Tritz v. Tritz CA4/3

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Filed 11/18/25 Tritz v. Tritz CA4/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

IRENE TRITZ,

Plaintiff and Appellant, G064261

v. (Super. Ct. No. 30-2020-
01122011)
VINCENT R. TRITZ, et al.,
OPINION
Defendants and Respondents.

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County,
Richard J. Oberholzer, Judge. (Retired judge of the Kern County Super. Ct.
assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to art. VI, § 6 of the Cal. Const.)
Affirmed.
Irene Tritz, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Bohm Wildish & Matsen and James G. Bohm for Defendants and
Respondents.
Plaintiff Irene Tritz appeals from a judgment entered in favor of
defendants Vincent and Gayle Tritz after a jury rendered a special verdict
finding all her causes of action were not timely filed. She contends the trial
court erred in denying her motions for a judgment notwithstanding the
verdict and a new trial. Among other arguments, she asserts instructions
provided to the jury concerning defendants’ statute of limitations affirmative
defenses were an inaccurate statement of the applicable law under the
circumstances. She also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support
the jury’s verdict. On the record before us, we find no error and affirm the
judgment.
FACTS

Plaintiff and defendants are family—defendants are plaintiff’s
brother-in-law and his wife.1 In 1986, defendants, plaintiff, and her husband,
Richard, worked together to purchase a condominium (the property).
Although not listed on title at the time of the purchase, plaintiff and her
husband were later added to the title as partial owners, consistent with an
arrangement agreed upon by the parties.
In 1992, also pursuant to an agreement of the parties, plaintiff
and her husband were taken off title to the property through a quitclaim deed
signed by all parties, and defendants pursued refinancing. At trial, the
parties disputed whether there was an agreement for plaintiff and her
husband’s ownership interest in the property to be restored immediately
thereafter. However, it was undisputed they were never put back on title.

1 Because the parties share a last name, we refer to them by first

name as needed for clarity. No disrespect is intended.

2
In 2018, unbeknownst to plaintiff and her husband, defendants
sold the property and retained all proceeds from the sale. Plaintiff presented
evidence at trial that she first learned of the sale on January 10, 2019, when
she approached a real estate agent about potentially selling the property and
found out from the agent that its ownership had already been transferred. Up
until that time, plaintiff said she did not know her and her husband’s names
had never been restored to title.
On January 7, 2020, plaintiff sued defendants alleging breach of
contract, fraud, and negligence. She alleged she and her husband were
partial owners of the property at the time it was sold in 2018 and defendants
wrongfully withheld their share of the sale proceeds. In addition, she alleged
that over the years defendants intentionally misrepresented ownership of the
property multiple times to secure personal loans, they deliberately concealed
from plaintiff and her husband the property’s ownership status, and Vincent,
who acted as a property manager, was negligent in handling property related
funds.
Following a couple of amendments to the complaint, all three
causes of action were tried to a jury, with plaintiff representing herself.
Among the disputed matters with which the jury was charged was
determining whether plaintiff timely filed her claims. Plaintiff argued the
delayed discovery rule rendered them timely, while defendants argued they
were filed too late.
After deliberating for roughly 40 minutes, the jury returned a
defense verdict. A special verdict form indicated it found all of plaintiff’s
claims to be untimely.
Plaintiff moved for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict
(JNOV) and a new trial. For the JNOV, she argued no evidence supported the

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jury’s verdict concerning the timeliness of her claims and the verdict “did not
consider the application of the [d]elayed [d]iscovery [r]ule to which [she was]
entitled.” From her perspective, her “admitted evidence and witness
testimony document[ed] the date of the discovery for [her] three causes of
action as being Jan[uary] 10, 2019,” and defendants’ evidence was not to the
contrary. Among her arguments for a new trial were: (1) the trial court failed
to discuss all disputed jury instructions before instructing the jury; (2) the
jury was improperly influenced by being given a version of the delayed
discovery rule proposed by defendants instead of instructions she proposed;
(3) the verdict did not account for the statute of frauds concerning oral real
estate contracts; and (4) as a matter of law, the evidence required a finding in
her favor on the timeliness of her claims.
The trial court denied plaintiff’s requests for a JNOV and new
trial, and thereafter entered judgment for defendants. Plaintiff timely
appealed.
DISCUSSION

Plaintiff challenges the trial court’s denial of her motions for a
JNOV and a new trial. She argues the court did not properly instruct the jury
on applicable statute of limitations principles and there is no evidence to
support the jury’s verdict concerning the timeliness of her claims. We find no
error.
I.
FORFEITURE AND WAIVER

Before considering the merits of plaintiff’s arguments on appeal,
we address two preliminary matters raised by defendants: (1) whether
plaintiff forfeited her challenge to the validity of the jury instructions by

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failing to object below;2 and (2) whether we should deem plaintiff’s challenge
to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the jury’s verdict waived due to
her failure to set forth all favorable and unfavorable evidence in her appellate
briefing. We do not find forfeiture or waiver under the circumstances.
Regarding plaintiff’s actions below, the record shows plaintiff
proposed statute of limitations related jury instructions that differed from
defendants. At the trial court’s direction, the parties conferred and came up
with a list of agreed upon instructions, as well as a list of those about which
they disagreed. The court reviewed the disputed instructions, which included
those challenged by plaintiff on appeal, and determined it would give
defendants’ version. Although plaintiff did not object further when the court
identified the instructions to be given, she reiterated her belief in the
inaccuracy of defendants’ statute of limitations related instructions when she
moved for a new trial. Under these circumstances, we decline to find
forfeiture. And, even if we were to find forfeiture, it would not preclude her
challenge asserting the instructions incorrectly stated the law. (See Argawal
v. Johnson (1979) 25 Cal.3d 932, 948–949, disapproved of on other grounds in
White v. Ultramar, Inc. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 563; Carrau v. Marvin Lumber &
Cedar Co. (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 281, 296.)
As for plaintiff’s briefing on appeal, defendants argue she “wholly
fail[s] to present a fair record of what occurred in the trial court and only
set[s] forth evidence in support of her position,” thereby waiving her

2 Though defendants characterize this as an alleged waiver, their

argument is more properly characterized as asserting a forfeiture. (See North
American Title Co. v. Superior Court (2024) 17 Cal.5th 155, 178
[“forfeiture ‘refers to a failure to object or to invoke a right’”]; People v. Simon
(2001) 25 Cal.4th 1082, 1097, fn. 9 [“‘waiver is different from forfeiture’”].)

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sufficiency of the evidence argument. Though not a model of clarity, plaintiff’s
briefing discusses the evidence she believes relevant to the issue based on her
perception of the law. As we explain below, she misunderstands the law, but
we decline to exercise our discretion to deem her argument waived. (See
Schmidlin v. City of Palo Alto (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 728, 738 [if party
making substantial evidence challenge presents only facts and inferences
favorable to their position, contention that finding is not supported by
substantial evidence may be deemed waived].)
Notably, while defendants’ counsel is quick to point out
deficiencies and errors in plaintiff’s briefing, they do so without recognizing
the documents they submitted on appeal contain critical errors of their own.
Among other things, defendants’ brief contains multiple inaccurate record
citations, and their appendix contains a plethora of documents which appear
irrelevant to the issues raised on appeal and an index that does not conform
to court rules. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.124(b)(3)(A), (b)(5), (d)(1),
8.144(b)(5)(A).) Combined, these errors make it very difficult to evaluate
some of their arguments and assertions.3

3 We would be remiss not to also comment on language used in

defendants’ brief. Regardless of how an attorney personally feels about the
other side’s arguments, describing a brief as a “lengthy and torturous
repetition of irrelevant ‘facts’ and recitation of grievances . . . in a thinly
veiled use of subterfuge as to what is actually before this [c]ourt,” and “a
rambling accusatory account devoid of a factual or legally supported basis
that should be deemed disregarded,” is unnecessary and borders on incivility.
(See In re S.C. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 396, 412 [“unwarranted personal
attacks on the character or motives of the opposing party . . . are
inappropriate and may constitute misconduct”]; People v. Chong (1999) 76
Cal.App.4th 232, 243 [“‘[I]t is vital to the integrity of our adversary legal
process that attorneys strive to maintain the highest standards of
ethics, civility, and professionalism in the practice of law’”].) As another court
has aptly stated, “[z]eal and vigor in the representation of clients are

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II.
VALIDITY OF JURY INSTRUCTIONS

Plaintiff contends the trial court erred in failing to discuss the
statute of limitations related jury instructions with the parties before using
them to instruct the jury and in giving those instructions because they
“contained an incorrect date for [p]laintiff to have acted on her claims.”4
Regarding the latter, she argues the date specified in the instructions should
have been January 10, 2019, which is the day on which she testified she
became aware of defendants’ sale of the property without her and her
husband’s consent. So her argument goes, such a date would have recognized
the applicability of the delayed discovery rule. We focus on the date related
arguments because the record reflects the trial court expressly gave the
parties two opportunities to comment on all jury instructions after it stated
which ones would be given to the jury.
A. The Disputed Jury Instructions

As part of her proposed jury instructions, plaintiff submitted
three statute of limitations related instructions. One concerned equitable
estoppel to assert a statute of limitations defense, one concerned equitable

commendable. So are civility, courtesy, and cooperation. They are not
mutually exclusive.” (In re Marriage of Davenport (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th
1507, 1537.)
4 For the first time in her reply brief, plaintiff also challenges the

legal accuracy of three other jury instructions given to the jury, each of which
concerned affirmative defenses unrelated to the statutes of limitations. We do
not address those argument because under basic tenets of appellate practice,
which apply equally to those who are self-represented (see Rappleyea v.
Campbell (1994) 8 Cal.4th 975, 984–985), matters raised for the first time in
a reply brief are generally deemed forfeited. (Aptos Council v. County of
Santa Cruz (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 266, 296, fn. 7.)

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tolling of the statute of limitations, and the last concerned the delayed
discovery rule. The latter instruction, based on CACI No. 455, read as follows:
“If Vincent R. Tritz and Gayle Weik Tritz prove that Irene Tritz’s claimed
harm occurred before January 10, 2019, Irene Tritz’s lawsuit was still filed on
time if Irene Tritz proves that before that date, Irene Tritz did not discover,
and did not know of facts that would have caused a reasonable person to
suspect, that she had suffered harm that was caused by someone’s wrongful
conduct.”
Ultimately, the trial court gave statute of limitations related
instructions proposed by defendants which were based on CACI Nos. 338
(breach of oral or written contract), 454 (negligence), 455 (delayed discovery),
and 1925 (fraud). None of those instructions included the January 10, 2019
date proposed by plaintiff. Instead, they referenced the following dates:
January 7, 2018 for breach of an oral contract; January 7, 2016 for breach of
a written contract; January 7, 2018 for negligence; and January 7, 2017 for
fraud.
B. Analysis

“[A] plaintiff must file suit within a designated period after the
cause of action accrues.” (Pooshs v. Philip Morris USA, Inc. (2011) 51 Cal.4th
788, 797, italics omitted.) “Generally speaking, a cause of action accrues at
‘the time when the cause of action is complete with all of its elements.’
[Citations.] An important exception to the general rule of accrual is the
‘discovery rule,’ which postpones accrual of a cause of action until the plaintiff
discovers, or has reason to discover, the cause of action. [Citations.] [¶] A
plaintiff has reason to discover a cause of action when he or she ‘has reason
at least to suspect a factual basis for its elements.’” (Fox v. Ethicon Endo-
Surgery, Inc. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 797, 806–807.) “‘The policy reason behind the

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discovery rule is to ameliorate a harsh rule that would allow the limitations
period for filing suit to expire before a plaintiff has or should have learned of
the latent injury and its cause.’” (Pooshs, at pp. 797–798.)
In focusing on the January 2019 date on which she allegedly
learned of the property sale, plaintiff appears to misunderstand the function
of the dates listed in the various instructions provided to the jury. The
statutes of limitations applicable to her claims were as follows: four years for
breach of a written contract (Code Civ. Proc., § 337), two years for breach of
an oral contract (id. at § 339), three years for fraud (id. at § 338), and two
years for negligence (id. at § 335.1). The dates used in the jury instructions
accurately reflected those limitation periods. For example, the fraud related
instruction referenced January 7, 2017. That was a date three years before
the filing of the complaint, which occurred on January 7, 2020. And the
instruction correctly stated that, absent a delayed discovery finding which we
later address, if the jury concluded the evidence showed plaintiff’s harm
occurred before January 7, 2017, the filing of her claim would fall outside the
three-year statute of limitations and be considered untimely. The same is
true for the statute of limitations related instructions for her other claims.
Plaintiff’s other focus is on the delayed discovery rule. She states
“[t]he [d]elayed [d]iscovery [r]ule is applicable” and appears to argue the jury
instructions did not allow the jury to properly consider it. But, the delayed
discovery rule was expressly incorporated into the instructions related to
each claim. Once again using fraud as an example, a portion of the
instruction provided: “If Vincent and Gail [sic] Tritz prove that Irene Tritz’s
claimed harm occurred before January 7, 2017, Irene Tritz’s lawsuit was still
filed on time if Irene Tritz proves that before that date, she did not discover
facts constituting the fraud or mistake, and with reasonable diligence could

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not have discovered those facts.” As previously discussed, the 2017 date was
the three-year statute of limitations cutoff. And even if the jury concluded
plaintiff’s harm occurred before that date, the additional language allowed
the jury to find plaintiff’s claims timely if it determined plaintiff did not
discover, and with reasonable diligence could not have discovered, the facts
constituting the fraud before that date. Similar language was incorporated
into the instruction based on CACI No. 338, which concerned breach of
contract, and the one based on CACI No. 455, which concerned delayed
discovery in the negligence context.
Because the statute of limitations related jury instructions
incorporated and accurately stated the relevant law, including the delayed
discovery rule, we find no error in the trial court’s giving of the challenged
instructions and the denial of plaintiff’s new trial motion.
III.
SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

Turning to the evidence presented at trial, plaintiff argues there
is no evidence to support the jury’s verdict. On this premise, and with
additional argument about the evidence related to the merits of her claims,
she asserts the trial court erred in denying her JNOV motion. Having
reviewed the record, we agree with defendants that substantial evidence
supports the verdict and, thus, the JNOV denial was proper.
Upon the timely filing of a motion, a party is entitled to a JNOV
if there is no substantial evidence to support the verdict and the evidence
compels a judgment for the moving party as a matter of law. (See Code Civ.
Proc., § 629; Clemmer v. Hartford Insurance Co. (1978) 22 Cal.3d 865, 877–
878, overruled on other grounds in Ryan v. Rosenfeld (2017) 3 Cal.5th 124.)
If, as here, the motion challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support

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the verdict, we apply the substantial evidence standard. (Clemmer, at pp.
877–878.) “Under that standard of review, ‘the power of an appellate court
begins and ends with the determination as to whether there is any
substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, which will support the
finding of fact.’ [Citation.] In so doing, we accept all evidence that supports
the judgment, disregard contrary evidence, and draw all reasonable
inferences to uphold the judgment. [Citation.] ‘It is not our role to reweigh the
evidence, redetermine the credibility of the witnesses, or resolve conflicts in
the testimony, and we will not disturb the judgment if there is evidence to
support it.’” (Slone v. El Centro Regional Medical Center (2024) 106
Cal.App.5th 1160, 1173.)
The critical dispute at trial concerning the timeliness of plaintiff’s
claims was when she discovered, or with reasonable diligence could have
discovered, that she and her husband were not placed back on title to the
property after being removed therefrom in 1992. Substantial evidence
supports the jury’s implicit conclusion that it was sometime before January 7,
2017, a date four years before the filing of the complaint which correlated to
the longest of the applicable statutes of limitations.
After Richard testified he was never excluded from accessing the
property, defendants’ counsel elicited on cross-examination that in Richard’s
deposition testimony he admitted to being “aware that [he was] excluded
from the property” from around 1995 onward. This was consistent with
testimony concerning certain ledgers of property income and expenses kept
by Vincent, who acted as the property manager, which showed plaintiff and
her husband were not billed for any expenses after 1994. Likewise, plaintiff
confirmed she and her husband did not declare any income from the property
on their taxes even though she believed the property started making money

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as a rental in 1995, and they never received any accounting or other financial
information about the property after 1995.
Additionally, loan applications signed by plaintiff and her
husband under penalty of perjury in 1999 and 2005 did not list the property
as an owned asset. Although Richard testified this was done at the advice of
their accountant for tax purposes, it was for the jury to judge credibility and
decide the import of the evidence and testimony. The same was true of
evidence concerning a search of property tax records done by plaintiff.
Plaintiff testified she looked into property tax records for the property,
including by contacting the county assessor’s office, but did not locate her
name anywhere. At trial plaintiff said that took place in 2020, but her
deposition testimony read to the jury indicated it took place in 2016. And,
though plaintiff explained her discussions with the county assessor’s office
led her to believe technical issues were preventing her from finding any name
on the property’s title, and she thereafter did not reinvestigate the matter
due to her husband being ill, it was the jury’s role to determine what, if any,
weight to give that testimony.
In a separate but related argument, plaintiff contends “the jury’s
verdict did not consider the application of the [d]elayed [d]iscovery [r]ule.”
However, the jury instructions included legally-valid delayed discovery
principles, and we must presume the jury followed the instructions when the
record, like the one before us, contains no indication to the contrary. (NBC
Subsidiary (KNBC-TV), Inc. v. Superior Court (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1178, 1223.)
Because there was ample evidence from which the jury could find
that well before 2017, plaintiff discovered, or with reasonable diligence
should have discovered, she and her husband were never restored to the
property’s title, substantial evidence supports the jury’s verdict that all her

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claims were filed outside the applicable statutes of limitations. Accordingly,
the trial court did not err in denying the requested JNOV.5
DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. In the interest of justice, the parties
shall bear their own costs on appeal.

DELANEY, ACTING P. J.

WE CONCUR:

SCOTT, J.

BANCROFT, J.*

*Judge of the Orange County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice
pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

5 Because we conclude substantial evidence supports the jury’s

finding that plaintiff’s claims were untimely, and that conclusion affirms the
validity of the trial court’s actions, we do not address plaintiff’s arguments
concerning the merits of her claims.

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