Razaqi v. Khurush CA3

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Filed 11/21/25 Razaqi v. Khurush CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(San Joaquin)
----

SARAH RAZAQI, C099636, C101262

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No.
STAFLDWC20170005083)
v.

JAWED KHURUSH,

Defendant and Appellant;

ARZO RAZAQ,

Claimant and Appellant.

This consolidated appeal arises out of a marital dissolution proceeding in which
Sarah Razaqi (wife) and Jawed Khurush (husband) disputed whether the home they lived
in at the time of separation (the Property) was community property. Husband’s sister,
Arzo Razaq (sister), was joined in the action. After a bench trial, the court found the
Property was community property even though paper title was in sister’s name because

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title was taken pursuant to a “straw buyer” agreement among the parties, and husband
and wife were intended to be the true owners. During trial, husband and his sister denied
the existence of this agreement, denied husband and wife reimbursed sister for the down
payment, and claimed husband and wife merely rented the Property from sister. The trial
court found husband’s and sister’s testimony not credible, and concluded husband
breached his fiduciary duty to wife by repeatedly repudiating the straw buyer agreement
and that he colluded and worked in concert with his siblings in their effort to deprive his
wife and children of “their sole, exclusive, and valuable asset.” The court awarded all of
the Property to wife based on this breach under Family Code section 1101, subdivision
(h).1 Additionally, the court awarded wife a total of $154,840 in attorney’s fees under
section 2030 and an additional $200,000 as sanctions under section 271.
On appeal, sister argues: (1) the court had no subject matter jurisdiction over
wife’s dispute with her; (2) the court erred in finding by clear and convincing evidence
that sister entered into a straw buyer agreement; (3) this dispute is barred by the two-year
statute of limitations for oral contracts; and (4) the court erred in finding sister’s motion
to disqualify the trial court judge under Code of Civil Procedure section 170.6 was
untimely and in striking her Code of Civil Procedure section 170.1 declaration. Husband
argues the trial court exceeded its authority under section 1101, subdivision (h) by
awarding all of the Property to wife. Sister and husband both challenge the awards of
attorney’s fees under sections 271 and 2030. We affirm the orders awarding the Property
to wife and awarding her attorney’s fees.
I. BACKGROUND
Husband and wife married in 1999. In 2012, husband and wife wanted to move
out of her parents’ house. They had sold their previous home in a short sale and

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Family Code.

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discussed with husband’s brother, who was a realtor, how this might affect their credit.
Husband’s brother suggested that instead of buying a home directly, husband and wife
use sister as a straw buyer. Husband and wife would pay the mortgage, and sister would
benefit from the tax write-offs. Escrow closed on the Property in May 2012. Afterwards,
husband and wife made extensive improvements to the home, including remodeling the
kitchen, without consulting sister. Husband and wife separated in 2015, but continued to
live together.
Wife testified that she and husband paid the entire amount of the down payment,
and made the mortgage payments until she moved out of the home in August 2019. Wife
testified that the agreement was supposed to last for at least a year or two, after which
sister would transfer title to wife and husband.
In 2017, wife and husband met with sister and informed her that they were
divorcing and discussed selling the Property. Wife learned that husband had promised
sister a share of equity in the home. Wife’s understanding after the meeting was that the
house would be sold, she would receive her half, and husband and sister would work out
their own agreement for the other half.
In September 2017, wife filed the underlying action for dissolution of marriage.
Wife submitted a property declaration indicating the Property was community property.
In 2019, wife discovered husband stated in his property declaration that he and wife
rented the Property. His May 2019 income and expense declaration also stated that he
rented.
In August 2019, wife filed a related civil complaint alleging various causes of
action against husband, sister, and others including breach of contract, quiet title,
imposition of resulting trust, equitable division of proceeds and rental value credit,
declaratory relief, disparagement of title, and fraud. These proceedings were stayed
pending resolution of this matter.

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Husband’s and wife’s marital status was dissolved at a settlement conference in
March 2023.
The following month, the court conducted a bench trial on whether the Property
was community property. Sister had previously been joined in this proceeding. The
court issued its statement of decision on September 7, 2023.
The court found by clear and convincing evidence that husband, wife, and sister
entered into a straw buyer arrangement facilitated by husband’s brother. The court
recognized that as a result of the straw buyer agreement, all of the parties had unclean
hands. Nonetheless, the court found the straw buyer agreement was enforceable because
the contract had already been performed, third parties had received all payments owed,
wife was less culpable, and failing to enforce the agreement would result in sister being
unjustly enriched. (See, e.g., Johnson v. Johnson (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 551, 557.) The
court also explained that, as a result of the substantial performance of the oral straw buyer
agreement, the Statute of Frauds did not apply.
The court imposed a resulting trust. “ ‘A resulting trust arises by operation of law
from a transfer of property under circumstances showing that the transferee was not
intended to take the beneficial interest. [Citations.] Such a resulting trust carries out and
enforces the inferred intent of the parties. [Citations.] “Ordinarily a resulting trust arises
in favor of the payor of the purchase price of the property where the purchase price, or a
part thereof, is paid by one person and the title is taken in the name of another.” ’ ”
(Estate of Yool (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 867, 874.) “In other words, the relationship
between resulting trustee and beneficiary arises where one, in good faith, acquires title to
property belonging to another. The law implies an obligation on the part of the one in
whom title has vested to hold the property for the owner’s benefit and eventually convey
it to the owner.” (Ibid.) The court concluded the evidence showed the parties’ intent that
the beneficial interest in the Property was to be enjoyed solely and exclusively by
husband and wife. The court found that sister was not intended to be the true owner, and

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husband and wife were meant to be the true owners of the Property. The court found that
all parties knew husband and wife were not renting the Property from sister. The court
found the resulting trust was enforceable because, with the sister’s consent as trustee,
wife as the beneficiary took possession of the Property, made valuable improvements,
and irrevocably changed her position in reliance on the trust. The court adjudicated wife
as the Property’s sole, true, equitable, and beneficial owner, and explained that title
should be quieted in her name as sister’s paper title was deemed to confer, at best,
nominal status as trustee of a resulting trust in wife’s favor. With respect to the issue of
whether the award to wife included reimbursement of all previously withdrawn home
equity, the court confirmed that it found the Property was community property, and it
awarded wife 100 percent of the Property and any equity therein as of the date of
separation.
Additionally, the court awarded all of the Property to wife under section 1101,
subdivision (h) on the basis of its finding that husband breached his fiduciary duty to
wife.
In February 2024, sister attempted to disqualify the judge who issued the
statement of decision under Code of Civil Procedure section 170.6, but her filing was
rejected as untimely.
On April 8, 2024, the court issued its order on attorney’s fees and costs.
Husband and sister appealed from both the September 7, 2023 and April 8, 2024
orders. We granted the parties’ joint motion for consolidation of these cases, and
consolidated these cases for purposes of briefing, oral argument, and decision.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Standards for Appellate Briefs
We begin with a few words regarding appellate briefing. Orders and judgments
are presumed to be correct, and the appellant must affirmatively show error. (Denham v.
Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564.) “To demonstrate error, appellant must present

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meaningful legal analysis supported by citations to authority and citations to facts in the
record that support the claim of error. [Citations.] When a point is asserted without
argument and authority for the proposition, ‘it is deemed to be without foundation and
requires no discussion by the reviewing court.’ [Citations.] Hence, conclusory claims of
error will fail.” (In re S.C. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 396, 408.) Moreover, any arguments
raised or only supported by authority on reply have been waived. (People v. Baniqued
(2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 13, 29.)
In addition, the appellant must “[s]tate each point under a separate heading or
subheading summarizing the point.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(B).) “This is
not a mere technical requirement.” (In re S.C., supra, 138 Cal.App.4th at p. 408.) It is
designed so that we may be advised “ ‘of the exact question under consideration, instead
of being compelled to extricate it from the mass.’ ” (Ibid.) “Failure to provide proper
headings forfeits issues that may be discussed in the brief but are not clearly identified by
a heading.” (Pizarro v. Reynoso (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 172, 179.)
B. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Sister argues the trial court had no subject matter jurisdiction over wife’s dispute
with her. The court explained that sister was properly joined as a party to the dissolution
action, and consented to the joinder. Sister cites no authority explaining why, in an action
to determine marital property, a third party who claims ownership of the disputed
property cannot be joined. No authority cited by sister adequately supports her
jurisdictional argument. As such, we must reject it.
C. Substantial Evidence
Sister argues substantial evidence does not support the existence of the straw
buyer agreement. We disagree.
“We review factual findings of the family court for substantial evidence,
examining the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party. [Citation.]
‘ “ ‘In reviewing the evidence on . . . appeal all conflicts must be resolved in favor of the

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[prevailing party], and all legitimate and reasonable inferences indulged in [order] to
uphold the [finding] if possible.’ ” ’ ” (In re Marriage of Rossi (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 34,
40.) The court found that wife proved by clear and convincing evidence the parties
entered into the straw buyer agreement to purchase the Property. Where proof is required
by clear and convincing evidence, “we must inquire whether the record contains
‘ “substantial evidence to support a determination by clear and convincing evidence.” ’ ”
(Ibid.; see also Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 1011 [“[T]he question
before the appellate court is whether the record as a whole contains substantial evidence
from which a reasonable fact finder could have found it highly probable that the fact was
true”].)
Sister’s arguments are unavailing. She essentially asks us to reevaluate the
credibility of witnesses by noting that wife was the only witness who testified to the
existence of an agreement between the parties. We may not do so. Further, we note
wife’s testimony was corroborated by other evidence including evidence that
communications regarding increasing the offer to purchase the Property were only
conveyed to husband and wife; meanwhile, sister did not tour the home prior to
purchasing it. The existence of the straw buyer agreement was supported by substantial
evidence.
D. Statute of Limitations
Sister contends wife’s claim is barred by the statute of limitations. We are
unpersuaded.
Sister relies on the two-year statute of limitations for actions on an oral contract
set forth in Code of Civil Procedure section 339 and asserts that wife failed to prove the
civil complaint was brought within this time frame. We disagree with sister’s suggestion
that the court found a breach of an oral agreement or that this was a basis of its ruling.
The court did explain, in part, that wife had claimed husband and sister breached the
straw buyer agreement by not transferring title of the home, not cooperating with selling

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the home for the purpose of giving husband and wife the proceeds of their community
property interest therein, and repudiating the agreement by stating that sister is the true
owner of the Property and that brother and wife are merely renters. Assuming without
deciding that the two-year statute of limitations set forth in Code of Civil Procedure
section 339 applies,2 we disagree that it began to run more than two years before wife
brought her claim. (See Gaglione v. Coolidge (1955) 134 Cal.App.2d 518, 526 [statute of
limitations for breach of oral contract cause of action began to run from “an absolute
repudiation of the contract”].) Sister relies on wife’s testimony that she stopped being
“okay” with the house not being in her name when she separated from husband in 2015.
But that does not mean any oral agreement had been breached at this time. The record
does not suggest that the parties had agreed to a deadline for transferring title to the
Property. Wife testified sister did not “change[] her tone” about the house until May
2019. Wife filed the civil action against sister later that year. Sister’s assertion that the
dispute over ownership of the property is barred by the applicable statute of limitations is
without merit.
E. Trial Court’s Award of 100 Percent of Property to Wife
Husband argues the trial court exceeded its authority under section 1101,
subdivision (h) by awarding 100 percent of the Property to wife. He argues that various
requirements for imposing a remedy under this subdivision were unmet. It provides:
“Remedies for the breach of the fiduciary duty by one spouse, as set forth in Sections 721
and 1100, when the breach falls within the ambit of Section 3294 of the Civil Code shall
include, but not be limited to, an award to the other spouse of 100 percent, or an amount

2 “The applicable statute of limitations on an action to establish a resulting trust is the
four-year statute found in Code of Civil Procedure section 343. [Citation.] The statute of
limitations does not begin to run against a voluntary resulting trust in the absence of
repudiation by the trustee, that is, until demand has been made upon the trustee and the
trustee refuses to account or convey.” (Estate of Yool, supra, 151 Cal.App.4th at p. 875.)

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equal to 100 percent, of any asset undisclosed or transferred in breach of the fiduciary
duty.” (§ 1101, subd. (h).)
“To the extent that we are called upon to interpret the statutes relied on by the trial
court to impose sanctions, we apply a de novo standard of review. [Citation.] We review
any findings of fact that formed the basis for the award of sanctions under a substantial
evidence standard of review.” (In re Marriage of Feldman (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1470,
1479.)
“Statutory interpretation raises questions of law subject to de novo review.
[Citation.] ‘As in any case involving statutory interpretation, our fundamental task here
is to determine the Legislature’s intent so as to effectuate the law’s purpose. [Citation.]
We begin by examining the statute’s words, giving them a plain and commonsense
meaning. [Citation.] We do not, however, consider the statutory language “in isolation.”
[Citation.] Rather, we look to “the entire substance of the statute . . . in order to
determine the scope and purpose of the provision . . . . [Citation.]” [Citation.] That is,
we construe the words in question “ ‘in context, keeping in mind the nature and obvious
purpose of the statute . . . .’ [Citation.]” [Citation.] We must harmonize “the various
parts of a statutory enactment . . . by considering the particular clause or section in the
context of the statutory framework as a whole.” ’ ” (In re Marriage of Wiese (2024) 102
Cal.App.5th 917, 930.)
The court imposed a remedy under section 1101, subdivision (h) based on its
conclusion that husband breached his fiduciary duty to wife and his actions constituted
oppression, fraud, or malice under Civil Code section 3294. We will begin with an
overview of husband’s fiduciary obligations to wife before we address husband’s
arguments concerning the statutory requirements for imposition of a remedy under
section 1101, subdivision (h).
“The fiduciary obligations of spouses to each other are set forth in section 721,
and are made specifically applicable during dissolution proceedings by section 1100,

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subdivision (e).” (In re Marriage of Feldman, supra, 153 Cal.App.4th at p. 1475, fn.
omitted.) It provides: “Each spouse shall act with respect to the other spouse in the
management and control of the community assets and liabilities in accordance with the
general rules governing fiduciary relationships which control the actions of persons
having relationships of personal confidence as specified in Section 721, until such time as
the assets and liabilities have been divided by the parties or by a court. This duty
includes the obligation to make full disclosure to the other spouse of all material facts and
information regarding the existence, characterization, and valuation of all assets in which
the community has or may have an interest and debts for which the community is or may
be liable, and to provide equal access to all information, records, and books that pertain to
the value and character of those assets and debts, upon request.” (§ 1100, subd. (e).)
“Consistent with these fiduciary obligations, section 2100, subdivision (c)
provides that ‘a full and accurate disclosure of all assets and liabilities in which one or
both parties have or may have an interest must be made in the early stages of a
proceeding for dissolution of marriage or legal separation of the parties, regardless of the
characterization as community or separate, together with a disclosure of all income and
expenses of the parties.’ ” (In re Marriage of Feldman, supra, 153 Cal.App.4th at p.
1476.)
“To implement the disclosure obligation, the Family Code requires the service of a
preliminary and final declaration of disclosure ‘[i]n order to provide full and accurate
disclosure of all assets and liabilities in which one or both parties may have an interest
. . . .’ (§ 2103.) Specifically, ‘[t]he preliminary declaration of disclosure shall set forth
with sufficient particularity,’ to the extent that ‘a person of reasonable and ordinary
intelligence can ascertain [them],’ ‘[t]he identity of all assets in which the declarant has or
may have an interest and all liabilities for which the declarant is or may be liable,
regardless of the characterization of the asset or liability as community, quasi-community,

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or separate.’ (§ 2104, subd. (c)(1).)” (In re Marriage of Feldman, supra, 153
Cal.App.4th at pp. 1476-1477.)
As relevant here, section 721 provides, “in transactions between themselves,
spouses are subject to the general rules governing fiduciary relationships that control the
actions of persons occupying confidential relations with each other. This confidential
relationship imposes a duty of the highest good faith and fair dealing on each spouse, and
neither shall take any unfair advantage of the other.” (§ 721, subd. (b).)
The court found husband’s repeated repudiation of the straw buyer agreement “and
the fact it is clear the []Property is community property, even in the face of overwhelming
evidence to the contrary,” was a breach of his fiduciary duty. Further, the court explained
“[w]hat adds to this breach, is [husband] has now colluded with his sister[] and brother[]
in denying the existence of the agreement, in an effort to deprive [wife] of her rightful
ownership of the []Property.”
Section 1101, subdivision (a), provides for a claim by one spouse “against the
other spouse for any breach of the fiduciary duty that results in impairment to the
claimant spouse’s present undivided one-half interest in the community estate, including,
but not limited to, a single transaction or a pattern or series of transactions, which
transaction or transactions have caused or will cause a detrimental impact to the claimant
spouse’s undivided one-half interest in the community estate.” “Subdivisions (g) and (h)
of section 1101 ‘provide remedies for claims brought under [that section].’ [Citation.]
Subdivision (g) states, as relevant here, ‘Remedies for breach of the fiduciary duty by one
spouse, including those set out in Sections 721 and 1100, shall include, but not be limited
to, an award to the other spouse of 50 percent, or an amount equal to 50 percent, of any
asset undisclosed or transferred in breach of the fiduciary duty plus attorney’s fees and
court costs.’ (§ 1101, subd. (g).) And under subdivision (h), where the breach falls
within the scope of Civil Code section 3294—meaning it involves oppression, fraud, or
malice—‘[r]emedies for the breach of the fiduciary duty by one spouse, as set forth in

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Sections 721 and 1100 . . . shall include . . . an award to the other spouse of 100 percent,
or an amount equal to 100 percent, of any asset undisclosed or transferred in breach of
the fiduciary duty.’ (§ 1101, subd. (h).)” (In re Marriage of Wiese, supra, 102
Cal.App.5th at p. 932.)
Husband argues the Property was not “undisclosed or transferred” in breach of
fiduciary duty or within the meaning of section 1101, subdivision (h).
The community had an interest in the Property and, as wife notes, husband did not
disclose this beneficial interest or equitable title, and he supported the transfer of it to
sister. Indeed, he promised his sister equity in the home without wife’s agreement.
Regardless of whether the community’s interest was “transferred” in breach of fiduciary
duty, we find no error in the court’s finding that it was “undisclosed” in breach of that
duty. For an asset to be “undisclosed” under section 1101, it is sufficient if the asset is
undisclosed to the court. (In re Marriage of Gutierrez (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 877, 882.)
This section “create[s] incentives for divorcing parties to be candid with each other and
the court.” (Ibid., italics added.) Husband argues he was not obligated to disclose
ownership of Property to the court due to the fact he did not hold legal title, and whether
the straw buyer agreement was legally binding was a disputed legal question. This
argument is unavailing because it depends on an overly narrow interpretation of
husband’s disclosure obligations and an overly generous interpretation of the facts.
Husband was obligated to disclose any asset in which he or the community had or “may”
have had an interest. (In re Marriage of Feldman, supra, 153 Cal.App.4th at p. 1476.)
Not only did he not do that, but the court found he affirmatively misrepresented the state
of the facts. Thus, the court found that husband’s non-disclosure was not based on any
confusion about the enforceability of the straw buyer agreement, but was part of his
affirmative efforts to deprive his wife of her interest in the property. In essence, the court
found husband’s nondisclosure to the court was part of his breach of fiduciary duty.

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Husband argues he did not conceal anything from wife about the Property and they
“candidly discussed the [P]roperty’s disputed status from 2016 throughout this litigation.”
This argument is also inconsistent with the state of the facts as found by the trial court.
Wife argues, consistently with the facts determined by the trial court, that husband
conspired with his sister and brother to conceal the true ownership of the Property, and
she had no idea the extent of the conspiracy engaged in by husband. Wife further argues
that in interpreting section 1101, subdivision (h), we must not construe the words in
isolation but look at the entire statutory framework including the duty to disclose set forth
in section 1101, subdivision (e). As set forth above, “[t]his duty includes the obligation
to make full disclosure to the other spouse of all material facts and information regarding
the existence, characterization, and valuation of all assets in which the community has or
may have an interest.” (§ 1100, subd. (e).) In determining whether a remedy under
section 1101, subdivisions (g) or (h) is appropriate we may consider a spouse’s failure to
disclose material information to the other spouse. (See In re Marriage of DeSouza (2020)
54 Cal.App.5th 25, 31, 35 [affirming sanctions under § 1101, subd. (g) where the trial
court found husband breached his fiduciary duties to wife when he purchased bitcoins
and also when he later failed to inform wife about company’s bankruptcy; company’s
bankruptcy substantially impaired wife’s interest in the bitcoins by rendering them
inaccessible and potentially worthless].)
“The strong language of section 1101, subdivision (h) serves an important
purpose: full disclosure of marital assets is absolutely essential to the trial court in
determining the proper dissolution of property and resolving support issues. The
statutory scheme for dissolution depends on the parties’ full disclosure of all assets so
they may be taken into account by the trial court. A failure to make such disclosure is
properly subject to the severe sanction of section 1101, subdivision (h).” (In re Marriage
of Rossi, supra, 90 Cal.App.4th at p. 42.) Husband did not disclose any possible interest
in the Property and the court found he misrepresented the relevant facts; thus, the parties

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ultimately had to litigate the veracity of husband’s misrepresentations before the trial
court could determine the community’s interest in the Property based on the true state of
the facts. The trial court concluded husband’s conduct was extreme enough to warrant
the remedy of awarding wife all of the Property: “[Husband]’s years’ long, egregious,
oppressive, and fraudulent misconduct toward his wife and young son is intentional. His
conduct cannot be explained away as the product of feigned ‘confusion’ or naivete.
[Husband]’s malicious conduct instead shows he clearly, knowingly, actively, and
repeatedly colluded and worked in concert with his two siblings to deprive his wife and
young children of their sole, exclusive, and valuable asset.” Husband has failed to
persuade us that, as a matter of law, the Property was not “undisclosed or transferred in
breach of the fiduciary duty.” (§ 1101, subd. (h).)
Husband further argues section 1101 remedies are not available because wife’s
interest in the Property was not impaired or detrimentally impacted by his breach of
fiduciary duty. The trial court did not make an explicit finding of impairment; nor does it
appear that it was asked to. But as the court explained, husband worked over a series of
years with his siblings to deprive wife of the Property. This was a deprivation of her
interest in the Property. Further, husband agreed his sister could have equity in the
Property and the record suggests that in the interim sister refinanced the home and
withdrew equity. Husband seems to argue that his behavior did not matter because the
dispute with sister would have prevented wife from taking control of her share of the
property any sooner. This is not the conclusion the trial court reached from this record.
Husband’s assertion that we cannot find impairment because his interest in the property
was equally harmed is also unpersuasive. Section 1101 does not require that only the
claimant spouse’s interest be impaired or detrimentally impacted. (See In re Marriage of
Hokanson (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 987, 991, 993-994 [spouse breached her fiduciary
duties by dilatory conduct in selling house that caused the community to suffer a loss].)

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Husband argues the record lacks clear and convincing evidence of oppression,
fraud, or malice within the meaning of Civil Code section 3294 as required to impose a
remedy under section 1101, subdivision (h).
Under Civil Code section 3294, “ ‘malice’ ” is defined as “conduct which is
intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is
carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety
of others.” (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (c)(1).) “ ‘Oppression’ means despicable conduct
that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person’s
rights.” (Id., subd. (c)(2).) “ ‘Fraud’ means an intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or
concealment of a material fact known to the defendant with the intention on the part of
the defendant of thereby depriving a person of property or legal rights or otherwise
causing injury.” (Id., subd. (c)(3).)
The trial court found husband’s “years’ long, egregious, oppressive, and fraudulent
misconduct toward his wife and young sons [wa]s intentional.” Further, his “malicious
conduct . . . show[ed] he clearly, knowingly, actively, and repeatedly colluded and
worked in concert with his two siblings to deprive his wife and young children of their
sole, exclusive, and valuable asset.” Husband attempts to downplay the trial court’s
credibility findings by suggesting he “merely testif[ied] in court that he believed that he
and [wife] rented from [sister].” Husband falsely testified that his sister lived at the
property for a period of time, when even she testified she did not. The trial court found
husband also fabricated reasons for various checks that were written to sister. Husband
has not identified a permissible basis to disturb the trial court’s conclusion that his breach
of fiduciary duty involved oppression, fraud, or malice on his part.

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We affirm the trial court’s decision to award wife all of the Property under section
1101, subdivision (h).3
F. Attorney’s Fee Awards
The trial court awarded wife attorney’s fees pursuant to sections 271 and 2030. As
a threshold matter, it declined to award fees based on the 40 percent contingency fee
contract between wife and her attorney because it determined that to do so would be
unconscionable. The court found that $335,610 in fees was reasonably incurred by wife’s
counsel and necessary to litigate the matter. It ordered husband to pay wife $1,500, sister
to pay wife $135,000, and husband and sister jointly and severally liable to pay wife
$18,340 in need-based attorney’s fees pursuant to section 2030. Separately, the court
ordered sister to pay wife $100,000, and husband and sister jointly and severally liable to
pay wife $100,000 in attorney’s fees as a sanction under section 271. Husband and sister
challenge each of these awards.
1. Section 2030
We first address the court’s award of need-based attorney’s fees. Pursuant to
section 2030, “[i]n a proceeding for dissolution of marriage . . . , the court shall ensure
that each party has access to legal representation . . . to preserve each party’s rights by
ordering, if necessary based on the income and needs assessments, one party. . . to pay to
the other party, or to the other party’s attorney, whatever amount is reasonably necessary

3 Husband argues the trial court determined the Property was community property but
improperly imposed a resulting trust for wife’s sole beneficial interest. The court found
the Property was community property, that the parties intended the beneficial interest in
the Property was to be enjoyed by wife and husband, and ultimately stated wife “is
hereby adjudicated the []Property’s sole, true, equitable, and beneficial owner because
imposing a resulting trust as to the []Property in [wife]’s favor is apt, appropriate,
equitable, and just.” Husband’s argument is moot given that the trial court awarded wife
all of the property pursuant to section 1101, subdivision (h), and we have affirmed the
award of all of the Property to wife on this basis.

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for attorney’s fees and for the cost of maintaining or defending the proceeding during the
pendency of the proceeding.” (§ 2030, subd. (a)(1).) Further, “the court shall make
findings on whether an award of attorney’s fees and costs under this section is
appropriate, whether there is a disparity in access to funds to retain counsel, and whether
one party is able to pay for legal representation of both parties. If the findings
demonstrate disparity in access and ability to pay, the court shall make an order awarding
attorney’s fees and costs.” (§ 2030, subd. (a)(2).)
“Parties to the dissolution proceeding other than spouses can be required to pay
under this statute.” (In re Marriage of Wendt & Pullen (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 647, 653.)
“Any order requiring a party who is not the spouse of another party to the proceeding to
pay attorney’s fees or costs shall be limited to an amount reasonably necessary to
maintain or defend the action on the issues relating to that party.” (§ 2030, subd. (d).)
“In assessing a party’s relative need and the other party’s ability to pay, [the court]
is to take into account ‘ “ ‘all evidence concerning the parties’ current incomes, assets,
and abilities.’ ” ’ [Citation.] That a party who is requesting fees and costs has the
resources is not, by itself, a bar to an award of part or all of such party’s fees. Financial
resources are only one factor to consider. [Citation.] The trial court may also consider
the other party’s trial tactics.” (In re Marriage of Falcone & Fyke (2012) 203
Cal.App.4th 964, 975.)
“In summary, the proper legal standard for determining an attorney fee award
[under section 2030] requires the trial court to determine how to apportion the cost of the
proceedings equitably between the parties under their relative circumstances. [Citation.]
In making this determination, the trial court has broad discretion in ruling on a motion for
fees and costs; we will not reverse absent a showing that no judge could reasonably have
made the order, considering all of the evidence viewed most favorably in support of the
order.” (In re Marriage of Falcone & Fyke, supra, 203 Cal.App.4th at p. 975.) No such
showing was made here.

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Sister argues there was no evidence of a disparity in access to funds or ability to
pay, and she is only obligated to pay for issues relating to her. Husband contends the
court failed to appropriately consider his financial circumstances when it combined his
and sister’s resources for purposes of awarding need-based fees under section 2030.
These assertions are unavailing.
The attorney’s fees pertained to issues that equally applied to both husband and
sister. The court discussed each party’s resources and expenses and imposed a far greater
need-based attorney’s fee award payable by sister than by brother. The court ordered
husband to pay wife $1,500, sister to pay wife $135,000, and husband and sister jointly
and severally liable to pay wife $18,340. The court explained that while husband and
wife earned similar incomes, sister earned more than three times that amount and had
$178,773 in cash accounts, $198,808 in stocks, bonds, etc., and $60,000 in unidentified
other property. The court found wife had no similar cash or assets available to pay
attorney’s fees and costs. Sister alleged she had previously paid $147,400 in attorney’s
fees but had no balance outstanding. Meanwhile, husband indicated he incurred only
$7,500 in attorney’s fees that he had already paid, and he had a $6,000 cash account and
$5,000 in other property assets. Husband and sister have not demonstrated any basis to
reverse the award of attorney’s fees under section 2030.
2. Section 271
We now turn to the court’s award of attorney’s fees as sanctions under section 271.
“Section 271 authorizes an award of attorney fees and costs as a sanction for
uncooperative conduct that frustrates settlement and increases litigation costs.” (In re
Marriage of Fong (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 278, 290.)
Section 271, subdivision (a) provides, “Notwithstanding any other provision of
this code, the court may base an award of attorney’s fees and costs on the extent to which
any conduct of each party or attorney furthers or frustrates the policy of the law to
promote settlement of litigation and, where possible, to reduce the cost of litigation by

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encouraging cooperation between the parties and attorneys. . . . In making an award
pursuant to this section, the court shall take into consideration all evidence concerning the
parties’ incomes, assets, and liabilities. The court shall not impose a sanction pursuant to
this section that imposes an unreasonable financial burden on the party against whom the
sanction is imposed. In order to obtain an award under this section, the party requesting
an award of attorney’s fees and costs is not required to demonstrate any financial need for
the award.” “The policy of the law is to promote settlement and to encourage
cooperation which will reduce the cost of litigation. [Citation.] But the sanction must be
scaled to the payor’s ability to pay and must be made in light of both parties’ financial
circumstances.” (In re Marriage of Falcone & Fyke (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 814, 827-
828.)
“We review an award of attorney fees and costs under section 271 for abuse of
discretion. [Citation.] ‘Accordingly, we will overturn such an order only if, considering
all of the evidence viewed most favorably in its support and indulging all reasonable
inferences in its favor, no judge could reasonably make the order. [Citations.]’
[Citation.] We review any factual findings made in connection with the award under the
substantial evidence standard.” (In re Marriage of Fong, supra, 193 Cal.App.4th at
p. 291.)
Husband argues the trial court failed to appropriately consider his financial
circumstances, including the fact that the Property was awarded to wife, when awarding
fees against him ($100,000) under section 271. “It is true that the only stricture imposed
by section 271 is that the sanction may not impose an unreasonable financial burden on
the party sanctioned. (§ 271, subd. (a).) It follows, therefore, that the party who wishes
to contest their ability to pay any sanctions award (both at trial and on appeal) bears the
burden to submit evidence or a current income and expense declaration in opposition to
the sanctions request and to present their inability to pay argument at the trial court level,
with reference to that evidence.” (In re Marriage of Rangell (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th

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1206, 1223.) The trial court noted this rule in its order as well as the fact that husband
made no argument that he should not be subject to sanctions under section 271 or that he
did not have the ability to pay a sanctions award. Husband argues his expense
declaration establishes his inability to pay because it shows $5,000 in average monthly
salary and $4,900 in average monthly expenses. We note the record does not reflect that
the trial court agreed that husband’s claimed expenses were accurate, and they included
$3,000 in claimed monthly “rent” for the Property.
Husband further contends the court erred in imposing sanctions against husband
and sister jointly and severally because section 271 provides that “the court may base an
award of attorney’s fees and costs on the extent to which any conduct of each party . . .
furthers or frustrates the policy of the law to promote settlement of litigation” and
requires the court to award attorneys’ fees and costs “only from the property or income of
the party against whom the sanction is imposed.” (§ 271, subds. (a), (c), italics added.)
Sister makes a similar argument. We are unpersuaded by either. The court found
husband and sister acted in concert and engaged in a “four-year campaign to deprive
[wife] of her interest in community property,” and clearly disagreed with husband’s
suggestion that he and sister took “vastly different” approaches during litigation. Rather,
the court explained that both husband and sister engaged in conduct that increased
litigation and repeatedly misrepresented to the court that the home was a rental property
owned by sister. Neither sibling has identified any authority that precludes the imposition
of joint and several liability in this circumstance. Sister further argues she was
sanctioned for taking a litigation position with which the court disagreed. She also
contends there is no evidence she took actions that frustrated settlement. Sister simply
disagrees with the trial court’s findings. She has identified no basis for us to disturb the
court’s award.

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G. Attempt to Disqualify Judge
In February 2024, after the court had issued its statement of decision following
trial, sister attempted to disqualify the trial judge under Code of Civil Procedure section
170.6 and file a declaration objecting to the qualifications of the judge under Code of
Civil Procedure section 170.1, subdivision (a)(6)(A)(iii). (See Code Civ. Proc., § 170.1,
subd. (a)(6)(A)(iii) [“A person aware of the facts might reasonably entertain a doubt that
the judge would be able to be impartial”].) Sister argues the court erred in finding that
her motion to disqualify the trial court judge under Code of Civil Procedure section 170.6
was untimely and in striking her Code of Civil Procedure section 170.1 declaration. This
court has already denied a petition for writ of mandate on these issues. (See Razaq v.
Superior Court, case No. C100562.) Further, these issues are only reviewable by petition
for writ of mandate. “This statutory right to impartiality [set forth in section 170.1] is
raised through a motion to disqualify an assertedly biased judge (Code Civ. Proc., §
170.6), the resolution of which is reviewable only by writ of mandate (Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 170.3, subd. (d)).” (People v. Nieves (2021) 11 Cal.5th 404, 498, fn. 13; accord People
v. Brown (1993) 6 Cal.4th 322, 333.) To the extent sister raises a due process challenge to
the impartiality of the trial judge based on the judge’s adverse credibility findings, we
reject it.

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III. DISPOSITION
The September 7, 2023 and April 8, 2024 orders are affirmed. Respondent Sarah
Razaqi shall recover her costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(1) & (2).)

/S/

RENNER, J.

We concur:

/S/

DUARTE, Acting P. J.

/S/

FEINBERG, J.

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