People v. Monroe CA4/1

CourtListener 10738332Calctapp18 nov. 2025

Texte intégral

Filed 11/18/25 P. v. Monroe CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE, D085630

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v. (Super. Ct. No. SCD304279)

FELICIA MONROE,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Kimberlee A. Lagotta, Judge. Affirmed.
Sally Patrone, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Steve
Oetting and Paige B. Hazard, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
Felicia Monroe appeals from a conviction of misdemeanor petty theft,
contending the trial court erred by excluding evidence of the victim’s acts of
moral turpitude for purposes of impeachment. Resolving this matter by
memorandum opinion (see generally People v. Garcia (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th
847), we affirm.
I.
In July 2024, Monroe got into an altercation with Christina O. that
resulted in Monroe pulling Christina off her bicycle. As a result, Christina’s
two bottles of liquor and cell phone scattered on the ground. Monroe picked
up these items, placed them under the driver’s seat of her car parked across
the street, and locked the doors. Christina flagged down a police officer
driving by. After speaking with Christina and Monroe, the officer searched
the front driver’s side of Monroe’s car, where he found Christina’s cell phone
and the two liquor bottles. Monroe was arrested.
Before trial, Monroe moved to admit, for impeachment purposes,
evidence that Christina had a pending misdemeanor theft case and had failed
to appear for arraignment in that case. Monroe offered examples of
inconsistent statements Christina made to police officers regarding her
possession of an alleged stolen moped along with several photos of the moped
itself and the tools used to operate it without a key. The People argued that
admitting the evidence in the manner Monroe proposed would be like holding
a “theft trial within a theft trial” because it required “an outside witness,”
“additional officers,” and “photographs.” The trial court acknowledged the
pending misdemeanor charge and failure to appear were, if proven, acts of
moral turpitude and potentially relevant for the purpose of impeaching
Christina’s character for honesty. The court denied the motion, however,
finding the probative value of the evidence was substantially outweighed by
the undue consumption of time presenting it would require and the risk of
confusing the issues for the jury.

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After a jury found Monroe not guilty of robbery and guilty of the lesser
included offense of misdemeanor petty theft (Pen. Code, § 484), the trial court
sentenced Monroe to one year summary probation and five days of custody.
II.
Monroe argues the trial court erred in excluding evidence of Christina’s
pending case for misdemeanor receiving a stolen vehicle—the moped—and
her failure to appear in that action because these acts of moral turpitude are
relevant to impeach Christina’s character for honesty or veracity and their
relevance is not substantially outweighed by other considerations. We
disagree.
A.
Under Evidence Code section 780, a court or jury may consider a
witness’s “character for honesty or veracity” when assessing the witness’s
credibility. “[S]pecific instances of [the witness’s] conduct” are admissible to
“support or attack the credibility of a witness.” (Evid. Code, § 1101(a) & (c).)
Misdemeanors with “some logical bearing upon the veracity of a witness in a
criminal proceeding . . . [are] admissible, subject to trial court discretion, as
‘relevant’ evidence.” (People v. Wheeler (1992) 4 Cal.4th 284, 295.)
Even relevant evidence, however, may be excluded “if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission will
(a) necessitate undue consumption of time or (b) create substantial danger of
undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury.” (Evid.
Code, § 352.) Impeachment evidence “other than felony convictions entails
problems of proof, unfair surprise, and moral turpitude evaluation” that
require a court to pay particular attention to balancing the considerations of
section 352. (Wheeler, 4 Cal.4th at p. 296.)

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We review evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion. (People v.
Mataele (2022) 13 Cal.5th 372, 413.) It is a defendant’s burden to show “the
trial court exercised its discretion in an arbitrary, capricious, or patently
absurd manner that resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice.” (People v.
Bryant, Smith and Wheeler (2014) 60 Cal.4th 335, 390 [cleaned up].)
B.
We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying
Monroe’s motion in limine to admit evidence of Christina’s pending
misdemeanor charge.
To support her claim of error, Monroe relies on Wheeler. There, the
prosecution sought to impeach a defense witness with a misdemeanor
conviction for grand theft. Defense counsel objected, the court overruled the
objection, and the witness admitted the conviction. (Wheeler, 4 Cal.4th at
p. 288-289.) On appeal, the defendant claimed that misdemeanor conduct
was inherently more prejudicial than probative and therefore must always be
excluded as evidence of a witness’s credibility. (Id. at p. 295.) Wheeler
discerned no statutory basis for a blanket exclusion of misdemeanor
convictions but reiterated that “the latitude section 352 allows for exclusion
of impeachment evidence . . . is broad.” (Id. at p. 296.) Wheeler concluded the
trial court had not abused its discretion under section 352 in admitting the
witness’s conviction for a misdemeanor involving moral turpitude as evidence
of the witness’s credibility. (Id. at p. 297.)
Wheeler is distinguishable. In Wheeler, the witness was convicted of a
misdemeanor crime of moral turpitude, but here, Christina was only charged.
And, unlike in Wheeler, admitting the evidence in the instant case would
have required—as the parties argued below—testimony from various
witnesses regarding a separate, unrelated case of theft by someone other

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than the defendant resulting in, as the trial court concluded, “a trial within a
trial.”
Paying particular attention to the consumption of time and possibility
of confusing the jury, the trial court heard arguments on the motion from
both sides before balancing the probative value of Christina’s pending
charges for crimes involving moral turpitude—which it found “tangential”—
against the section 352 factors justifying exclusion. We cannot conclude on
this record that the trial court acted in an “‘“arbitrary, capricious, or patently
absurd”’” manner in doing so. (Bryant, 60 Cal.4th at p. 390.)
C.
We likewise determine the trial court exercised sound judicial
discretion in denying Monroe’s motion in limine to admit evidence of
Christina’s failure to appear for arraignment in the misdemeanor case.
Any person charged with a misdemeanor and released from custody on
their own recognizance is guilty of a misdemeanor if they “willfully” fail to
appear in court as ordered. (Pen. Code § 1320.) “The word willfully when
used in a criminal statute implies that the person knows what he [or she] is
doing and intends to do what he [or she] is doing.” (People v. Lee (1991)
229 Cal.App.3d 1504, 1508.)
Monroe contends that a similar factual issue was addressed in People v.
Maestas (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 1552, where a witness’s felony conviction for
failure to appear was properly admitted for the purpose of impeachment. (Id.
at p. 1557.) The People argue the facts of Maestas are distinguishable from
the instant case. We agree with the People.
Indeed, Maestas contrasted its facts with those of People v. Cloyd (1997)
54 Cal.App.4th 1402, where a failure to appear was excluded for the purpose
of impeachment because (1) the witness had been neither charged with nor

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convicted of the crime and (2) there was no evidence the witness had willfully
failed to appear. (Maestas, 132 Cal.App.4th at p. 1557.)
Here, the facts are more closely aligned with those in Cloyd. Christina
was not charged with failure to appear, and the defense offered no evidence
that the act was willful. Rather, the prosecution noted that Christina was
“unhoused” with “no transportation, no cellphone, nothing.” Moreover,
Christina had addressed the issue on her pending case and was on calendar
for her arraignment. The court decided here, too, that the probative value of
this evidence was substantially outweighed by section 352 considerations.
For the same reasons as the misdemeanor charge, we conclude this was not
an abuse of discretion.
* * *
In sum, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Monroe’s
motion to admit evidence of Christina’s pending misdemeanor charge and her
failure to appear. We therefore need not address Monroe’s prejudice
argument.
III.
We affirm.

CASTILLO, J.

WE CONCUR:

DO, Acting P. J.

KELETY, J.

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