Reed v. Reed CA2/8

CourtListener 10746046Calctapp2 déc. 2025

Texte intégral

Filed 12/2/25 Reed v. Reed CA2/8
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION EIGHT

KASEI REED, B344540

Petitioner and Respondent, Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
v. 23CMFL00199

ALONZO BILL REED,

Respondent and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Kimberly Dotson, Commissioner. Affirmed.
No appearance for Petitioner and Respondent.
Alonzo B. Reed, in pro per., for Respondent and Appellant.
____________________
Alonzo Reed and Kasei Reed married in August 2014 and
separated in March 2023, citing irreconcilable differences. We
refer to them by their first names. Undesignated statutory
citations refer to the Family Code.
In May 2023, Alonzo signed an FL-180 judgment form that
Kasei had prepared. Near the top of the form, Kasei checked the
box stating the judgment was an uncontested or default
dissolution of the Reeds’ marriage. The judgment awarded Kasei
real property located at 724 W. Plum Street in Compton. Notary
public T. Donlow verified Alonzo personally appeared before him,
signed the judgment, and acknowledged his understanding that
signing the judgment was a free and voluntary act.
In July 2023, Alonzo signed an interspousal grant deed,
which provided, in relevant part, that: “for a valuable
consideration, receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, Grantor
Alonzo B. Reed and Kasei C. Reed, Trustors and Trustees of the
Reed Family Trust, dated November 7th, 2020 hereby grants to
Kasei C. Reed, a married woman as her sole and separate
property the real property . . . more commonly known as 724 W.
Plum Street, Compton, CA 90222-3940.” Notary public
Emmanuel Gonzalez verified that he had confirmed Alonzo’s
identity and that Alonzo signed the deed in his authorized
capacity.
In November 2023, Alonzo signed the final Stipulated
Judgment form, which stated Kasei would be awarded the 724 W.
Plum St. property as “her sole and separate property.” The
judgment included an acknowledgement by Alonzo that he had
been advised by counsel or had the opportunity to seek
independent counsel “in regards to the economic benefits
conferred by this Stipulated Judgment as they may be better or
worse than the economic benefits that would be conferred after
such a full evidentiary hearing or trial.”
One year later, Alonzo filed a motion to set aside the
judgment under § 2120. Section 2120 et seq. “authorizes a

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dissolution judgment to be vacated . . . where the judgment was
procured by fraud or perjury.” (Rubenstein v. Rubinstein (2000)
81 Cal.App.4th 1131, 1152.)
As the moving party, Alonzo had the burden of proving his
entitlement to relief. (In re Marriage of Diamond (2024) 106
Cal.App.5th 550, 566 (Diamond).) In support of his motion,
Alonzo wrote: “I am asking the judge to set aside the divorce
judgment. I recently became aware my former spouse might
have defrauded me in the divorce because I was served with a 3-
day notice.”
In January 2025, Kasei filed her opposition to Alonzo’s
motion. Kasei included a sworn declaration in which she averred
that the 724 W. Plum St. property had been owned by Alonzo’s
family for more than a decade before it was awarded to her in the
divorce settlement, but as a courtesy, she allowed Alonzo to
continue residing at the property as a paying tenant. After
Alonzo stopped paying rent, Kasei served him with a 3-day notice
to pay rent or quit. When Alonzo did not comply, Kasei filed an
unlawful detainer case against him, which ultimately resolved in
Kasei’s favor.
A few weeks later, the family court held a hearing on
Alonzo’s motion. Alonzo and Kasei were present at the hearing,
but there was no court reporter. Neither Alonzo nor Kasei had
counsel. After hearing the parties’ testimony and argument, the
court denied Alonzo’s motion.
Alonzo appealed, seeking reversal of the court’s order. He
claims he was “never informed of the legal [c]onsequences of
signing the [I]nterspousal Transfer Grant Dee[d], nor was he
compensated, advised, or questioned.” Although he is once again
representing himself, Alonzo must still follow the rules of

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appellate procedure. (See Nwosu v. Uba (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th
1229, 1246–1247 [“[A]s is the case with attorneys, pro. per.
litigants must follow correct rules of procedure”.)
Alonzo, however, failed to comply with the basic rules of
appellate procedure. His opening brief lacks any citations to the
record; instead, it is full of unsupported legal and factual
assertions, much of which is contradicted by evidence in the
record. For instance, Alonzo claims the family court denied his
motion without holding a hearing or taking any testimony. The
family court’s January 27, 2025 minute order refutes this
assertion, as it shows the court held a hearing, Alonzo and Kasei
were sworn and testified, and the court heard argument on
Alonzo’s motion before denying it. Alonzo’s failure to follow
appellate procedure means he has forfeited any argument that
the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion. (See
L.O. v. Kilrain (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 616, 621.)
Forfeiture aside, Alonzo cannot meet the burden he bears
on appeal. Because he had the burden of proof in the family
court, he can win this appeal only if he proves the evidence
compels a finding in his favor as a matter of law. (Diamond,
supra, 106 Cal.App.5th at p. 566.) The record here consists of the
documents we summarized at the beginning of this opinion.
There is no transcript of the hearing on Alonzo’s motion. This
evidence does not compel a judgment in Alonzo’s favor. (See
Bookout v. State of Cal. ex. rel. Dept. of Transportation (2010) 186
Cal.App.4th 1478, 1486 [“[U]nless the trial court makes specific
findings of fact in favor of the losing [party], we presume the trial
court found the [losing party’s] evidence lacks sufficient weight
and credibility to carry the burden of proof. [Citations.] We have

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no power on appeal to judge the credibility of witnesses or to
reweigh the evidence”].)
DISPOSITION
We affirm the family court’s order. We do not award costs
because Kasei did not file a brief.

WILEY, Acting P. J.

We concur:

VIRAMONTES, J.

UZCATEGUI, J. 


Judge of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, assigned by
the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California
Constitution.

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