Moultrie v. Haysbert CA2/3

CourtListener 10747733Calctapp4 déc. 2025

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Filed 12/4/25 Moultrie v. Haysbert CA2/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

JAMES L. MOULTRIE, III, B344566

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 24STCV10288)
v.

NAZARETH M. HAYSBERT,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Barbara Scheper and Dean J. Kitchens, Judges.
Reversed and remanded.
Halpern May Ybarra Gelberg, A. Carley Palmer; Ariel Law
and Judah J. Ariel for Defendant and Appellant.
Blut Law Group and Elliot S. Blut for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗
Defendant and appellant Nazareth M. Haysbert appeals
from an order denying his petition to compel plaintiff and
respondent James L. Moultrie to submit to binding arbitration.
Haysbert also challenges the trial court order denying his motion
for reconsideration. Haysbert contends the trial court erred by
finding he was judicially estopped from arguing that an
arbitration provision applied to the claims in Moultrie’s amended
complaint. We agree and reverse the order denying Haysbert’s
petition to compel arbitration.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Partnership agreement
In January 2015, Haysbert and Moultrie signed a
partnership agreement forming Haysbert Moultrie LLP. The
agreement stated its operation began “November 7, 2014, and
shall continue until automatically terminating on December 31,
2016. . . . The terms and conditions of this Agreement shall be
continuously renewable for another year up to fifteen (15) days
before the termination date with the unanimous consent of all
partners.” The agreement included a clause titled “Voluntary
Termination,” under which the parties could dissolve the
partnership “at any time and without cause by written notice
given from one partner to another . . . .”
The agreement established that Haysbert, as managing
partner and 100 percent equity owner, was responsible for
overseeing operations, including covering expenses and managing
the partnership’s accounting. Haysbert was the head of the
partnership’s Litigation Practice Group; Moultrie was the head of
the Transactions Practice Group.

2
The agreement provided that “[n]either partner shall
receive any salary for services rendered to the partnership.” The
agreement also did “not consist of any profit sharing between
partners except through the referral process outlined in this
Agreement.” The referral clause required Haysbert and Moultrie
“to refer cases and transactional projects” to each other. The
referral fee was 20 percent of net profits for each matter referred,
except for cases with net profits exceeding $1 million. In those
cases, “the referral fee percentage [would] be discussed and
agreed upon on a case by case basis by the partners involved.”
The agreement contained a “Mediation and Arbitration”
clause. It required the parties to first attempt to resolve
“dispute[s] aris[ing] out of or in connection with th[e] Agreement”
through informal consultation before proceeding to mediation.
The clause continued: “If mediation is not successful in resolving
the entire dispute or is unavailable, any outstanding issues will
be submitted to final and binding arbitration. The arbitrator’s
award will be final, and judgment may be entered upon it by any
court having jurisdiction within California.”
Moultrie’s complaint
In April 2024, Moultrie filed a complaint alleging that
Haysbert failed to pay the agreed-upon referral and attorney fees
to compensate Moultrie for the legal work he performed. His
complaint asserted causes of action for breach of contract,
implied-in-fact contract, breach of fiduciary duty, and fraud.
Moultrie alleged that he and Haysbert “are partners of the
law firm Haysbert Moultrie LLP.” He claimed that in December
2016, the partnership agreement “lapsed by its terms and was
not renewed.” However, according to Moultrie, he and Haysbert
“continued operating after January 1, 2017[,] as Haysbert

3
Moultrie LLP.” Moultrie alleged that after the expiration of the
agreement, he and Haysbert orally “agreed that the originating
attorney for a case would receive 30% of the attorneys’ fees
recovered.”
According to Moultrie, he informed Haysbert in 2019 that
he had not received the agreed-upon compensation for work he
performed on certain cases. Moultrie alleged Haysbert breached
their post-2016 agreement by refusing to pay him the referral fee
or to compensate him for work he performed on cases
independently or with Haysbert “as partners.” Moultrie also
alleged that Haysbert breached his fiduciary duty by withholding
the referral fee, withholding information about the status of cases
Moultrie worked on, and “convincing Moultrie that the
partnership would continue” before the parties’ mediation, even
though “[Haysbert] knew his plan was to dissolve the
partnership.”1 Moultrie further claimed that Haysbert falsely
stated that no funds were available to pay Moultrie, and he
attempted to deceive Moultrie into abandoning his claim for
additional attorney fees.
Haysbert’s first petition to compel arbitration
In July 2024, Haysbert filed a petition to compel arbitration.
Haysbert’s petition began by re-stating the allegations in
Moultrie’s complaint that the partnership agreement expired in
2016, it was not renewed, and, after that time, the parties had a
different referral arrangement. The petition identified two cases
for which Moultrie alleged he had not received compensation.
The petition then asserted: “Notably, and importantly, Plaintiff’s
complaint does not provide any information on when these cases

1 In October 2023, the parties unsuccessfully mediated the
dispute.

4
were brought into the firm, when they were specifically settled,
whether they were brought into the firm while the Agreement
was in effect (2014 to 2016), or during the time the Parties had
allegedly agreed to an oral compensations structure for referrals
(after December 2016). The reason why Moultrie avoided
including this critical information is simple, to avoid Arbitration.”
Haysbert contended the arbitration provision applied to the
dispute because several cases underpinning Moultrie’s claims
originated in 2014 and 2015, “during the term of the Agreement.”
Further, Haysbert contended that Moultrie’s specific allegation
that he was owed damages as a partner indicated he was
challenging “his entire compensation structure since the
beginning of his relationship with Haysbert, dating back to the
initial term of the Agreement between November 7, 2014, and
December 31, 2016.” Haysbert concluded, “This, by [Moultrie’s]
own admission, subjects his demand of compensation to the
Agreement and therefore is subject to the Arbitration Clause
provision.”
Moultrie opposed the petition on the ground that his claims
did not “ ‘aris[e] out of or in connection with’ ” the partnership
agreement, as required by the arbitration provision. Instead,
Moultrie argued his claims arose from the continued partnership
he and Haysbert implied from their conduct after the agreement
expired in 2016. Moultrie stated in a supporting declaration that
he and Haysbert “acknowledged to each other” in December 2016
“that the Partnership Agreement had terminated and its terms
would not renew or continue.” However, they “continued working
together as partners under the name Haysbert Moultrie LLP and
referred to each other as partners to the public.” According to
Moultrie, there was no written contract to continue the

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partnership after 2016 and no agreement to arbitrate disputes
arising during that period.
In his reply, Haysbert argued that the complaint was
“written so broadly that it sweeps up as potential damages,
compensation for any and all work [Moultrie] performed during
the pendency of the Agreement,” and was not limited to seeking
payment for work Moultrie did after the partnership agreement
ended. Haysbert argued that, in any event, the compensation
structure giving rise to the dispute was set when the cases were
referred, refuting Moultrie’s claim that the dispute “did not occur
until after the termination of the agreement.” Finally, Haysbert
contended that regardless of the timing, the arbitration clause
was broad enough to “sweep[ ] up all claims that have any type of
relationship to the Agreement,” even if they related to cases “that
did not per se originate during the term of the Agreement.”
Trial court ruling and Moultrie’s amended complaint
In August 2024, the court held a hearing on the petition.
No transcript of the hearing was prepared. The court’s minute
order indicates that it denied Haysbert’s motion “as the
agreement is too vague.”2 The court denied the motion “without
prejudice to a renewed Motion to Compel Arbitration to an
amended complaint as discussed in open court.”
In October 2024, Moultrie filed an amended complaint
alleging the same causes of action. Moultrie again alleged that
the written partnership agreement “lapsed by its terms and was
not renewed,” but he and Haysbert continued their partnership

2 Although the minute order referenced the “agreement” as
vague, the trial court’s later comments suggest this was a
typographical error and the court in fact found the complaint was
vague.

6
after the agreement expired. Moultrie claimed he and Haysbert
“agreed that the originating attorney for any litigation matter
going forward would receive Thirty Percent (30%) of the
attorneys’ fees recovered, separate and distinct from any
percentages assigned for work performed on each matter.”
Moultrie again alleged that, although he referred matters to
Haysbert and performed substantial work after the agreement
terminated in 2016, Haysbert did not pay him the 30 percent
origination fee or compensate him for work he performed on a
host of matters. The amended complaint clarified that Moultrie
was asserting each cause of action only “in regard to work
performed and attorneys’ fees earned subsequent to the
termination of the Partnership Agreement.”
Haysbert’s second petition to compel arbitration
Haysbert filed a second petition to compel arbitration.
Haysbert argued that the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) applied
because Moultrie’s claims stemmed from “the provision of legal
services to clients based outside of California” and therefore
involved interstate commerce. Haysbert argued that under the
FAA, the arbitrator had the authority to decide preliminary
questions about whether the partnership agreement expired at
the end of 2016.
Alternatively, Haysbert contended that should the court
determine it had the authority to decide the question, it should
conclude the partnership agreement was valid and enforceable at
all relevant times. He argued that the partnership agreement’s
“initial term . . . ran through December 31, 2016. However, by its
terms, the agreement was ‘continuously renewable’ for an
additional one-year term ‘with the unanimous consent of all
partners.’ . . . In the lead-up to December 31, 2016, neither

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Mr. Haysbert nor Mr. Moultrie expressed any desire to allow the
Agreement to lapse, and continued to operate their partnership
by its terms until the present day.” In an accompanying
declaration, Haysbert stated that neither he nor Moultrie agreed
to terminate the agreement. Haysbert contended that Moultrie’s
continued acceptance of the benefits of the original agreement,
such as Haysbert’s payment of the partnership’s expenses,
established his consent to renewal of the agreement. Haysbert
also again contended that the arbitration clause “survive[d] any
termination of the Partnership Agreement” and “does not exclude
disputes that otherwise fall within its scope simply because they
did not arise until later in time.”
Moultrie opposed the petition to compel, arguing that he
and Haysbert did not continue the partnership agreement after
2016. Instead, they both acknowledged it had terminated and
would not renew in December 2016.3 Moultrie also argued that
Haysbert had already conceded in the first petition to compel
arbitration that the partnership agreement expired at the end of
2016. Moultrie asserted the first petition’s references to the
agreement’s “term,” its “pendency,” and its expiration, were
admissions that the agreement was not in effect after 2016.
Moultrie claimed Haysbert had now reversed his position,
without any evidence to support his new argument that the
partnership continued to be in effect after 2016. Moultrie further
argued that although Haysbert claimed the agreement was
renewed, he did not assert that the parties unanimously agreed

3 Moultrie did not address Haysbert’s argument about
interstate commerce, arguing instead that the FAA did not apply
because the agreement was no longer in effect when the parties
started working on the out-of-state litigation.

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to renewal within 15 days before termination, as the agreement
required.
Haysbert replied that the FAA applied and all questions
about the validity of the partnership agreement after 2016 were
for an arbitrator to decide. He also asserted that Moultrie did not
explain why the first petition’s failure to argue that the
agreement remained in effect after 2016 should preclude
Haysbert from making the argument in his second petition.
Trial court ruling on the second petition
In December 2024, the trial court held a hearing on the
petition. Although Moultrie had not invoked judicial estoppel in
his briefing, the court issued an oral tentative ruling denying the
petition based on the doctrine. The court found that Haysbert’s
first petition “expressed [the] view that the agreement was of a
finite term and that it was terminated, and one of the reasons
why the plaintiff . . . did amend the complaint was I think the
court’s comment that . . . the initial complaint was very confusing
in terms of when the event occurred that gave rise to plaintiff’s
claims; that is, whether they were before the agreement, after the
agreement or during the agreement.”
Haysbert’s counsel argued that the first petition conceded
only “that there was a finite term listed in the agreement,
not . . . that the partnership itself had ceased.” He further
contended that under the Corporations Code, the partnership
continued even if the written agreement’s term ended. The court
stated that even if the partnership survived the written
agreement’s expiration, the arbitration clause was not
enforceable in the absence of a written agreement. The court
explained, “[Y]ou only get to compel arbitration based on the
written agreement that agreed to arbitration. [¶] . . . [¶] And

9
that was no longer in effect.” Haysbert’s counsel disagreed that
the agreement was no longer in effect. He contended that
because the parties continued acting and performing their duties
as partners under the agreement, the agreement remained in
effect even after the expiration of its term. Moultrie’s counsel
submitted on the court’s tentative.
The court denied the petition. In its written ruling, the
trial court concluded judicial estoppel precluded Haysbert from
claiming that the parties’ dispute was subject to a valid and
enforceable agreement to arbitrate. The court found that the
statements in Haysbert’s first petition that the agreement was
“limited in term,” that Moultrie’s complaint concerned work that
occurred “ ‘while the Agreement was in place’ ” between 2014 and
2016, and that the agreement “expired” in 2016, indicated that he
took the position that the partnership agreement terminated at
the end of 2016. The court determined that Haysbert
“successfully asserted” this position, he took a “completely
inconsistent” position in his second petition, and he did “not
allege that the first position was taken out of ignorance, fraud, or
mistake.”
The court further concluded that Haysbert’s “inconsistent
positions threaten[ed] the integrity of the judicial system by
muddling the interpretation of a contract.” The court also stated
that allowing Haysbert to assert the contrary position would
result in a waste of time and resources, since Moultrie had
“amend[ed] his complaint through reliance on” Haysbert’s earlier
position. The court thus “held [Haysbert] to his previous position
that the Agreement terminated in 2016,” and concluded:
“Because the Agreement terminated in 2016, [Haysbert] has not
alleged the existence of a written agreement to arbitrate the

10
present controversy, which consists solely of post-Agreement
work, as required under Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.2.”
Haysbert timely moved for reconsideration. The matter
was reassigned to a different trial judge, who denied the motion.4
Haysbert timely appealed from the orders denying the second
petition to compel arbitration and the motion for reconsideration.
The trial court granted Haysbert’s motion to stay the proceedings
pending appeal.
DISCUSSION
I. Applicable Legal Principles and Standard of Review
“ ‘ “Judicial estoppel precludes a party from gaining an
advantage by taking one position, and then seeking a second
advantage by taking an incompatible position. . . . The doctrine’s
dual goals are to maintain the integrity of the judicial system and
to protect parties from opponents’ unfair strategies. [Citation.]
Application of the doctrine is discretionary.” ’ [Citation.] The
doctrine applies when ‘(1) the same party has taken two
positions; (2) the positions were taken in judicial or quasi-judicial
administrative proceedings; (3) the party was successful in
asserting the first position (i.e., the tribunal adopted the position
or accepted it as true); (4) the two positions are totally
inconsistent; and (5) the first position was not taken as a result of
ignorance, fraud, or mistake.’ [Citations.]” (Aguilar v. Lerner
(2004) 32 Cal.4th 974, 986–987.)

4 We grant Haysbert’s motion to augment the record with the
notice of case reassignment, Haysbert’s motion to stay
proceedings pending appeal, the court’s ruling granting the
motion to stay, and a minute order denying Moultrie’s request for
injunctive relief.

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Judicial estoppel “is an ‘ “extraordinary remed[y] to be
invoked when a party’s inconsistent behavior will otherwise
result in a miscarriage of justice.” [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (Daar
& Newman v. VRL International (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 482,
491.) “Because of its harsh consequences, the doctrine should be
applied with caution and limited to egregious circumstances.”
(Gottlieb v. Kest (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 110, 132.)
“The determination of whether judicial estoppel can apply
to the facts is a question of law reviewed de novo, i.e.,
independently. [Citations.] [B]ut the findings of fact upon which
the application of judicial estoppel is based are reviewed under
the substantial evidence standard of review.” (Blix Street
Records, Inc. v. Cassidy (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 39, 46.) “Even if
the necessary elements of judicial estoppel are found, because
judicial estoppel is an equitable doctrine [citations], whether it
should be applied is a matter within the discretion of the trial
court [citations]. The exercise of discretion for an equitable
determination is reviewed under an abuse of discretion
standard.” (Id. at pp. 46–47.)
II. Judicial Estoppel Did Not Apply On This Record
Judicial estoppel protects against the abuse of process by
prohibiting parties from “ ‘first [advocating] one position, and
later, if it becomes beneficial, to assert the opposite.’ [Citation.]”
(Jackson v. County of Los Angeles (1997) 60 Cal.App.4th 171,
181.) To warrant application of the doctrine, “[t]he position[s]
must be clearly inconsistent so that one necessarily excludes the
other.” (Law Offices of Ian Herzog v. Law Offices of Joseph M.
Fredrics (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 672, 678 (Herzog).) A party
asserts totally inconsistent positions warranting judicial estoppel
by affirmatively taking diametrically opposing, irreconcilable

12
views on a single issue. (See, e.g., Vaghashia v. Vaghashia (2024)
106 Cal.App.5th 188, 196 [party that moved to enforce settlement
agreement could not later move to vacate agreement as
unenforceable]; DotConnectAfrica Trust v. Internet Corp. for
Assigned Names & Numbers (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 1141, 1160
(DotConnectAfrica) [party that told arbitrators it waived court
trial precluded from bringing subsequent dispute in court];
Padron v. Watchtower Bible & Tract Society of New York, Inc.
(2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 1246, 1249 [party that argued for
monetary sanctions barred from later arguing that sanctions
were unauthorized]; Herzog, at p. 679 [defendant who orally
stipulated that parties could be ordered to binding arbitration
precluded from later opposing petition to confirm award on basis
that arbitration was non-binding].)
“The case law speaks of a party successfully ‘ “asserting the
first position” ’ (Aguilar v. Lerner, supra, 32 Cal.4th at pp. 986–
987), indicating judicial estoppel does not occur absent an
affirmative assertion. In other words, silence and lack of
objection does not result in judicial estoppel.” (Brown v. Ralphs
Grocery Co. (2018) 28 Cal.App.5th 824, 842.) We consider the
context of the relevant legal assertions when determining
whether a party took inconsistent positions. (DotConnectAfrica,
supra, 68 Cal.App.5th at p. 1160.)
Here, Haysbert did not take opposing and mutually
exclusive positions regarding whether the terms of the
partnership agreement, including specifically the arbitration
provision, applied to Moultrie’s claims if they arose after 2016.
Moultrie’s original complaint admitted the partnership
agreement was in effect between 2014 and 2016. The complaint
alleged that different terms applied to his partnership with

13
Haysbert before and after 2016, and it was vague as to when
Moultrie’s claims arose. Haysbert’s first petition argued the
complaint’s own allegations conceded the applicability of the
partnership agreement and the arbitration provision to the
dispute because it asserted claims arising before the end of 2016.
(See Ahern v. Asset Management Consultants, Inc. (2022) 74
Cal.App.5th 675, 687 [petition to compel arbitration must
establish whether agreement to arbitrate exists and if dispute
falls within agreement’s scope].) As such, Haysbert’s position did
not require him to also argue that the parties had renewed the
partnership agreement under the same terms, such that the
arbitration provision continued to apply even after 2016.
The first petition’s language does not support the
conclusion that Haysbert took irreconcilable positions. For
example, the phrase “after the Agreement expired” appears twice
in Haysbert’s initial petition. In the first instance, Haysbert
argued that the work Moultrie performed on a specific case “for
the most part occurred during the entire time the Agreement was
in place . . . . [T]he fact that [it] . . . may have resolved after the
Agreement expired has no relevance at all.” In the second
instance, Haysbert described Moultrie as arguing that the
arbitration provision did not apply “because in his mind the
alleged disagreement between Plaintiff and Haysbert purportedly
did not occur until after the Agreement expired.” Haysbert used
the phrase to address and characterize Moultrie’s arguments, not
to adopt or advocate for the position that the agreement did, in
fact, terminate in 2016. He did not assert an “unequivocal,
unconditional, and unlimited” argument that the partnership
expired in 2016, or that the arbitration provision would not

14
govern disputes arising after that time. (DotConnectAfrica,
supra, 68 Cal.App.5th at p. 1160.)
Moreover, in both petitions, Haysbert contended that the
arbitration provision applied, irrespective of the duration of the
partnership agreement. In the first petition, Haysbert argued
the arbitration provision was broad enough to cover claims
arising from cases that did not originate during the undisputed
term of the agreement. In the second petition, he argued the
arbitration provision survived termination of the written
partnership agreement and did not “exclude disputes that
otherwise fall within its scope simply because they did not arise
until later in time.”
Challenges to the enforceability or applicability of an
arbitration clause are distinct from challenges to the validity of
the underlying contract. (Nielsen Contracting, Inc. v. Applied
Underwriters, Inc. (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 1096, 1107–1108; see
also Ericksen, Arbuthnot, McCarthy, Kearney & Walsh, Inc. v.
100 Oak Street (1983) 35 Cal.3d 312, 322 [“agreement” in federal
and state arbitration statutes refers to agreement to arbitrate “as
distinguished from the overall contract in which that agreement
is contained”].) Thus, even if Haysbert conceded the written
partnership agreement expired in 2016 for purposes of arguing
that Moultrie’s claims were clearly arbitrable because they arose
before 2016, that concession did not “necessarily exclude” his
other, consistent position, that the dispute nonetheless fell within
the scope of the arbitration provision. (Herzog, supra, 61
Cal.App.4th at pp. 678–679.)
“Judicial estoppel is applied only against a party that has
taken positions or made statements that are ‘totally inconsistent.’
[Citation.] Put another way, the party must have taken positions

15
that are so irreconcilable that . . . ‘ “one necessarily excludes the
other.” ’ [Citations.]” (Bell v. Wells Fargo Bank (1998) 62
Cal.App.4th 1382, 1387, fn. omitted.) Further, “[j]udicial estoppel
is an extraordinary remedy that is applied ‘with caution.’
[Citation.] To invoke the rule, a party’s inconsistent position
must arise from intentional wrongdoing or an attempt to obtain
an unfair advantage.” (Kitty-Anne Music Co. v. Swan (2003) 112
Cal.App.4th 30, 35 (Kitty-Anne).)
There was no evidence here to support a finding that
Haysbert was attempting to play “ ‘ “fast and loose with the
court[.]” ’ [Citation.]” (Kitty-Anne, supra, 112 Cal.App.4th at
p. 36.) His position in the first petition to compel arbitration was
responsive to Moultrie’s complaint as it was pled at that time.
Haysbert did not independently assert that the partnership
agreement expired in 2016. While he described the written
partnership agreement as being “in place” or “in effect” through
2016, he did so in the context of arguing that Moultrie’s
complaint arose entirely before any expiration of the agreement.
Haysbert would have gained nothing by affirmatively arguing in
the first petition to compel that the arbitration provision would
not apply to disputes arising after 2016. He did not appear to
ever take the position that if the partnership agreement expired
in 2016, the parties were no longer bound to arbitrate disputes
that arose from their ongoing work together after 2016. It was
not entirely inconsistent for Haysbert to respond to Moultrie’s
original complaint by asserting the claims arose when the written
partnership agreement was undisputedly in effect, and, when
Moultrie amended his complaint to allege claims arising in a
different time period, for Haysbert to respond by disputing that
the partnership agreement—or the arbitration provision—no

16
longer governed the parties’ relationship or disputes that arose
after 2016.
The evidence was insufficient to support the conclusion
that Haysbert took totally inconsistent positions. We therefore
reverse the trial court’s order denying his petition to compel
arbitration based on judicial estoppel. Haysbert raised several
additional arguments below in support of his petition to compel
arbitration, including whether the FAA governs the parties’
agreement to arbitrate. These issues rely in part on factual
findings that were not made below in light of the trial court’s
application of judicial estoppel. We therefore remand to the trial
court to consider in the first instance the remaining issues raised
by Haysbert’s petition.

17
DISPOSITION
The trial court’s order denying appellant’s petition to
compel arbitration is reversed and the matter is remanded for
further proceedings. Appellant to recover costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL
REPORTS

ADAMS, J.

We concur:

EGERTON, Acting P. J.

HANASONO, J.

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