People v. Sanchez CA2/8

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Filed 11/24/25 P. v. Sanchez CA2/8
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION EIGHT

THE PEOPLE, B336220

Plaintiff and Respondent, Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BA511351
v.

JERSAIN SANCHEZ,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, David Herriford, Judge. Affirmed.
Debbie Yen, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Amanda V. Lopez and Nicholas J. Webster,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
____________________
Police pursued a white Ford F-250 truck after learning the
truck was stolen. With their sirens and lights on, they trailed the
truck as it sped, weaved, and abruptly slowed on the 10 Freeway.
A police helicopter tracked the truck. Two pursuing officers
testified about the chase, detailing the many traffic violations
they saw. Defendant Jersain Sanchez rolled out of the truck as it
was moving and ran away. The truck crashed. Police tackled
and arrested Sanchez. No one else was in the truck or in the
area. It was around 1:30 in the morning.
The jury heard from the truck owner Lorena Jovel, who
testified she last had her truck two days before the chase. She
and her husband had driven it to a supermarket that day. They
locked it and secured it with a boot device before grocery
shopping. When they returned, the truck was gone. No security
footage captured the theft.
After hearing from Jovel and the two officers and viewing
the videotaped chase, the jury convicted Sanchez of the two
counts charged: reckless evading (§ 2800.2; count 1) and driving
or taking a vehicle without consent (§ 10851, subd. (a); count 2)
(section 10851(a)). All statutory citations are to the Vehicle Code.
The trial court separately found several prior convictions
and aggravating factors. It sentenced Sanchez to three years for
the first count and eight consecutive months for the second.
On appeal, Sanchez argues the court prejudicially erred in
instructing the jury on count 2. We shall address the errors he
asserts. Neither was prejudicial.
I
The pivotal point here is that section 10851(a) criminalizes
multiple acts, but the prosecution pursued only one of the
available theories in its case in chief.

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A defendant may be convicted of taking another’s car. Or
the defendant may be convicted of driving the car without the
owner’s consent and with the intent to deprive the owner of
possession. (People v. Lara (2019) 6 Cal.5th 1128, 1135 (Lara).)
A defendant may be convicted of both offenses, provided a
substantial break separates the taking and the driving. (See id.
at p. 1136.) Unlike the taking offense, the driving offense is not a
theft crime. (Ibid.)
The information charged Sanchez with unlawfully driving
or taking Jovel’s truck without consent, and the verdict form
followed this charge.
But the prosecution pursued only the driving theory at
trial. The evidence conformed to this theory. Sanchez recognized
this in his sentencing memorandum when he stated, with our
emphasis, that he had been convicted of “VC 10851(a) Felony
Driving a Vehicle without the Owner’s Consent.”
Sanchez’s appeal takes a different tack. He argues the jury
instruction for count 2 covered both theories under section
10851(a) yet omitted elements of these theories. Sanchez argues
this fact invalidates his conviction. This argument is mistaken.
After inviting objections from counsel and receiving none
relevant here, the trial court used the driving alternative in
CALCRIM No. 1820, the pattern instruction for section 10851(a).
As given, but with our emphasis, the instruction was:
“The defendant is charged in Count 2 with unlawfully taking
or driving a vehicle.
“To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the
People must prove that:
“1. The defendant drove someone else’s vehicle without the
owner’s consent;

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“AND
“2. When the defendant drove the vehicle, he intended to
deprive the owner of possession or ownership of the vehicle for
any period of time.
“A taking requires that the vehicle be moved for any distance,
no matter how small.
“A vehicle includes a passenger vehicle.”
The instruction went on to define “driver” and “driving.”
In this instruction, the optional italicized statement
defining a taking is legally correct but inapplicable to the
prosecution’s theory of the case. The bench notes to the pattern
instruction say the statement may be given if there is a question
whether a vehicle that was taken was moved any distance.
Including this statement in this case was unnecessary. But
this inclusion did not convert the instruction into an instruction
on the alternative taking theory.
It is not reasonably likely that including this errant
statement affected the verdict. (See People v. Cross (2008) 45
Cal.4th 58, 67 [giving an inapplicable instruction is generally
only a technical error that does not constitute ground for
reversal].)
We presume juries are intelligent and follow the trial
court’s instructions. (People v. Mehserle (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th
1125, 1155 (Mehserle); People v. Chhoun (2021) 11 Cal.5th 1, 30.)
This court warned this jury there may be inapplicable
instructions. Then it instructed the jurors on the elements
required to convict Sanchez of count 2. These elements were for
the driving offense only, and Sanchez does not dispute they were
phrased correctly. The instruction thus permitted the jury to
convict Sanchez on a driving theory only.

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The instruction concluded a trial that focused on Sanchez’s
driving. Following the evidence, the prosecutor elected the
driving theory for count 2 in closing argument: the prosecutor
told the jury “the issue” on this count was “the defendant drives
someone else’s vehicle, and did he intend to deprive the owner of
it for any period of time.” This was after the prosecutor discussed
the evading charge at length, repeatedly telling the jurors to
believe their eyes (the video) and arguing Sanchez’s driving
exhibited wanton disregard for safety.
In short, considering the instructions as a whole and the
entire record, this instructional error was harmless by any
standard. (See Mehserle, supra, 206 Cal.App.4th at p. 1155.)
Sanchez’s trial involved one theory under section 10851(a), and
the trial court instructed the jury accordingly.
II
Sanchez contends, and the prosecution on appeal agrees,
there was another error. This error also was harmless.
We agree with the parties that the trial court’s instruction
erroneously omitted an element of the driving offense. But we
conclude the omission was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
(See Lara, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 1138.)
The Supreme Court decision in Lara leads the way.
Before Lara, there were two elements for the driving
theory, which CALCRIM No. 1820 reflected. Currently, this
instruction has a third element, to account for Lara. The third
element is: “The driving occurred after a substantial break from
the original theft of the vehicle.”
Lara clarified the driving offense involves posttheft
driving—driving after the theft is complete. If the defendant
drove away just to effectuate the theft, there can be no separate

5
driving offense. (See Lara, supra, 6 Cal.5th at pp. 1136–1138.)
Accordingly, the Court explained, the driving theory requires a
substantial break between the original theft and the challenged
driving. (Ibid.)
The jury had not been instructed on this posttheft driving
element in Lara, but the high court concluded the omission was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. (See Lara, supra, 6 Cal.5th
at p. 1138.) In Lara, police set up surveillance on a stolen car
and caught the defendant driving it. Nothing else tied the
defendant to the car’s theft six or seven days earlier. Although
the information charged the defendant with unlawfully driving
and taking the car, the prosecutor argued only a driving theory to
the jury. The jury instructions did refer to an unlawful taking,
but they substantively focused on driving. (Id. at pp. 1131–1132,
1137–1138.)
Sanchez says his case requires reversal because it is like
People v. Jackson (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 371 (Jackson), not Lara.
In Jackson, an employee of a home staging business saw the
defendant load the company’s chairs into a Toyota Land Cruiser.
The witness confronted Jackson. Jackson got angry. The witness
left to get help. Police soon found Jackson asleep in the SUV,
which turned out to be stolen and was parked at an unspecified
distance from the first sighting. (Id. at pp. 373–374, 380.) There
was no direct evidence that Jackson drove the SUV. (Id. at pp.
380–381.) The prosecutor argued both taking and driving
theories to the jury. And the court instructed the jury on both
theories, yet failed to give a unanimity instruction. (Id. at pp.
376–377, 379–380.)
This case is different. As we have explained, the
prosecution presented only the driving theory to the jury, the

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prosecutor argued only this theory, and the trial court instructed
only on this theory. Jackson is inapposite, as are the other cases
Sanchez cites involving instructions on alternative legal theories.
Lara dictates the result here.
This trial was about Sanchez’s driving. No direct evidence
placed Sanchez at the supermarket, and the prosecution never
argued Sanchez took the truck then. Two days after the original
theft, video caught Sanchez fleeing police in the stolen truck and
then fleeing the truck on foot, alone. No one suggested this
driving related to the original theft. There is no question the jury
determined Sanchez was the driver, as it convicted him of the
separate count of fleeing a pursuing peace officer while driving
recklessly.
As a matter of law, there was a substantial break between
the original theft and Sanchez’s videotaped drive. As in Lara, the
failure to reference posttheft driving in the instruction for count 2
was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
We need not reach the parties’ arguments about forfeiture
and ineffective assistance of counsel.
DISPOSITION
We affirm the judgment.

WILEY, Acting P. J.
We concur:

VIRAMONTES, J. UZCATEGUI, J.*

* Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the Chief

Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California
Constitution.

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