CourtListener 10741569•People v. Smith CA2/2
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Filed 11/24/25 P. v. Smith CA2/2
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE, B338262
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BA518805)
v.
AHJANAE SMITH,
Defendant and Appellant.
THE COURT:
Defendant and appellant Ahjanae Smith (defendant)
appeals the order denying her motion for mental health diversion
(Pen. Code,1 § 1001.36). Her appointed counsel filed a brief
pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, raising no
issues; we notified defendant of her counsel’s brief and gave her
leave to file, within 30 days, her own brief or letter stating any
grounds or argument she might wish to have considered.
1
Unless otherwise designated, all further statutory
references are to the Penal Code.
Defendant filed no such brief or letter. We have reviewed the
record and, finding no error, we affirm.
BACKGROUND
On March 1, 2024, an information was filed charging
defendant in count 1 with grand theft (§ 487, subd. (a)) and in
count 2 receiving stolen property (§ 496, subd. (a)). In count 1, it
was further alleged defendant committed the offense while she
was out of custody on bail or on her own recognizance within the
meaning of section 12022.1. It was further alleged defendant
suffered a prior strike, within the meaning of the “Three Strikes”
law, and served a prior prison term under section 1170,
subdivision (h).
On April 8, 2024, defendant filed a motion for mental
health diversion, pursuant to section 1001.36, along with a
diversion report by the psychologist who evaluated her. The
psychologist opined defendant “me[t] criteria for treatment in the
community.”
In her motion, defendant argued: (1) she “has been
diagnosed with an unspecified mood disorder, stimulant use
disorder, opioid use disorder, alcohol use disorder, and cannabis
use disorder”; (2) the “disorders were a significant factor in the
commission of the charged offenses”; and (3) the evaluating
doctor “opines that [defendant’s] symptoms of her mental
disorders that motivated her behavior in this case would respond
to mental health treatment.” Furthermore, defendant agreed to
consent to diversion, waive her right to a speedy trial, and comply
with treatment. Finally, she asserted she was “not charged with
a disqualifying offense” and would “not pose any significant risk
of danger to public safety if treated in the community.”
On April 19, 2024, the People filed a written opposition to
defendant’s motion. The People argued diversion was not
appropriate because: (1) at the time defendant’s case was filed,
defendant had four pending cases involving similar activity; (2)
the probation report indicated “defendant was believed
responsible for 44 Rite Aid thefts totaling $39,000 in total loss”;
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(3) her offense “was clearly planned and required a certain level
of sophistication”; and (4) defendant was “legally ineligible for
probation.” The People contested defendant’s mental health
diagnoses because they were based on records not provided to the
People and “substantially . . . based on self-serving statements”
by defendant.
The People argued her offenses were not drug motivated;
thus, the presumption that there is a nexus between defendant’s
diagnoses and the offenses was rebutted because there was no
evidence defendant committed the thefts “to get Percocet” as
defendant told the psychologist. To the contrary, the People
noted defendant has “never [had] a drug charge or an incident
where she was arrested and found to be under the influence or
[have] drugs or drug paraphernalia on her.” The People argued
defendant’s ability “to plan and execute multiple sophisticated
thefts on multiple dates from multiple stores,” where she brought
her own bags and a lookout, point to someone who was not in the
throes of addiction. The only time defendant indicated the profits
from her thefts were to be used for anything other than material
items to support her lifestyle was to the psychologist, when she
said it was to buy Percocet.
The People argued defendant was unsuitable because there
was “insufficient” evidence to suggest the symptoms motivating
defendant’s behavior would respond to mental health treatment,
and there was “inadequate proof that the defendant w[ould] not
pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety.” The People
pointed to: (1) defendant being labeled as “unsuitable for
supervision” in multiple probation reports; (2) her prior poor
performance on supervision; (3) her unwillingness to comply with
court orders such that she had “pick[ed] up numerous bench
warrants”; (4) her lying to officers about her identity; and (5) her
history of “refusing medication [and] diverting the narcotics to
other people.”
On April 22, 2024, the court held a hearing on defendant’s
motion. At the hearing, defense counsel argued the People could
not overcome the presumption provided for in section 1001.36,
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subdivision (b)(2), because there was a nexus between
defendant’s mental disorders and the charged offenses. Defense
counsel also argued defendant was suitable because she “hasn’t
had an opportunity to really partake in a program that would
give her the benefit that this current program [would].”
The People argued the presumption was rebutted.
Specifically, the evaluating psychologist “was not made aware
of . . . some of the prior physical entries in [defendant’s] record,”
the various theft offenses with which defendant was charged
required a high degree of planning and sophistication, and
defendant’s history of manipulation all demonstrated there was
no nexus between the offenses and defendant’s substance abuse
and mood disorders as described in the psychologist’s report.
The court found the presumption was rebutted by clear and
convincing evidence. The court discussed defendant’s
psychological report and noted it appeared as though defendant
was not “elicit[ing] a need for mental health treatment, but that
[she was] saying whatever was necessary to convince the doctor”
and “manipulate the process to get what [she] wanted.” The
court found there was not a “nexus or connection between the
underlying diagnosis . . . and the [theft-related] incidents”
especially given “the level of planning, sophistication, and
amount of items that were taken,” and her lack of any history of
drug offenses or being found to carry narcotics during her arrests.
Thus, finding defendant ineligible, the court denied defendant’s
request for diversion.
On May 8, 2024, defendant entered a plea of nolo contendre
to count 1 and was sentenced to the midterm of two years in state
prison to run concurrent with her three other cases. Count 2 was
dismissed as a part of the plea agreement.
The trial court granted a request for a certificate of
probable cause. (§ 1237.5; see People v. Robinson (2024) 100
Cal.App.5th 133, 136.) Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal
from the order of denial.
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DISCUSSION
I. Applicable law and standard of review
“[M]ental health diversion requires trial court findings that
the defendant is both eligible for diversion and suitable for the
program. The criteria for each are specified in the statute.
(§ 1001.36, subds. (b) & (c).) Defendants are eligible if they have
been diagnosed with a recognized mental disorder that was a
significant factor in the commission of the criminal offense with
which they are charged. (Id., subd. (b).)” (Sarmiento v. Superior
Court (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 882, 891 (Sarmiento).) “[T]he . . .
statute creates a presumption that the defendant’s diagnosed
mental disorder was a significant factor in the commission of the
charged crime. The court is directed to find a causal connection
‘unless there is clear and convincing evidence that [the mental
disorder] was not a motivating factor, causal factor, or
contributing factor to the defendant’s involvement in the alleged
offense.’ ([§ 1001.36,] subd. (b)(2).)” (Ibid.)
We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion for mental
health diversion for abuse of discretion, and its related factual
findings for substantial evidence. (People v. Whitmill (2022) 86
Cal.App.5th 1138, 1147.) “A trial court has ‘broad discretion to
determine whether a given defendant is a good candidate for
mental health diversion.’” (Ibid.) “A court abuses its discretion
when it makes an arbitrary or capricious decision by applying the
wrong legal standard [citations], or bases its decision on express
or implied factual findings that are not supported by substantial
evidence.” (People v. Moine (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 440, 449.)
II. Analysis
Here, the court found defendant was not eligible for
diversion. The trial court supplied two grounds for its decision:
first, defendant appeared to be manipulating the psychological
evaluation “to get what [she] wanted”; and second, the court
found no “nexus or connection between the underlying diagnosis
[of stimulant use disorders] . . . and the [theft-related] incidents”
because of the high degree of planning and sophistication
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required along with the “absence of any drug offenses in
[defendant’s] criminal history.”
Thus, the court found, “the presumption [of eligibility was]
overcome by clear and convincing evidence that . . . there is not a
nexus to the commission of the crimes and . . . her diagnosis.”
Related to her diagnosis of various drug use disorders, the court
noted “the only evidence that was provided [for] the medical
report were some statements [by defendant],” and the court
pointed to incidents while defendant was at Folsom State Prison
where she was “given medicine and didn’t take it and then would
give it to other inmates.” The court found the behavior was
similar to the type of sophisticated “behavior she demonstrated in
the [instant] case.”
We find the court’s ruling was based on factual findings
supported by substantial evidence. (See People v. Whitmill,
supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at p. 1147.) The court’s decision was not
arbitrary, used the proper legal standard, and was based on the
facts presented in the record. (See People v. Moine, supra, 62
Cal.App.5th at p. 449.) As such, the court did not err in denying
defendant’s motion for pretrial diversion.2
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
LUI, P. J. CHAVEZ, J. RICHARDSON, J.
2
Because the statute requires a finding defendant is both
eligible and suitable, a proper finding of ineligibility is
determinative and does not require a finding on suitability. (See
Sarmiento, supra, 98 Cal.App.5th at p. 891.)
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