CourtListener 10745322•People v. Cuevas CA2/6
Texte intégral
Filed 12/1/25 P. v. Cuevas CA2/6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SIX
THE PEOPLE, 2d Civ. No. B342898
(Super. Ct. No. 23CR04974)
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Santa Barbara County)
v.
LUIS ALFONSO CUEVAS,
Defendant and Appellant.
Luis Alfonso Cuevas appeals a judgment following his
conviction of various offenses, including driving under the
influence of alcohol. Cuevas argues the trial court erroneously
found he waived his Miranda1 rights. We will affirm.
1 Miranda v. Arizona (1996) 384 U.S. 436 [16 L.Ed.2d. 694].
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND2
Two callers called 911 to report a possible drunk driver in a
truck. The truck was described as small, old, and black. The
driver was stated to be a male, that he appeared to have run a
red light and struck another vehicle. The other vehicle drove
away. One of the 911 callers reported: “He’s out of the car now
. . . . He’s really drunk.”
Paramedics (AMR) arrived at the scene first. Santa
Barbara Police Officers Justin Cruz and Netza Ortiz arrived
subsequently and saw a pickup truck stopped and blocking the
street. The driver’s side door was open. Appellant was leaning
through the door into the truck cab. There were several opened
and three unopened alcoholic beverage cans in the truck bed.
Ortiz overheard AMR ask appellant “Are you the only one in the
car?” Appellant replied “Yes.” Ortiz believed there had been only
one occupant of the truck because the driver’s seat was clear of
any items and the passenger seat had objects on it. A receipt
found in the truck had appellant’s first name on it. The keys
were found on the floorboard.
Appellant denied having a California driver’s license. He
was unable or unwilling to perform some of the field sobriety
tests. Breathalyzer results showed his blood alcohol content was
.244 percent and .23 percent. After he was given his Miranda
rights, he said he understood them. He was asked where he was
going and he responded he was going home.
2 Our summary of all the facts is limited given the only
issue raised on appeal concerns appellants waiver of his Fifth
Amendment rights.
2
A jury convicted appellant of all counts and found true the
special allegations for counts 1 and 2.3 The court found true
appellant had three prior driving under the influence convictions
(Veh. Code, § 23550, subd. (a)) and a prior strike conviction (Pen.
Code § 667, subds. (d)(1) & (e)(1).) On count one, the court
sentenced appellant to an aggregate term of four years (midterm
of two years doubled for the prior strike) and stayed sentence on
count two under Penal Code section 654. On count three
appellant was sentenced to 120 days county jail concurrent to
count one.
Motion to Exclude Appellant’s Admission
Appellant moved to exclude any statements he made in
violation of Miranda. On appeal he limits his contention to his
post-Miranda statements that support that he was driving. He
argues he was too intoxicated to understand and waive his
Miranda rights and without his admission of driving there was
no substantial evidence he had been driving.
The trial court reviewed Officers Ortiz’s and Cruz’s body
camera video and audio transcripts from the videos and
considered the parties’ briefs and arguments. The court found it
clear appellant was intoxicated. It also found that appellant’s
answers to some questions posed by the officers and AMR were
responsive and some were not. “Some appeared to be evasive.”
3 Count 1 – felony driving under the influence of alcohol
(Veh. Code, § 23152, subd. (a); Count 2 – felony driving with a .08
percent or higher blood alcohol level (id., § 23152, subd. (a) & (b);
Count 3 – misdemeanor driving with a suspended license for a
prior driving under the influence conviction (id., §§ 14601,
14601.2, subd (a)). Special allegations were that his blood alcohol
level was .15 percent or higher (Veh. Code, § 23578).
3
“[A]t times, [he] cursed at officers, refused to answer questions, or
appeared to stall in responding.” The court noted when asked, he
provided his correct address. The court also remarked on the fact
that appellant had a history of law enforcement contact so “he is
not unfamiliar with the criminal justice system.” The court saw
no indication appellant was coerced, fearful or intimidated by his
interactions with law enforcement; to the contrary he “appeared
quite comfortable” enough to respond with snide remarks which
included cursing at the officers. The court concluded that “in
reviewing the totality of the circumstances” no Miranda violation
occurred and that appellant voluntarily waived his Miranda
rights.
DISCUSSION
“‘Miranda holds that “[t]he defendant may waive
effectuation” of the rights conveyed in the warnings “provided the
waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently.”
[Citation.] The inquiry has two distinct dimensions. [Citations.]
First, the relinquishment of the right must have been voluntary
in the sense that it was the product of a free and deliberate choice
rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception. Second, the
waiver must have been made with a full awareness of both the
nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the
decision to abandon it. Only if the “totality of the circumstances
surrounding the interrogation” reveals both an uncoerced choice
and the requisite level of comprehension may a court properly
conclude that the Miranda rights have been waived.’” (People v.
Smith (2007) 40 Cal.4th 483, 501-502 (Smith), quoting Moran v.
Burbine (1986) 475 U.S. 412, 421 [89 L.Ed.2d 410].)
“‘The prosecution bears the burden of demonstrating the
validity of the defendant's waiver by a preponderance of the
4
evidence.’ [Citations.] In addition, ‘[a]lthough there is a
threshold presumption against finding a waiver of Miranda
rights [citation], ultimately the question becomes whether the
Miranda waiver was [voluntary,] knowing[,] and intelligent
under the totality of the circumstances surrounding the
interrogation.’ [Citation.] On appeal, we conduct an independent
review of the trial court’s legal determination and rely upon the
trial court’s findings on disputed facts if supported by substantial
evidence.” (People v. Williams (2010) 49 Cal.4th 405, 425.)
“Where . . . an interview is recorded, the facts surrounding the
admission or confession are undisputed and we may apply
independent review.” (People v. Duff (2014) 58 Cal.4th 527, 551.)
“A suspect’s expressed willingness to answer questions
after acknowledging an understanding of [their] Miranda rights
has itself been held sufficient to constitute an implied waiver of
such rights. [Citations.]” (People v. Sauceda-Contreras (2012) 55
Cal.4th 203, 218-219.)
Voluntary consumption of an intoxicating substance alone
does not establish impaired capacity to waive Miranda rights.
(People v. Frye (1998) 18 Cal.4th 894, 988, overruled on another
ground in People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 421, fn. 22.)
Evidence that might suggest a lack of understanding must be
accompanied by evidence of actual inability to comprehend or
lack of ability to make a free and rational choice to waive his
rights. (People v. Cunningham (2015) 61 Cal.4th 609, 645.)
Defendant’s coherent and responsive answers may show lack of
an impaired mental state. (People v. Hensley (2014) 59 Cal.4th
788, 814.)
Appellant contends the totality of the circumstances
establish that due to his level of intoxication he was incapable of
5
knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently waiving his Miranda
rights. Appellant points to his blood alcohol level, and expert
testimony that at such levels a person exhibits mental
impairments, memory effects, and confusion. He also points out
evidence of his physical impairment, like swaying, and sweating.
And he notes the officers testified appellant was “unable to
coherently and cohesively answer questions, they did not
understand what appellant was trying to say, and the words
coming out of his mouth were nonsensical.” But his physical
appearance and evidence that alcohol at certain blood alcohol
levels affects the brain and memory does not support that
appellant was so impaired that he was not acting knowingly and
voluntarily. Neither do the general descriptions of what the
officers first encountered at the scene support appellant’s
contention. Instead, we consider the totality of the evidence.
There is no dispute that appellant was intoxicated and that
at times he seem to make nonresponsive and nonsensical
statements. But we have reviewed the video recordings and
related transcripts and agree with the trial court that the totality
of the circumstances establish appellant understood his Miranda
rights and impliedly waived them when he chose to answer the
officer’s questions.
Appellant’s response to many of the officers’ and AMR
statements were coherent and responsive. When asked if he was
hurt, he responded “No. No hurt.” When he was asked “Is that
your car? It’s parked sideways in the middle of the street and
you’re standing there stumbling” appellant responded, “I don’t
say nothing.” Then he was asked, “You don’t want to say
anything?” He said “No.” When asked if he had an “ID” he
responded “No-no-no-no. No ID but I can.” When officers and
6
AMR discussed the need to take appellant to the hospital he
made clear “I don’t want to go to the hospital.”4 He added they
did not have the right to take him to the hospital.5 When asked
what city he was in, appellant answered correctly, “Santa
Barbara.” He also correctly stated the year, “twenty three.” He
became belligerent when asked what happened, saying “You
assholes [unintelligible] what – what is it that you want?” and
then he answered “Nothing.” During a discussion between AMR
and officers about whether he should be medically checked
because “there could be a medical thing going on” appellant
volunteered “No, I am just drunk only and that’s all.” When told
by Officer Ortiz they needed to make sure he had the ability to
drive a car, appellant responded “If you want, I drive any car.”
When Officer Ortiz explained that he had the choice of allowing a
blood draw or a breath test, and that if he chose a breath test “so
then we don’t have to go to the hospital, they don’t have to draw
blood and right here we can do it in about two minutes” appellant
responded “Yes, that’s better.” He was asked if had a middle
name: “Is it just Luis Cuevas?” He said “Yes Cuevas.” “Only
Cuevas?” “Yes.” After completing his breath tests, Officer Ortiz
told appellant he was going to “read something to you, okay?”
Appellant responded “Yes tell me . . . Mother Fucker.” Appellant
was then read his Miranda rights and afterward was asked “do
you understand each of these rights?” He responded “Yes – yes.”
4 Some of his statements were in English, others in
Spanish. This statement was made in Spanish.
5 His exact words, as translated from Spanish to English
were “No, it’s my, not your rights of you guys to [unintelligible].
No, no, no. . . .” Officer Ortiz understood his statement to be “he’s
saying that you don’t have a right to take him [to the hospital].”
7
He then was asked whether it was his truck and whether it was
registered under his name” and answered “Yes – yes – yes.”
Then he was asked “Okay and where were you going?” and he
responded “I was going home.” Then in response to the question
“So, then you were driving to your house?” he said “Yes, yes.” He
also provided his correct address when asked.
This and other evidence establishes that despite being
intoxicated, appellant understood his rights and that he
knowingly and intelligently waived them when he subsequently
answered the officer’s questions.
Moreover, appellant was not prejudiced by any error in
admitting his post-Miranda statements. There was abundant
circumstantial evidence to support the jury’s determination that
he had been driving the truck shortly before he was contacted by
AMR and law enforcement. Admission of a defendant’s
statements in violation of Miranda is subject to the harmless
error standard of Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 [17
L.Ed.2d 705]. (People v. Sims (1993) 5 Cal.4th 405, 447.) “That
test requires the People ‘to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict
obtained.’” (People v. Henderson (2020) 9 Cal.5th 1013, 1029.)
No evidence suggested there was more than one occupant
in the truck. Calls to 911 identified a truck and a drunken man
driving the truck. One caller reported the man got out of the
truck. Shortly thereafter AMR and officers encountered
appellant alone standing outside his truck leaning into the open
driver side door. There were items on the passenger side that
would have hindered anyone sitting there leading Officer Ortiz to
believe there was only occupant. A receipt found inside the truck
had appellant’s first name on it. The truck’s keys were found on
8
the driver’s side floorboard. Appellant admitted to AMR that he
was the only one in the vehicle. Appellant never denied it was
his truck or said there was another person or driver. Thus, even
though the prosecution’s case relied upon appellant’s admission
to establish he had been driving there was other compelling
evidence to support the jury reaching same conclusion.
DISPOSITION
Judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
CODY, J.
We concur:
GILBERT, P. J.
BALTODANO, J.
9
Von N. Deroian, Judge
Superior Court County of Santa Barbara
______________________________
Asya Ovsepyan, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Scott A. Taryle, Supervising Deputy
Attorney General, and David A. Voet, Deputy Attorney General,
for Plaintiff and Respondent.
10
Filed 12/1/25 P. v. Cuevas CA2/6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SIX
THE PEOPLE, 2d Civ. No. B342898
(Super. Ct. No. 23CR04974)
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Santa Barbara County)
v.
LUIS ALFONSO CUEVAS,
Defendant and Appellant.
Luis Alfonso Cuevas appeals a judgment following his
conviction of various offenses, including driving under the
influence of alcohol. Cuevas argues the trial court erroneously
found he waived his Miranda1 rights. We will affirm.
1 Miranda v. Arizona (1996) 384 U.S. 436 [16 L.Ed.2d. 694].
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND2
Two callers called 911 to report a possible drunk driver in a
truck. The truck was described as small, old, and black. The
driver was stated to be a male, that he appeared to have run a
red light and struck another vehicle. The other vehicle drove
away. One of the 911 callers reported: “He’s out of the car now
. . . . He’s really drunk.”
Paramedics (AMR) arrived at the scene first. Santa
Barbara Police Officers Justin Cruz and Netza Ortiz arrived
subsequently and saw a pickup truck stopped and blocking the
street. The driver’s side door was open. Appellant was leaning
through the door into the truck cab. There were several opened
and three unopened alcoholic beverage cans in the truck bed.
Ortiz overheard AMR ask appellant “Are you the only one in the
car?” Appellant replied “Yes.” Ortiz believed there had been only
one occupant of the truck because the driver’s seat was clear of
any items and the passenger seat had objects on it. A receipt
found in the truck had appellant’s first name on it. The keys
were found on the floorboard.
Appellant denied having a California driver’s license. He
was unable or unwilling to perform some of the field sobriety
tests. Breathalyzer results showed his blood alcohol content was
.244 percent and .23 percent. After he was given his Miranda
rights, he said he understood them. He was asked where he was
going and he responded he was going home.
2 Our summary of all the facts is limited given the only
issue raised on appeal concerns appellants waiver of his Fifth
Amendment rights.
2
A jury convicted appellant of all counts and found true the
special allegations for counts 1 and 2.3 The court found true
appellant had three prior driving under the influence convictions
(Veh. Code, § 23550, subd. (a)) and a prior strike conviction (Pen.
Code § 667, subds. (d)(1) & (e)(1).) On count one, the court
sentenced appellant to an aggregate term of four years (midterm
of two years doubled for the prior strike) and stayed sentence on
count two under Penal Code section 654. On count three
appellant was sentenced to 120 days county jail concurrent to
count one.
Motion to Exclude Appellant’s Admission
Appellant moved to exclude any statements he made in
violation of Miranda. On appeal he limits his contention to his
post-Miranda statements that support that he was driving. He
argues he was too intoxicated to understand and waive his
Miranda rights and without his admission of driving there was
no substantial evidence he had been driving.
The trial court reviewed Officers Ortiz’s and Cruz’s body
camera video and audio transcripts from the videos and
considered the parties’ briefs and arguments. The court found it
clear appellant was intoxicated. It also found that appellant’s
answers to some questions posed by the officers and AMR were
responsive and some were not. “Some appeared to be evasive.”
3 Count 1 – felony driving under the influence of alcohol
(Veh. Code, § 23152, subd. (a); Count 2 – felony driving with a .08
percent or higher blood alcohol level (id., § 23152, subd. (a) & (b);
Count 3 – misdemeanor driving with a suspended license for a
prior driving under the influence conviction (id., §§ 14601,
14601.2, subd (a)). Special allegations were that his blood alcohol
level was .15 percent or higher (Veh. Code, § 23578).
3
“[A]t times, [he] cursed at officers, refused to answer questions, or
appeared to stall in responding.” The court noted when asked, he
provided his correct address. The court also remarked on the fact
that appellant had a history of law enforcement contact so “he is
not unfamiliar with the criminal justice system.” The court saw
no indication appellant was coerced, fearful or intimidated by his
interactions with law enforcement; to the contrary he “appeared
quite comfortable” enough to respond with snide remarks which
included cursing at the officers. The court concluded that “in
reviewing the totality of the circumstances” no Miranda violation
occurred and that appellant voluntarily waived his Miranda
rights.
DISCUSSION
“‘Miranda holds that “[t]he defendant may waive
effectuation” of the rights conveyed in the warnings “provided the
waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently.”
[Citation.] The inquiry has two distinct dimensions. [Citations.]
First, the relinquishment of the right must have been voluntary
in the sense that it was the product of a free and deliberate choice
rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception. Second, the
waiver must have been made with a full awareness of both the
nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the
decision to abandon it. Only if the “totality of the circumstances
surrounding the interrogation” reveals both an uncoerced choice
and the requisite level of comprehension may a court properly
conclude that the Miranda rights have been waived.’” (People v.
Smith (2007) 40 Cal.4th 483, 501-502 (Smith), quoting Moran v.
Burbine (1986) 475 U.S. 412, 421 [89 L.Ed.2d 410].)
“‘The prosecution bears the burden of demonstrating the
validity of the defendant's waiver by a preponderance of the
4
evidence.’ [Citations.] In addition, ‘[a]lthough there is a
threshold presumption against finding a waiver of Miranda
rights [citation], ultimately the question becomes whether the
Miranda waiver was [voluntary,] knowing[,] and intelligent
under the totality of the circumstances surrounding the
interrogation.’ [Citation.] On appeal, we conduct an independent
review of the trial court’s legal determination and rely upon the
trial court’s findings on disputed facts if supported by substantial
evidence.” (People v. Williams (2010) 49 Cal.4th 405, 425.)
“Where . . . an interview is recorded, the facts surrounding the
admission or confession are undisputed and we may apply
independent review.” (People v. Duff (2014) 58 Cal.4th 527, 551.)
“A suspect’s expressed willingness to answer questions
after acknowledging an understanding of [their] Miranda rights
has itself been held sufficient to constitute an implied waiver of
such rights. [Citations.]” (People v. Sauceda-Contreras (2012) 55
Cal.4th 203, 218-219.)
Voluntary consumption of an intoxicating substance alone
does not establish impaired capacity to waive Miranda rights.
(People v. Frye (1998) 18 Cal.4th 894, 988, overruled on another
ground in People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 421, fn. 22.)
Evidence that might suggest a lack of understanding must be
accompanied by evidence of actual inability to comprehend or
lack of ability to make a free and rational choice to waive his
rights. (People v. Cunningham (2015) 61 Cal.4th 609, 645.)
Defendant’s coherent and responsive answers may show lack of
an impaired mental state. (People v. Hensley (2014) 59 Cal.4th
788, 814.)
Appellant contends the totality of the circumstances
establish that due to his level of intoxication he was incapable of
5
knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently waiving his Miranda
rights. Appellant points to his blood alcohol level, and expert
testimony that at such levels a person exhibits mental
impairments, memory effects, and confusion. He also points out
evidence of his physical impairment, like swaying, and sweating.
And he notes the officers testified appellant was “unable to
coherently and cohesively answer questions, they did not
understand what appellant was trying to say, and the words
coming out of his mouth were nonsensical.” But his physical
appearance and evidence that alcohol at certain blood alcohol
levels affects the brain and memory does not support that
appellant was so impaired that he was not acting knowingly and
voluntarily. Neither do the general descriptions of what the
officers first encountered at the scene support appellant’s
contention. Instead, we consider the totality of the evidence.
There is no dispute that appellant was intoxicated and that
at times he seem to make nonresponsive and nonsensical
statements. But we have reviewed the video recordings and
related transcripts and agree with the trial court that the totality
of the circumstances establish appellant understood his Miranda
rights and impliedly waived them when he chose to answer the
officer’s questions.
Appellant’s response to many of the officers’ and AMR
statements were coherent and responsive. When asked if he was
hurt, he responded “No. No hurt.” When he was asked “Is that
your car? It’s parked sideways in the middle of the street and
you’re standing there stumbling” appellant responded, “I don’t
say nothing.” Then he was asked, “You don’t want to say
anything?” He said “No.” When asked if he had an “ID” he
responded “No-no-no-no. No ID but I can.” When officers and
6
AMR discussed the need to take appellant to the hospital he
made clear “I don’t want to go to the hospital.”4 He added they
did not have the right to take him to the hospital.5 When asked
what city he was in, appellant answered correctly, “Santa
Barbara.” He also correctly stated the year, “twenty three.” He
became belligerent when asked what happened, saying “You
assholes [unintelligible] what – what is it that you want?” and
then he answered “Nothing.” During a discussion between AMR
and officers about whether he should be medically checked
because “there could be a medical thing going on” appellant
volunteered “No, I am just drunk only and that’s all.” When told
by Officer Ortiz they needed to make sure he had the ability to
drive a car, appellant responded “If you want, I drive any car.”
When Officer Ortiz explained that he had the choice of allowing a
blood draw or a breath test, and that if he chose a breath test “so
then we don’t have to go to the hospital, they don’t have to draw
blood and right here we can do it in about two minutes” appellant
responded “Yes, that’s better.” He was asked if had a middle
name: “Is it just Luis Cuevas?” He said “Yes Cuevas.” “Only
Cuevas?” “Yes.” After completing his breath tests, Officer Ortiz
told appellant he was going to “read something to you, okay?”
Appellant responded “Yes tell me . . . Mother Fucker.” Appellant
was then read his Miranda rights and afterward was asked “do
you understand each of these rights?” He responded “Yes – yes.”
4 Some of his statements were in English, others in
Spanish. This statement was made in Spanish.
5 His exact words, as translated from Spanish to English
were “No, it’s my, not your rights of you guys to [unintelligible].
No, no, no. . . .” Officer Ortiz understood his statement to be “he’s
saying that you don’t have a right to take him [to the hospital].”
7
He then was asked whether it was his truck and whether it was
registered under his name” and answered “Yes – yes – yes.”
Then he was asked “Okay and where were you going?” and he
responded “I was going home.” Then in response to the question
“So, then you were driving to your house?” he said “Yes, yes.” He
also provided his correct address when asked.
This and other evidence establishes that despite being
intoxicated, appellant understood his rights and that he
knowingly and intelligently waived them when he subsequently
answered the officer’s questions.
Moreover, appellant was not prejudiced by any error in
admitting his post-Miranda statements. There was abundant
circumstantial evidence to support the jury’s determination that
he had been driving the truck shortly before he was contacted by
AMR and law enforcement. Admission of a defendant’s
statements in violation of Miranda is subject to the harmless
error standard of Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 [17
L.Ed.2d 705]. (People v. Sims (1993) 5 Cal.4th 405, 447.) “That
test requires the People ‘to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict
obtained.’” (People v. Henderson (2020) 9 Cal.5th 1013, 1029.)
No evidence suggested there was more than one occupant
in the truck. Calls to 911 identified a truck and a drunken man
driving the truck. One caller reported the man got out of the
truck. Shortly thereafter AMR and officers encountered
appellant alone standing outside his truck leaning into the open
driver side door. There were items on the passenger side that
would have hindered anyone sitting there leading Officer Ortiz to
believe there was only occupant. A receipt found inside the truck
had appellant’s first name on it. The truck’s keys were found on
8
the driver’s side floorboard. Appellant admitted to AMR that he
was the only one in the vehicle. Appellant never denied it was
his truck or said there was another person or driver. Thus, even
though the prosecution’s case relied upon appellant’s admission
to establish he had been driving there was other compelling
evidence to support the jury reaching same conclusion.
DISPOSITION
Judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
CODY, J.
We concur:
GILBERT, P. J.
BALTODANO, J.
9
Von N. Deroian, Judge
Superior Court County of Santa Barbara
______________________________
Asya Ovsepyan, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Scott A. Taryle, Supervising Deputy
Attorney General, and David A. Voet, Deputy Attorney General,
for Plaintiff and Respondent.
10
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