People v. McGruder CA2/3

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Filed 11/19/25 P. v. McGruder CA2/3
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE, B335512

Plaintiff and Respondent, Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
v. XWESA107741

DEANDRE DORELL
McGRUDER,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Joseph J. Burghardt, Judge. Affirmed.

Laini Millar Melnick, under appointment by the Court
of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Noah P. Hill and David F. Glassman,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_________________________
A jury convicted Deandre Dorell McGruder of attempted
murder and several firearm-related offenses, including unlawful
possession of a firearm and ammunition by a felon. At trial,
the People presented evidence that McGruder was upset with
the victim because he refused to open a sandwich shop that was
closed for the evening. McGruder confronted the victim in the
parking lot as he was walking to his car to go home for the night.
McGruder fired at least five shots at the victim from close range,
none of which struck the intended target. The victim identified
McGruder in a photographic lineup and at trial. The jury
convicted McGruder as charged, and the court sentenced him
to a life term with the possibility of parole plus 10 years.
On appeal, McGruder contends the record lacks sufficient
evidence to support his conviction for attempted murder, the
trial court should have suppressed evidence found during a
warrantless search of his van, and California’s laws prohibiting
felons from possessing firearms and ammunition violate
the Second Amendment to the United States Constitution.
We affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
1. The charges
The People charged McGruder with willful, deliberate, and
premeditated attempted murder (Pen. Code, §§ 664, subd. (a),
187, subd. (a)),1 shooting at an occupied motor vehicle (§ 246),
shooting from a motor vehicle (§ 26100, subd. (c)), assault with
a firearm (§ 245, subd. (a)(2)), possession of a firearm by a felon
(§ 29800, subd. (a)(1)), and possession of ammunition by a felon
(§ 30305, subd. (a)(1)). The People alleged various firearm

1 Statutory references are to the Penal Code.

2
enhancements and aggravating circumstances. The People also
alleged McGruder has a prior conviction that qualifies as a strike
under the Three Strikes law.
2. The People’s case
At trial, the People presented testimony from Michael
Scott. Scott testified that he was working at a sandwich shop
on August 1, 2022. The shop normally closed at 10:00 p.m.
However, Scott was the only employee working that night,
so he closed the restaurant at 9:00 p.m.
Around 9:50 p.m., a white van pulled into the parking lot.
A man—whom Scott later identified as McGruder—got out of
the van and walked up to the restaurant. The man “bang[ed]”
on the restaurant’s door—which was locked—and asked Scott
to let him inside so he could order a sandwich. Scott responded
that he could not open the door because the restaurant was closed
for the night. The man continued banging on the door, and he
became more upset after noticing a sign stating the restaurant
is open until 10:00 p.m.
The man eventually went back to his van, where he sat
for a few minutes before driving away. Scott thought nothing
of the encounter and went back to work closing the shop.
The last task Scott had to complete before going home was
to take out the trash. Scott locked up the restaurant and started
walking across the parking lot to the dumpster. On his way,
Scott noticed the man from the earlier encounter leaving a
nearby store. Scott dropped off the trash and headed towards
his car to go home.
As Scott was walking to his car, a white van drove up close
to him. It was the same van that had been parked outside the
restaurant earlier that evening. Scott could not see the driver’s

3
face because it was dark inside the van. The driver referred to
Scott using offensive language and asked if he was the person
who “ ‘didn’t let me in the’ ” restaurant. Scott said he was sorry,
but he had to close the restaurant early and there was nothing
he could do. Scott believed it was the same person whom he
encountered earlier that night, based on the van, the man’s voice,
and his “approach.”
The van drove away, and Scott continued to his car.
Moments later, the van turned around and headed back towards
Scott. The van stopped about five feet from Scott, who was now
standing next to his own car.
Someone inside the van started shooting a gun in Scott’s
direction. Scott was able to get inside his car and shut the door.
He ducked under the steering wheel until the gunshots stopped
and he heard the van drive away. Scott sat up, started his car,
and drove away. He eventually went home and called 911.
Scott noticed several bullet holes on the driver’s side of
his car, and one of its rear windows was shattered. Sheriff’s
deputies later removed four expended bullets from the car. They
found five shell casings in the parking lot where the shooting
took place.
On August 11, 2022, a deputy presented Scott with a
six-person photographic lineup, which included a picture of
McGruder. The deputy who presented the lineup did not know
whether it contained a photograph of a potential suspect. Scott
recognized McGruder’s photograph “right off the bat.” After
taking a minute to study the other photographs, Scott circled
McGruder’s picture and wrote, “His nose and eyes and his
mustache resemble the person that committed this crime.”
At trial, the prosecutor asked Scott, “[D]id you pick that

4
photograph because you believed it was the person or someone
that just resembled the person that committed the crime?” Scott
responded, “Because I believed it was the person.”
Scott identified McGruder at the preliminary hearing and
at trial as the man he saw outside the restaurant on August 1,
2022. Scott said he got a “good look” at McGruder’s face when
he was banging on the restaurant door.
During Scott’s testimony, the prosecutor played for the jury
videos taken by surveillance cameras pointed at the parking lot.
Scott had not watched the videos before trial. The videos showed
the man Scott identified as McGruder wearing dark Adidas shoes
and driving a white van.
About a month after the shooting—on August 29, 2022—
police officer Ricardo Leon responded to a radio call of an assault
with a deadly weapon. Leon arrived at the scene of the shooting
and noticed McGruder trying to drive away in a white van.
McGruder was nervous, “sweating profusely,” and bleeding. The
officer arrested McGruder and searched his van. Inside the van,
the officer found an identification card with McGruder’s name.
A detective obtained a warrant and searched McGruder’s
van two days later, on August 31, 2022. During the second
search, the detective found dark Adidas shoes, a wallet, and
five forms of identification bearing McGruder’s name.
The parties stipulated that McGruder did not access
the van between the two searches. They also stipulated that
McGruder was prohibited from possessing a firearm on August 1,
2022, the police did not find any firearms related to this case,
and McGruder was the only victim of the shooting on August 29,
2022.

5
3. McGruder’s defense
McGruder testified in his own defense. McGruder could
not recall where he was the night of the shooting. However,
he denied that he was the person who tried to shoot Scott. On
cross examination, McGruder agreed he and the man in the
surveillance videos physically resemble one another, have tattoos
on the same places on their arms, and had matching shoes.
McGruder also agreed the white van in the surveillance videos
resembles his own van.
McGruder presented expert testimony from Dr. Mitchell
Eisen, who is a professor of psychology. Dr. Eisen testified to
the limits of human memory and attention, particularly as
applied to eyewitness identifications. Dr. Eisen told the jury
eyewitness identifications are an important component of the
criminal justice system, but they present significant reliability
problems. He discussed factors that affect the reliability of
an eyewitness’s identification, including trauma, “exposure
duration,” the passage of time, and suggestion. According to
Dr. Eisen, the most accurate identifications typically occur when
a witness—without suggestion—looks at a photographic lineup
and has an instant and powerful recognition of the suspect.
4. The verdict and sentencing
The jury found McGruder guilty as charged and found
the enhancements true. After the jury returned its verdicts,
McGruder stipulated that there are sufficient aggravating
circumstances to justify an upper term sentence.2

2 McGruder agreed to stipulate to the aggravating
circumstances on the condition that the court not sentence him
under the Three Strikes law.

6
The court sentenced McGruder to life with the possibility
of parole for premeditated attempted murder, plus a determinate
term of 10 years for the firearm enhancement (§ 12022.5, subd.
(a)). The court imposed terms on the other counts, which it
stayed under section 654.
McGruder timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
1. Substantial evidence supports McGruder’s conviction
for attempted murder
McGruder contends there is insufficient evidence
supporting his conviction for attempted murder.
In reviewing a conviction challenged for insufficient
evidence, “ ‘ “we review the entire record in the light most
favorable to the judgment to determine whether it contains
substantial evidence—that is, evidence that is reasonable,
credible, and of solid value—from which a reasonable trier of fact
could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” ’ ”
(People v. McCurdy (2014) 59 Cal.4th 1063, 1104; People v.
Salazar (2016) 63 Cal.4th 214, 242.) We presume in support
of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier of fact could
reasonably deduce from the evidence. (People v. Smith (2005)
37 Cal.4th 733, 739 (Smith); People v. Booker (2011) 51 Cal.4th
141, 173.)
It is the exclusive province of the jury to determine the
credibility of a witness and the truth or falsity of the facts on
which that determination depends and, if substantial evidence
supports the verdict, we accord due deference to the trier of fact.
(Smith, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 739.) Reversal is not warranted
unless it appears “ ‘ “ ‘that upon no hypothesis whatever is there
sufficient substantial evidence to support [the conviction].’ ” ’ ”

7
(People v. Penunuri (2018) 5 Cal.5th 126, 142; People v. Bolin
(1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 331.)
Here, substantial evidence supports McGruder’s conviction
for attempted murder. It is undisputed that, the night of
August 1, 2022, a man driving a white van attempted to kill Scott
by firing at least five gunshots at him from close range. The only
significant issue in dispute at trial was the shooter’s identity.
There is substantial evidence in the record from which a
reasonable juror could conclude McGruder was the shooter. At
the preliminary hearing and at trial, Scott identified McGruder
as the man driving the white van. Scott also identified McGruder
in a photographic lineup a few days after the shooting. Scott
testified that he recognized McGruder “right off the bat.”
According to McGruder’s expert, an eyewitness’s “immediate
confident recognition . . . tends to be associated with accuracy.”
Surveillance videos of the shooter supported Scott’s
identification of McGruder. The videos showed the shooter
shared McGruder’s facial features, hair, and tattoos. McGruder
also owned a white van and dark shoes that matched the
shooter’s van and shoes, as seen in the surveillance videos.
On this record, the jury reasonably could have determined
Scott’s identification was accurate and McGruder committed
the attempted murder.
McGruder argues Scott’s identification lacks probative
value and does not constitute substantial evidence of his guilt.
According to McGruder, many of the factors his expert identified
as negatively affecting the accuracy of an eyewitness’s
identification are present here. McGruder points to Scott’s
testimony that his interactions with the shooter were brief
and took place in the dark, he tried to avoid looking directly

8
at the shooter, and the incident was traumatizing. McGruder
also notes that, in a 911 call and at the preliminary hearing,
Scott gave inaccurate descriptions of the shooter’s hair, facial
hair, clothing, and tattoos.
Despite McGruder’s insistence otherwise, his arguments
are little more than veiled attempts to have us reweigh the
evidence. None of the circumstances McGruder identifies
renders Scott’s identification physically impossible or inherently
improbable. (See People v. Young (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1149, 1181
[“unless the testimony is physically impossible or inherently
improbable, testimony of a single witness is sufficient to support
a conviction”]; Evid. Code, § 411 [“the direct evidence of one
witness who is entitled to full credit is sufficient for proof of
any fact”].) Nor is there a requirement that an eyewitness’s
recollection be entirely accurate to be reliable. (See People v.
Ibarra (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 1174, 1188 [approving standard
jury instruction admonishing jurors not to reject testimony
automatically “ ‘just because of inconsistencies or conflicts’ ”].)
The jury was capable of deciding what weight to give Scott’s
testimony in light of the circumstances surrounding his
interactions with the shooter, the discrepancies in his
descriptions, and the expert testimony concerning the limits
of memory and eyewitness identifications. We will not second
guess the jury’s conclusions on appeal. It is enough that Scott’s
testimony, when considered with the other evidence in the record,
was sufficiently reasonable, credible, and of solid value to support
a conviction for attempted murder. (See People v. Cuevas (1995)
12 Cal.4th 252, 260 [substantial evidence is “ ‘evidence which
is reasonable, credible, and of solid value’ ”].)

9
The record does not support McGruder’s contention that
Scott’s identification is unreliable because he never got “a good
look” at the shooter. McGruder points to an exchange at trial
when defense counsel asked Scott, “[Y]ou said that you never
got a very good look at the guy; right?” Scott replied, “Not really,
no.” Scott’s answer contains a double negative, rendering it
ambiguous. Moreover, Scott unambiguously testified on direct
examination that he got “a good look at [the shooter’s] face”
during their first encounter. On review for substantial evidence,
we must view the record in the light most favorable to the
prosecution. (See People v. Zamudio (2008) 43 Cal.4th 327,
357.) Applying that standard to Scott’s testimony, we reject
McGruder’s contention that the record shows Scott never got
a good look at the shooter.
We also reject McGruder’s passing suggestions that the
identification process was overly suggestive. McGruder notes the
police did not videotape the identification procedure—as required
under section 859.7—or record every conversation with Scott
concerning the photographic lineup. He also notes suggestibility
can be subtle, and it may persist even after an admonition.
None of the circumstances McGruder identifies render Scott’s
identification unreliable as a matter of law. The jury was fully
capable of considering the circumstances when determining
what weight to give Scott’s identification.
2. The trial court’s denial of McGruder’s suppression
motion was harmless
McGruder argues the trial court erred by denying his
motion to suppress evidence found during the August 29, 2022
warrantless search of his van.

10
a. Background
Before trial, McGruder moved to suppress evidence from
the first search of his van, which the police conducted without
a warrant on August 29, 2022. McGruder argued the police
lacked probable cause for the search, rendering it unlawful. He
asked the court to suppress evidence the officers found inside
the van, as well as videos from the officers’ body-worn cameras.
McGruder did not move to suppress evidence obtained during
the second search of the van.
One of the officers who conducted the search, Ricardo Leon,
testified at the suppression hearing. Leon testified that, on
August 29, 2022, he and his partner responded to a report of
a shooting at a residence. When the officers arrived at the
residence, McGruder was trying to drive away in a white van.
McGruder got out of the van when he noticed the officers. He
was nervous, sweating profusely, and bleeding. The officers
detained McGruder.
According to Leon, a man named Michael told the officers
McGruder had pointed at gun at him during an argument. After
the argument ended, McGruder accidentally shot himself in
the leg. McGruder gave Michael the gun and told him to hide it.
The officers searched the residence and found a gun under a
mattress.
Leon testified that, after speaking with Michael and
searching the house, he arrested McGruder and decided to search
his van “based on the totality of the circumstances and all the
other evidence that we already had recovered.” Leon described
the search as a “protective sweep” to look for victims, suspects,
and weapons. Leon also wanted to determine if the van belonged
to McGruder, “because we were going to leave [the van] at the

11
residence based on what [McGruder] had requested. So we were
looking for any information or any keys that would tie that van
to [McGruder].” Inside the van, Leon found a wallet containing
McGruder’s identification card.
The court denied the motion to suppress. The court
concluded, based on the totality of the circumstances, the police
had probable cause to search the van. The court noted the
officers responded to a report of an assault with a deadly weapon,
identified McGruder as a possible suspect, and noticed McGruder
was nervous, sweating profusely, and bleeding.
At trial, the prosecutor played for the jury video of the first
search captured by Officer Leon’s body-worn camera. The video
showed Leon finding a wallet that contained an identification
card. Leon testified the identification card belonged to
McGruder.
The prosecutor also presented evidence that, during a
second search of the van two days later, a detective found dark
Adidas shoes and a wallet. Inside the wallet, the officer found
an insurance card with McGruder’s name. The officer also found
a vehicle registration card, AAA card, medical insurance card,
and tax registration certificate, all bearing McGruder’s name.
b. Analysis
The Fourth Amendment prohibits “unreasonable searches
and seizures.” (U.S. Const., 4th Amend.) A defendant may move
to suppress evidence “obtained as a result of a search” on the
ground that the search without a warrant was unreasonable.
(§ 1538.5, subd. (a)(1)(A).) A warrantless search is presumed
to be unreasonable, and the prosecution bears the burden of
demonstrating a legal justification for the search. (People v. Redd
(2010) 48 Cal.4th 691, 719.) The “fruit of the poisonous tree”

12
doctrine prohibits the introduction of evidence causally connected
to an unlawful search. (People v. Navarro (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th
146, 157, fn. 6.)
We need not decide whether the August 29, 2022 search
was unreasonable because, even assuming it was, any error in
denying McGruder’s suppression motion was harmless beyond
a reasonable doubt. (See Chapman v. California (1967) 386
U.S. 18, 24; People v. Tewksbury (1976) 15 Cal.3d 953, 972
(Tewksbury).) McGruder asserts the evidence found during the
first search was crucial to the People’s case because it tied him to
a van that resembled the one used in the shooting. He suggests
admission of that evidence was particularly prejudicial because
the primary disputed issue at trial was the identity of the
shooter.3
While we agree the evidence obtained during the first
search was incriminating, we do not agree its introduction was
prejudicial. McGruder’s identification card was the only evidence
found during the first search that tied him to the van. Even
without that card, the jury heard overwhelming evidence that
the van belonged to McGruder, to the point that the issue was
not seriously in dispute at trial. Officer Leon testified that
he saw McGruder driving the van on August 29, 2022. The
prosecutor also presented undisputed evidence that, during
the second search on August 31, 2022, the police found five

3 On appeal, McGruder does not argue the video of the
search taken by the officer’s body-worn camera was incriminating
or otherwise prejudicial. Therefore, we do not consider that
issue. (See People v. Spector (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 1335,
1372, fn. 12 (Spector) [declining to address issue not raised
in appellant’s opening brief].)

13
documents bearing McGruder’s name. To the extent there was
still doubt about the van’s ownership, McGruder testified that
it belonged to him. On this record, there is no question the jury
would have concluded the van belonged to McGruder, even
without the evidence found during the first search. Accordingly,
any error in failing to suppress that evidence was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt. (See Tewksbury, supra, 15 Cal.3d
at p. 972 [any error in not suppressing evidence of a gun was
harmless where other evidence of guilt was overwhelming];
People v. Meza (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 604, 612–613 [erroneous
failure to suppress evidence of a blood draw was harmless where
a different blood draw showed the defendant’s blood alcohol
content was well above the legal limit].)
McGruder suggests the court also should have suppressed
evidence found during the second search. According to
McGruder, the discovery of his identification card during the
first search caused the police to impound the van and obtain
a warrant to conduct the second search. Therefore, he argues,
any evidence found during the second search was tainted by
the unlawful first search and should have been excluded.
McGruder forfeited this issue by failing to raise it below.
In his motion to suppress, McGruder sought to exclude only
evidence obtained during the first search. He did not challenge
the legality of the second search or otherwise seek to suppress
any evidence obtained during it. By failing to do so, McGruder
forfeited any argument that the trial court should have
excluded evidence found during the second search. (See People
v. Lilienthal (1978) 22 Cal.3d 891, 896 [“it would be wholly
inappropriate to reverse a superior court’s judgment for error
it did not commit and that was never called to its attention”];

14
People v. Partida (2005) 37 Cal.4th 428, 435 [a “party cannot
argue the court erred in failing to conduct an analysis it was
not asked to conduct”].)
3. California’s laws prohibiting felons from possessing
firearms and ammunition do not violate the Second
Amendment
McGruder argues his convictions for unlawful possession
of a firearm and ammunition must be reversed because the
underlying statutes violate the Second Amendment to the
United States Constitution.
The People charged McGruder with violating sections
29800, subdivision (a)(1), and 30305, subdivision (a)(1). Section
29800, states, in relevant part, “[a]ny person who has been
convicted of a felony . . . and who owns, purchases, receives,
or has in possession or under custody or control any firearm is
guilty of a felony.” (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1).) Section 30305 states,
“[n]o person prohibited from owning or possessing a firearm
under [section 29800] shall own, possess, or have under custody
or control, any ammunition or reloaded ammunition.” (§ 30305,
subd. (a)(1).)
Before trial, McGruder filed a motion to dismiss both
charges. McGruder asserted sections 29800 and 30305 violate
the Second Amendment as applied to the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment. McGruder also argued the charges
should be dismissed because they relied on his prior felony
conviction for carrying a gun in public, which itself violates
the Second Amendment. The trial court denied the motion,
and the jury convicted McGruder of both offenses.

15
In the trial court, McGruder made both a facial and an
“as-applied” challenge to sections 29800 and 30305. On appeal,
he focuses on the facial challenge and does not meaningfully
address the as-applied challenge.4 A facial challenge “is the
‘most difficult challenge to mount successfully,’ because it
requires a defendant to ‘establish that no set of circumstances
exists under which the [statute] would be valid.’ [Citation.] That
means that to prevail, the Government need only demonstrate
that [the statute] is constitutional in some of its applications.”
(United States v. Rahimi (2024) 602 U.S. 680, 693 (Rahimi).)
The Second Amendment provides, “A well regulated
Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right
of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”
(U.S. Const., 2d Amend.) In District of Columbia v. Heller (2008)
554 U.S. 570, the United States Supreme Court held the “Second
Amendment conferred an individual right to keep and bear
arms,” which “elevates above all other interests the right of law-
abiding, responsible citizens to use arms in defense of hearth
and home.” (Id. at pp. 595, 635.) Two years later, the Supreme
Court held the Second Amendment is “fully applicable to the
States” under the Fourteenth Amendment. (McDonald v. City
of Chicago, Ill. (2010) 561 U.S. 742, 750, 791.)
In New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. v. Bruen
(2022) 597 U.S. 1 (Bruen), the Supreme Court clarified the
“standard for applying the Second Amendment is as follows:
When the Second Amendment’s plain text covers an individual’s
conduct, the Constitution presumptively protects that

4 McGruder’s failure meaningfully to address the as-applied
challenge on appeal forfeits the issue. (See Spector, supra, 194
Cal.App.4th at p. 1372, fn. 12.)

16
conduct. The government must then justify its regulation by
demonstrating that it is consistent with the Nation’s historical
tradition of firearm regulation.” (Id. at p. 24.) The court
explained the historical inquiry “will often involve reasoning
by analogy,” and “determining whether a historical regulation
is a proper analogue for a distinctly modern firearm regulation
requires a determination of whether the two regulations are
‘relevantly similar.’ ” (Id. at pp. 28–29.)
In Rahimi, supra, 602 U.S. 680, the Supreme Court applied
the Bruen framework and upheld a federal statute prohibiting
individuals subject to domestic violence restraining orders
from possessing firearms. The court explained “the Second
Amendment permits more than just those regulations identical
to ones that could be found in 1791. Holding otherwise would
be as mistaken as applying the protections of the right only
to muskets and sabers.” (Rahimi, at pp. 691–692.) The court
reiterated that “the appropriate analysis involves considering
whether the challenged regulation is consistent with the
principles that underpin our regulatory tradition,” and “[w]hy
and how the regulation burdens the right are central to this
inquiry.” (Id. at p. 692.)
California courts have unanimously held sections 29800
and 30305 do not violate the Second Amendment, but they have
given different reasons for doing so. The majority of courts have
concluded the Second Amendment’s plain text does not apply
to convicted felons. (See People v. Richardson (2025) 108
Cal.App.5th 1203, 1207; People v. Ceja (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th
1296, 1300–1302; People v. Odell (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 307, 309,
316–317; People v. Alexander (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 469, 479.)
In Alexander, for example, the court explained that “Heller

17
and Bruen both held that the Second Amendment protects the
individual right of ‘ “law-abiding, responsible citizens” ’ to possess
firearms. [Citations.] Convicted felons, by definition, are not
law abiding. Felons thus are not among ‘the people’ who have
an individual right to possess firearms under the Second
Amendment. (U.S. Const., 2d Amend.) . . . [Therefore,]
challenges to the constitutionality of section 29800(a)(1) and
section 30305(a)(1) under the Second Amendment fail under
the first step of Bruen’s analytical framework.” (Alexander,
at p. 479.)
A minority of California courts have proceeded to the
second step of the Bruen framework. (See People v. Anderson
(2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 577, 582 (Anderson); People v. Gomez
(2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 419, 425; People v. Bey (2025) 108
Cal.App.5th 144, 162.) In Anderson, for example, the court
determined felons are among “ ‘the people’ ” whose rights
the Second Amendment protects. (Anderson, at pp. 588–589.)
Nevertheless, after conducting a detailed historical survey of
“sources from 17th-Century England, colonial America, and
the early federal period,” the court concluded sections 29800
and 30305 pass constitutional muster. (Id. at pp. 589, 599–600.)
The Anderson court employed a “thematic” approach to
determine whether California’s statutes are consistent with the
nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation. (Anderson,
supra, 104 Cal.App.5th at p. 597.) The court identified three
categories of historical evidence that are “ ‘relevantly similar’ ”
to sections 29800 and 30305: (1) “categorical disarmament laws,
which prohibited categories of people from owning firearms
based on their race, religion, or unwillingness to swear an oath
of allegiance”; (2) “criminal penalties, whereby individuals were

18
disarmed as a consequence of their own criminal conduct”; and
(3) Pennsylvania’s and Massachusetts’s “ratifying conventions’
proposed constitutional provisions, which protected a right to
arms that could be abrogated ‘for crimes committed,’ or upon
evidence that a person posed a ‘danger of public injury’ or was
not a ‘peaceable citizen[ ].’ ” (Anderson, at pp. 597–599.) The
court concluded, “[t]aken together, this historical evidence shows
that individuals were disarmed as a preventative measure
when the law assessed they were unwilling to respect sovereign
authority, and they were disarmed as a sanction for criminal
conduct, whether or not involving physical violence. California’s
felon disarmament measures are ‘ “relevantly similar” ’ in serving
both of these purposes.” (Id. at p. 598.)
McGruder agrees with the Anderson court’s conclusion that
the Second Amendment applies to felons. However, he contends
the court erred in concluding sections 29800 and 30305 are
consistent with the historical tradition of firearm regulation.
According to McGruder, the court’s reasoning is flawed because
it failed to identify a single historical analogue to California’s
statutes. Instead, the court bundled “distinct sets of historical
evidence, each insufficient on its own to serve as a representative
analogue.”
Assuming, for the sake of argument, the Second
Amendment applies to felons, we find the Anderson court’s
analysis of the historical record to be persuasive. Although
the court did not identify any specific historical laws imposing
lifetime disbarment on felons, “the Second Amendment permits
more than just those regulations identical to ones that could
be found in 1791.” (Rahimi, supra, 602 U.S. at pp. 691–692.)
We agree with the Anderson court’s determination that the

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historical evidence demonstrates “this nation’s tradition of
firearm regulation allows for a categorical ban on the possession
of firearms by persons who have been convicted of a felony.”
(Anderson, supra, 104 Cal.App.5th at p. 599; see Bruen, supra,
597 U.S. at p. 24 [a regulation that restricts the right to keep and
bear arms survives scrutiny if it “is consistent with the Nation’s
historical tradition of firearm regulation”].) Accordingly, we
agree with its conclusion that section 29800—and by extension
section 30305—does not violate the Second Amendment. (See
Anderson, at pp. 599–600.)
DISPOSITION
We affirm the judgment.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

EGERTON, J.

We concur:

EDMON, P. J.

ADAMS, J.

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