People v. Calderon CA2/6

CourtListener 10746903Calctapp3 déc. 2025

Texte intégral

Filed 12/3/25 P. v. Calderon CA2/6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule
8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

THE PEOPLE, 2d Crim. No. B336987
(Super. Ct. No. 2015024873)
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Ventura County)

v.

DAVID GUADALUPE
CALDERON,

Defendant and Appellant.

David Guadalupe Calderon appeals from the judgment
after a jury convicted him of premeditated first degree murder
(Pen. Code,1 §§ 187, subd. (a), 189, subd. (a); count 1) and found
true that he personally and intentionally discharged a firearm
causing death (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)). Calderon requested a
bifurcated trial and waived jury on enhancements alleging a
gang-murder special circumstance (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(22)), and

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
that he committed the offense to benefit a criminal street gang
(§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)) and while on-bail (§ 12022.1, subd. (b)).
The trial court found the special circumstance and enhancements
true. The court sentenced Calderon to life without the possibility
of parole.
Calderon does not contest the sufficiency of the evidence
supporting his conviction and true findings. He contends his jury
trial waiver on the bifurcated enhancements was invalid. We
affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In February 2012, Calderon and another man drove into
rival gang territory. Calderon said he would shoot rival gang
members. They saw Edwin Herrera sitting in a parked car with
the driver’s door open. Calderon exited the car with a firearm
hidden behind his leg. He approached Herrera and asked him,
“ ‘Where are you from?’ ” Herrera responded, “ ‘I’m not from
nowhere.’ ”
Calderon then pointed his firearm at Herrera and asked
again, “ ‘Where are you from?’ ” Herrera repeatedly said, “ ‘I’m
not from nowhere.’ ” Calderon then aimed the firearm at
Herrera, and Herrera again said, “ ‘I’m not from nowhere’ ” and
put up his hands. Calderon “pull[ed] the trigger” from two to
three feet away and Herrera’s body slumped in the car. Herrera
was not a gang member.
In June 2016, Calderon was charged in an amended
indictment with premeditated first degree murder. It was also
alleged that Calderon committed the offense while he was an
active participant in a criminal street gang to further the
activities of and benefit the gang, and while he was released on
bail. (§§ 190.2, subd. (a)(22), 186.22, subd. (b)(1), 12022.1, subd.

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(b).)
In May 2021, Calderon elected to represent himself. The
trial court approved Calderon’s written waiver of his right to
counsel. Calderon represented himself for approximately fifteen
months. He engaged with the prosecutor and the trial court in
setting court dates, waiving his speedy trial rights, and
rescheduling his trial date. Calderon filed a written motion for
discovery that cited various legal authorities, and he argued the
motion at a hearing. Calderon also filed a motion to suppress
evidence. (§ 1538.5.) He again cited legal authority,
cross-examined the People’s witness, and conducted direct
examination of three witnesses.
In October 2022, the court approved Calderon’s request to
relieve his pro per status and appointed counsel.
At a pretrial hearing in February 2024, Calderon requested
a bifurcated trial on the gang-murder special circumstance
(§ 190.2, subd. (a)(22)) and the criminal street gang (§ 186.22,
subd. (b)(1)) and on-bail enhancements (§ 12022.1, subd. (b)).
Calderon and his counsel took a break to discuss a waiver of
constitutional rights form.
The written waiver form stated: “My attorney has
explained to me, and I understand, that I am waiving (giving up)
each of the following constitutional rights regarding the special
circumstance, alleged pursuant to Penal Code section
190.2(a)(22), and the special allegation, alleged pursuant to Penal
Code section 186.22(b)(1), in the indictment[;] . . . The right to
have every allegation against me determined by a jury of 12
persons; [¶] . . . [¶] I am entering this waiver freely and
voluntarily and not as the result of any force, pressure, threats,
or coercion brought against me or any member of my family.

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Further, no commitments have been made to me or my attorney
other than those that appear on this form . . . [¶] [and] I have
discussed with my attorney and understand the consequences of
this waiver and my constitutional rights. I waive (give up) the
above-mentioned constitutional rights. I request that the court
accept my waiver.”
The prosecutor questioned Calderon about the waiver.
Calderon confirmed the signature and initials on the form were
his. Calderon also confirmed he reviewed the waiver with his
attorney, understood he was waiving his “right to have every
allegation against [him] determined by [a] jury of 12 people,” and
agreed to give up his right to a jury trial.
Calderon’s counsel joined in the waiver of rights. In the
written waiver, counsel confirmed that he “explained to the
defendant all of his constitutional rights.” He also stated, “I am
satisfied [Calderon] understands his constitutional rights. . . . I
have explained the direct and indirect consequences of this
waiver to the defendant and am satisfied he understands them. I
am satisfied the defendant is voluntarily and of his own free will
seeking to enter this waiver.”
The trial court did not independently question Calderon.
But it found he “expressly, knowingly, understandingly and
intelligently waived his statutory and constitutional rights to the
jury trial” on the gang-murder special circumstance and criminal
street gang enhancements. It also entered an order granting the
jury waiver based on findings that Calderon “understands” the
consequences, “knowingly, intelligently, and understandingly
waived his rights,” and the waiver was “voluntary.”
The next day the parties indicated that Calderon was
prepared to also waive his right to a jury trial on the on-bail

4
enhancement. The court said, “You still have a right to a jury
trial which means you have the right to have 12 citizens from the
community listen to the evidence with respect to that out-on-bail
allegation and determine whether or not it’s been proven beyond
a reasonable doubt.” “And if you give up your right to a jury trial,
it would be the Court, me, deciding whether or not the People
have proven that allegation beyond a reasonable doubt.”
Calderon said he understood, waived his right to a jury trial, and
his counsel joined in the waiver. The court found the waiver was
“freely and voluntarily made.”
Jury trial proceedings began the next morning. Calderon
was present for jury selection proceedings and the prosecution’s
case in chief.
Calderon elected not to testify, and the defense did not call
any witnesses after the close of the prosecution’s case in chief.
The jury convicted Calderon of premeditated first degree
murder (§§ 187, subd. (a), 189, subd. (a); count 1) and found true
that he personally and intentionally discharged a firearm causing
death (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)). At no point before the bifurcated
trial on the enhancements did Calderon express a desire to
deviate from his jury trial waivers. In the bifurcated trial, the
court found true the gang-murder special circumstance (§ 190.2,
subd. (a)(22)), and criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1))
and on-bail enhancements (§ 12022.1, subd. (b)).
The trial court sentenced Calderon to life without the
possibility of parole for the special circumstance murder plus 25
years to life for the firearm enhancement, and two years
consecutive for the on-bail enhancement.

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DISCUSSION
Jury waiver
Calderon contends his jury trial waivers on the bifurcated
special circumstance, criminal street gang, and on-bail
enhancements were invalid. We are not persuaded.
The federal and state constitutions guarantee the right to
trial by jury. (U.S. Const., 6th Amend.; Cal. Const., art. I, § 16.)
“The denial of a defendant’s constitutional right to a jury trial
constitutes structural error that requires reversal regardless of
the strength of the evidence supporting the conviction.
[Citations.]” (People v. Jones (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 420, 429.)
A waiver of jury trial must be “ ‘knowing and intelligent,
that is, “ ‘ “made with a full awareness both of the nature of the
right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to
abandon it,” ’ ” ’ ” and “ ‘voluntary “ ‘ “in the sense that it was the
product of a free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation,
coercion, or deception.” ’ ” ’ [Citation.]” (People v. Sivongxxay
(2017) 3 Cal.5th 151, 166 (Sivongxxay).) But trial judges need
not follow a rigid formula or use any particular words to ensure
that a jury waiver is knowing and intelligent. (Id. at pp. 169–
170.) The advisements may be given by the prosecutor rather
than the judge. (People v. Harty (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 493, 504
[guilty plea].)
“The voluntariness of a waiver is a question of law which
appellate courts review de novo.” (People v. Panizzon (1996) 13
Cal.4th 68, 80 [waiver of appeal]; People v. Morelos (2022) 13
Cal.5th 722, 735 [Faretta2 waiver].) A jury waiver is valid only
“ ‘ “if the record affirmatively shows that it is voluntary and

2 Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806.

6
intelligent under the totality of the circumstances.” ’ ” (People v.
Daniels (2017) 3 Cal.5th 961, 991 (lead opn. of Cuéllar, J.)
(Daniels).) “ ‘[W]hether or not there is an intelligent, competent,
self-protecting waiver of jury trial by an accused must depend
upon the unique circumstances of each case.’ ” (Sivongxxay,
supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 166.)
In Sivongxxay, our Supreme Court provided guidance to
trial courts taking jury waivers in criminal cases. “Going
forward, we recommend that trial courts advise a defendant of
the basic mechanics of a jury trial in a waiver colloquy, including
but not necessarily limited to the facts that (1) a jury is made up
of 12 members of the community; (2) a defendant through his or
her counsel may participate in jury selection; (3) all 12 jurors
must unanimously agree in order to render a verdict; and (4) if a
defendant waives the right to a jury trial, a judge alone will
decide his or her guilt or innocence.” (Sivongxxay, supra, 3
Cal.5th at p. 169.) But Sivongxxay nonetheless confirmed that
California Supreme Court “precedent has not mandated any
specific method for determining whether a defendant has made a
knowing and intelligent waiver of a jury trial in favor of a bench
trial.” (Id. at p. 167.) Later in Daniels, our high court reaffirmed
that the validity of a jury waiver does not depend on “trial courts
provid[ing] any particular advisements.” (Daniels, supra, 3
Cal.5th at p. 993.)
Calderon was advised of two of the Sivongxxay
recommendations, and a third was not relevant. He waived the
right to “a jury of 12 persons.” Regarding the bail allegation, he
was advised he “still [had] the right to a jury trial which means
. . . the right to have 12 citizens from the community listen to the
evidence.” (Italics added.) Also, regarding the bail allegation, he

7
was advised the judge alone would decide whether the allegation
had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. The waiver
regarding the bail allegation preceded the trial on the
enhancements, while Calderon still had the opportunity to
withdraw his jury waiver if he wished.
An advisement about participation in jury selection was not
required because the bifurcated portion of the trial is generally
heard by the same jury that decided guilt. Calderon’s attorney
had participated in jury selection by questioning potential jurors
and exercising peremptory challenges.
Calderon was present at the conclusion of the guilt phase
when the jury was instructed that its verdict must be unanimous.
(CALCRIM No. 3550.) Although jury unanimity was not
mentioned regarding the jury waiver, our Supreme Court has
“never insisted that a jury waiver colloquy invariably must
discuss . . . the unanimity requirement.” (Sivongxxay, supra, 3
Cal.5th at p. 168.)
Despite our Supreme Court’s guidance in Sivongxxay,
neither Calderon’s written waiver, the prosecutor’s questions, nor
the trial court’s colloquy contain all its recommended
advisements. But “[v]iewed holistically, [we conclude] the
circumstances surrounding [Calderon’s] jury waiver demonstrate
that it was knowing and intelligent.” (Sivongxxay, supra, 3
Cal.5th at p. 168.) Those circumstances include Calderon’s
written jury waiver and defense counsel’s representations;
Calderon’s conduct after executing his waiver; and Calderon’s
experience with the criminal justice system.
The written jury waiver and defense counsel’s attestations
support that Calderon’s jury waiver was knowing, intelligent,
and voluntary. A written waiver can help establish the adequacy

8
of a jury waiver. (See People v. Weaver (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1056,
1070 (Weaver).) Calderon and his counsel took a break to discuss
the jury waiver. In that waiver, Calderon confirmed that he and
his attorney discussed the consequences of waiving his right to
jury trial on the bifurcated enhancements. Calderon also
confirmed that his waiver was entered freely and voluntarily.
And counsel confirmed that he explained the indirect and direct
consequences of the jury trial waiver to Calderon. Counsel was
satisfied that Calderon understood the waiver of his
constitutional rights, including the indirect and direct
consequences, and that his waiver was voluntary.
“Counsel plays a crucial part in transmitting information to
the client.” (Daniels, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 996.) Here, counsel’s
written waiver’s attestations satisfy Sivongxxay’s additional
recommendations that trial courts inquire whether a defendant
and counsel had an adequate opportunity to discuss the waiver to
ensure understanding of the right being waived. (Sivongxxay,
supra, 3 Cal.5th at pp. 169–170; see also Weaver, supra, 53
Cal.4th at p. 1070 [counsel’s attestations established jury waiver
was knowing and intelligent].) The written waiver also provides
a factual basis to establish voluntariness because it confirms no
threats or promises were made to Calderon in exchange for
waiving jury. (See People v. Morelos, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 754;
Daniels, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 988 (lead opn. of Cuéllar, J.).)
Because our de novo review is based on a “nuanced
account” of the “totality of the circumstances” (Daniels, supra, 3
Cal.5th at pp. 991, 1018), we also consider events “before and
after [Calderon’s] waiver was entered” to confirm its “character
and scope.” (Sivongxxay, supra, 3 Cal.5th at pp. 167, fn. 2, 173,
fn. 8.) After executing his jury waiver and the trial court

9
expressly finding that it was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary,
trial proceedings began. Calderon was present for jury selection
and the guilt phase of trial. At no point during these proceedings
did Calderon indicate he wanted a jury trial on the
enhancements. Not before the People rested. Not when Calderon
chose not to testify. Not after the jury rendered its verdict at the
conclusion of the guilt phase. And not before the bifurcated trial
on the enhancements began.
Like the defendant in People v. Mosby (2004) 33 Cal.4th
353 (Mosby) who was aware of his trial rights when he admitted
a prior conviction because he “had just undergone a jury trial” on
the substantive offense (Mosby, at p. 364), Calderon did not
request the trial court deviate from his previously executed
waivers after having just undergone a jury trial in the guilt
phase. Calderon’s conduct supports our conclusion that his jury
waiver on the bifurcated enhancements was knowing, intelligent,
and voluntary.
Nor was Calderon a person who lacked legal sophistication.
A “ ‘defendant’s prior experience with the criminal justice system’
is . . . ‘relevant to the question [of] whether he knowingly waived
constitutional rights.’ ” (Mosby, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 365.)
During the pendency of this case Calderon represented himself
for fifteen months, executed a written waiver of counsel form,
waived his speedy trial rights, filed two motions citing legal
authorities, argued the motions before the court, and conducted
direct and cross-examinations of witnesses at a motion to
suppress hearing. “[W]hen criminal history is brought to bear on
an inquiry into a waiver of the right to a jury trial in favor of a
bench trial, the most relevant experience is previously having
undergone a criminal trial.” (Daniels, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 1001,

10
italics omitted.) In our view, Calderon’s jury trial waiver cannot
be attributed to ignorance.3
We recognize that our Supreme Court has recommended
trial courts engage in a “robust oral colloquy” when criminal
defendants seek to waive jury. But based on the totality of “all
relevant circumstances” here, such a colloquy was not necessary.
(Sivongxxay, supra, 3 Cal.5th at pp. 168–170.) “The test of a
valid waiver ultimately turns, not on whether specific warnings
or advisements were given, but whether “ ‘the record
affirmatively shows that [the waiver] is voluntary and intelligent
under the totality of the circumstances.’ ” (Daniels, supra, 3
Cal.5th at p. 1018.) The record here “affirmatively” shows that
Calderon’s waiver was voluntary and intelligent.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

BALTODANO, J.

We concur:

YEGAN, Acting P. J. CODY, J.

3 Calderon requests that we take judicial notice of the
felony disposition statement in another case in which he was the
defendant, People v. Calderon (Super. Ct. Ventura County, 2024,
No. 2023030241). We deny the request because it has “little
relevance to a material issue in this matter.” (Ketchum v.
Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1135, fn. 1.)

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Catherine Voelker, Judge

Superior Court County of Ventura

______________________________

Jin H. Kim, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews and Michael J. Wise,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

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