People v. Harmon CA4/1

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Filed 11/18/25 P. v. Harmon CA4/1
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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE, D085869

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v. (Super. Ct. No. SWF2007471)

KENNETH ALAN HARMON et al.,

Defendants and Appellants.

APPEAL from judgments of the Superior Court of Riverside County,
Francisco Navarro, Judge. Reversed in part and remanded for resentencing.
Marcia R. Clark, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant Kenneth Alan Harmon.
Alan Siraco, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant
and Appellant Isaac Delarosa.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Steve
Oetting and Daniel J. Hilton, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
A jury found Kenneth Alan Harmon and Isaac Delarosa guilty of

(1) first degree murder (Pen. Code,1 § 187, subd. (a)), committed by lying in
wait (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(15)) (count 1); and (2) attempted murder with
premeditation and deliberation (§§ 187, subd. (a), 664, subd. (a)) (count 2).
The jury made true findings as to Harmon that during both crimes he
discharged a firearm causing death or great bodily injury (§ 12022.53,
subd. (d)) and that during the attempted murder he personally inflicted great
bodily injury (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)). In addition, the jury found Harmon guilty
of two counts of being a felon in possession of a firearm. (§ 29800,
subd. (a)(1).) Harmon was sentenced to an indeterminate term of 57 years to
life, plus life without parole and a determinate term of five years four
months. Delarosa was sentenced to an indeterminate term of seven years to
life, plus life without parole.
Harmon and Delarosa both contend that (1) in count 1, the evidence
was insufficient to prove lying in wait, requiring reversal of both the lying-in-
wait special circumstance findings and the first degree murder verdicts;
(2) the trial court gave a prejudicially incomplete instruction on using lying in
wait as a ground to find that the murder was of the first degree; and (3) the
trial court prejudicially erred in declining to instruct the jury on the lesser
included offense of voluntary manslaughter and attempted voluntary
manslaughter based on imperfect self-defense. Delarosa further contends
that the trial court prejudicially erred in allowing the prosecution to
introduce evidence of a Facebook message in which he stated that he
possessed a gun three weeks before the shooting at issue here.

1 Unless otherwise indicated, all further statutory references are to the
Penal Code.
2
We conclude that insufficient evidence supports the finding of lying in
wait in count 1. That conclusion requires us to reverse the finding on the
lying-in-wait special circumstance, but it does not require a reversal of the
first degree murder convictions, as they are supported by the alternative
theory of premeditation and deliberation. We also conclude that none of the
other issues raised by the parties provide a ground for reversal. According,
we reverse the findings of lying in wait as a special circumstance in count 1,
and we remand for resentencing.
I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Around 5:00 p.m. on February 9, 2020, Harmon and Delarosa walked
together into the parking lot of a park in Romoland, where the victims A.V.
and J.R. were sitting in A.V.’s parked car. The rear of A.V.’s car was backed
into a parking space at the far end of the parking lot. A.V. was in the driver’s
seat, and J.R. was in the passenger seat with his window partially lowered.
The passenger side of A.V.’s car was facing the entrance to the parking lot.
Harmon and Delarosa walked toward A.V.’s car along a sidewalk that
eventually would have taken them past the back of the car. A law
enforcement investigator interpreted a surveillance video to show that
Harmon and Delarosa were wearing masks and hooded sweatshirts as they
approached.
Upon reaching a position near the rear of A.V.’s car, Delarosa turned to
walk along the car’s passenger side, toward the front of the car. At the same
time, Harmon charged toward the rear passenger side of the car and fired
multiple gunshots toward the passenger-side window where J.R. was sitting.
A.V. reacted to the gunshots by driving his car forward and pulling out of the

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parking space. Harmon then ran toward A.V.’s moving car and fired at least
two more shots toward the passenger-side window.
A.V. was shot in the right arm, but he managed to drive out of the
parking lot. J.R. was shot in the head and later died as a result. A.V. drove
approximately a mile and a half away and parked by an empty field, where,
after a delay of several minutes, he called 911.
Law enforcement did not locate any weapons or bullet casings in or
around A.V.’s car where it was parked near the field. Further, no evidence
related to the shooting—such as bullets, casings or broken glass—were found
in the parking lot where the incident occurred. After reviewing surveillance
videos of the incident, law enforcement eventually identified Harmon and
Delarosa as suspects.
An information alleged in count 1 that Harmon and Delarosa
committed the first degree murder of J.R. (§ 187, subd. (a)), with lying in wait
alleged as a special circumstance (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(15)). That count also
alleged that Harmon discharged a firearm causing death or great bodily
injury (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)) and that Delarosa was armed with a firearm
(§ 12022, subd. (a)(1)). In count 2, the information alleged that Harmon and
Delarosa both committed the attempted murder of A.V. with premeditation
and deliberation (§§ 187, subd. (a), 664, subd. (a)). It also alleged that
Harmon discharged a firearm causing death or great bodily injury
(§ 12022.53, subd. (d)) and personally inflicted great bodily injury (§ 12022.7,
subd. (a)) and that Delarosa was armed with a firearm (§ 12022, subd. (a)(1)).
Based on Harmon’s possession of a firearm during the February 9, 2020
shooting and when he was arrested on August 4, 2020, Harmon was charged
with two counts of being a felon in possession of a firearm. (§ 29800,
subd. (a)(1).)

4
At trial, the jury heard evidence that around the time of the shooting,
Delarosa and A.V. were in a dispute with each other and had planned to fight
at some point. Establishing the existence of that dispute, on January 30,
2020, Delarosa sent A.V. a message over Facebook to state he was upset that
A.V. had shown up at his house at 4:00 a.m. and had woken up Delarosa’s
grandmother. In a series of Facebook messages, the two men agreed to settle
the issue by fighting each other, and as of February 9, 2020, the fight had not
yet taken place.
A.V. and Delarosa both testified at trial about the events of the
afternoon leading up to the shooting. Many of those activities were also
shown on surveillance video footage, as was some of the shooting itself.
According to A.V., he and J.R. arrived at the park on the afternoon of
February 9, 2020 “just to hang out.” Harmon and Delarosa were not at the
park at the time. After spending some time at the park, A.V. and J.R. left to
get food, beer and gas. They then returned, and A.V. backed into a parking
space at the far end of the parking lot. From where they were parked, A.V.
and J.R. had a clear view of anyone walking into the parking lot toward the
car.
A minute or two later, Harmon and Delarosa were driven into the
parking lot as passengers in their friend’s vehicle. Instead of stopping in the
parking lot, the friend’s vehicle circled through it and then exited. Delarosa
testified that he noticed A.V.’s car in the parking lot, and he asked his friend
not to stop there because he did not want to have a confrontation with A.V.
on that day.
Approximately 26 minutes after Harmon and Delarosa circled and left
the parking lot in their friend’s vehicle, Harmon and Delarosa entered the
parking lot on foot and walked toward A.V.’s car. The car was still backed

5
into the parking space where it was located 26 minutes earlier, and A.V. and
J.R. were still inside.
According to A.V., he and J.R. spent the intervening 26 minutes sitting
in A.V.’s car where they listened to music and smoked. A.V. testified that he
did not notice Harmon and Delarosa approaching on foot because he was
looking at his phone, as was J.R. A.V. then heard shots coming from the
right, and he immediately started his car and drove away. A.V. stated that
neither he nor J.R. had a gun during the incident.
Delarosa testified that during the 26 minutes between the time that his
friend’s vehicle circled the parking lot and he and Harmon walked back into
the parking lot, he and Harmon were in their friend’s car at an elementary
school that was adjacent to the park. According to Delarosa, they spent those
26 minutes smoking marijuana with their friend. Then, when the friend
drove away, he and Harmon walked down toward the parking lot with the
plan that they would walk through the parking lot and across the park to
reach Harmon’s house, which was on the other side of the park. Although
Delarosa saw that A.V.’s car was still in the parking lot, he and Harmon
nevertheless walked in the direction of A.V.’s vehicle because he “just felt like
there wasn’t a need to have any problems that day.” Delarosa denied that he
and Harmon were wearing masks, explaining that it was raining, so they
were wearing caps and had their hooded sweatshirts pulled up, with the
drawstring of Harmon’s hood pulled tight.
According to Delarosa, as he and Harmon got near A.V.’s car, J.R.
“popped up” from the reclined passenger seat and said “What’s up fool?”
through the open window. J.R. pulled out a gun and fired one shot toward

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Harmon, who was on Delarosa’s left, toward the back of the car.2 Harmon
took out a gun, which Delarosa did not know that Harmon had, and started
shooting toward J.R. “in defense.” Although J.R. shot his gun only once, at
the very beginning of the incident, Harmon continued to fire at J.R. multiple

times, even after A.V. started to drive away.3
The jury found Harmon and Delarosa guilty as charged, except that it
rejected the allegation that Delarosa was armed with a firearm (§ 12022,
subd. (a)(1)) in counts 1 and 2. Harmon was sentenced to an indeterminate
term of 57 years to life, plus life without parole and a determinate term of
five years four months. Delarosa was sentenced to an indeterminate term of
seven years to life, plus life without parole.
II.
DISCUSSION
A. Challenge to the Sufficiency of the Evidence to Support Lying in Wait
We first consider Harmon’s and Delarosa’s contention that insufficient
evidence supports a finding that the killing of J.R. was committed by means
of lying in wait.
Two different instructions gave the jury the opportunity to make a
finding on lying in wait. First, the People charged both Harmon and

2 Consistent with Delarosa’s testimony that J.R. fired a gun, a particle of
gunshot residue was found on J.R.’s left hand, although an expert testified
that the presence of the particle did not establish that J.R. discharged a
firearm, as it could have been deposited by other means.
3 Four bullets struck the car. One of those bullets lodged in the rubber
at the top of the front passenger window, and a second bullet lodged in the
right rear roof. A third bullet passed through the glass on the lowered front
passenger window, and a fourth bullet passed through the rubber at the base
of the front passenger window. Based on the physical evidence, a defense
expert agreed that there were at least four shots fired at the car, and possibly
five.
7
Delarosa in count 1 with murder in the first degree based on two alternative
theories: (1) the murder was committed with premeditation and deliberation;
or (2) the murder was committed by lying in wait. (§ 189, subd. (a).) Second,
the People alleged a special circumstance in connection with the murder,
namely, that the murder was committed by means of lying in wait. (§ 190.2,
subd. (a)(15).) The jury returned first degree murder verdicts in count 1,
without an indication of which theory of first degree murder the jurors had
selected, and the instructions did not require unanimity as to the theory. The
jury also made a unanimous true finding on the lying-in-wait special

circumstance.4
The lying-in-wait special circumstance requires “ ‘ “ ‘ “an intentional
murder, committed under circumstances which include (1) a concealment of
purpose, (2) a substantial period of watching and waiting for an opportune
time to act, and (3) . . . a surprise attack on an unsuspecting victim from a
position of advantage . . . .” ’ ” ’ [Citation] The lying-in-wait special
circumstance ( . . . § 190.2, subd. (a)(15)) includes the elements of first degree
lying-in-wait murder ( . . . § 189, subd. (a)), but requires the additional
element that the killing was intentional, not merely committed with implied
malice.” (People v. Flinner (2020) 10 Cal.5th 686, 748 (Flinner).) Therefore,
if the evidence is sufficient to support the special circumstance, “it
necessarily supports the theory of first degree lying-in-wait murder.” (Ibid.)
Because “the murderer who kills by lying in wait acts surreptitiously,

4 Under current law, the only difference in the legal requirements
between lying in wait for first degree murder and lying in wait for the special
circumstance in section 190.2, subd. (a)(15) is that “ ‘the lying-in-wait special
circumstance requires intent to kill, while lying-in-wait murder requires only
a wanton and reckless intent to inflict injury likely to cause death.’ ” (People
v. Nelson (2016) 1 Cal.5th 513, 549 (Nelson).)

8
concealing himself or his purpose and making a surprise attack on his victim
from a position of advantage, thereby denying the victim any chance of
escape, aid, or self-defense,” “a murder committed by lying in wait
historically has been viewed as ‘ “a particularly heinous and repugnant
crime.” ’ ” (People v. Johnson (2016) 62 Cal.4th 600, 636–637 (Johnson).)
Harmon and Delarosa contend that insufficient evidence supports a
finding in favor of the People on the elements of (1) a concealment of purpose;
and (2) a substantial period of watching and waiting for an opportune time to
act.
In assessing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we “ ‘ “ ‘must
review the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment below to
determine whether it discloses substantial evidence—that is, evidence which
is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—such that a reasonable trier of fact
could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” ’ [Citation] The
same standard applies when examining the sufficiency of the evidence
supporting a special circumstance finding. [Citation] ‘Substantial evidence
includes circumstantial evidence and any reasonable inferences drawn from
that evidence.’ ” (People v. Brooks (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1, 57.)
1. Concealment of Purpose
First, we examine whether sufficient evidence supports a finding of “a
concealment of purpose.” (Flinner, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 748.)
To support a finding of concealment of purpose, “ ‘ “ ‘[i]t is not required
that [a defendant] be literally concealed from view before he attacks the
victim.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Barrett (2025) 17 Cal.5th 897, 966–967.) “Rather, ‘[i]t
is sufficient that a defendant’s true intent and purpose were concealed by his
actions or conduct.” ’ [Citation.] The concealment, in that sense, “ ‘is that
which puts the defendant in a position of advantage, from which the

9
factfinder can infer that lying-in-wait was part of the defendant’s plan to take
the victim by surprise.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Duong (2020) 10 Cal.5th 36, 67
(Duong).) “[C]oncealment of purpose inhibits detection, defeats self-defense,
and may betray at least some level of trust, making it more blameworthy
than premeditated murder that does not involve surprise.” (People v. Stevens
(2007) 41 Cal.4th 182, 204.)
Here, Harmon and Delarosa were certainly visible to A.V. and J.R. as
they walked into the parking lot and toward A.V.’s car. However, two aspects
of their approach are sufficient to support a finding that Harmon and
Delarosa concealed their murderous purpose as they walked toward the car.
First, based on the surveillance videos and the testimony from law
enforcement, the evidence was sufficient for the jury to find that Harmon and
Delarosa were both wearing masks and had their hoods raised. From that
fact, the jury could reasonably infer that Harmon and Delarosa were
attempting to conceal their identities from A.V. so that they could get close to
A.V.’s car without raising a concern in their victims that they intended to
initiate the fight that A.V. expected to have with Delarosa. Because A.V. was
expecting a fight with Delarosa, Harmon and Delarosa’s attempt to conceal
their identities by use of a mask is the functional equivalent of attempting to
conceal their hostile purpose in approaching A.V.’s car. (See People v. Hyde
(1985) 166 Cal.App.3d 463, 476 [“Concealment by disguise is, in our view,
sufficient to support the giving of a ‘lying in wait’ instruction.”].) Delarosa
argues that because he had relationships with both victims, “[i]t is absurd to
believe that Delarosa could sneak up on [A.V.] by wearing a face mask.” The
argument posits a factual question for a jury, not a sufficiency of the evidence
question for our review on appeal. As we assess the evidence, a reasonable

10
juror could conclude that Harmon and Delarosa were at least attempting to
conceal their identities, as they approached, by wearing masks and hoods.
Second, regardless of whether they were trying to conceal their
identities, the surveillance video supports a finding that Harmon and
Delarosa entered the parking lot and walked in the direction of A.V.’s car in a
manner that concealed their true murderous purpose. Specifically, Harmon
and Delarosa are shown walking with their heads down and at a normal pace
on the sidewalk that eventually passes along the end of the parking space
where A.V.’s car was backed in. Their path of travel would have taken them
behind the rear of A.V.’s car, not toward the front of the car where A.V. and
J.R. were sitting inside. That path of travel would give the impression that
Harmon and Delarosa intended to pass behind A.V.’s car without incident.
Conduct that gives the false impression of a non-threatening situation can
satisfy the concealment of purpose requirement. (See Duong, supra,
10 Cal.5th at p. 67 [“[t]here was sufficient evidence of concealed purpose”
when the defendant, who had been involved in a verbal altercation with the
victim in a nightclub, sat back down at his table and waited for 10 to 15
minutes after getting back up, approaching the victim from behind, and
shooting him]; People v. Mendoza (2011) 52 Cal.4th 1056, 1074 [concealment
of purpose was shown when a defendant, who was detained by a police
officer, moved closer to the officer and shot him while the officer was patting
down another detainee, in that the defendant “managed to conceal his
murderous purpose so well that he took the officer completely by surprise
when he fired the single deadly shot at close range”].)
Further, Harmon’s gun was not visible as he approached. Harmon’s
hiding of his weapon while he approached also supports a finding that he
concealed his purpose, as it allowed him to walk within close range without

11
alerting his victims that he intended to shoot them. (See People v. Woodruff
(2018) 5 Cal.5th 697, 775 [evidence that the “defendant moved the gun
behind his back,” so that it could not be seen, supported a finding that the
defendant’s “ ‘true intent and purpose were concealed by his actions’ ”]; People
v. Cage (2015) 62 Cal.4th 256, 279 [evidence that the defendant “hid his
shotgun in a laundry basket” that contained clothes supported an inference
that “defendant planned and undertook a deliberate subterfuge aimed at
making his presence appear to be . . . innocuous” and that he “disguised his
intent to kill”]; People v. Tuthill (1947) 31 Cal.2d 92, 101 [lying in wait was
present when the defendant concealed his gun under his body while lying in
bed and waiting for the victim].)
Accordingly, the evidence supports a finding that Harmon and Delarosa
approached A.V.’s car in a manner that minimized the chance of drawing any
attention to themselves or raising a suspicion that they intended to commit a
shooting. By the manner in which they approached, Harmon and Delarosa’s
“ ‘ “ ‘true intent and purpose were concealed by [their] actions or conduct,’ ” ’ ”
which the jury could reasonably conclude was “ ‘ “ ‘part of [their] plan to take
the victim[s] by surprise.’ ” ’ ” (Duong, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 67.)
Accordingly the concealment of purpose finding is supported by substantial
evidence.
2. Watching and Waiting
We next examine whether sufficient evidence supports a finding of “a
substantial period of watching and waiting for an opportune time to act.”
(Flinner, supra, 10 Cal.5th 686, 748.)
“[T]he purpose of the watching and waiting element ‘ “ ‘is to distinguish
those cases in which a defendant acts insidiously from those in which he acts
out of rash impulse.’ ” ’ ” (Flinner, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 749.) “ ‘[T]he lying-

12
in-wait special circumstance requires no fixed, quantitative minimum time,
but the lying in wait must continue for long enough to premeditate and
deliberate, conceal one’s purpose, and wait and watch for an opportune
moment to attack.’ ” (People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522, 629.) To
distinguish the circumstance from ordinary premeditation and deliberation, a
“distinct period of watchful waiting” is required. (Nelson, supra, 1 Cal.5th at
p. 551.) “ ‘Watchful’ does not require actual watching; it can include being
‘alert and vigilant’ in anticipation of the victim’s arrival to take him or her by
surprise.” (People v. Streeter (2012) 54 Cal.4th 205, 247.)
According to Harmon, “there is no evidence” that he and Delarosa
“watched and waited for any period of time to find an opportune moment to
strike,” and that accordingly, the evidence does not prove any such activity
for a period of “substantial duration.” As we will explain, we agree.
The surveillance camera footage establishes that 26 minutes elapsed
between when Harmon and Delarosa (1) saw A.V.’s car in the parking lot as
they drove through in their friend’s car, and (2) walked into the parking lot
and committed the shooting. At trial, there was conflicting evidence about
what Harmon and Delarosa may have been doing during those 26 minutes.
Delarosa testified that he and Harmon spent 26 minutes with their
friend, at the school, smoking marijuana in the friend’s car, after which they
walked directly to the park. If the jury credited that testimony, Harmon and
Delarosa would not have been waiting and watching during the 26 minutes
because they would have been at the school, away from the park, and doing
something else.
In contrast, the friend who drove Harmon and Delarosa through the
parking lot provided a different account of the 26 minutes. According to the
friend’s testimony, he dropped off Harmon and Delarosa a short distance

13
away, near the school, immediately after exiting the parking lot, at the
beginning of the 26 minutes. He then saw Harmon and Delarosa walk back
toward the parking lot. The friend drove home, and “minutes” later, at his
house, he heard a sound like fireworks or gunshots coming from the scene of

the shooting.5 If the jury credited the friend’s testimony, there is a gap in the
evidence about what occurred in the 26 minutes after Harmon and Delarosa
were dropped off near the school.
Although one could speculate that Harmon and Delarosa spent some or
all of the 26 minutes surreptitiously watching A.V. and J.R. to determine the
right time to launch an attack, that conclusion would be based on nothing
more than conjecture. “ ‘[A] reasonable inference . . . ‘may not be based on
suspicion alone, or on imagination, speculation, supposition, surmise,
conjecture, or guess work.” ’ ” (People v. Ware (2022) 14 Cal.5th 151, 167.)
Indeed, nothing about the nature of the attack suggested that Harmon and
Delarosa watched and waited until A.V. and J.R. were in a more vulnerable
position. On the contrary, A.V. and J.R. stayed put, inside the parked car,
during the entire 26 minutes and were still in the same position when
Harmon and Delarosa walked into the parking lot and shot at them. In the
absence of any basis to infer that Harmon and Delarosa spent some or all of
the 26 minutes observing their victims and waiting for the right time to
attack, it is just as likely that they spent the time doing something else. For

5 Contrary to his trial testimony, when the friend was interviewed by law
enforcement, he described events similar to those described by Delarosa.
Specifically, the friend told law enforcement that he, Harmon and Delarosa
“bought the marijuana at the dispensary in Perris, smoked marijuana at the
park near the dispensary in Perris, and then drove back to the elementary
school next to [the park where the shooting occurred] and smoked marijuana
again.”

14
example, even if Harmon and Delarosa did not spend the time smoking
marijuana at the school as Delarosa testified, they could just as plausibly
have spent the time away from the park discussing whether to engage in a
shooting, or going somewhere to procure the firearm or masks they used
during the shooting. Although those activities may support a finding of
premeditation, they do not constitute watching and waiting for an opportune
time to act. (See Nelson, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 552 [“the fact that there was
substantial evidence of premeditation and deliberation does not necessarily
mean there was substantial evidence of watching and waiting for an
opportune time to act.”].)
The instant case is similar to Nelson, supra, 1 Cal.5th 513, in which our
Supreme Court determined that, in the absence of evidence regarding the
defendant’s movements before he approached the victims and shot them, the
evidence was insufficient to support a finding of watching and waiting. In
Nelson, the defendant “rode his bicycle to the area near the . . . parking lot,
where he had reason to believe the victims would be waiting to go to work.
He concealed his bicycle and came up behind his victims on foot to take them
by surprise,” after which he then shot them. (Id. at p. 551.) Our Supreme
Court explained that there was “no factual basis for an inference that before
approaching the victims, [the defendant] had concealed his bicycle and waited
for a time when they would be vulnerable to surprise attack. The jury was
presented with no evidence from which it could have chosen, beyond a
reasonable doubt, that scenario over one in which defendant arrived after the
victims, dismounted from his bicycle, and attacked them from behind without
any distinct period of watchful waiting.” (Ibid.) The same analysis applies
here. Because it is not known what occurred during the 26 minutes before
the shooting, the jury was presented with no evidence from which it could

15
have chosen, beyond a reasonable doubt, a scenario in which Harmon and
Delarosa waited and watched for an opportune time to attack before walking
into the park and shooting their victims. Without more, the fact that
Harmon and Delarosa drove through the park and confirmed the presence of
their victims 26 minutes before the attack, does not support a reasonable
inference that Harmon and Delarosa spent any of the next 26 minutes in the
activity of watchful waiting.
Accordingly, we conclude that one of the elements of lying in wait,
namely, “a substantial period of watching and waiting for an opportune time
to act” (Flinner, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 748), is not supported by substantial
evidence. The true findings on the lying-in-wait special circumstance must
therefore be reversed, and lying in wait cannot serve as the basis for the first
degree murder convictions in count 1.
B. Due to the Theory of Premeditation and Deliberation, the First Degree
Murder Convictions May Be Affirmed Despite the Lack of Substantial
Evidence to Support Lying in Wait
Having concluded that insufficient evidence supports a finding of lying
in wait, we next consider whether that conclusion requires the reversal of the
first degree murder convictions in count 1. As we have explained, the jury
was instructed that it could return a verdict of first degree murder based on
two alternative theories: (1) the murder was committed with premeditation
and deliberation; or (2) the murder was committed by lying in wait.
“A first degree murder verdict will be upheld if there is sufficient
evidence as to at least one of the theories on which the jury is instructed,
‘absent an affirmative indication in the record that the verdict actually did
rest on the inadequate ground.’ ” (Nelson, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 552
[affirming first degree murder based on sufficient evidence of premeditation
and deliberation despite insufficient evidence to support lying in wait].)

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“[T]he appellate court should affirm the judgment unless a review of the
entire record affirmatively demonstrates a reasonable probability that the
jury in fact found the defendant guilty solely on the unsupported theory.”
(People v. Guiton (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1116, 1130 (Guiton), italics added.) In
making that determination, we examine “the entire record . . . , including the
facts and the instructions, the arguments of counsel, any communications
from the jury during deliberations, and the entire verdict.” (Ibid.)
Here, neither Harmon nor Delarosa challenge the sufficiency of the
evidence to support a finding of premeditation and deliberation. Thus, our
inquiry is whether there is a reasonable probability that the jury returned a
verdict of first degree murder based “solely” on lying in wait, rather than also
on premeditation and deliberation. (Guiton, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 1130,
italics added.) The jury’s express findings in connection with the attempted
murder in count 2 preclude any reasonable probability the jury relied solely
on lying in wait as the theory for first degree murder.
Specifically, the jury returned verdicts in count 2 which expressly
stated they found “the attempted murder WAS premeditated and deliberate.”
Based on the undisputed evidence at trial, the murder of J.R. and the
attempted murder of A.V. were both caused by Harmon’s act of
indiscriminately shooting a series of bullets, from a distance, into the car
where the two victims sat together in close proximity. The evidence supports
no other conclusion than that it was only a matter of chance that one of the
bullets fatally injured J.R. by hitting him in the head and another of the
bullets nonfatally injured A.V. by hitting him in the right arm. Accordingly,
if the jury found that the act of shooting A.V. in the right arm amounted to
attempted murder because it was committed with premeditation and
deliberation, they also would have specifically found, if asked, that the

17
murder of J.R. by shooting him in the head inside the same car, at the same
time, was also premeditated and deliberate.
We therefore affirm the first degree murder conviction despite our
conclusion that the theory of lying in wait was not supported by substantial

evidence.6
C. Appellants’ Contention That the Trial Court Erred in Refusing to
Instruct on Imperfect Self-Defense as a Basis for Voluntary
Manslaughter Verdicts in Both Counts
Harmon and Delarosa next contend that the trial court prejudicially
erred in refusing to instruct the jury that it could reach a verdict of voluntary
manslaughter in count 1 and attempted voluntary manslaughter in count 2 if
it found that the defendants acted in imperfect self-defense.
1. The Trial Court Erred in Not Instructing on Imperfect Self-
Defense
“Imperfect self-defense, which reduces murder to voluntary
manslaughter, arises when a defendant acts in the actual but unreasonable
belief that he is in imminent danger of death or great bodily injury.” (People
v. Duff (2014) 58 Cal.4th 527, 561.) “Under the doctrine of imperfect self-
defense . . . ‘[i]f a person kills . . . in the unreasonable but good faith belief in
having to act in self-defense, the belief negates what would otherwise be
malice, and that person is guilty of voluntary manslaughter . . . , not
murder.’ ” (Schuller, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 243; see also People v. Rios
(2000) 23 Cal.4th 450, 461 [the mitigating circumstance of imperfect self-

6 As to the first degree murder convictions in count 1, Harmon and
Delarosa additionally argue that those convictions should be reversed due to
an instructional error that inadvertently omitted part of the instruction on
lying in wait as a theory of first degree murder. Because we are affirming the
convictions in count 1 based on premeditation and deliberation rather than
based on lying in wait, we need not, and do not, address that instructional
error.
18
defense serves to “reduce an intentional, unlawful killing from murder to
voluntary manslaughter ‘by negating the element of malice that otherwise
inheres in such a homicide.’ ”].) “[I]mperfect self-defense, ‘obviates malice
because that most culpable of mental states ‘cannot coexist’ with an actual
belief that the lethal act was necessary to avoid one’s own death or serious
injury at the victim’s hand.’ ” (Schuller, at p. 252.) “[U]nreasonable self-
defense “is based on a defendant’s assertion that he lacked malice . . . because
he acted under an unreasonable mistake of fact—that is, the need to defend
himself against imminent peril of death or great bodily harm.” (People v.
Elmore (2014) 59 Cal.4th 121, 136.)
“Imperfect self-defense differs from complete self-defense, which
requires not only an honest but also a reasonable belief of the need to defend
oneself.” (People v. Simon (2016) 1 Cal.5th 98, 132 (Simon), italics added.)
“To constitute ‘perfect self-defense,’ i.e., to exonerate the person completely,
the belief [in the need to defend with deadly force] must . . . be objectively
reasonable.” (People v. Humphrey (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1073, 1082.)
CALCRIM No. 571 describes the requirements for imperfect self-
defense as follows: “The defendant acted in (imperfect self-defense/ [or]
imperfect defense of another) if: [¶] 1. The defendant actually believed that
(he/she/ [or] someone else/ <insert name of third party>) was in imminent
danger of being killed or suffering great bodily injury; [¶] AND [¶] 2. The
defendant actually believed that the immediate use of deadly force was
necessary to defend against the danger; [¶] BUT 3. At least one of those
beliefs was unreasonable.” (CALCRIM No. 571.)
Here, the trial court instructed the jury on complete self-defense, but
both Harmon and Delarosa requested that the trial court also instruct the
jury on the lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter based on

19
imperfect self-defense.7 The trial court refused to instruct on imperfect self-
defense, explaining that the evidence supported only an instruction for
complete self-defense. As the trial court explained, “what I looked at is you
only have one act here as to the basis for a voluntary manslaughter theory,
and that is that [J.R.] popped up with a gun and fired the gun. I did not
believe that there was any evidence that would support this because it’s
based on the facts and the evidence that we have in this case. Mr. Harmon, if
the jury believes Mr. Delarosa’s recitation of the facts, would be acting
reasonabl[y] in his defense of others and defense of himself. There [were] no
other acts or anything else the jury could consider. So I did not believe that
imperfect self-defense was an appropriate instruction to give.”
The trial court was required to instruct on imperfect self-defense “if
there [was] substantial evidence to support the theory.” (Schuller, supra,
15 Cal.5th at p. 253.) “Substantial evidence is evidence from which a jury
could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the lesser offense [of voluntary
manslaughter] was committed,” but does not include evidence that is
“[s]peculative, minimal, or insubstantial.” (Simon, supra, 1 Cal.5th at
p. 132.) “We review de novo a trial court’s decision not to give an imperfect
self-defense instruction.” (Id. at p. 133.)
Harmon, in an argument joined by Delarosa, argues that the trial court
erred in refusing to instruct on imperfect self-defense because there are two
scenarios under which the jury could have found that Harmon shot at J.R.
and A.V. in an actual but unreasonable belief that he needed to do so to

7 The discussion in the trial court did not focus on the attempted murder
count. However, if an imperfect self-defense instruction was warranted for
the murder count, it would also be warranted for the attempted murder
count, just as the trial court instructed on complete self-defense as to both
counts.

20
defend himself. In the first scenario, the jury could have found that Harmon
saw J.R. pull out a gun but mistakenly believed that J.R. fired the gun, in
which case Harmon’s belief in the need to defend himself would have been
unreasonable and based on a mistake of fact. In the second scenario, the jury
could have found that J.R. did fire a gun (as Delarosa testified), but that
because J.R. fired only a single shot, after which A.V. immediately started to
drive away, it was unreasonable for Harmon to believe that, to defend
himself, he was required to run toward A.V.’s moving car and continue to fire
shots at it as shown in the surveillance video.
We are persuaded that a reasonable jury could interpret the facts to

support the second scenario described by Harmon.8 The evidentiary support
for that scenario was highlighted in a portion of the prosecutor’s own closing
argument to the jury on the issue of complete self-defense, as follows:
“The other thing that you learn about self-defense is that
you cannot use any more force than is reasonably necessary. So
say we believe Isaac Delarosa, and [J.R.] fired off one shot. Let’s
remember what his positioning was. So he described how he was
sitting in the passenger seat of the car, and remember
[Harmon’s] coming up from behind him. . . . [J.R.] has the gun
here, and [Delarosa] said [J.R.] turned like this and fired. [¶]
This was his exact position. It’s not going back to where [J.R.
and Harmon are] at. It’s going over this way.
“So what is this imminent [danger]? According to Mr.
Delarosa, there’s only that one shot [by J.R.]. So Mr. Harmon
fires off two. The car starts to move away. At this point, the car
is leaving. The threat is over. No more shots are being fired.
Mr. Harmon follows that car and fires at least three more.

8 Because we rely on the second scenario to conclude that the evidence
supports an imperfect self-defense instruction, we need not, and do not,
consider whether the evidence also would support a finding of imperfect self-
defense based on the first scenario posited by Harmon, i.e., that J.R. pulled
out a gun but did not shoot it. Relevant to that issue, however, is Delarosa’s
testimony that he actually saw a flash coming from the muzzle of J.R.’s gun.
21
“So is this more force than would be reasonably necessary?
If you believe that he acted in self-defense, it’s a complete
acquittal. He’s not culpable at all for the murder. So that would
be the end of it. That would be the end of your analysis, because
self-defense is considered to be a perfect defense, and that is why
the requirements are so incredibly strict.
“And you notice it all relies on reasonable. And it’s what
would a reasonable person do in this same situation? Would a
reasonable person do the same thing Mr. Harmon did? If that’s
true, then he gets self-defense. But you have to use not what Mr.
Harmon thinks is reasonable, [but] what you all think is
reasonable.”

As we have explained, the requirements of imperfect self-defense would
be satisfied if Harmon actually believed he was in imminent danger of being
killed or suffering great bodily injury and that deadly force was necessary to
defend against that danger, but at least one of those beliefs was
unreasonable. (CALCRIM No. 571.) That is exactly the scenario described
by the prosecutor’s closing argument. If, as Delarosa testified, J.R. fired a
gun at Harmon, and Harmon reacted by immediately returning fire in self-
defense, it might be reasonable to take the first shots, but after A.V. started
to drive away and J.R. did not fire any more shots, a jury could find that
Harmon overreacted, in an unreasonable manner, by running toward A.V.’s
car and continuing to shoot at it. As the prosecutor argued, at that point, a
reasonable person in Harmon’s position might have concluded that the
danger had subsided and that the continued use of deadly force was
unnecessary.
In their respondent’s brief, the People acknowledge the scenario
described in the prosecutor’s closing argument, but they attempt to distance
themselves from it. Contrary to what the prosecutor argued to the jury, the
People contend that if J.R. did shoot at Harmon first as Delarosa testified, no
rational jury could have found that Harmon acted unreasonably in shooting
22
four or five shots at J.R. in response. Specifically, stressing that the entire
shooting occurred over the course of no more than a few seconds, the People
contend that “the shots were all fired in a quick burst,” and “if Harmon had
indeed been ambushed and shot at, it would not have been unreasonable for
him to return fire for the next two seconds.” (Italics added.)
The argument is belied by the actual facts of the shooting. The
surveillance video shows that A.V.’s car started to drive away shortly after
the incident began. As described in Delarosa’s testimony, J.R. fired only one
shot, which was before A.V. started to drive in a direction away from Harmon.
In response, after shooting two or three shots at the car, Harmon ran towards
the car and continued to shoot. Although the incident was brief, there was
time enough for Harmon to run forward, reposition himself, take aim, and
fire two more shots. Therefore, the People are not correct in representing
that “the shots were all fired in a quick burst.” A rational jury could find that
it was unreasonable for Harmon to run toward the fleeing car, take aim
again, and continue to use deadly force after J.R. ceased shooting and A.V.
started to drive away.
Therefore, based on the second scenario posited in Harmon’s briefing,
we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support an instruction on
imperfect self-defense. The trial court erred in refusing Harmon’s and
Delarosa’s request for such an instruction.
2. The Error Was Not Prejudicial
Having concluded that the trial court erred, we must determine
whether the error was prejudicial. “[W]hen the record contains substantial
evidence of imperfect self-defense, the trial court’s failure to instruct on that
theory amounts to constitutional error and is thus subject to review under
the federal Chapman standard.” (Schuller, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 243, citing

23
Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24.) Constitutional error is
implicated because “a trial court’s failure to instruct on imperfect self-defense
amounts to an incomplete instruction on the malice element of murder.”
(Schuller, at p. 254.) Under the Chapman standard, reversal is required
“unless it appears ‘ “beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of
did not contribute to the verdict obtained.” ’ ” (Schuller, at p. 261.)
Our Supreme Court has stated that where, as here, the instructional
error involves the omission of an imperfect self-defense instruction, “ ‘the
[harmless error] test is exacting.’ ” (Schuller, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 261.)
Specifically, the error is harmless only if “no ‘rational juror who made the
findings reflected in the verdict and heard the evidence at trial could have
had reasonable doubt regarding the findings necessary to convict the
defendant [absent the instructional error].” (Id. at p. 244.) As we will
explain, the jury’s findings on certain elements of the lying-in-wait special
circumstance establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the jury would not
have found imperfect self-defense if it had been instructed on that theory.
As the jury was instructed pursuant to CALCRIM No. 728, to make a
true finding on the lying-in-wait special circumstance, it was required to find
the following, in addition to an intent to kill:
“1. [The defendant] concealed his or her purpose from the person
killed;
“2. [The defendant] waited and watched for an opportunity to
act;
“3. Then [the defendant] made a surprise attack on the person
killed from a position of advantage;
“AND
“4. [The defendant] intended to kill the person by taking the
person by surprise.

24
“The lying in wait does not need to continue for any particular
period of time, but its duration must be substantial and must
show a state of mind equivalent to deliberation or premeditation.”

Although, as we have discussed above, insufficient evidence supports a
finding on the second element of lying in wait, namely that Harmon and
Delarosa “waited and watched for an opportunity to act,” Harmon and
Delarosa have not established any failure of proof for the remaining elements
of lying in wait. Therefore, we look to the jury’s findings on those remaining
elements in conducting our harmless error analysis. (See Schuller, supra,
15 Cal.5th at p. 244 [describing a harmless error analysis based on “the
findings reflected in the verdict”].)
To conclude that a defendant acted in imperfect self-defense, a jury is
required to find as follows: “1. The defendant actually believed that (he/she/
[or] someone else/ <insert name of third party>) was in imminent danger of
being killed or suffering great bodily injury; [¶] AND [¶] 2. The defendant
actually believed that the immediate use of deadly force was necessary to
defend against the danger; [¶] BUT 3. At least one of those beliefs was
unreasonable.” (CALCRIM No. 571.) Under the theory of imperfect self-
defense described by Harmon and Delarosa, Harmon approached A.V.’s car
without an intention to shoot at it, but his intent changed when he saw J.R.
point or shoot a gun at him. Under that scenario, when J.R. drew or shot his
gun, Harmon could have perceived imminent danger, which Harmon believed
he needed to defend against by using deadly force.
However, in finding the elements of lying in wait satisfied, the jury
rejected the scenario advanced by Harmon in support of the instruction on
imperfect self-defense. As shown by their true finding on the lying-in-wait
special circumstance, the jury necessarily found that Harmon and Delarosa
intentionally killed J.R. by “ma[king] a surprise attack on [J.R.] from a

25
position of advantage” while “taking [J.R.] by surprise” and “conceal[ing]
[their] purpose from [J.R.].” (CALCRIM No. 728.) Having made those
findings, the jury could not have found an imperfect self-defense scenario in
which Harmon and Delarosa used deadly force against J.R. because they
unreasonably believed that doing so was necessary to defend themselves

against imminent danger when they saw J.R. use his gun.9
Consistent with our analysis, in People v. Cruz (2008) 44 Cal.4th 636
our Supreme Court held that a jury’s true finding on a lying-in-wait special
circumstance “negate[d] any possibility that defendant was prejudiced from
the failure to instruct on . . . unreasonable self-defense theories of
manslaughter.” (Id. at p. 665.) As Harmon points out, the facts of Cruz differ
from this case, as the jury there additionally found true a second special
circumstance of murder for the purpose of perfecting or attempting to perfect
escape from lawful custody (Cruz, at p. 643, citing § 190.2, subd. (a)(5)), and
our Supreme Court referred collectively to the two special circumstance
findings when stating that “[t]hese special circumstance findings themselves
negate any possibility that defendant was prejudiced.” (Cruz, at p. 665.)
Nevertheless, we regard Cruz as precedent that is, at the least, consistent
with our conclusion that the jury’s findings on the elements of the lying-in-

9 Although we have noted the jury’s finding that Harmon and Delarosa
intended to kill, the intent-to-kill finding, standing alone, is not necessarily
inconsistent with imperfect self-defense. “ ‘A finding of malice may be
precluded, and the offense limited to manslaughter, even when an unlawful
homicide was committed with intent to kill’ . . . when a person kills ‘ “ ‘ . . . in
“unreasonable self-defense”—the unreasonable but good faith belief in having
to act in self-defense.’ ” ’ ” (Schuller, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 252, citations
omitted.) However, when combined with the other elements of the lying-in-
wait special circumstance found by the jury and supported by substantial
evidence, the finding of intent contributes to our conclusion that the jury’s
verdict establishes it would not have found imperfect self-defense had it been
properly instructed.
26
wait special circumstance render harmless the trial court’s error in failing to

instruct on imperfect self-defense.10
Further, although the lying-in-wait special circumstance applied only
to the murder of J.R. in count 1, whereas the instruction on imperfect self-
defense should have been given as to both the murder count (count 1) and the
attempted murder count (count 2), we nevertheless rely on the jury’s findings
for the lying-in-wait special circumstance finding to conclude that the failure
to instruct on imperfect self-defense was harmless as to both count 1 and
count 2. The shooting here consisted of a series of gunshots into a vehicle
where both J.R. and A.V. were sitting. Because of the physical proximity of
the two victims, who sat next to each other in the car that Harmon shot into,
there is no factual basis for a jury to have concluded that Harmon and
Delarosa planned to murder by lying in wait only as to J.R., but not as to A.V.
Therefore, we conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury’s true finding
on the elements of lying in wait with respect to J.R.’s murder inescapably
leads to the conclusion that the jury would have rejected imperfect self-
defense both as to the murder of J.R. and the attempted murder of A.V., had
it been instructed on that theory.

10 In his concurrence in Schuller, Justice Liu expressed the view that a
finding of first degree murder based on premeditation and deliberation is not
inconsistent with a finding of imperfect self-defense. (Schuller, supra,
15 Cal.5th at p. 265 (conc. opn. of Liu, J.).) Although we need not, and do not,
take a position on that issue, we note that a finding of lying in wait includes
elements beyond premeditation and deliberation, even though there is some
overlap. (People v. Sandoval (2015) 62 Cal.4th 394, 416 [“ ‘an intentional
murder, committed under circumstances which include (1) a concealment of
purpose, (2) a substantial period of watching and waiting for an opportune
time to act, and (3) immediately thereafter, a surprise attack on an
unsuspecting victim from a position of advantage, presents a factual matrix
sufficiently distinct from “ordinary” premeditated murder to justify treating
it as a special circumstance’ ”].)
27
In sum, based on the jury’s findings on the elements of the lying-in-wait
special circumstance that were supported by substantial evidence, we
conclude that the trial court’s error in failing to instruct on voluntary
manslaughter based on imperfect self-defense was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt for both count 1 and count 2.
D. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Admitting Evidence That Delarosa
Possessed a Gun Three Weeks Prior to the Shooting
Finally, we consider Delarosa’s contention that the trial court erred in
allowing the People to present evidence that, three weeks before the shooting,
he possessed a gun.
On January 19, 2020, Delarosa sent a message to his girlfriend using
Facebook. The message stated, “I heard random ass people fighting [right
now], babe[,] and I thought they were outside of my house[.] I went outside
with my gun [and] everything.” Counsel for Delarosa filed an in limine
motion arguing that the message should be excluded, either because it was
irrelevant or because it was unduly prejudicial under Evidence Code section
352. During an in limine hearing, counsel additionally argued that the
Facebook message constituted improper character evidence. In opposition,
the prosecutor argued that because the crimes were committed with a gun, it
was relevant that Delarosa possessed a gun prior to the shooting, even if he
was not the shooter. More specifically, the prosecutor explained that
Delarosa’s possession of a gun was relevant because “Mr. Harmon, if he takes
the stand, will tell the jury he got the gun from Mr. Delarosa. I have to prove
that he is an aider and abettor to the crime. So if I can prove that he had a
gun on January 19th, 2020, then a gun is used to kill the person that he
actually has the beef with, or to shoot at the person he has the beef with, I
think that’s highly probative.”

28
The trial court ruled that it would allow the People to introduce the
Facebook message into evidence. The trial court explained that evidence of
Delarosa’s gun possession was relevant to the issues presented at trial, and
the Facebook message was not unduly prejudicial under Evidence Code
section 352.
During trial, the People introduced evidence of the Facebook message
through the testimony of a law enforcement investigator. When Delarosa
testified, he stated that when he sent the Facebook message to his girlfriend,
he was lying about having a gun because he was “trying to act like a tough
guy.” Harmon elected not to testify, and no evidence was presented that
Delarosa gave Harmon the gun used in the shooting.
“ ‘We review claims regarding a trial court’s ruling on the admissibility
of evidence for abuse of discretion.’ ” (People v. Henriquez (2017) 4 Cal.5th 1,
31.) “ ‘ “Under the abuse of discretion standard, ‘a trial court’s ruling will not
be disturbed, and reversal . . . is not required, unless the trial court exercised
its discretion in an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd manner that
resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Chhoun (2021)
11 Cal.5th 1, 26.) “If a judgment rests on admissible evidence it will not be
reversed because the trial court admitted that evidence upon a different
theory, a mistaken theory, or one not raised below.” (People v. Brown (2004)
33 Cal.4th 892, 901.) “[W]e review the trial court’s ruling, ‘not the court’s
reasoning and, if the ruling was correct on any ground, we affirm.’ ” (People
v. Camacho (2022) 14 Cal.5th 77, 123.)
Delarosa contends that the Facebook message should have been
excluded from evidence as “irrelevant because no evidence ties the murder
gun to any weapon possessed by Delarosa at any time.” Specifically, he
points out that no evidence was presented about the type of gun used in the

29
shooting, and it was unknown what type of gun Delarosa was referencing in
the Facebook message. Therefore, according to Delarosa, the Facebook
message “in no way supports an inference of supplying a weapon to Harmon
on the day of the shooting.”
1. The Facebook Message Was Relevant Evidence
We are not persuaded that the Facebook message was irrelevant to any
issue in the trial. Evidence Code section 210 defines relevant evidence as
“having any tendency in reason to prove or disprove any disputed fact that is
of consequence to the determination of the action.” (Id.) “The trial court has
broad discretion . . . in determining the relevance of evidence.” (People v.
Horning (2004) 34 Cal.4th 871, 900.) As the prosecutor explained at the in
limine hearing, evidence of Delarosa’s gun possession was relevant because
Harmon would testify that the gun used during the shooting came from
Delarosa. Although Harmon ultimately decided against testifying, “[i]n
determining whether the trial court abused its discretion” in admitting
evidence “we must focus on what the court was made aware of at the time it
ruled on the motion, not on evidence that came out or circumstances that
took place during the trial.” (People v. Fruits (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 188, 208
(Fruits).) Based on the prosecutor’s offer of proof that Harmon, if he testified,
would say Delarosa gave him the gun, evidence that Delarosa possessed a
gun three weeks before the shooting was relevant because it would help the
jury assess the credibility of Harmon’s statement that Delarosa gave him the
gun. (See People v. Abel (2012) 53 Cal.4th 891, 928 (Abel) [evidence that the
defendant possessed weapons was admissible when introduced “to
corroborate [a witness’s] testimony of having seen similar weapons in
defendant’s possession during the same general time period]; Evid. Code,
§ 210 [“ ‘Relevant evidence’ means evidence, including evidence relevant to

30
the credibility of a witness . . . .”].) In turn, establishing that Delarosa was
the source of the gun would be relevant to whether Delarosa acted as an
aider and abettor.
Delarosa argues that because there was no information about the type
of gun used in the shooting or the type of gun referenced in the Facebook
message, the only purpose of admitting evidence of the Facebook message
would be to support “speculative inferences of propensity.” The argument
lacks merit. The general rule is that “[e]vidence a defendant possessed
weapons that were not used to commit a crime is inadmissible to show the
defendant committed the crime.” (Abel, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 928, italics
added.) This is because “ ‘such evidence tends to show, not that [the
defendant] committed the crime, but only that he is the sort of person who
carries deadly weapons.’ ” (People v. Smith (2003) 30 Cal.4th 581, 613.)
However, “[w]hen the specific type of weapon used to commit a homicide is
not known, it may be permissible to admit into evidence weapons found in the
defendant’s possession . . . that could have been the weapons employed.
There need be no conclusive demonstration that the weapon in defendant’s
possession was the murder weapon.” (People v. Riser (1956) 47 Cal.2d 566,
577, italics added.) Here, the gun Delarosa mentioned in the Facebook
message could have been the gun used in the shooting. The evidence of
Delarosa’s gun possession was therefore relevant to an issue other than
Delarosa’s character, namely, to corroborate Harmon’s expected testimony
that Delarosa gave him a gun.
Because Delarosa’s gun could have been the weapon that Harmon used
in the shooting, one of the central cases upon which Delarosa relies,
McKinney v. Rees (9th Cir. 1993) 993 F.2d 1378, does not support his
argument, and, in fact, undermines it. In McKinney the defendant was

31
accused of using a knife (of an undetermined type) to commit a murder.
(Id. at p. 1381.) McKinney held that some of the evidence regarding the
defendant’s past knife possession was irrelevant and inadmissible as
improper character evidence, including evidence that the defendant
previously possessed a particular knife that he undisputedly no longer had
access to at the time of the murder. (Id. at pp. 1382–1383.) However, there
was one specific knife that, according to some of the testimony, the defendant
still possessed within seven weeks of the murder. (Id. at p. 1383.) McKinney
explained that because the jury could infer the defendant still had possession
of that knife at the time of the murder, the evidence regarding that knife was
relevant on an issue other than the defendant’s character because it made the
defendant’s “identity as the murderer[ ] more probable.” (Id. at p. 1384.)
Here, similar to McKinney, the jury could infer that Delarosa still had
possession of the gun that he referenced in the Facebook message only three
weeks before. Further, as was the case with the knife in McKinney, it was
possible that Delarosa’s gun was the same type of gun used in the shooting.
Therefore, based on the logic of McKinney, evidence of Delarosa’s gun
possession three weeks before the shooting was admissible because it tended
to prove that Delarosa acted as an aider and abettor by giving Harmon the
gun.
2. The Trial Court Did Not Err In Concluding That the Facebook
Message Was Not Unduly Prejudicial
Delarosa next argues that, based on Evidence Code section 352, the
trial court abused its discretion by admitting the Facebook message into
evidence.
Under Evidence Code section 352, “[t]he court in its discretion may
exclude evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the
probability that its admission will (a) necessitate undue consumption of time

32
or (b) create substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or
of misleading the jury.” (Evid. Code, § 352.) “ ‘Evidence is substantially more
prejudicial than probative . . . [only] if, broadly stated, it poses an intolerable
“risk to the fairness of the proceedings or the reliability of the outcome.” ’ ”
(People v. Tran (2011) 51 Cal.4th 1040, 1047.) “ ‘ “Prejudice,” as used in
Evidence Code section 352, is not synonymous with ‘damaging.’ [Citation.]
Rather, it refers to evidence that uniquely tends to evoke an emotional bias
against the defendant as an individual, and has little to do with the legal
issues raised in the trial.’ ” (People v. Miles (2020) 9 Cal.5th 513, 587.) The
prejudice that section 352 is designed to avoid is not the prejudice or damage
to a defense that naturally flows from relevant, highly probative evidence.
(People v. Baker (2021) 10 Cal.5th 1044, 1089.)
Delarosa contends that the Facebook message was prejudicial because
it suggested he “had a rather glib attitude toward gun violence.” Specifically,
Delarosa points out that the message was “followed by ‘certain emojis,’ ”
which could be interpreted as “suggesting he believed the conduct was funny
or cute.” The law enforcement investigator who testified described the emojis
as “a smiley face emoji and a devil horn emoji.” More specifically, the printed
Facebook message that was admitted into evidence shows a face-with-tears-
of-joy emoji and a smiling-face-with-horns emoji at the end of the message.
Delarosa’s reliance on the presence of the emojis is unavailing because,
as the record shows, the trial court was not aware of the emojis when it
considered whether the Facebook message should be excluded from evidence.
Attached to Delarosa’s motion in limine, as Exhibit B, was a printed version
of the Facebook message. However, due to the format of that message as it
appears in Exhibit B, the emojis were not shown. Instead, on Exhibit B,
instead of being followed by two emojis, the message is followed by four

33
closely-spaced rectangles. Neither the text of Delarosa’s in limine motion,
nor anything said during the in limine hearing would have informed the trial
court that the four rectangles represented two emojis.
When deciding whether a trial court abuses its discretion in making an
evidentiary ruling under Evidence Code section 352, we look to the
information available to the trial court at the time it ruled. (Fruits, supra,
247 Cal.App.4th at p. 208.) Here, based on what the trial court knew at the
time it ruled, because it was unaware of the emojis, the trial court had no
reason to conclude that the message suggested a “glib attitude toward gun
violence.”
Apart from the emojis, Delarosa does not identify any other potentially
inflammatory items in the Facebook message, and we do not perceive any.
Although Delarosa mentions a gun in the message, he does not state that he
plans to use the gun to perpetrate violence or commit a crime. He appears to
be indicating that he is taking his gun with him for protection as he goes
outside to investigate a fight. We therefore find no merit to Delarosa’s
contention that, due to its prejudicial nature, the trial court should have
excluded the Facebook message from evidence pursuant to Evidence Code
section 352.

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DISPOSITION
In count 1, as to both Harmon and Delarosa, we reverse the true
findings on the lying-in-wait special circumstance. In all other respects, we
affirm the judgment and remand for resentencing.

IRION, Acting P. J.

WE CONCUR:

DATO, J.

RUBIN, J.

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