CourtListener 10743286•People v. Barner CA2/8
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Filed 11/26/25 P. v. Barner CA2/8
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION EIGHT
THE PEOPLE, B337923
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BA442619-01)
v.
ASHLEY CRAIG BARNER,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Deborah S. Brazil, Judge. Appeal dismissed.
Jake E. Stanton, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Idan Ivri and Roberta L. Davis, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_______________________
We review an order denying Ashley Barner’s motion for
resentencing brought under Penal Code1 section 1172.1,
subdivision (a)(1). Because we find the order is not appealable,
we dismiss the appeal.
BACKGROUND
On June 27, 2016, a jury convicted appellant Ashley Craig
Barner of assault with a firearm in violation of section 245,
subdivision (a)(2). It also found Barner personally used a sawed-
off shotgun during the commission of the crime in violation of
sections 12022.5, subdivision (a).
On August 23, 2016, Barner admitted two prior strike
convictions pursuant to sections 667, subdivision (d) and 1170.12,
subdivision (b). The trial court sentenced Barner to 39 years to
life in state prison under the Three Strikes Law as follows: 25
years to life for the assault, plus 10 years pursuant to section
667, subdivision (a)(1) for two prior serious felony convictions,
plus the middle term of four years pursuant to section 12022.5 for
use of the firearm. We affirmed the judgment. (People v. Barner
(Aug. 25, 2017, B277839) [nonpub. opn.].)
On April 8, 2024, Barner filed a Request for Recall of
Sentence and Resentencing pursuant to Assembly Bill No. 600
and section 1172.1 and a request for appointment of counsel. On
April 16, 2024, the trial court summarily denied appellant’s
petition for resentencing without appointing counsel. The court
declined to exercise its discretion to reduce the gun enhancement,
citing the nature of the crime, Barner’s criminal history, the
safety of the public, and the interests of justice. It also found
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
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that recent legislative ameliorative changes did not apply to
Barner’s case. The trial court found no provision in section
1172.1 for a defendant to initiate the resentencing process and
noted the statute provides that courts are not obligated to
respond to such requests. Barner timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
I. Section 1172.1—the Recall and Resentencing Statute
Section 1172.1 endows a trial court with authority to recall
the sentences of incarcerated defendants and resentence them
under certain circumstances. Like its predecessor provisions,
section 1172.1 is a statutory exception to the general rule that
“ ‘once a judgment is rendered and execution of the sentence has
begun, the trial court does not have jurisdiction to vacate or
modify the sentence.’ ” (People v. King (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 629,
637–638.)
Under section 1172.1, a trial court may recall and
resentence “at any time” upon the recommendation of the
Secretary of the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation,
the Board of Parole Hearings, the district attorney of the county
in which the defendant was sentenced, or the Attorney General if
the Department of Justice originally prosecuted the case.
(§ 1172.1, subd. (a)(1).) Until recently, the statute also provided
that a trial court may recall and resentence “on its own motion”
only within 120 days of the date of commitment. Effective
January 1, 2024, the 120-day provision was expanded. Now a
trial court may recall a sentence and resentence a defendant on
its own motion “at any time if the applicable sentencing laws at
the time of original sentencing are subsequently changed by new
statutory authority or case law.” (Ibid.; Assem. Bill No. 600
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(2023–2024 Reg. Sess.).) Once a trial court decides to recall and
resentence, it may either reduce the sentence by modification or
vacate the conviction and impose judgment on “any necessarily
included lesser offense or lesser related offense, whether or not
that offense was charged in the original pleadings.” (§ 1172.1,
subd. (a)(3).)
Notably, section 1172.1, by its terms, denies a defendant
the right to petition the court for recall and resentencing. Section
1172.1, subdivision (c) states: “A defendant is not entitled to file a
petition seeking relief from the court under this section,” and “[i]f
a defendant requests consideration for relief under this section,
the court is not required to respond.” As to a right to appeal, the
statute provides: “After ruling on a referral authorized by this
section, the court shall advise the defendant of their right to
appeal.” (Id., subd. (d).)
II. The Right to Appeal Generally
The right to appeal is statutory only, and a party may not
appeal a trial court’s judgment, order or ruling unless such is
expressly made appealable by statute. (Teal v. Superior Court
(2014) 60 Cal.4th 595, 598.) Criminal defendants are entitled to
appeal from “any order made after judgment, affecting the
substantial rights of the party.” (§ 1237, subd. (b).)
III. The Definition of “Substantial Rights”
Our Supreme Court has not provided “a comprehensive
interpretation of the term ‘substantial rights’ as used in section
1237, subdivision (b).” (People v. Loper (2015) 60 Cal.4th 1155,
1161, fn. 3 (Loper).) But Loper did discuss how to approach
formulating a definition. There, the court addressed the question
whether a defendant has the right to appeal a trial court’s denial
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of a request for compassionate release properly made by the
Secretary of the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation
under section 1170, former subdivision (e). That statute is
similar to section 1172.1 in that both statutes do not give
defendants the right to make a request for relief themselves. For
relief under section 1170, only the Secretary of the Department of
Corrections and Rehabilitation or the Board of Parole Hearings
may make such a request. (§ 1170, former subd. (e).)
In deciding that the denial of a request for compassionate
release affects substantial rights, our Supreme Court in Loper
noted: “Although the defendant has no independent right to
initiate compassionate release proceedings in the trial court, the
Secretary [of the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation]
evaluated defendant’s medical condition and made a
recommendation for compassionate release on his behalf. By
providing a mechanism for releasing eligible prisoners from
custody, section 1170 [former subdivision (e) implicates a
prisoner’s substantial interest in personal liberty. Moreover,
although section 1170 [former subdivision (e) authorizes the trial
court to exercise discretion whether to release a prisoner for
compassionate reasons, the statute also establishes clear
eligibility criteria (§ 1170[, former subd.] (e)(2)), suggesting that
discretion is not unfettered when evidence is presented satisfying
the statutory criteria. These factors lead us to conclude the trial
court’s ruling clearly affected defendant’s substantial rights for
purposes of section 1237, subdivision (b).” (Loper, supra,
60 Cal.4th at p. 1161, fn. 3.)
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We glean from this footnote that the combination of three
factors dictates whether a defendant’s substantial rights in
personal liberty are implicated: 1) the Legislature sets up a
mechanism for releasing eligible prisoners from custody; 2) that
mechanism is used to get the issue of release from custody before
the trial court; and 3) that mechanism includes a list of eligibility
statutory criteria that must then be followed by the trial court in
making its ruling, suggesting that the trial court’s discretion is
not unfettered. We also glean from the extended discussion in
Loper on standing that whether or not the defendant has the
express right to initiate the request for sentencing relief is
immaterial to determining whether substantial rights are
affected. (See Loper, supra, 60 Cal.4th at pp. 1161–1165
[defendant may appeal an adverse decision on a postjudgment
motion or petition if it affects substantial rights, even if someone
else brought the original motion].) Indeed, we find that it is use
of the mechanism set up by the Legislature, coupled with
legislatively mandated factors to consider, that are determinative
of whether substantial rights are affected by the statute.
Keeping these three factors in mind, we hold that section
1172.1 does not implicate a defendant’s substantial rights where,
as here, a defendant has personally filed a petition not authorized
by statute. It is true that the Legislature created a mechanism
for release, satisfying the first of the three criteria set out above.
However, that mechanism, authorized for use by only designated
entities or persons, was not followed in this case. Section 1172.1,
subdivision (c) expressly provides: “A defendant is not entitled to
file a petition seeking relief from the court under this section. If
a defendant requests consideration for relief under this section,
the court is not required to respond.” The statute also expressly
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provides that where an authorized request for relief is denied, a
defendant must be advised of their appellate rights, inferring a
right to appeal a properly authorized request. (§ 1172.1,
subd. (d).
Here, Barner filed an unauthorized request for relief to
which the trial court was not obligated to respond. Thus, the
second criterion—that the authorized mechanism be used to
obtain the requested relief—has not been satisfied. This, we
emphasize, stands apart from a standing analysis per se.
We also adopt the analysis of our colleagues in Division 2
who concluded that orders denying requests for relief from
defendants personally, as opposed to those from authorized third
parties, are not appealable. (People v. Hodge (2024)
107 Cal.App.5th 985.) As Presiding Justice Lui wrote, “[T]he
second sentence of section 1172.1, subdivision (c) does undermine
any claim that defendants have a substantial right at stake when
they file an unauthorized request for resentencing. That
sentence excuses the trial court from any responsibility to rule on
such a request, or even to respond. It follows that a defendant
who chooses to file an unauthorized request for resentencing has
no right to a ruling. The defendant may have a liberty interest at
stake in any decision as to whether they should remain
incarcerated. But a defendant has no right to demand that the
trial court actually make such a decision. If the defendant has no
right to a decision, the trial court’s choice not to make one does
not deprive the defendant any right, much less a substantial
one.” (Id. at p. 996.) Under Hodge, where a statute expressly
relieves the court of any obligation to adjudicate a request for
relief filed by defendants personally, it follows that defendants do
not have a substantial right in this particular pathway toward
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resentencing. (Ibid; see also People v. Faustinos (2025)
109 Cal.App.5th 687, 697 (Faustinos) [order declining to act on
defendant’s unauthorized section 1172.1 petition not an
appealable order]; People v. Brinson (2025) 112 Cal.App.5th 1040,
1047 [same]; People v. Roy (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 991, 996
[same].)
Barner argues that the trial court misunderstood the scope
of its discretion in denying relief and therefore his substantial
rights were affected by the court’s error. Our analysis does not
change where, as here, the trial court issued an order explaining
why it was declining to act on the request (instead of ignoring the
request, as it was authorized to do). It is the Legislature’s
mechanism and the use of that mechanism that is paramount in
deciding whether substantial rights are affected, not the format
or content of the trial court’s order. As stated in Faustinos,
supra, 109 Cal.App.5th at page 698, appealability depends upon
the nature of the decision made, not the court’s justification for
its ruling. A court cannot “transform a nonappealable order
(stating that it would not act on an unauthorized motion) into an
appealable one by addressing a matter that it needed not address
. . . even if it was wrong about that matter.” (Ibid.)
We find that the order denying Barner’s section 1172.1
petition is not an appealable order because Barner did not invoke
the procedures mandated by the statute. We therefore do not
address the merits of his petition.
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DISPOSITION
The appeal is dismissed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
STRATTON, P. J.
We concur:
WILEY, J.
VIRMONTES, J.
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