CourtListener 10740571•People v. Burke CA3
Texte intégral
Filed 11/21/25 P. v. Burke CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Butte)
----
THE PEOPLE, C102091
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. 24CF01991)
v.
ERIC TYLER BURKE,
Defendant and Appellant.
Defendant Eric Tyler Burke appeals his conviction for driving under the influence
causing great bodily injury. Defendant claims the trial court erred by not imposing
probation, not imposing the low term, and not dismissing his sentence enhancement in
the interests of justice. We affirm because defendant’s claims are forfeited for failing to
object at the trial court and for failing to make a cognizable argument on appeal.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
We base our recitation of the facts on defendant’s probation report, which he
stipulated to as being the factual basis for his plea.
1
On February 22, 2024, around 11:00 p.m., defendant was arrested for suspected
driving under the influence. During the arrest, officers discovered defendant had
consumed cannabis recently and had a blood-alcohol content of 0.312 percent.
Defendant was arrested and booked into the Butte County jail.
Defendant was released from jail at 12:05 a.m. the next day, February 23, 2024.
Later that day, around 4:00 p.m., defendant once again drove while under the influence.
This time defendant ran a stop sign and struck another vehicle, which the 91-year-old
victim was driving. The victim suffered a broken sternum. Defendant fled the scene,
leaving the keys to his home at the scene of the crash.
Law enforcement officials later spoke with defendant at his home. Defendant said
he had not been driving the vehicle, even though no officer had yet asked him about the
accident. Officers later determined defendant was under the influence of cannabis and
had a blood-alcohol content of 0.283 percent.
Defendant pled no contest to a felony count of causing injury while driving under
the influence and a misdemeanor count of driving under the influence, and defendant
admitted a special allegation of causing great bodily injury attached to the felony count.
At sentencing on September 18, 2024, the trial court stated its intended ruling was
to impose the middle term for the felony conviction. In response, defendant’s counsel
asked the court to impose probation because defendant lacked a criminal history, was
responsible for financially supporting his children, had recently obtained sobriety, and the
probation report determined he was suitable. The court acknowledged counsel’s
argument and that this was defendant’s first felony, but ultimately was unconvinced this
was an “unusual case” as required under California Rules of Court, rule 4.413 (rule
4.413), because of the short time between instances of driving while under the influence,
and that “even if [d]efendant were not presumptively ineligible for probation, probation
would be denied due to the nature, seriousness and circumstances of this case.”
2
The trial court then imposed the middle term, finding the crime involved “a high
degree of cruelty, viciousness or callousness”; the victim was particularly vulnerable; and
defendant’s “conduct indicate[d] a serious danger to society,” among other factors. In
mitigation, the court found only that defendant lacked a criminal record and he resolved
the “matter at a relatively early stage in the proceeding[].”
After denying probation and imposing the middle term, the trial court stated it had
considered striking defendant’s sentence enhancements “pursuant to Penal Code[1]
section 1385.” The court specifically noted it had reviewed the relevant mitigating
circumstances under this provision and found none of them applied to defendant.
Accordingly, the court refused to strike the great bodily injury enhancement, stating that
doing so “would endanger the public safety.”
Defendant appeals.
DISCUSSION
Defendant argues the trial court erred by denying probation, sentencing him to the
middle term instead of the low term, and not striking the sentence enhancement for
causing great bodily injury. We disagree, as defendant has forfeited all his claims on
appeal.
I
Defendant Fails To Make A Cogent Argument
Regarding The Trial Court’s Decision Not To Impose Probation
Appellants carry the burden to demonstrate error by making some cogent
argument that is supported by legal analysis and citation to the record. (United Grand
Corp. v. Malibu Hillbillies, LLC (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 142, 161.) We are not required
to “scour the record unguided.” (City of Santa Maria v. Adam (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th
1 Further undesignated section references are to the Penal Code.
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266, 287.) Nor are we obliged to make arguments for an appellant or “speculate about
which issues counsel intend to raise.” (Opdyk v. California Horse Racing Bd. (1995)
34 Cal.App.4th 1826, 1830, fn. 4.) We may and do “disregard conclusory arguments that
are not supported by pertinent legal authority or fail to disclose the reasoning by which
the appellant reached the conclusions [the appellant] wants us to adopt.” (City of Santa
Maria, at p. 287.)
Here, the main heading of defendant’s opening brief’s argument states: “Given
[defendant]’s background, lack of prior record, remorse for his conduct and multiple
efforts to improve himself, imposition of a state prison sentence was not appropriate.”
(Some capitalization omitted.) A page later, defendant writes, “Further, the court
incorrectly found that [defendant]’s case was not unusual within the meaning of . . .
section 1203 and [r]ule 4.413. In fact, [defendant] satisfied the criteria of [r]ule 4.413.”
The foregoing is the totality of defendant’s argument regarding the trial court’s
decision not to impose probation. These barren statements do not amount to an argument
guided by legal analysis as to how he would like this court to reach the conclusions he
would like us to adopt. (City of Santa Maria v. Adam, supra, 211 Cal.App.4th at p. 287.)
Defendant never expresses how he satisfies the criteria of rule 4.413 or how the trial
court’s analysis fell short, nor does he cite any authority to support his contention that the
trial court erred. Defendant merely asserts that something different should have
happened than what did happen; or, in other words, defendant’s argument is merely
conclusory. We may disregard conclusory statements, such as these, as they fail to
disclose the reasoning by which defendant would like us to adopt his proffered
conclusion. (City of Santa Maria, at p. 287.) Thus, as defendant has failed to carry his
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burden of demonstrating error, his claims regarding probation are forfeited.2 (United
Grand Corp. v. Malibu Hillbillies, LLC, supra, 36 Cal.App.5th at p. 161.)
II
Defendant’s Remaining Claims Are Also Forfeited
The doctrine of forfeiture applies to sentencing. (People v. Trujillo (2015)
60 Cal.4th 850, 856.) As such, any alleged sentencing error that a party had a meaningful
chance to object to at the trial court is forfeited on appeal. (People v. Scott (1994)
9 Cal.4th 331, 351, 353-354, 356; see also People v. Sarmiento-Zuniga (2025)
108 Cal.App.5th 1216, 1222.) A meaningful chance for objection occurs when the trial
court “clearly apprise[s the parties] of the sentence the court intends to impose and the
reasons that support any discretionary choices.” (Scott, at p. 356.) If there has been a
meaningful opportunity for objection, “counsel is charged with understanding,
advocating, and clarifying permissible sentencing choices at the hearing.” (Id. at p. 353;
see id. at p. 356.)
Here, the trial court clearly indicated its intent to impose the middle term as well
as to decline to dismiss defendant’s sentence enhancement—two decisions defendant
challenges on appeal. The trial court also stated the reasons for imposing the middle term
and not dismissing the sentence enhancement. Therefore, the trial court gave the parties a
meaningful chance for objection. (People v. Scott, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 351.)
Yet, defendant did not object on either ground at sentencing. Defendant did object
to the denial of probation, but defendant’s reasons for so objecting made no mention of
2 In this arena, courts have used “forfeiture” and “waive[r]” interchangeably. (See
United Grand Corp. v. Malibu Hillbillies, LLC, supra, 36 Cal.App.5th at pp. 154, 161.)
Our Supreme Court has clarified the distinction between the two, stating that forfeiture is
a “ ‘failure . . . to invoke a right’ ” by way of failing to raise it or object to its
contravention, while waiver occurs when a right has been intentionally relinquished.
(See North American Title Co. v. Superior Court (2024) 17 Cal.5th 155, 178.)
Defendant’s failure to present a cogent argument is therefore a forfeiture of his argument.
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the trial court’s decision to impose the middle term or of the court’s refusal to strike the
sentence enhancement. In sum, defendant had a full and fair opportunity to object at the
trial court on the same grounds he now raises. He did not. Accordingly, defendant’s
remaining claims of sentencing error are forfeited. (See People v. Scott, supra, 9 Cal.4th
at p. 351.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
/s/
ROBIE, J.
We concur:
/s/
HULL, Acting P. J.
/s/
BOULWARE EURIE, J.
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