People v. McKey CA4/2

CourtListener 10747618Calctapp4 déc. 2025

Texte intégral

Filed 12/4/25 P. v. McKey CA4/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for
publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent, E084019

v. (Super.Ct.No. FSB19003704)

DESMOND TAWAIN MCKEY, OPINION

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Rafael A. Arreola,

Judge. (Retired Judge of the San Diego Sup. Ct. assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant

to art. VI, § 6 of the Cal. Const.)

Christine M. Aros, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and

Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney

General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, A. Natasha Cortina and

1
Christine Levingston Bergman, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and

Respondent.

In July 2022, a jury found defendant and appellant Desmond McKey guilty of

possessing methamphetamine while armed with a firearm (Health & Saf. Code,

§ 11370.1, subd. (a)) and being a felon in possession of a firearm (Pen. Code, § 29800,

subd. (a)(1))1. The jury found defendant not guilty of first degree murder and

deadlocked on the lesser offense of second degree murder. The jury also deadlocked on

a charge of shooting at an occupied motor vehicle.

In July 2023, a second jury found defendant guilty of voluntary manslaughter

(§ 192, subd. (a)) as a lesser offense of second degree murder. The jury found

defendant not guilty of shooting at an occupied motor vehicle. The trial court found

true the allegations that defendant suffered two prior convictions that qualified as strikes

(§ 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d)) and serious felonies (§ 667, subd. (a)(1)). The trial court

sentenced defendant to prison for a term of 25 years to life.

Defendant contends the trial court erred by denying his motion to strike one of

his prior strikes (Romero2 motion). We affirm.

1 All subsequent statutory references will be to the Penal Code unless otherwise
indicated.

2 People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497 (Romero).

2
FACTS

A. PRIOR OFFENSES

Defendant’s criminal history includes the following prior convictions: (1) June

19, 1998: residential burglary (§ 459), a felony (first strike), granted 36 months of

supervised probation with 270 days in jail; (2) October 22, 1999: battery (§ 242), a

misdemeanor, granted 24 months probation with 77 days in jail; (3) July 14, 2000:

(A) transporting or selling a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code, § 11352, subd.

(a)), a felony, sentenced to prison for six years; (B) possessing cocaine base for sale

(Health & Saf. Code, 11351.5), a felony, given a stayed prison sentence of six years;

and (C) driving without a license (Veh. Code, § 12500, subd. (a)), a misdemeanor,

sentenced to jail for 120 days; (4) September 25, 2006: shooting at an occupied motor

vehicle (§ 246), a felony (second strike), sentenced to prison for eight years; and

(5) October 17, 2014: false imprisonment (§ 236), a felony, sentenced to 32 months in

prison.

B. CURRENT OFFENSE

On the evening of October 22, 2019, at 6:23:45, Trenton Jacobs (the victim)

parked his vehicle in front of a liquor store. A few seconds later, he walked into the

store. Defendant walked by the front of the liquor store, looking toward the store’s

windows. Defendant paused, walked up to one of the windows, and, at 6:24:50,

extended both arms in front of him, as though holding a gun. At 6:24:55, defendant

walked to his car, which was parked around the side of the liquor store.

3
At 6:25:37, the victim exited the liquor store. The victim briefly spoke to a

friend in the parking lot, then he turned toward his car and opened the driver’s door. As

the victim was opening the door, at 6:25:48, defendant walked from the side of the

liquor store to the front. From 6:25:48 to 6:25:55 defendant and the victim spoke to

each other with more than three empty parking spaces between them. At 6:25:52 the

victim took several steps in the direction of defendant, and defendant took several steps

toward the victim. At 6:25:55, defendant shot the victim from a distance of three

parking spaces away.

Defendant fired his gun twice, striking the victim once in the chest. The other

bullet went through the victim’s car window where a woman and a one-year-old child

were sitting. The victim was unarmed. The victim “ ‘died within minutes’ ” due to the

gunshot wound.

In an interview with law enforcement, defendant asserted that the victim shot

defendant in his leg in August 2019 due to a dispute over defendant dating the victim’s

girlfriend while the victim was incarcerated. When defendant saw the victim at the

liquor store, defendant was scared because he thought the victim might shoot him again.

According to the woman, who was seated in the victim’s car, when defendant

approached the victim, at 6:25:48, defendant said, “ ‘Hey . . . I know you.’ ” The victim

responded, “ ‘I don’t think so.’ ” Defendant then killed the victim. According to

defendant, the victim said to defendant, “ ‘I wish I didn’t miss.’ ”

4
C. ROMERO MOTION

In defendant’s Romero motion, he raised two arguments. First, defendant

contended his first strike was non-violent and remote, in that it occurred 26 years

earlier. Second, defendant asserted that if he were given an upper term sentence,

doubled for a second strike, plus enhancements, that would be a 32-year prison term.

Defendant was 45 years old at sentencing, so he would likely be over 60 years old when

released, and “[i]ndividuals 60 and over ha[ve] the lowest conviction rate of all age

groups (16.5 percent).” Defendant contended that keeping him “in prison through his

80s has no benefit to society.”

In opposing the motion, the People asserted defendant’s criminal history is over

20 years long and of increasing severity. The People contended, “Defendant is a career

criminal and a life sentence is required to curtail this revolving door of criminal

conduct.” The trial court denied the motion without stating its reasons.

DISCUSSION

Defendant contends the trial court erred by denying his motion to strike one of

his prior strikes.

“ ‘[T]he Three Strikes law does not offer a discretionary sentencing choice, . . .

but establishes a sentencing requirement to be applied in every case where the defendant

has at least one qualifying strike.’ ” (People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 377

(Carmony).) If a trial court decides to dismiss a prior strike allegation in the interest of

justice (§ 1385, subd. (a)), then it must state its reasons for doing so. (Carmony, at p.

377.) “Thus, the three strikes law not only establishes a sentencing norm, it carefully

5
circumscribes the trial court’s power to depart from this norm and requires the court to

explicitly justify its decision to do so. In doing so, the law creates a strong presumption

that any sentence that conforms to these sentencing norms is both rational and proper.

“In light of this presumption, a trial court will only abuse its discretion in failing

to strike a prior felony conviction allegation in limited circumstances. For example, an

abuse of discretion occurs where the trial court was not ‘aware of its discretion’ to

dismiss [citation], or where the court considered impermissible factors in declining to

dismiss [citation].” (Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 378.)

“ ‘[I]t is not enough to show that reasonable people might disagree about whether

to strike one or more’ prior conviction allegations.’ ” (Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p.

378.) “[T]he circumstances must be ‘extraordinary . . . by which a career criminal can

be deemed to fall outside the spirit of the very scheme within which he squarely

falls . . . .’ Of course, in such an extraordinary case—where the relevant factors . . .

manifestly support the striking of a prior conviction and no reasonable minds could

differ—the failure to strike would constitute an abuse of discretion.” (Ibid.)

When deciding or reviewing a motion to dismiss a prior strike conviction

allegation, the court “ ‘must consider whether, in light of the nature and circumstances

of his present felonies and prior serious and/or violent felony convictions, and the

particulars of his background, character, and prospects, the defendant may be deemed

outside the scheme’s spirit, in whole or in part, and hence should be treated as though he

had not previously been convicted of one or more serious and/or violent felonies.’ ”

(Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 377.)

6
Defendant’s criminal history stretches over more than 25 years and involves

drugs and violence. At times, defendant was granted probation. At other times, he was

sentenced to prison. Neither approach made a significant difference, as defendant

continued to commit crimes involving drugs and/or violence.

In the instant case, defendant saw that the victim was in the liquor store.

Defendant then went to his car. Defendant could have driven away, walked away, or

called for help. Instead, defendant left his place of safety (his car) and walked around

the corner of the liquor store to approach the victim. Within seven seconds of defendant

appearing at the front of the liquor store, he shot the victim. Defendant’s conduct

demonstrates that he is still apt to choose violence. When given the option of being in a

place of safety or shooting a person, defendant chose to shoot a person.

Defendant’s 25-year history of crimes involving drugs and violence, his violence

escalating to cause the death of another person, and his decision to engage in violence

rather than remain in a place of safety establish that he falls squarely within the spirit of

the “Three Strikes” law.

Defendant asserts that (1) the majority of his prior convictions are misdemeanors

or drug offenses—not violent offenses; (2) defendant shot the victim because defendant

was scared; (3) defendant expressed remorse for killing the victim; and (4) a sentence of

33 years is sufficient punishment for the convictions in this case.

As explained ante, “ ‘[I]t is not enough to show that reasonable people might

disagree about whether to strike one or more’ prior conviction allegations.” (Carmony,

supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 378.) “[T]he circumstances must be ‘extraordinary . . . by which

7
a career criminal can be deemed to fall outside the spirit of the very scheme within

which he squarely falls.’ ” (Ibid.)

The circumstances set forth by defendant are not extraordinary; they might lead

some people to disagree about a three-strikes sentence in this case, but they are not the

type of circumstances where no reasonable person would find that defendant falls within

the spirit of the Three Strikes law. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its

discretion.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

MILLER
J.

We concur:

McKINSTER
Acting P. J.

FIELDS
J.

8

Poursuivez vos recherches dans ChatGPT ou Claude

Connectez Omnilex pour rechercher dans le corpus juridique depuis votre assistant IA.