In re Jamar J. CA2/5

CourtListener 10744965Calctapp26 nov. 2025

Texte intégral

Filed 11/26/25 In re Jamar J. CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

In re Jamar J., A Person B342821
Coming Under the Juvenile (Los Angeles County
Court Law. Super. Ct. No.
20CCJP02063H)

LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF
CHILDREN AND FAMILY
SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

A.G.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Ashley M. Price, Judge. Affirmed.
Richard L. Knight, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, Jessica S. Mitchell, Senior Deputy
County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

_____________________

I. INTRODUCTION

A.G. (mother) appeals from the juvenile court’s orders
sustaining a Welfare and Institutions Code section 3001 petition,
declaring Jamar J. (the child) a dependent of the court and
ordering him removed from his parents.2 Mother does not
challenge the merits of the court’s orders. Instead, she contends
the Department of Children and Family Services (Department)
and the court failed to comply with their inquiry duties under the
Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA; 25 U.S.C. § 1901 et
seq.) and related California statutes (Cal-ICWA; § 224 et seq.).
We affirm.

II. BACKGROUND

Mother and father are the parents of five children, four of
whom were the subject of another dependency case before the
birth of the child. During that prior case, the Department made

1 Further statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code unless otherwise stated.

2 I.J. (father) is not a party to this appeal.

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inquiries of mother, father, maternal grandmother, and maternal
great-aunt Kelly J. (who is also referred to in the record as Kelly
G.) about possible Indian ancestry and those family members
denied any such ancestry.
On July 16, 2024, the Department filed a section 300
petition with respect to the then one-year-old child. In an
addendum report filed on July 16, 2024, the Department
explained that it had asked mother, paternal aunt T.R., and
maternal great-aunt Kelly J. about their Indian ancestry and
each had denied any such ancestry.
On July 17, 2024, mother filed a Parental Notification of
Indian Status (ICWA-020) form stating she had no Indian
ancestry. On the same day, the juvenile court held a hearing at
which mother was present. The court acknowledged mother’s
indication of no Indian ancestry and asked mother if father had
any such ancestry. Mother replied, “I don’t think so. No.” The
court found it did not have reason to know the child was an
Indian child. The court ordered the Department to “interview
any and all known relatives regarding ICWA and to give an
update in the jurisdiction report. [The Department] has an
ongoing duty to inquire of all relatives and case participants
about possible Native American Heritage throughout the life of
this case.”
On August 22, 2024, the Department filed a first amended
section 300 petition. In its August 22, 2024, jurisdiction and
disposition report, the Department reported the details of its
ICWA investigation. The Department explained that it had
received denials of Indian ancestry from the following nine family
members: mother, father, maternal great-aunt Kelly J.,
maternal great-uncle T.J., maternal great-aunt D.O., maternal

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grandmother L.D., paternal aunt T.R., paternal uncle J.J., and
paternal grandmother Tracey R. (who is also referred to in the
record as Tracey G.). The Department contacted the maternal
grandfather, M.G. Sr., on May 14, 2024, but received no response.
At his September 3, 2024, arraignment hearing, father told
the juvenile court that he was not aware of any Indian ancestry
within his family. This was consistent with what he had told the
court in a prior dependency case in June 2022, and told a social
worker in August 2024. The court made an updated finding of
“no ICWA” in this case.
On December 3, 2024, at the continued jurisdiction and
disposition hearing, the juvenile court declared the child a
dependent of the court and ordered him removed from the
parents. The court determined the child should remain in his
existing placement with maternal great-aunt D.O. The court
ordered family reunification services for mother, bypassed
services for father, and ordered monitored visits for the parents.
The court set a six-month review hearing for June 3, 2025, and a
section 366.26 hearing for March 18, 2025.
Mother timely filed a notice of appeal.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Legal Principles: ICWA and the Duties of Inquiry

“The California Supreme Court recently addressed
‘whether a child welfare agency’s failure to make the statutorily
required initial inquiry under California’s heightened ICWA
requirements constitutes reversible error.’ (In re Dezi C. (2024)
16 Cal.5th 1112, 1125.) It ‘conclude[d] a judgment must be

4
conditionally reversed when error results in an inadequate ICWA
inquiry.’ (In re Kenneth D.[ (2024)] 16 Cal.5th [1087,] 1094; see
In re Dezi C., [supra, 16 Cal.5th] at p. 1125.) [¶] . . . [¶]
“The Department’s duty of ‘[i]nquiry includes, but is not
limited to, asking the child, parents, legal guardian, Indian
custodian, extended family members, others who have an interest
in the child, and the party reporting child abuse or neglect,
whether the child is, or may be, an Indian child.’ (Former
§ 224.2, subd. (b)[3]; see [Cal. Rules of Court,] rule 5.481(a)(1) [the

3 The current version of section 224.2, subdivision (b)
provides:
“(1) The duty to inquire begins for a county when first
contacted regarding a child, including, but not limited to, asking
a party reporting child abuse or neglect whether the party has
any information that the child may be an Indian child, and upon
a county department’s first contact with the child or the child’s
family, including extended family members as defined in
paragraph (1) of subdivision (c) of Section 224.1. At the first
contact with the child and each family member, including
extended family members, the county welfare department or
county probation department has a duty to inquire whether that
child is or may be an Indian child.
“(2) If a child is placed into the temporary custody of a
county probation department pursuant to Section 307, or received
and maintained in temporary custody of a county welfare
department pursuant to paragraph (1) of subdivision (a) of
Section 306, or taken into or maintained in the temporary
custody of a county welfare department pursuant to paragraph
(2) of subdivision (a) of Section 306, or if they were initially taken
into protective custody pursuant to a warrant described in
Section 340, the county welfare department or county probation
department has a duty to inquire whether that child is an Indian
child. Inquiry includes, but is not limited to, asking the child,

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Department ‘must ask the child, if the child is old enough, and
the parents, Indian custodian, or legal guardians, extended
family members, others who have an interest in the child, and
where applicable the party reporting child abuse or neglect,
whether the child is or may be an Indian child’]; In re
Y.W.[ (2021)] 70 Cal.App.5th [542,] 551–552.)
“ICWA and Cal-ICWA define ‘extended family member,’ if
not separately defined by the law or custom of the Indian child’s
tribe, as ‘a person who has reached the age of eighteen and who is
the Indian child’s grandparent, aunt or uncle, brother or sister,
brother-in-law or sister-in-law, niece or nephew, first or second
cousin, or stepparent.’ (25 U.S.C. § 1903(2); see § 224.1, subd. (c)
[providing ‘extended family member’ follows definition stated in
ICWA].)” (In re T.R. (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 206, 218–219.)
“The juvenile court’s factual finding that ICWA does not
apply is ‘subject to reversal based on sufficiency of the evidence.’
(§ 224.2, subd. (i)(2).)” (In re Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at
p. 1134.) We will “review[] for substantial evidence whether
there is reason to know a minor is an Indian child, and review[] a
finding of due diligence and proper inquiry for abuse of
discretion.” (In re Kenneth D., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1101; but
see ibid. [“some courts have applied a standard substantial
evidence test, ‘which requires us to determine if reasonable,
credible evidence of solid value supports the court’s’ ICWA
finding”].)

parents, legal guardian, Indian custodian, extended family
members, others who have an interest in the child, and the party
reporting child abuse or neglect, whether the child is, or may be,
an Indian child and where the child, the parents, or Indian
custodian is domiciled.” (See Stats. 2024, ch. 656, § 3, eff.
Sept. 27, 2024.)

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“[T]he juvenile court’s fact-specific determination that an
inquiry is adequate, proper, and duly diligent is ‘a
quintessentially discretionary function’ [citation] subject to a
deferential standard of review. [Citations.] ‘“On a well-developed
record, the court has relatively broad discretion to determine
whether the agency’s inquiry was proper, adequate, and duly
diligent on the specific facts of the case. However, the less
developed the record, the more limited that discretion necessarily
becomes.”’ [Citations.] [¶] If, upon review, a juvenile court’s
findings that an inquiry was adequate and proper and ICWA
does not apply are found to be supported by sufficient evidence
and record documentation as required by California law ([Cal.
Rules of Court, ]rule 5.481(a)(5)), there is no error and conditional
reversal would not be warranted even if the agency did not
inquire of everyone who has an interest in the child. On the
other hand, if the inquiry is inadequate, conditional reversal is
required so the agency can cure the error and thereby safeguard
the rights of tribes, parents, and the child.” (In re Dezi C., supra,
16 Cal.5th at p. 1141.)

B. Analysis

Mother contends the Department and the juvenile court
failed to comply with their continuing duty of inquiry under
ICWA and Cal-ICWA. According to mother, the Department
unreasonably failed to ask the following relatives about the
child’s possible Indian ancestry: maternal great-aunt Kelly G.,
an unidentified maternal great-grandmother; maternal uncle
M.G., paternal uncle D., paternal grandfather, and paternal
grandmother (both of whom mother describes as “unidentified”).

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As an initial matter, and contrary to mother’s assertions,
the Department did ask paternal grandmother Tracey R. and
maternal great-aunt Kelly G. about the child’s Indian ancestry.
They denied any such ancestry. Further, the Department could
not have asked paternal grandfather about Indian ancestry
because he was deceased.4
We next consider mother’s complaint that the Department
failed to contact and then ask the following relatives about
Indian ancestry: a maternal great-grandmother; maternal uncle
M.G.; and paternal uncle D. In support of her contention that the
Department failed to interview these relatives, mother cites to
the reporter’s transcript from the July 29, 2024, hearing, at
which none of the relatives appeared but the court and the
parties made reference to these family members during a
discussion about the child’s placement and monitored visits. We
reject mother’s contention that the Department was required to
locate and interview these relatives. A great-grandmother does
not fall within the definition of “extended family” and thus the
Department was not required to interview her. (§ 224.1, subd.
(c)(1); In re D.S. (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 1041, 1053). Further, on
this record, where the Department had inquired of nine other
family members, five maternal and four paternal, about the
child’s Indian ancestry, the Department was not additionally
required to obtain contact information for and interview a

4 In support of her contention that the Department failed to
interview paternal grandfather, mother cites to a reporter’s
transcript from a September 3, 2024, hearing at which the
parties discuss father’s paternity and a pending DNA test of
paternal grandmother. That portion of the transcript does not
refer to a paternal grandfather.

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maternal uncle and a paternal uncle in order to fulfill its duty of
initial inquiry. (In re D.S., supra, 46 Cal.App.5th at p. 1053 [the
Department “is not required to ‘cast about’ for information or
pursue unproductive investigative leads”].)5
Mother also contends that if we conclude that the
Department made an adequate initial ICWA inquiry, “then [the
Department] failed to report fully on its initial inquiry, as
required, because inquiry with the identified extended families
was not completely listed in [the Department’s] reports . . . .” We
reject the contention. As we explain above, the Department’s
reports included descriptions of the Department’s ICWA inquiry.
We conclude that substantial evidence supports the
juvenile court’s finding that ICWA does not apply in this case.

5 For the same reason, we reject mother’s related contention
that the Department was required to ask mother, father, and any
other extended family members “whether they could provide
contact information for any other maternal or paternal extended
family members, so that the social worker could inquire about
whether [the child] may have Native American heritage.”

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IV. DISPOSITION

The juvenile court’s December 3, 2024, jurisdiction and
removal orders are affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

KIM (D.), J.

We concur:

HOFFSTADT, P. J.

BAKER, J.

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