In re W.B. CA5

CourtListener 10741458Calctapp24 nov. 2025

Texte intégral

Filed 11/21/25 In re W.B. CA5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

In re W.B., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile
Court Law.

KERN COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN F088736
SERVICES,
(Super. Ct. No. JD145421-00)
Plaintiff and Respondent,

v. OPINION
S.V.,

Defendant and Appellant.

THE COURT*
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Kern County. Christie Canales
Norris, Judge.
S.V., in propria persona.
No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
-ooOoo-

* Before Detjen, Acting P. J., Meehan, J. and DeSantos, J.
In this juvenile dependency case, S.V. (mother), mother of minor child W.B.,
appeals, in propria persona, from the juvenile court’s postdisposition order relieving her
attorney and appointing her new counsel following a Marsden1-type hearing on
September 25, 2024. Her primary contention is that the court did not adequately examine
the parties on the alleged failings of counsel’s representation.2 Mother has not asserted
she was in any way harmed or prejudiced by the alleged errors, as the court ultimately
relieved her attorney and appointed her a new one. She therefore has not established
grounds for reversal.
We affirm the juvenile court’s order from which mother appeals.3

1 People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118.
2 Mother’s notice of appeal only lists the September 25, 2024 order, but her briefing
raises several additional issues unrelated to that order. We do not address those
contentions as they are not properly before us here.
We note that mother has also appealed from the juvenile court’s dispositional
order in the underlying dependency case, where she raises many of the issues raised in
the present appeal, including that the protective custody warrant was invalid, that the
jurisdictional and dispositional findings were supported by insufficient evidence, and that
her attorney provided ineffective assistance of counsel. We addressed those issues to the
extent they were properly before us in the nonpublished opinion issued in that appeal, and
affirmed the dispositional order. (In re W.B. (Aug. 20, 2025, F088142) [nonpub. opn.].)
3 As of the issuance of this opinion, mother’s reunification services have been
terminated at the six-month review hearing, and a Welfare and Institutions Code
section 366.26 hearing was set. Mother filed a petition for extraordinary writ, which this
court denied by written opinion. (S.V. v. Superior Court (Feb. 21, 2025, F088973)
[nonpub. opn.].) All statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code, unless
otherwise indicated.
Additionally, this court is informed the section 366.26 hearing was conducted on
June 12, 2025, and parental rights were terminated. Both mother and W.B.’s father have
appealed from the order terminating their parental rights, and the appeal is pending and in
the briefing stage in case No. F090001.

2.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On January 10, 2024, the Kern County Department of Human Services
(department) filed a juvenile dependency petition on behalf of then three-month-old W.B.
The petition alleged W.B. came within the juvenile court’s jurisdiction under section 300,
subdivision (b)(1) due to mother’s failure to provide care as a result of mental illness and
substance abuse. On January 12, 2024, the juvenile court ordered W.B. detained from
mother. On March 13, 2024, the court sustained the petition and found that W.B. was
described by section 300, subdivision (b)(1). On April 4, 2024, mother’s attorney
declared a conflict, and the court relieved her as counsel and appointed mother new
counsel. On May 29, 2024, the court adjudged W.B. a dependent child, removed him
from mother’s physical custody, and ordered her to participate in reunification services.
Prior to the six-month review hearing, on August 27, 2024, mother filed a request
for a Marsden hearing, stating she was requesting a new attorney due to an “irreparable
breakdown in communication” between her and her attorney who was appointed in
April 2024. Mother alleged her attorney would not communicate with her outside written
communication and was refusing to “further object” to W.B. getting haircuts as he felt it
was “unmeritorius [sic] and vexatious.”4
On September 3, 2024, the matter came on for hearing due to mother’s request,
but mother was not present. Mother’s attorney stated that she had represented to him she
no longer wanted to pursue the Marsden motion and wanted the matter taken off
calendar, but that he was now “joining her in the initial Marsden request.” (Italics
added.) The matter was taken off calendar given mother’s withdrawal of her request and
her absence.

4 W.B.’s care provider sought court permission to get W.B.’s hair cut because his
hair was interfering with his glasses. On August 13, 2024, the juvenile court authorized a
haircut over mother’s continuing objection.

3.
On September 17, 2024, mother’s counsel filed a request for an ex-parte hearing,
stating he was declaring a conflict in the case, “[t]he nature of which cannot be disclosed
without violating attorney-client privilege.”
On September 25, 2025, a closed hearing was held with only mother and her
attorney present. The juvenile court questioned the parties at length regarding their
relationship. Mother initially stated she was no longer requesting a new attorney but
expressed frustrations with feeling like she was unable to speak for herself and testify
during the proceedings and that her concerns were not being heard. She was, however,
still willing to communicate with her attorney.
Mother’s attorney indicated that from his perspective there had been a complete
breakdown in communication. He was no longer willing to communicate with mother in
person or by telephone because he believed she was recording him without his consent.
He was willing to communicate with mother via text message but felt they had gotten to a
point where he was unable to communicate with her effectively using that method. The
juvenile court advised mother it was a misdemeanor offense to record someone without
their consent, and mother denied making any recordings of her attorney. The court
questioned the parties about whether they would be able to communicate in person if
mother’s phone was off. Counsel represented he already tried asking mother to turn off
her phone but subsequently noticed the phone still appeared to be on, and when he
confronted mother about it, she insulted him. Mother vehemently denied this incident
occurred.
Mother went on to explain that when her attorney was appointed, she told him that
she had previously been unable to testify and that she wanted to contest the jurisdictional
allegations because they were not true.5 The juvenile court ascertained that counsel had

5 The record indicates that mother contested the jurisdictional allegations and
testified at the jurisdiction hearing conducted on March 13, 2024.

4.
been appointed after the court had already sustained the jurisdictional allegations. The
court further elicited that at the time of counsel’s appointment, mother was facing bypass
of reunification services because she was refusing to attend a court-ordered psychological
evaluation for determination of whether services would be beneficial. Counsel
encouraged her to attend the evaluation. Mother heeded his advice and was ultimately
granted reunification services. Counsel asserted mother had not asked to testify at the
dispositional hearing, and he never told her she could not testify.
The juvenile court noted that counsel had given mother “very sage advice”
regarding the psychological evaluation and that while mother may not have agreed with
the jurisdiction allegations being found true, that occurred while she was represented by
her previous attorney, and her current attorney had “proceeded properly at every stage
since then.”
Mother then explained she understood but was still upset. She felt her attorney
misled her into thinking that she would be able to contest the jurisdictional allegations if
she completed the psychological evaluation and that turned out to be untrue.
At that point, the juvenile court concluded there had been a breakdown in
communication between mother and her attorney. The court relieved mother’s attorney
and appointed a new one.
DISCUSSION
In the criminal context, a motion to obtain new appointed counsel because current
appointed counsel is providing inadequate representation is commonly referred to as a
Marsden motion. (People v. Smith (2003) 30 Cal.4th 581, 604.) Pursuant to Marsden
procedure, when, after hearing from the defendant and counsel, a trial court has found
counsel “is not providing adequate representation or that defendant and counsel have
become embroiled in such an irreconcilable conflict that ineffective representation is
likely to result,” it should appoint new counsel. (Smith, at p. 604.) Juvenile courts have
allowed parents who have been appointed counsel in dependency proceedings to bring

5.
Marsden-type motions. (In re V.V. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 392, 398; see In re Z.N.
(2009) 181 Cal.App.4th 282, 289 [Marsden principles apply by analogy to dependency
proceedings].)
Mother does not allege the juvenile court wrongly relieved her attorney or
appointed new counsel. Rather, she makes complaints about her attorney’s
representation and conduct at the Marsden hearing, including that he refused to file
certain motions on her behalf, failed to contest removal, would not meet with her in
person, and falsely accused her of recording him. Mother contends the court erred at the
hearing by focusing more on her behavior than her complaints about her attorney; not
adequately examining whether her counsel’s conduct “compromised [her] rights”;
ignoring several of her claims “in evaluating whether communication was irreparably
broken”; and “ignoring the actual breakdown in representation.”
We reject mother’s claims; she has not demonstrated prejudice stemming from any
of the errors she alleges occurred at the Marsden hearing and thus has failed to
demonstrate reversible error.
The appellant has the burden of supporting each contention with argument and
citation to authority that demonstrates prejudice resulting from any alleged error.
(Hernandez v. First Student, Inc. (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 270, 277.) This applies to
appellants who represent themselves on appeal. (Nwosu v. Uba (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th
1229, 1246–1247.) In a general sense, in determining prejudice, we look to whether the
alleged error had an effect adverse to the appellant on the result of the proceeding. (See
In re Celine R. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 45, 60 [applying Watson6 standard of prejudice]; In re
Mark A. (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 1124 [applying Chapman7 standard of prejudice].)

6 People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818.
7 Chapman v. State of California (1967) 386 U.S. 18.

6.
Here, as a result of the Marsden hearing conducted by the juvenile court, mother’s
attorney was relieved, and she was appointed new counsel. That is, she received the
relief that the Marsden procedure provides. As such, mother has not shown prejudice
arising from her alleged errors. She does not explain how any difference in how the
Marsden hearing was conducted would have resulted in a different outcome of that
hearing or any other proceeding below.
Mother has failed to show reversible error, and we affirm the order.
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s order from which mother appeals is affirmed.

7.

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