parents (case No. 18-
FAM-02115-A) (the first DVPA action).

2
In a separate case, in January 2019, Malinowski’s parents obtained a
three-year elder abuse restraining order against Martin.
A. First DVPA Trial
In October 2020, the trial court held a trial in the first DVPA action
and issued a three-year DVRO protecting Malinowski from Martin. The
court elected not to include Malinowski’s parents or the children as protected
parties because, as the court explained, the grandparents already had a
restraining order, and the children were adequately protected in the “hands-
on family law action currently pending.”
B. Family Court’s March and July 2021 Hearings on Visitation
In the dissolution action, the family court (Hon. Sean P. Dabel)
conducted a hearing in March 2021 and heard testimony from supervised
visitation provider Julie Espinoza. Judge Dabel elevated Martin’s visitation
status from supervised to unsupervised and ordered Espinoza’s supervision of
the exchanges of the children.
In July 2021, Judge Dabel held an evidentiary hearing on, among other
matters, Martin’s request for increased visitation hours and his claim that
Malinowski was interfering with visitation. Espinoza testified regarding the
children’s refusal to go on visits. She also testified as to several events that
would later become the subject of Malinowski’s second DVPA action,
including: (1) on June 14, 2021, Martin allegedly drove away from the
exchange site with only J.M. and left I.M. alone in a parking lot; (2) Martin
told J.M. that if he did not come on the visit to take care of his pet fish,
Martin would flush the fish down the toilet; (3) on June 1, 2021, Martin
allegedly told I.M. she could go to jail for six-year-olds for lying; and
(4) instances in which the children waited in the car for hours and urinated
on themselves during the exchanges. After the conclusion of testimony,

3
Judge Dabel announced his decision to increase Martin’s visitation hours.
Judge Dabel admonished Martin for threatening to flush J.M.’s fish. But he
also expressed his “deep suspicion” that Malinowski was alienating the
children from Martin, and he admonished her for telling the children that
visitation should not go forward. On July 13, 2021, Judge Dabel issued a
written order increasing Martin’s visitation with the children to 15 hours per
week, with exchanges to be supervised by Espinoza.
C. Second DVPA Action
Two months later, on September 14, 2021, Malinowski filed a petition
in a new DVPA action (case No. 21-FAM-101531) (the second DVPA action)
seeking a DVRO to protect herself and the children from Martin. In a
supporting declaration, Malinowski alleged that Martin had committed the
following nine instances of abuse against the children in 2021: (1) on April 3,
the children returned from a visit reporting that Martin had pulled J.M. by
the wrists and locked I.M. in another room; (2) on April 8, upon returning
from a visit, I.M. reported that J.M. fell and sustained a concussion after
Martin allowed J.M. to leave the residence unattended; (3) on May 13, the
children returned from a visit reporting that Martin had punched J.M. in the
chest at the front gate of Martin’s property; (4) on May 17, upon returning
from a visit, J.M. reported that Martin hit him in the shoulder and said
“ ‘Fuck you, [J.M.]’ ”; (5) during an exchange on May 24, Martin threatened to
kill J.M.’s fish if he did not agree to a visit; (6) during an exchange on June 1,
Martin threatened to send I.M. to “jail for six-year-olds”; (7) on June 3, J.M.
reported to school personnel that his father had punched him in the chest
while yelling, “ ‘Fuck you, [J.M.]’ ”; (8) during an exchange on June 14,
Martin took a crying J.M. and drove away, abandoning I.M. in the parking
lot; and (9) on August 9, after an unsupervised visit, I.M. reported that

4
“ ‘Daddy tried to punch my head’ ” and “ ‘Daddy said he will make me dead.’ ”
(Italics omitted.)
1. DVTRO and Malinowski I
The trial court (Hon. Rachel Holt) immediately issued a DVTRO in the
second DVPA action prohibiting Martin from all contact with the children,
with no exceptions. (Malinowski I, supra, 93 Cal.App.5th at p. 686.) As a
result, Martin’s visitation with the children ceased for several months. (Id. at
p. 687.)
After the second DVPA action was assigned for all purposes to Judge
Dabel, Malinowski filed a successful peremptory challenge under Code of
Civil Procedure section 170.6. (Malinowski I, supra, 93 Cal.App.5th at
p. 687.) The matter was then reassigned several times until both the second
DVPA action and the dissolution action were assigned to Judge Holt.
(Malinowski I, at pp. 687–688.) In March 2022, Judge Holt explained that
after having become fully acquainted with the case, including Judge Dabel’s
prior orders allowing Martin unsupervised visits and increasing his visitation
hours, she would modify the DVTRO to include exceptions for brief and
peaceful contact for court-ordered visitation. (Malinowski I, at p. 689.)
On appeal from the trial court’s modification order, we concluded in
Malinowski I that the court was not required to follow the procedures of Code
of Civil Procedure section 533 in order to modify the DVTRO to allow for
exceptions consistent with child visitation ordered in the parallel dissolution
case. (Malinowski I, supra, 93 Cal.App.5th at p. 685.) In so concluding, we
explained why the record in that case “illustrates perfectly why a DVTRO
issued under expedited procedures may require flexibility and nimbleness for
modifications as further information comes to light. Malinowski’s DVRO
application, though procedurally sufficient for purposes of obtaining an initial

5
DVTRO [citation], omitted reference to Judge Dabel’s July 2021 visitation
order, even as Malinowski sought to prohibit Martin from all contact with the
children. . . . Malinowski’s application was presented to Judge Holt in ‘a
flurry of ex partes,’ which resulted in the quick issuance of a DVTRO that
conflicted . . . with the extant rulings of the dissolution court.” (Id. at p. 695.)
2. Second DVPA Trial and Malinowski II
The trial in the second DVPA action was held in October 2022. Both
parties filed multiple motions in limine, including cross-motions regarding
the admissibility of video footage of the supervised exchanges captured by a
“dash cam” in the vehicle that Malinowski’s father (“Grandfather”) used to
transport the children. The trial court granted Martin’s motion to exclude
the dash cam evidence.
Over the course of nine days, the trial court (Judge Holt) heard
testimony from several witnesses including: Malinowski; the children’s
therapist, Valerie Houghton; the visitation exchange supervisor, Espinoza;
Malinowski’s private investigator; Grandfather; and Martin. After closing
arguments, the court issued its oral ruling denying Malinowski’s request to
add the children as protected parties to the DVRO.
On Malinowski’s request, the trial court issued a written statement of
decision. The court found that Martin “did not commit the alleged acts of
domestic violence or abuse against the minor children.” In the statement of
decision, Judge Holt made reference to the dissolution action, stating that
“Judge Dabel, when he presided over the marital dissolution case of the
parties, closely monitored the safety of the children in 2021. In March 2021,
Judge Dabel conducted a hearing at which the same questions were posed to
Julie Espinoza, the exchange supervisor, as were posed to her in the DVPA
trial, and Judge Dabel found her to be a credible, neutral, and unbiased

6
witness. Based on Ms. Espinoza’s testimony, Judge Dabel made changes to
the visitation Orders—first removing the requirement that the children’s
visits with their father be supervised, and then expanding the number of
hours of unsupervised visitation — after hearing the same allegations and
testimony as were presented herein.” Judge Holt wrote, “This Court also
finds Ms. Espinoza to be a credible witness. Indeed, she represented the
voice of sanity amidst all the chaos.”
The statement of decision further reflected the trial court’s findings
that Dr. Houghton was not a reliable witness, as she “never spoke directly to
either [Martin] or Ms. Espinoza.” The court likewise found that Malinowski’s
“testimony regarding the children’s reporting of abuse by their father and
observed symptoms of such purported abuse was not supported by the
evidence” because she “was not a personal witness to any of the alleged abuse
perpetrated by [Martin] and thus, had no personal knowledge of any such
abuse.” Based on these remarks about the testimony given at trial, Judge
Holt concluded, “The evidence, in toto, does not support any of the allegations
of abuse of the children by [Martin].”
On appeal from the judgment, we held in Malinowski II that the trial
court erred in excluding the dash cam evidence because the videos were not
confidential communications within the meaning of the California Invasion of
Privacy Act (Privacy Act; Pen. Code, § 630 et seq.).2 However, we concluded
the court’s Privacy Act error was harmless because Malinowski failed to
demonstrate a reasonable probability that admission of the dash cam footage
would have led to the issuance of a DVRO protecting the children. We then

2 We also elected to reach, then rejected, Malinowski’s alternate
contention that the dash cam recordings were permitted under statutory
exceptions to the Privacy Act (Pen. Code, §§ 633.5 and 633.6). (Malinowski
II, supra, 104 Cal.App.5th at pp. 573–575.)

7
rejected Malinowski’s remaining claims of error. (Malinowski II, supra, 104
Cal.App.5th at pp. 563, 576.)
D. Martin’s Request for Section 6344 Attorney Fees and Costs
In January 2023, Martin filed a request for order (“RFO”) awarding
him attorney fees and costs as the prevailing respondent in the second DVPA
action.
1. Supporting Papers
Martin argued he was entitled to attorney fees and costs under section
6344 because Malinowski’s second DVPA action was frivolous and solely
intended to abuse, intimidate, and cause unnecessary delay. Specifically,
Martin contended that Malinowski’s motive in filing the second DVPA action
was “to forum shop so that child custody and parenting issues would not be
heard by Judge Dabel” and “to deny me my parental rights with our children
which would deny our children to have a relationship with their father.”
Martin further argued that Malinowski had the ability to pay the award
given her gross yearly income in excess of $400,000 and her share of the
approximately $1.7 million equity in the marital residence.
In support, Martin submitted a declaration stating in relevant part
that he had incurred $161,438.22 in attorney fees and costs from May 4, 2022
to November 30, 2022 with his then-current counsel, Seeley Family Law
Practice, and that he anticipated incurring additional fees and costs on the
fee motion. Martin attached redacted billing statements from his attorney
Yvonne Seeley, which were heavily redacted to obscure the descriptions of the
legal services performed. However, the billing statements contained specific
information on the dates of services, the number of hours expended, and
various hourly billing rates applied.

8
Martin further stated in his declaration that he had incurred
$42,169.75 in legal services from his prior attorney, Paul Vorsatz, from the
filing of the second DVPA action in September 2021 until March 2022.
Martin attached copies of billing records from Vorsatz’s firm and stated that
he (Martin) “approve[d] these bills as reasonable and necessary.”
Seeley also submitted a declaration in support of the fee motion, stating
that as of November 30, 2022, Martin owed her firm $161,438.22 for legal
fees “incurred in this Domestic Violence action.” Seeley further stated that
she “will amend this Declaration closer to trial to reflect fees and cost
incurred since then.” In her declaration, Seeley identified various individuals
from her firm “who worked on this case, and their respective titles and billing
rates,” including herself at $600 an hour; a senior associate at $500 an hour;
an of counsel attorney at $500 an hour; and four additional staff members at
billing rates of $250 and $200 an hour.
2. Opposition, Reply, and Supplemental Papers
In May 2024, Malinowski and her then-counsel, Gary Dubcoff, each
filed declarations opposing Martin’s fee motion, arguing that Malinowski
lacked the ability to pay, and that the second DVPA action was not frivolous
or intended to cause unnecessary delay. In arguing Malinowski’s inability to
pay the requested fees, Dubcoff noted that Malinowski “owes me over
$170,000, and, indeed, I am being forced to withdraw from the case because
of her inability to pay my fees.”
In June 2023, Seeley filed a reply declaration stating she had incurred
an additional $1,080 in fees reviewing the opposition papers, increasing the
total request for fees and costs to $204,687.97.
The matter was originally scheduled for a hearing in August 2023 but
was continued pending the outcome of the appeal in Malinowski II. In the

9
meantime, Malinowski filed supplemental papers arguing that: (1) under the
disentitlement doctrine, Martin was not entitled to his fees and costs due to
his refusal to pay family-court-ordered fees and costs to Malinowski, as well
as his failure during discovery to disclose evidence of his wealth; and (2) in
November 2023, another trial court judge renewed the DVRO issued in the
first DVPA action, while in July 2024, the family court in another action (18-
FAM-02115-B) issued a DVRO protecting Malinowski and the children based
on new allegations of domestic violence committed by Martin in or around
June 2024.
3. Hearing and Decision
On November 20, 2024, the trial court (Judge Holt) held a hearing on
Martin’s request for DVPA-related attorney fees and costs under section
6344.
In late December 2024, the trial court issued its written order awarding
Martin attorney fees and costs in the amount of $204,687.97. The court first
highlighted that it was not ordering Malinowski to pay the award
immediately and “directs that the current fee award be offset against any
amounts that [Martin] otherwise owes to [Malinowski]” under two prior
orders issued in April 2021 (for $117,508.30) and September 2023 (for
$175,000).
In finding that Martin had met his burden to demonstrate a basis for
relief under section 6344, the trial court highlighted the timing of
Malinowski’s filing. As the court explained, Malinowski filed the second
DVPA petition in September 2021, just after the family court “had recently
expanded visitation with [Martin], pursuant to a hearing on July 1, 2021. . . .
[A]lthough the DVRO petition includes nine claims of abuse, all but one of
those claims were based on information that had been available to

10
[Malinowski] ahead of the July 1, 2021 visitation hearing. Further, upon
trial of these issues, the Court determined to deny all of the claims, and it
also credited testimony from Ms. Espinoza that [Malinowski] and her father
. . . had taken actions to disrupt the ongoing visitation orders. In light of this,
as well as the other evidence considered in the trial, the Court concludes that
[Malinowski’s] petition was brought in bad faith, as an improper collateral
attack on existing orders, and as a part of ongoing efforts to disrupt
[Martin’s] relationship with the children.”
The trial court further found that Martin had adequately documented
the requested attorney fees and costs and found that the amount of fees he
incurred “was reasonable in light of the overall complexity of these
proceedings.” The court also observed that Malinowski’s attorney appeared
to indicate that Malinowski “incurred a comparable amount of fees while this
issue was being litigated.”
As to Malinowski’s ability to pay, the trial court reiterated it was not
immediately requiring Malinowski to pay the fees and costs because of
outstanding amounts that Martin owed her. Additionally, the court
commented that Malinowski’s “most recent” income and expense declaration
“documents considerable debt” but “also documents a high income.”
Accordingly, the court found no basis to deny or limit its award based on
ability to pay.
4. Motions for Reconsideration and Disqualification, and
Appeal
Mother filed a request for reconsideration arguing that: (1) the trial
court “erroneously (and solely) relie[d] on the doctrine of res judicata or issue
preclusion” based on Judge Dabel’s July 1, 2021 visitation order in the family
dissolution case, which was governed by a different legal standard than the
DVPA and did not involve the adjudication of any allegations of domestic

11
violence; (2) the second DVPA case involved an additional allegation of abuse
that occurred in August 2021, after the July 2021 family court hearing, which
alone satisfied the DVPA’s requirements for issuing a DVRO; (3) the court’s
award of $204,687.97 in fees and costs exceeded the amount sought by
Martin in his RFO; (4) Seeley’s supporting declaration was too heavily
redacted to allow verification of the reasonableness of the services performed;
and (5) Vorsatz’s fees were not supported by an attorney declaration, and his
fees were already fully satisfied by Malinowski’s payment of $65,000 to him
in November 2024. The court denied the motion, concluding there were no
new facts, circumstances, or law that justified reconsideration of the section
6344 ruling.
In February 2025, Malinowski sought to disqualify Judge Holt under
Code of Civil Procedure sections 170.1 and 170.3. Judge Holt struck the
statement of disqualification.
Malinowski filed a timely notice of appeal from the trial court’s
December 2024 order granting Martin section 6344 fees and costs.3
DISCUSSION
On appeal from an award of attorney fees, we review the determination
of the legal basis for the award independently as a question of law (Leamon v.
Krajkiewcz (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 424, 431) and the amount of the award for
abuse of discretion (Loeffler v. Medina (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 1495, 1509

3 We previously deferred ruling on Malinowski request for judicial notice.
We now grant the request, in part, as to the following: (1) the records in
Malinowski I and II; (2) the records of this court; (3) the Local Rules of the
San Mateo County Superior Court; and (4) 13 documents filed in the various
related trial court matters that were included in the record on appeal in this
case. (Evid. Code, §§ 452, subd. (e)(1), 459, subd. (a).) The balance of the
request is denied.

12
(Loeffler)). Where the trial court resolves disputed factual questions, we
review the court’s factual findings for substantial evidence, resolving all
conflicts in the evidence and questions of credibility in favor of the prevailing
party, and indulging all reasonable inferences to support the trial court’s
order. (Horsford v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2005)
132 Cal.App.4th 359, 390.)
In this case, the statutory basis for the attorney fees and cost award
was section 6344, which provides in relevant part that a trial court in a
DVPA action may, upon request and after notice and hearing, “issue an order
for the payment of attorney’s fees and costs for a prevailing respondent only if
the respondent establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that the
petition or request is frivolous or solely intended to abuse, intimidate, or
cause unnecessary delay.” (§ 6344, subd. (b).)
A. Entitlement to Fees and Costs
Malinowski challenges the trial court’s conclusion that Martin was
entitled to section 6344 attorney fees and costs, arguing: (1) the second
DVPA action was not frivolous, (2) the court improperly gave res judicata
effect to the family court’s July 2021 visitation order; and (3) the court
erroneously imposed an affirmative duty on her to pursue her DVPA
allegations during the 2021 family court hearings even though those
proceedings were limited to visitation and custody matters. For the reasons
below, we conclude Malinowski fails to demonstrate the court erred.
We begin by observing that the phrase “frivolous or solely intended to
abuse, intimidate, or cause unnecessary delay” in section 6344,
subdivision (b) (“6344(b)”) mirrors somewhat the language used in Code of
Civil Procedure section 128.5, which authorizes the award of reasonable
expenses, including attorney fees, incurred by a party as a result of the other

13
party’s “actions or tactics, made in bad faith, that are frivolous or solely
intended to cause unnecessary delay.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 128.5, subd. (a).)
“[A] term having a specific meaning in one area of the law should be
construed similarly elsewhere,” unless the legislative policies “reveal a
distinct legislative intent behind each respective statutory scheme.” (Britts v.
Superior Court (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 1112, 1127.) Here, the statutes
espouse similar intentions of compensating a party for fees and costs incurred
as a result of another party’s frivolous or improperly motivated litigation
conduct. Accordingly, we may construe their terms similarly.
On this score, “frivolous” means “ ‘totally and completely without merit
or for the sole purpose of harassing an opposing party.’ [Citation.] To meet
this standard, a party requesting the award must show that ‘any reasonable
attorney would agree the motion was totally devoid of merit.’ ” (Gerbosi v.
Gaims, Weil, West & Epstein, LLP (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 435, 450.) This is
an objective standard, while the question whether an action was prosecuted
solely with the intent to cause unnecessary delay is a subjective
determination. (See Chitsazzadeh v. Kramer & Kaslow (2011) 199
Cal.App.4th 676, 683–684.) Here, the trial court did not make a finding that
the second DVPA action was frivolous within the meaning of section 6344.
But no matter. Because the statutory grounds under section 6344(b) are
written in the disjunctive—e.g., “frivolous or solely intended to abuse,
intimidate, or cause unnecessary delay” (§ 6344(b), italics added), each
ground may independently support a section 6344 award. As such, even if we
accepted for the sake of argument that the second DVPA was arguably
meritorious, that “ ‘is not conclusive proof that the action was not brought
solely to harass or delay,’ ” and Martin could still prove that “ ‘the arguably

14
meritorious action was taken for improper motives.’ ” (Bach v. McNelis
(1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 852, 876.)
What the trial court did find is that Malinowski brought the second
DVPA action in September 2021 to effectively circumvent the family court
orders issued in March and July 2021 that significantly expanded Martin’s
visitation with the children. Substantial evidence supports that
determination. First, there were substantial similarities between the
allegations of Martin’s conduct during exchanges and visits asserted in the
second DVPA petition and the allegations that had already been explored in
the family court proceedings. Second, Malinowski filed the second DVPA
action shortly after the family court decided, over her opposition, to expand
Martin’s visitation with the children. Because the prior DVRO from the first
DVPA action remained in effect, the trial court could reasonably conclude
that Malinowski should have sought to amend the existing DVRO rather
than bring a new DVPA action. Third, the second DVPA trial included
evidence of Malinowski’s other efforts to thwart Martin’s visitation with the
children by encouraging the children to misbehave during the exchanges. On
this record, the court could reasonably conclude that Malinowski was
improperly motivated to bring the second DVPA action as yet another
attempt to obstruct or otherwise cause unnecessary delay in Martin’s court-
ordered visitation.
Malinowski insists the trial court erroneously imposed an affirmative
duty on her to bring her DVRO claims in the parallel family court
proceedings, even though those proceedings were limited to dissolution and
visitation matters. But nothing in the section 6344 order supports her claim;
rather, the court explicitly based its decision on the timing of Malinowski’s

15
DVPA action and her prior attempts to undermine Martin’s visitation with
the children.
Nor do we accept Malinowski’s claim that she was prevented from
raising child abuse allegations in the family court. Malinowski selectively
quotes Judge Dabel as stating at the July 2021 hearing that the child abuse
allegations were “not before me,” but she fails to provide both his full
remarks and the context for the statement. The reporter’s transcript of the
hearing reveals that after Malinowski’s counsel told Judge Dabel there were
“[child protective services] reports out right now,” he replied, “That’s not
before me, unless there’s a witness here to discuss that.” (Italics added.) So
prompted, Malinowski’s counsel immediately began questioning exchange
supervisor Espinoza regarding the June 2021 incident in which I.M. was
purportedly left alone in the parking lot during an exchange, and Espinoza
provide detailed testimony on this matter. The other allegations of abuse,
including Martin’s alleged threats regarding J.M.’s fish and I.M. going to
“six-year-old jail,” were also explored during the July 2021 hearing.
Malinowski’s contention that the trial court misapplied the doctrine of
res judicata fares no better. The term “res judicata” is “an umbrella term
encompassing both claim preclusion and issue preclusion.” (DKN Holdings
LLC v. Faerber (2015) 61 Cal.4th 813, 823.) Claim preclusion “acts to bar
claims that were, or should have been, advanced in a previous suit involving
the same parties,” while issue preclusion (or collateral estoppel) “describes
the bar on relitigating issues that were argued and decided in the first suit.”
(Id. at p. 824.) For our purposes, the linchpin of res judicata is its preclusive
effect; it “ ‘prevents relitigation” of causes of action or issues in subsequent
suits. (Cal Sierra Development, Inc. v. George Reed, Inc. (2017) 14
Cal.App.5th 663, 671.) This bar on relitigation may be achieved by raising

16
the res judicata defense in a demurrer (Boyd v. Freeman (2017) 18
Cal.App.5th 847, 855), a summary judgment motion (Ayala v. Dawson (2017)
13 Cal.App.5th 1319, 1325), or other pretrial motion (see, e.g., In re Marriage
of Brubaker & Strum (2021) 73 Cal.App.5th 525, 532 (Brubaker) [in limine
motion].)
Here, the trial court never barred relitigation of any claims or issues
based on the prior family court proceedings. There were no pretrial motions
at the second DVPA trial seeking to bar Malinowski from relitigating matters
addressed by the family court in July 2021. (Cf. Brubaker, supra, 73
Cal.App.5th at p. 532 [collateral estoppel defense raised by motion in
limine].) True, the court remarked in its statement of decision that “the same
questions” posed to Espinoza in the family court proceedings were also “posed
to her in the DVPA trial.” However, the court immediately stated that it
“also finds Ms. Espinoza to be a credible witness.” (Italics added.) That the
court made its own findings consistent with the family court was not
tantamount to barring Malinowski from relitigating those matters. Indeed,
the court’s admission of Espinoza’s live testimony on the same matters at
both the family court proceedings in July 2021 and the second DVPA trial in
October 2022 demonstrates that Malinowski was not barred from relitigating
the same abuse allegations. In reexamining such allegations at the DVPA
trial, Judge Holt evidently formed her own view of the testimony and
evidence in concluding there was no domestic violence within the meaning of
the DVPA.
Finally, Malinowski raises various arguments as to why she could not
have brought the second DVPA action earlier. Specifically, she claims that at
the time of the family court hearing in July 2021, the DVRO was “not ripe for
application nor adjudication” because (1) one of the allegations of abuse had

17
not yet occurred; (2) Malinowski had not yet reviewed all of the dash cam
footage; and (3) she had not yet received visitation reports or deposition
testimony and child welfare services reports from the children’s therapist,
which became available in September 2021. Critically, Malinowski fails to
support any of these assertions with citations to the record. (See Schmidlin
v. City of Palo Alto (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 728, 738 (Schmidlin) [appellant
has duty to refer to portions of record supporting contentions on appeal];
People v. Hyatt (1971) 18 Cal.App.3d 618, 624 (Hyatt) [where brief fails to
specify portions of record supporting factual assertions, record is presumed to
support trial court’s rulings].) In any event, these arguments essentially
challenge the trial court’s finding that the “timing” of Malinowski’s second
DVPA action supported an inference of her improper motive. But in
reviewing the court’s factual findings for substantial evidence, our role is to
determine whether there is evidence supporting the court’s findings, and we
disregard evidence that could support a contrary finding. (Harley-Davidson,
Inc. v. Franchise Tax Bd. (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 193, 213.)
In sum, we conclude Malinowski fails to demonstrate the trial court
erred in finding Martin’s entitlement to section 6344 fees and costs.
B. Ability to Pay
Section 6344, subdivision (c), provides that “[b]efore a court awards
attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to this section, the court shall first
determine pursuant to Section 270 that the party ordered to pay has, or is
reasonably likely to have, the ability to pay.” Section 271 additionally
requires the trial court to “take into consideration all evidence concerning the
parties’ incomes, assets, and liabilities,” and prohibits the court from making
an award “that imposes an unreasonable financial burden on the party
against whom the sanction is imposed.” (§ 271, subd. (a).)

18
We conclude substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding that
Malinowski had or was reasonably likely to have the ability to pay the section
6344 award. As the court emphasized, Malinowski was not being ordered to
make immediate payment, and the award would merely offset the
outstanding attorney fees that Martin owed to her. The court also cited
Malinowski’s “most recent” income and expense declaration, dated February
6, 2024, and found that while Malinowski had “considerable debt, she also
documents a high income.” From this, the court could reasonably conclude
the section 6344 award would not impose an unreasonable financial burden
on Malinowski.
Citing a local rule of the San Mateo County Superior Court requiring
the use of “current” income and expense declarations whenever a financial
matter is at issue in the family court, Malinowski insists the February 2024
declaration was obsolete because it was nine months old at the time of the
section 6344 hearing. However, Malinowski does not dispute the court’s
finding that the February 2024 declaration was the “most recent” evidence of
her financial condition at the time of the section 6344 hearing. Nor does she
demonstrate the existence of any material change in circumstances between
the February 2024 declaration and the court’s ability-to-pay determination.
Although Malinowski vaguely claims that her “financial situation has
deteriorated since her February 6, 2024 filing” and that “[t]he value of her
home, or any property she holds, is uncertain and insufficient to justify a
$204,000 penalty,” she fails to support these assertions with citations to
evidence in the record. (Schmidlin, supra, 157 Cal.App.4th at p. 738; Hyatt,
supra, 18 Cal.App.3d at p. 624.)
Malinowski next argues her inability to pay was conclusively
demonstrated by the April 2023 decision of a family court judge to grant her a

19
fee waiver. In support, she cites two Judicial Council form FW-008 orders
from April 2023 in which the family court checked boxes on the form
indicating as follows: “The court denies your request and will not waive or
reduce your fees and costs.” We fail to comprehend how these orders
support her claim of error here.
Finally, Malinowski argues the trial court erred by basing its ability-to-
pay determination on “speculative offsets” rather than her present ability to
pay. We are not persuaded. The offsets the court referenced were for certain
sums that Martin was previously ordered to pay Malinowski. We
acknowledge the court’s observation that “it recently dismissed a set of
[orders to show cause] for nonpayment of those prior awards, based on its
determination that [Malinowski] can seek collection of those amounts upon
the characterization and division of assets, which are issues that are
currently set for a trial beginning in June 9, 2025.” However, this does not
suggest the amounts that Martin owes to Malinowski are in any way
hypothetical or speculative. Indeed, the court identified the dates and case
numbers for the orders awarding specific sums ($117,508.30 and $175,000) to
Malinowski. That the final division of marital assets remained to be
determined at the time of the section 6344 hearing does not demonstrate that
the amounts Martin owed to Malinowski were so speculative that the court
could not consider them in determining whether Malinowski had the ability
to pay the section 6344 award.
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude the trial court did not err in its
ability-to-pay finding.
C. Amount of Fees and Costs
We review the amount of a section 6344 fee award for abuse of
discretion. (Loeffler, supra, 174 Cal.App.4th at p. 1509.) “ ‘[A]n experienced

20
trial judge is in a much better position than an appellate court to assess the
value of the legal services rendered in his or her court, and the amount of a
fee awarded by such a judge will therefore not be set aside on appeal absent a
showing that it is manifestly excessive in the circumstances.’ [Citation.] ‘The
only proper basis of reversal of the amount of an attorney fees award is if the
amount awarded is so large or small that it shocks the conscience and
suggests that passion and prejudice influenced the determination.’ ” (Ibid.)
That said, “ ‘[a]ll exercises of discretion must be guided by applicable
legal principles. . . . [Citations.] If the court’s decision is influenced by an
erroneous understanding of applicable law or reflects an unawareness of the
full scope of its discretion, the court has not properly exercised its discretion
under the law. [Citation.] Therefore, a discretionary order based on an
application of improper criteria or incorrect legal assumptions is not an
exercise of informed discretion and is subject to reversal.’ ” (David v.
Hernandez (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 578, 592 (David).)
“A trial court may not rubberstamp a request for attorney fees, but
must determine the number of hours reasonably expended.” (Concepcion v.
Amscan Holdings, Inc. (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 1309, 1325 (Concepcion)
(italics omitted).) Generally, a trial court assessing attorney fees begins with
the “lodestar,” i.e., the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by
the reasonable hourly rate. (PLCM Group, Inc. v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th
1084, 1095.) The lodestar may then be adjusted by the court based on
various factors, including the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved
and the attorney’s skill in presenting them. (Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24
Cal.4th 1122, 1132 (Ketchum).) The moving party has the burden of proving
the reasonable number of hours devoted to the litigation, “whether through

21
declarations or redacted or unredacted timesheets or billing records.”
(Concepcion, at p. 1325.)
Malinowski raises a number of challenges to the amount of the section
6344 award, most of which we reject. In contending the award of $204,687.97
was “legally unsound” because it exceeded the amount of fees that Martin
requested in his initial RFO ($203,607.97), Malinowski neglects to
acknowledge that the initial requested amount reflected fees incurred
through November 30, 2022, and that Martin and Seeley expressly indicated
their intent to file supplemental papers for fees incurred after that date.
Seeley later submitted a reply declaration substantiating $1,080 in additional
fees incurred, bringing the total to $204,687.97—the precise amount awarded
by the court. Simply put, the court did not award more than was requested.4
We also reject Malinowski’s challenge to the amount of the award based
on her claim of trial court bias. In support of this claim, Malinowski submits
that in early December 2024 (shortly after the hearing on the section 6344
motion but before the court issued its written decision), Judge Holt and
Seeley both attended the San Mateo County Bar Association’s Family Law
Section Annual Holiday Lunch, and that Seeley’s firm was among several
“Preferred Annual Supporters” of the bar association. Incidentally, this was
the basis of Malinowski’s February 2025 motion to disqualify Judge Holt.
Malinowski, however, did not seek mandamus relief from the order striking
her disqualification motion (see § 170.3, subd. (d)), nor does she present in

4 Moreover, the mere fact that the trial court awarded more than was
documented in attorney billing statements and declarations does not render
an award erroneous as a matter of law. As discussed, the court may, within
the reasonable exercise of its discretion, adjust the lodestar amount to
increase the total award based on factors such as the difficulty of the case.
(Ketchum, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 1132.)

22
this appeal any specific argument and authority supporting a due process
ground of relief for judicial bias (see People v. Brown (1993) 6 Cal.4th 322,
334). In any event, the due process clause “sets an exceptionally stringent
standard” for proving judicial bias. (Schmidt v. Superior Court (2020) 44
Cal.App.5th 570, 589.) “It is ‘extraordinary’ for an appellate court to find
judicial bias amounting to a due process violation.’ ” (Ibid.) Malinowski has
not met that high bar here. (See People v. Carter (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1114,
[judge’s professional association and casual social contact with prosecutor did
not require recusal].)
We now turn to Malinowski’s challenge to the evidentiary foundation
for the amount of the section 6344 award. She contends Martin failed to
submit adequate support for section 6344 fees because the Seeley billing
records were so heavily redacted that they were “completely illegible and
impossible to scrutinize for reasonableness or necessity.” This is insufficient
to demonstrate the trial court’s abuse of discretion, as attorney fees may be
awarded in the absence of detailed time sheets. (See, e.g., Wershba v. Apple
Computer, Inc. (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 224, 255; Weber v. Langholz (1995) 39
Cal.App.4th 1578, 1587 (Weber); Sommers v. Erb (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 1644,
1651.) As the courts have held, “ ‘[a]n attorney’s testimony as to the number
of hours worked is sufficient evidence to support an award of attorney fees,
even in the absence of detailed time records.’ ” (Rancho Mirage Country Club
Homeowners Assn. v. Hazelbaker (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 252, 263–264 (Rancho
Mirage); see Syers Properties III, Inc. v. Rankin (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 691,
698 (Syers) [“ ‘California courts do not require detailed time records, and trial
courts have discretion to award fees based on declarations of counsel
describing the work they have done and the court’s own view of the number of
hours reasonably spent’ ”].)

23
Here, Seeley’s supporting declaration provided substantial evidence to
support the amount of the section 6344 award attributable to her services.
Seeley explained that Martin incurred $161,438.22 in legal fees and costs “in
the Domestic Violence action with my firm,” and she cited the trial court’s
online “Odessey portal reflect[ing] how active the domestic violence case has
been. There are 27 pages on Odessey for the within action. This alone
demonstrates how active, time consuming and costly this case has been.”
Seeley further described the case as involving “motions to disqualify
numerous judges in San Mateo County Superior Court, Review hearings,
[Malinowski’s] Emergency Ex Parte in September 2022 to continue the
October 11, 2022 trial, and an eleven-day trial (half days).” The Seeley
billing records, though heavily redacted, contained specific information on the
dates of services, the amounts of hours expended, and the various hourly
billing rates applied. Together with Seeley’s sworn statements regarding the
services performed, the evidence was sufficient to support the award of
attorney fees, even in the absence of unredacted time records that detailed
the work. (Rancho Mirage, supra, 2 Cal.App.5th at pp. 263–264.)
In addition to the Seeley declaration, the trial court could rely on its
“ ‘own view of the number of hours reasonably spent’ ” by the Seeley firm in
this case. (Syers, supra, 226 Cal.App.4th at p. 698.) The record reflects that
Judge Holt presided over the second DVPA action from its inception in
September 2021 through the trial in October 2022 and the posttrial
proceedings in 2025. From this vantage point, Judge Holt saw firsthand the
heavily litigated nature and complexity of the proceedings—a point she
specifically made in her fee ruling. On this record, we conclude Judge Holt
was well positioned to assess the value of the legal services rendered by the

24
Seeley firm and to render a reasonable fee award in light of the
circumstances.
Malinowski insists the Seeley billing records were “patently defective”
because the entries on one date (October 6, 2022) contained more billable
hours (34.3) than hours in a day. She further complains that the invoices
totaled $159,142.72, short of the $161,438.22 claimed by Seeley in her
declaration. We are not persuaded that Malinowski has demonstrated a
manifest abuse of discretion by the trial court. With regard to the October 6,
2022 entry, the Seeley billing records reflect that the 34.3-hour total included
the aggregate hours of several individuals at the Seeley firm working at
various billing rates on that date. Although Malinowski points out there was
no hearing on October 6, 2022, the trial was set to begin only a few days
later. The court could reasonably conclude the high number of hours
reflected necessary preparation for the impending trial.
With regard to the purported discrepancy in totals between the Seeley
billing records and the Seeley declaration, we again reiterate that the trial
court was permitted to “make its own evaluation of the reasonable worth of
the work done in light of the nature of the case, and of the credibility of
counsel’s declaration unsubstantiated by time records and billing
statements.” (Weber, supra, 39 Cal.App.4th at p. 1587.) Notably, Malinowski
presented this same calculation error argument in her reconsideration
motion, which the court denied, suggesting the court did not base the award
on the precise total reflected in the billing records. Moreover, the court could
have permissibly concluded the higher amount stated in Seeley’s declaration
was justified as an adjustment to the lodestar based on the difficulty of the
case. (Ketchum, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 1132.)

25
We reach a different conclusion for the portion of the section 6344
award attributable to Vorsatz. Like Seeley’s billing records, the Vorsatz
billing records were heavily redacted to preclude review of the services
rendered. But unlike Seeley, Vorsatz submitted no declaration describing the
work he had performed, the hours expended, and the billing rates applied.
While Martin confirmed in his declaration that he owed Vorsatz $42,169.75
in total fees and “approve[d] these bills as reasonable and necessary,” this
was not a substitute for counsel’s own sworn statement. (See Rancho Mirage,
supra, 2 Cal.App.5th at pp. 263–264 [“attorney’s testimony” is sufficient
evidence to support fee award absent detailed time records]; Syers, supra, 226
Cal.App.4th at p. 698 [discretion to award fees based on “ ‘declarations of
counsel’ ”].)
Further complicating matters is the appearance in the record that the
$42,169.75 total included Vorsatz’s fees incurred in both the dissolution
action and the second DVPA action, with no basis for apportioning fees as
between the two. As Martin explained in his declaration, “From the date of
filing of the DV action in September 2021 until March 2022, Mr. Vorsatz
represented me in the within DV action and the dissolution of marriage
action. Mr. Vorsatz’s billings reflect legal services for both actions.” (Italics
added.)5 Martin then turned to those “billing invoices from September 2021
to March 2022” and explained that the “entries for that time frame totals
$42,169.75.” (Italics added.) In other words, Martin’s declaration seems to
confirm that the entire $42,169.75 portion of the section 6344 award
attributable to Vorsatz included compensation for his legal services in both

5 Seeley likewise represented Martin in both actions but made clear in
her declaration that her request for $161,438.22 in fees and costs were
incurred “in the Domestic Violence action with my firm.”

26
the dissolution action and second DVPA action. However, Martin presented
no basis showing his entitlement to section 6344 fees for Vorsatz’s services in
the parallel dissolution action. On this record, we conclude the trial court
lacked an evidentiary basis to determine the amount of fees attributable to
Vorsatz in connection with just the second DVPA action. To the extent the
court believed the declarations of Martin and Seeley and the heavily redacted
Vorsatz billing records provided a sufficient evidentiary foundation for
determining and awarding section 6344 fees limited to Vorsatz’s services in
the second DVPA action, we conclude this was an erroneous legal assumption
that subjects the order to reversal. (David, supra, 226 Cal.App.4th at
p. 592.)6
We acknowledge decisional authority that “[a]n award for attorney fees
may be made in some instances solely on the basis of the experience and
knowledge of the trial judge without the need to consider any evidence.”
(Fed-Mart Corp. v. Pell Enterprises, Inc. (1980) 111 Cal.App.3d 215, 227 (Fed-
Mart).) But even in Fed-Mart, the trial court had records that, while not
separately listing the time spent on compensable matters, “did identify for
each segment of time listed, the action taken by the attorney during that
particular time period.” (Id. at p. 223.) Additionally, counsel “testified in
detail” as to the services rendered. (Ibid.) The trial court here had no
comparable evidence regarding Vorsatz’s time and services, let alone

6 We are unable to discern from the record why the Vorsatz billing
records were redacted. (People v. Kelly (2020) 59 Cal.App.5th 1172, 1186 [not
all information in billings invoices is “ ‘categorically privileged’ ”].) To the
extent Martin is permitted on remand to make a foundational showing that
the unredacted Vorsatz billing entries would reveal privileged or attorney-
work product information, the trial court may review the unredacted records
in camera. (Coito v. Superior Court (2012) 54 Cal.4th 480, 502.)

27
sufficient information to apportion the fees between the dissolution action
and the second DVPA action.
East West Bank v. Rio School Dist. (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 742 presents
a different approach for determining a reasonable fee award within the trial
court’s discretion. There, despite the absence of “itemized time records,
estimates of time spent on discrete tasks, billings submitted to the client or
records of payments made for work done,” the trial court “undertook its own
analysis of the evidence and the record” and estimated a reasonable lodestar,
with a 10 percent multiplier based on relevant factors. (Id. at p. 750.) Citing
Fed-Mart, the Court of Appeal concluded the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in making “its own determination of fees based on its analysis and
the record.” (Ibid.) Here, in contrast, there is no indication the trial court
made an independent determination of fees based on its own analysis of the
record. In granting the precise amount of fees requested by Martin, it
appears the court simply accepted the amount of Vorsatz’s fees set forth in
the Martin and Seeley declarations. For the reasons discussed, this was
error. (Concepcion, supra, 223 Cal.App.4th at p.1325 [“trial court may not
rubberstamp a request for attorney fees, but must determine the number of
hours reasonably expended”].)
In light of the foregoing, we will reverse the trial court’s order awarding
section 6344 fees and costs and remand with instructions to redetermine the
amount of reasonable attorney fees and costs attributable to Vorsatz’s
compensable legal services.7 In all other respects, we affirm the court’s order.

7 We offer a few additional observations. Some of the unredacted
portions of the Vorsatz billing records identify services such as “Review of 113
page custody evaluation; preparation of notes”; “Response to various client
emails re: Parenting Coach”; and “email to Dubcoff regarding order and
visitation.” On first glance, these entries seem to reflect services performed

28
DISPOSITION
The trial court’s order awarding Martin attorney fees and costs under
section 6344 is reversed, and the matter is remanded for redetermination of
the amount of reasonable attorney fees and costs attributable to Vorsatz’s
compensable legal services. In the interests of justice, each side shall bear its
costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(5).)

_________________________
Fujisaki, Acting P. J.

WE CONCUR:

_________________________
Petrou, J.

_________________________
Rodríguez, J.

Malinowski v. Martin (A172705)

in connection with the martial dissolution action rather than the second
DVPA action. That said, we acknowledge that the services could potentially
apply to both proceedings, and furthermore, in cases where attorney fees are
compensable for some services and noncompensable for others, the trial court
is not required to apportion fees if the issues are so intertwined that it would
be impracticable to separate the attorney’s time into compensable and
noncompensable units. (See Bell v. Vista Unified School Dist. (2000) 82
Cal.App.4th 672, 687.) But on the record before us, we simply cannot
ascertain whether these principles would permit Martin to recover the
entirety of Vorsatz’s fees between the dissolution action and the second
DVPA action.
Furthermore, in light of our conclusion above, we need not resolve
Malinowski’s additional contention that she already paid Vorsatz $65,000 in
full satisfaction of all legal fees she owed to him across all actions, including
the second DVPA action. We leave it to the trial court to consider this and
any other matters it deems relevant and appropriate on remand.

29

Poursuivez vos recherches dans ChatGPT ou Claude

Connectez Omnilex pour rechercher dans le corpus juridique depuis votre assistant IA.