People v. McFadden CA2/7

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Filed 11/12/25 P. v. McFadden CA2/7
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

THE PEOPLE, B338006

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. YA102039)
v.

TRAYVON DESHON MOORE
MCFADDEN,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Laura C. Ellison, Judge. Affirmed.
Sandra Gillies, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Kristen J. Inberg and Megan Moine,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
INTRODUCTION

Trayvon Deshon Moore McFadden appeals from the
judgment after a jury convicted him of second degree murder and
found true a firearm allegation. The trial court sentenced
McFadden to a prison term of 45 years to life, plus 25 years to life
for the firearm enhancement. McFadden argues the trial court
erred in giving CALCRIM No. 335, a jury instruction his trial
counsel requested that concerns how the jury should consider
accomplice testimony. McFadden challenges the language of the
instruction and the court’s failure to define one of the terms in
the instruction. McFadden also argues the court abused its
discretion in refusing to strike the firearm enhancement because,
according to McFadden, the court used the wrong legal standard
to find striking the enhancement would endanger the public. We
affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. McFadden Kills Kenneth Onah
In the afternoon of January 10, 2020 Latavia Wicker and
Kenneth Onah agreed, through an exchange of text messages,
Onah would pay Wicker $250 for her to drive from San Diego to
Gardena, where Onah lived, for “fun.” Wicker arrived at Onah’s
apartment at approximately 9:30 p.m. Wicker and Onah talked,
smoked, drank, and watched television. Toward the end of the
evening, Wicker felt Onah was “acting weird.” Onah asked
Wicker to spend the night, and she said, “I don’t do that.” Onah
told Wicker that she could leave, and Wicker said, “Well, let me
call my ride.” Onah said, “Just for that . . . I’m only going to give

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you gas money.” Onah at first gave Wicker $50, but later offered
her $100. As Wicker prepared to leave Onah’s apartment, she
and McFadden (whom Wicker later described as her ex-boyfriend)
exchanged a series of text messages, which began with Wicker
telling McFadden that Onah was only giving her gas money:

Wicker: “This [guy] only trying to give $100. [What] do I
do now?”
McFadden: “Wym”1
McFadden: “Wasp with that play drink”2
Wicker: “He not drinking”
McFadden: “Figure it out”
Wicker: “What start trippen? I don’t know how to get out
of here tho”
McFadden: “So how much he got . . .”
Wicker: “$100 supposedly but he got cards n there’s
phones n shit I bet I haven’t been all around the room yet”
McFadden: “Yeah see what’s in there . . . . Game time”

At approximately 12:15 a.m. (i.e., early the next morning)
Wicker left Onah’s apartment and went outside. Onah followed
her, and when they arrived at the parking lot gate, McFadden
was standing there. According to Wicker, Onah “was basically

1 Meaning, “What [do] you mean?” (Garcia v. State of Texas
(Tex.App., July 25, 2023, No. 05-22-00526-CR) 2023 WL 4731296,
p. 7.)

2 Meaning, according to one of the detectives, the drink may
have been “spiked.” And with wasp probably meaning, “What’s
up.”

3
rambling on” about not giving Wicker the full amount of money
he promised. McFadden and Onah continued “talking,” and at
some point McFadden fired his gun at Onah. One of the bullets
struck Onah in the chest, killing him.
McFadden and Wicker jumped the fence of the parking lot,
got into McFadden’s car, and drove back to San Diego. Three
days later, police officers in San Diego stopped a car Wicker was
driving; McFadden was sitting in the front passenger seat.
McFadden fled, ran through an alley, and threw away a gun
before the officers apprehended him.

B. The Jury Convicts McFadden of Second Degree
Murder and Finds True the Firearm Allegation
The People charged McFadden with willful, deliberate, and
premeditated murder (§ 187, subd. (a))3 and alleged he personally
and intentionally discharged a firearm causing great bodily
injury or death (§12022.53, subd. (d)). At trial a criminalist
testified that McFadden contributed 85 percent of the DNA found
on the gun the police officers in San Diego recovered in the alley
and that Wicker contributed nine percent. Another criminalist
testified the two bullet casings the detectives found outside
Onah’s apartment complex and the bullet in Onah’s chest came
from the same gun. An intelligence analyst who mapped the cell
phone usage of McFadden’s cell phone testified that, between
12:06 a.m. and 12:30 a.m. on January 11, 2020, which included
when the shooting occurred, the cell phone was “hitting towers
that are nearest in their direction to” the address of Onah’s
apartment complex.

3 Statutory references are to the Penal Code.

4
Wicker testified McFadden was her ex-boyfriend, admitted
she saw him in court, but refused to identify him. Though she
admitted she was “honest” when detectives interviewed her in
May 2020, Wicker denied, or said she could not recall, making
most of the statements in that interview. The prosecutor played
the video of the interview for the jury.4
In the interview Wicker denied shooting Onah, but
admitted she went to his apartment on the evening of
January 10, 2020. Wicker told the detectives that, when she told
Onah that she would not spend the night with him and Onah
said he would not give her the $250 they had agreed on, Wicker
left the apartment. She said that Onah followed her and that
McFadden was standing by the gate to the parking lot for the
apartment complex. Wicker stated the three of them stood by the
gate talking about why Onah would not give Wicker “what she
asked for.” Wicker told the detectives that she was “in a haze” as
McFadden and Onah talked and that, at some point, she heard a
gunshot. Wicker said she did not see who shot Onah. When
asked why McFadden shot Onah, Wicker initially said, “That’s
between them,” but later in the interview suggested McFadden
“probably didn’t like what [Onah] was saying.” When asked
whether it was “common sense” that McFadden must have shot
Onah, Wicker nodded and said she was “not going to say names”
because she was not a “snitch.” At the end of the interview, one
of the detectives told Wicker, “We’re done. But, you know,
I mean, you’re a liar.”

4 Outside the presence of the jury the court found Wicker
was “purposefully uncooperative” and ruled statements from her
interview with the detectives were admissible as prior
inconsistent statements.

5
The jury found McFadden guilty of second degree murder
and found true the allegation he personally and intentionally
discharged a firearm causing great bodily injury or death. In a
bifurcated proceeding the jury found McFadden had five prior
convictions for first degree burglary, a serious or violent felony
(depending whether a non-accomplice is present)5 under the three
strikes law. (See §§ 667, subds. (b)-(j), 1170.12, subds. (a), (d),
1197, subd. (c)(18).)

C. The Trial Court Sentences McFadden
At sentencing the trial court denied McFadden’s motion to
strike his prior convictions and the People’s request to strike the
firearm enhancement. The court cited several factors in
aggravation and none in mitigation and sentenced McFadden to
45 years to life on his conviction for second degree murder
(15 years to life, tripled under the three strikes law), plus
25 years to life for the firearm enhancement under
section 12022.53, subdivision (d), for a total sentence of 70 years
to life. The court ordered McFadden to serve the sentence
consecutive to “any other sentence” he was serving. McFadden
timely appealed.

DISCUSSION

A. The Court Did Not Err in Giving CALCRIM No. 335
McFadden argues the trial court’s decision to grant his
request to give CALCRIM No. 335, which tells jurors they may
not convict the defendant based solely on the statement or

5 See People v. Mani (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 343, 367,
footnote 7; People v. Bedolla (2018) 28 Cal.App.5th 535, 541.

6
testimony of an accomplice, “undercut” his “third party
culpability defense in derogation of [his] federal constitutional
rights.” Specifically, McFadden contends that, because the court
failed to define the term “accomplice,” the instruction “effectively
told the jury Wicker did not kill [Onah], thus gutting the defense
theory of the case.” To the extent this argument is not forfeited
or barred by the doctrine of invited error, the trial court did not
err in giving the instruction. There is no reasonable likelihood
the jury understood or applied the instruction in the manner
McFadden asserts.

1. Relevant Proceedings
During a hearing on the proposed jury instructions, the
prosecutor stated that he was “not sure” CALCRIM No. 335 was
“required,” but that he included the instruction on the list of
instructions “out of an abundance of caution.” The court asked
counsel for McFadden, “Are you asking for this instruction?”
Counsel for McFadden answered, “I am requesting [CALCRIM
No.] 335.” The court summarized the use note and recited one
portion: “‘Give this instruction only if the court concludes that
the witness is an accomplice as a matter of law or the parties
agree about the witness’s status as an accomplice.’” The court
asked, “So do you both agree about the witness’s status as an
accomplice?” Counsel for McFadden stated, “Yes. Well, I do.”
The prosecutor, referring to Wicker, stated: “Well, she was
charged with [violating section 32], accessory after the fact.
I think, out of an abundance of caution, I would put it in there.”
The court confirmed that both sides agreed the court should give
CALCRIM No. 335.

7
The trial court instructed the jury with CALCRIM No. 335
as follows: “If the crime of murder was committed, then Latavia
Wicker was an accomplice to that crime. And you may not
convict the defendant of murder based on the statement or
testimony of an accomplice alone. You may use the statement or
testimony of an accomplice that tends to incriminate the
defendant to convict the defendant only if: (1) the accomplice’s
statement or testimony is supported by other evidence that you
believe; (2) that supporting evidence is independent of the
accomplice’s statement or testimony; and (3) that supporting
evidence tends to connect the defendant to the commission of the
crime.” After defining “supporting evidence,” the court told the
jurors: “Any statement or testimony of an accomplice that tends
to incriminate the defendant should be viewed with caution. You
may not, however, arbitrarily disregard it. You should give that
statement or testimony the weight you think it deserves after
examining it with care and caution and in light of all the other
evidence.”

2. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
“‘A claim of instructional error is reviewed de novo.
[Citation.] An appellate court reviews the wording of a jury
instruction de novo and assesses whether the instruction
accurately states the law. [Citation.] In reviewing a claim of
instructional error, the court must consider whether there is a
reasonable likelihood that the trial court’s instructions caused
the jury to misapply the law in violation of the Constitution.
[Citations.] The challenged instruction is viewed “in the context
of the instructions as a whole and the trial record to determine
whether there is a reasonable likelihood the jury applied the

8
instruction in an impermissible manner.”’” (People v. Lewis
(2023) 14 Cal.5th 876, 900; see People v. Temple (2025)
110 Cal.App.5th 1281, 1293, fn. 2.) “Instructions should be
interpreted, if possible, to support the judgment, rather than
defeat it, if they are reasonably susceptible to such
interpretation.” (People v. Parker (2025) 113 Cal.App.5th 1261,
1271; see People v. Morales (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 978, 994.)

3. The Court Did Not Err
To the extent McFadden did not forfeit his argument6 and
the doctrine of invited error does not apply,7 the trial court did

6 “In general, a defendant may raise for the first time on
appeal instructional error affecting his or her substantial rights.
[Citations.] But ‘[a] party may not argue on appeal that an
instruction correct in law was too general or incomplete, and thus
needed clarification, without first requesting such clarification at
trial.’” (People v. Buenrostro (2018) 6 Cal.5th 367, 428; accord,
People v. Temple, supra, 110 Cal.App.5th at p. 1293.) Counsel for
McFadden did not object to the trial court giving CALCRIM
No. 335 (in fact, he asked the court to give it), did not ask the
court to define the term “accomplice,” and did not ask the court to
give CALCRIM No. 334, which (McFadden asserts) would have
told the jury “to decide whether a witness is an accomplice” and
would have given the jury the legal definition of the term
“accomplice.”

7 “‘The doctrine of invited error is designed to prevent an
accused from gaining a reversal on appeal because of an error
made by the trial court at his behest. . . . [I]t . . . must be clear
that counsel acted for tactical reasons and not out of ignorance or
mistake.’ In cases involving an action affirmatively taken by
defense counsel, we have found a clearly implied tactical purpose

9
not err. Section 1111 provides: “A conviction cannot be had upon
the testimony of an accomplice unless it be corroborated by such
other evidence as shall tend to connect the defendant with the
commission of the offense; and the corroboration is not sufficient
if it merely shows the commission of the offense or the

to be sufficient to invoke the invited error rule.” (People v.
Coffman and Marlow (2004) 34 Cal.4th 1, 49; accord, People v.
Merriman (2014) 60 Cal.4th 1, 104.) As stated, counsel for
McFadden asked the court to give CALCRIM No. 335, and he had
a tactical reason for doing so: In his closing argument counsel for
McFadden repeatedly attacked the credibility of Wicker, whom
he described as the People’s “primary witness,” and reminded the
jury that one of the detectives called Wicker a “‘liar.’” (See People
v. Hardy (1992) 2 Cal.4th 86, 152 [defendant was “precluded from
challenging the correctness of the instruction on appeal” where
his trial counsel “specifically requested the challenged
instruction, presumably so he could argue the testimony of the
named persons should be viewed with distrust”].)

Counsel for McFadden also had a strategic reason for not
requesting CALCRIM No. 334, which would have required the
defense to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, Wicker was
an accomplice. (See People v. Rangel (2016) 62 Cal.4th 1192,
1222 [“When a person is not an accomplice as a matter of law, a
defendant has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the
evidence that a witness was an accomplice in the crime charged
against the defendant.”].) For this reason, McFadden cannot
show his counsel was ineffective for failing to request CALCRIM
No. 334. (See People v. Aguirre (2025)18 Cal.5th 629, 679
[“Unless a defendant establishes the contrary, we shall presume
that counsel’s performance fell within the wide range of
professional competence and that counsel’s actions and inactions
can be explained as a matter of sound trial strategy.” (Internal
quotation marks omitted.)].)

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circumstances thereof.” (See People v. Aguirre (2025) 18 Cal.5th
629, 675.) “‘Section 1111 serves to ensure that a defendant will
not be convicted solely upon the testimony of an accomplice
because an accomplice is likely to have self-serving motives.’”
(Aguirre, at p. 675.) “Only when there is ‘substantial evidence
that a witness who has implicated the defendant was an
accomplice’ must the trial court instruct on ‘the principles
regarding accomplice testimony.’” (People v. Johnsen (2021)
10 Cal.5th 1116, 1155; see People v. Houston (2012) 54 Cal.4th
1186, 1223; People v. Tobias (2001) 25 Cal.4th 327, 331.)
CALCRIM No. 335 correctly stated the law. (See People v.
Tran (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1169, 1200 [“CALCRIM No. 335 properly
instructed the jury on the corroboration requirement for
inculpatory accomplice testimony or statements.”].) McFadden
does not contend otherwise. Rather, as discussed, McFadden
argues CALCRIM No. 335 “told the jury Wicker was not the
perpetrator, so the instruction imputed guilt to McFadden.”
CALCRIM No. 335, however, did not instruct the jury in the
manner McFadden argues or impute guilt to him.
In People v. Hardy (1992) 2 Cal.4th 86 the Supreme Court
rejected an argument similar to McFadden’s. The trial court in
that case instructed the jury with CALJIC No. 3.16 (which like
CALCRIM No. 335 concerned the corroboration requirement for
accomplice testimony) that seven witnesses who testified were
accomplices “as a matter of law” and that their testimony was
“subject to the rule requiring corroboration.” (Id. at p. 151.) The
defendants argued the instruction “created an irrebuttable
presumption that a conspiracy existed” because, according to the
defendants, the crime of murder was listed in the information, “it
was obvious that the victims were murdered,” “accomplices are

11
essentially identical to coconspirators,” and therefore giving the
instruction essentially made the seven witnesses
“coconspirators,” which meant “a conspiracy must have existed.”
(Ibid.) In rejecting that argument, the Supreme Court held “no
reasonable juror would have so interpreted the instruction in
light of the other instructions.” For example, the Supreme Court
stated, the trial court told the jurors that “criminal defendants
‘are presumed to be innocent until the contrary is proved’” (id. at
pp. 151-152) and that the jurors had to determine whether each
defendant was a member of “‘the alleged conspiracy’” and
“‘willfully, intentionally and knowingly joined with any other or
others in the alleged conspiracy.’” (Id. at p. 151.)
Similarly, in People v. Johnson (2016) 243 Cal.App.4th
1247, the court rejected the defendants’ argument CALCRIM
No. 335 “amounted to an unconstitutional mandatory
presumption that they aided and abetted the charged offenses—
that is, that they were guilty as charged.” (Id. at pp. 1266, 1275,
1276.) The defendants argued the jurors would have understood
the statement in CALCRIM No. 335 that the defendants were
accomplices “as establishing” their guilt as “aiders and abettors.”
(Id. at p. 1276.) In rejecting that argument, the court in Johnson
explained the trial court instructed the jury on the elements of
aiding and abetting, the presumption of innocence, and the
prosecution’s burden to prove all the elements beyond a
reasonable doubt, concepts that the prosecutor and defense
counsel repeated in their closing arguments. (Ibid.) The court
concluded: “A reasonable juror would have understood
CALCRIM No. 335 as directing that neither defendant could be
convicted solely upon the testimony of his codefendant without
independent supporting evidence, and that the testimony of each

12
defendant against the other should be viewed with ‘care and
caution’—not that the entire trial was without purpose because
the court’s instruction on how to view an accomplice’s testimony
was really a direction to find defendants guilty of aiding and
abetting the charged offenses.” (Id. at pp. 1276-1277; see People
v. Heishman (1988) 45 Cal.3d 147, 163 [CALJIC No. 3.16 “could
not reasonably be understood as precluding rejection of [the
accomplice’s] testimony—including rejection based on a
conclusion that in fact she was the killer”].)
Here, as in Hardy and Johnson, it was not reasonably
likely the jury ignored all the instructions the trial court gave on
the presumption of innocence, the prosecution’s burden of proof,
the elements of the murder charge,8 and even the language in
CALCRIM No. 335 to guide the jury on how to view Wicker’s
testimony, and instead understood CALCRIM No. 335 as a one-
step path to McFadden’s guilt. (See People v. Thomas (2023)
14 Cal.5th 327, 382 [“‘Jurors are presumed able to understand
and correlate instructions and are further presumed to have
followed the court’s instructions.’”]; People v. Pierce (2025)
114 Cal.App.5th 508, 534 [same].) We presume the jury
understood the purpose of CALCRIM No. 335: to guide the jury’s
evaluation of Wicker’s testimony. (See People v. Heishman,

8 The trial court instructed the jury with CALCRIM No. 200,
which told the jury to decide “what the facts are . . . [and] what
happened, based only on the evidence that has been presented to
you in this trial,” and CALCRIM No. 220, which told the jury
about the presumption of innocence, the People’s burden to prove
the charges, and the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard of
proof. The court told the jury: “Unless the evidence proves the
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, he is entitled to an
acquittal, and you must find him not guilty.”

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supra, 45 Cal.3d at p. 162 [CALJIC No. 3.16 “was given to make
clear that [the witness] was being labeled an accomplice for
purposes of the rule requiring corroboration if her testimony were
believed” and “did not literally tell the jury it could not find [the
witness] was the killer”].)
Moreover, the prosecutor’s argument dispelled any
misunderstanding the jurors may have had about their duty.
(See People v. Hajek and Vo (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1144, 1220 [“‘any
theoretical possibility of confusion [may be] diminished by the
parties’ closing argument’”], overruled on another ground in
People v. Rangel (2016) 62 Cal.4th 1192, 1216; People v. Lua
(2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 1004, 1013 [same]; People v. Johnson,
supra, 243 Cal.App.4th at p. 1269 [same].) The prosecutor stated,
“The first thing you are going to be deciding . . . [is], did the
defendant murder Kenneth Onah?” The prosecutor explained
that, “to prove a murder,” he had “to prove that the defendant
committed an act that caused the death of Kenneth Onah” and
that, “when the defendant acted, he acted with . . . malice
aforethought.” The prosecutor did not discuss CALCRIM No. 335
or suggest the jury should conclude from Wicker’s status as an
accomplice that McFadden was the shooter. Counsel for
McFadden also reminded the jurors that they were the judges of
the facts, that McFadden was presumed innocent, and that the
prosecution had the burden to prove “every element” of murder
beyond a reasonable doubt. The closing arguments made clear
the jury had to decide whether the evidence established beyond a
reasonable doubt each element of the murder charge. There was

14
no reasonable likelihood the jury applied CALCRIM No. 335 as
McFadden argues.9
The cases McFadden cites are distinguishable. For
example, in People v. Hill (1967) 66 Cal.2d 536 the jury convicted
three defendants of, among other crimes, murder and robbery.
(Id. at p. 543.) One of the defendants testified at trial, providing
details that implicated his two codefendants. (Id. at pp. 543,
555.) The non-testifying defendants argued on appeal the trial
court erred in not instructing the jury that their testifying
codefendant was an accomplice as a matter of law. (Id. at p. 554.)
The Supreme Court held the trial court did not err, but
acknowledged that the witness appeared to be an accomplice as a
matter of law and that, “where a codefendant has made a judicial
confession as to crimes charged, an instruction that as a matter
of law such codefendant is an accomplice of other defendants
might well be construed by the jurors as imputing the confessing
defendant’s foregone guilt to the other defendants.” (Id. at

9 Because it was not reasonably likely the jury misapplied
CALCRIM No. 335, the court, in giving the instruction, did not
prejudice McFadden’s defense or violate his rights under the
Fifth, Sixth, or Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution. (See People v. Hardy, supra, 2 Cal.4th at pp. 151-
152 [accomplice-as-a-matter-of-law instruction did not violate the
Fifth Amendment by stripping the defendants of the presumption
of innocence or the Sixth Amendment by removing “a portion of
the jury’s factfinding function”].) For the same reason, McFadden
cannot show his counsel was ineffective for failing to request a
pinpoint instruction defining the term “accomplice” because he
cannot show prejudice. (See People v. Aguirre, supra, 18 Cal.5th
at p. 679 [to establish ineffective assistance of counsel, “the
defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced
the defense”].)

15
pp. 555-556.) Here, however, the People did not charge Wicker as
a codefendant in Onah’s murder, and Wicker did not make a
confession she killed Onah that the jury could have imputed to
McFadden. (See People v. Johnson, supra, 243 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1269 [“[w]hen the witness is a codefendant whose testimony
includes incriminating statements,” the court should give
CALCRIM No. 334, “Accomplice Testimony Must Be
Corroborated: Dispute Whether Witness Is Accomplice, informing
the jury that it must decide whether the testifying codefendant is
an accomplice”].) Moreover, the Supreme Court in Hill explained
why the trial court did not err in not giving the accomplice
instruction; the Supreme Court did not address when or how a
trial court might err in giving CALCRIM No. 335.
In People v. Valerio (1970) 13 Cal.App.3d 912 the defendant
and his codefendant each testified, essentially blaming the other
for committing the crime. (Id. at p. 918.) The defendant argued
on appeal the trial court erred in refusing to give an instruction
stating his codefendant was an accomplice as a matter of law.
(Id. at p. 924.) The court in Valerio held that the case presented
“a unique, but not unprecedented, situation” where, had the trial
court given the instruction, the trial court would, “in effect, be
instructing the jury that the codefendant was guilty of the
offenses charged, thereby invading the province of the jury with
respect to the determination of her guilt or innocence.” (Ibid.,
italics added.) The court’s concern with the accomplice-as-a-
matter-of-law instruction was that it would tell the jury one
defendant was guilty (i.e., as an accomplice to the other
defendant’s crimes). Here, as discussed, the People did not
charge Wicker with murder, she was not a codefendant, and her
guilt was not an issue the jury had to decide.

16
B. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in
Denying McFadden’s Motion To Strike the Firearm
Enhancement
McFadden argues the trial court abused its discretion in
declining to strike his firearm enhancement under
section 12022.53, subdivision (d). McFadden contends that, “by
focusing only on present dangerousness, the court employed the
wrong standard” in applying section 1385, subdivision (c)(2).
Assuming McFadden did not forfeit this argument,10 it lacks
merit.

1. Relevant Proceedings
Prior to the sentencing hearing counsel for McFadden filed
a motion under People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996)
13 Cal.4th 497 and section 1385 to strike his five prior
convictions, which were for serious or violent felonies. McFadden
stated in this motion that, when he committed the crimes, he was
“youthful, immature, and under great emotional and mental
stress.” The People opposed the motion, arguing that McFadden
murdered Onah while he was on probation for the five felony
convictions and that, while McFadden was in custody on this

10 Counsel for McFadden did not object when the trial court
found that striking the firearm enhancement would not protect
the public from McFadden. (See People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th
331, 353 [forfeiture applies “to claims involving the trial court’s
failure to properly make or articulate its discretionary sentencing
choices”]; People v. Anderson (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 233, 242
[because the defendant did not object when the trial court
imposed the upper term, he forfeited the argument the trial court
erred “by failing to articulate the reasons for imposing the upper
term and by relying on improper factors to do so”].)

17
case, he was convicted of assault by means of force likely to
produce great bodily injury (§ 245, subd. (a)(4)).
At the sentencing hearing the trial court stated it had
reviewed the record and concluded McFadden “cannot be deemed
to be outside the spirit of” the three strikes law. The court
considered McFadden’s prior felony convictions, “for which he
was given a break[11] and . . . a chance to rehabilitate himself.”
“Instead of that,” the court stated, McFadden “committed a
murder.” The court also stated that, while McFadden was in
custody on this case, he committed an assault with means of force
likely to produce great bodily injury. The court concluded:
“There has been no break in his felonious conduct. And, in fact,
his conduct has gotten more and more serious, and more and
more violent. So I will not be exercising any discretion that
I have to dismiss any of his strikes under 1385. The interests of
justice would not be served by doing that.”
Regarding the firearm enhancement under
section 12022.53, subdivision (d), which would add 25 years to life
to McFadden’s sentence, the prosecutor stated that “the office
policy” (under the then-district attorney) required him to ask the
court to impose a sentence of 45 years to life on the murder
conviction “without imposing the 25 years to life on the
[section] 12022.53 allegation.” The prosecutor explained it was
“the office’s belief that, in the interest of justice, lengthy prison
sentences are not conducive or proper to reducing the crime.”
Counsel for McFadden did not provide any argument or evidence
to prove any mitigating factors under section 1385,

11 The trial court stated: “What is so unbelievable about the
sentencing is that he got probation on what was five individual
separate counts of residential burglary. I’d enter a plea too.”

18
subdivision (c)(2). The court denied the prosecutor’s request:
“I don’t think that office policy in this particular case services the
public by protecting them from this defendant. As you noted in
this paper, and the fact remains, he was on probation for violent
offenses when he committed this murder. So, I will not be
exercising my discretion or following your office policy. I will do
what I think the interest of justice demands in this case and give
him the sentence that he has earned himself.”
The court listed the factors in aggravation: The crime
involved “great violence” and “great cruelty”; the victim “seemed
to be very vulnerable”; McFadden occupied a position of
leadership over Wicker, who was 18 years old at the time; and
McFadden’s conduct demonstrated “planning.” The court found
there were “no factors in mitigation at all.” The court imposed a
prison term of 45 years to life on the second degree murder
conviction, plus 25 years to life for the firearm enhancement, for
a total prison sentence of 70 years to life.

2. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
Section 1385, subdivision (c), provides:
“(1) Notwithstanding any other law, the court shall dismiss an
enhancement if it is in the furtherance of justice to do so, except
if dismissal of that enhancement is prohibited by any initiative
statute. [¶] (2) In exercising its discretion under this
subdivision, the court shall consider and afford great weight to
evidence offered by the defendant to prove that any of the
mitigating circumstances in subparagraphs (A) to (I) are present.
Proof of the presence of one or more of these circumstances
weighs greatly in favor of dismissing the enhancement, unless
the court finds that dismissal of the enhancement would

19
endanger public safety. ‘Endanger public safety’ means there is a
likelihood that the dismissal of the enhancement would result in
physical injury or other serious danger to others.”12 (See People
v. Walker (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1024, 1028; People v. Torres (2025)
113 Cal.App.5th 88, 92; People v. Mazur (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th
438, 443-444; People v. Ortiz (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 1087, 1094.)
“The trial court must find that any dismissal under
[section 1385,] subdivision (c) is in ‘furtherance of justice,’” a
standard that “allows the court to consider factors beyond public
safety in exercising its discretion whether to dismiss an
enhancement, including the nature and circumstances of the
crimes and the defendant’s background, character, and
prospects.” (People v. Mazur, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at p. 446; see
§ 1385, subd. (c)(1); People v. Walker, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1033
[“‘the ultimate question before the trial court remains whether it
is in the furtherance of justice to dismiss an enhancement’”];
People v. Ortiz, supra, 87 Cal.App.5th at p. 1098 [same].)
“We review a trial court’s order denying a motion to dismiss
a sentence enhancement under section 1385 for abuse of
discretion. [Citations.] A trial court may abuse its discretion
where ‘its decision is so irrational or arbitrary that no reasonable
person could agree with it,’ ‘where the trial court was not “aware
of its discretion”’ to dismiss a sentencing allegation under
section 1385, or ‘where the court considered impermissible factors
in declining to dismiss.’” (Nazir v. Superior Court (2022)

12 Section 1385, subdivision (c)(2)(A) through (I), states nine
circumstances in mitigation, including that the “current offense is
connected to mental illness” and that, though “a firearm was
used in the current offense, it was inoperable or unloaded.”

20
79 Cal.App.5th 478, 490; see People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th
367, 373-374; People v. Mendoza (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 287, 298.)

3. The Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion
The record reflects that, in concluding that striking
McFadden’s firearm enhancement would not be in furtherance of
justice, the trial court was aware of the standard under
section 1385, subdivision (c), and considered proper factors. As
discussed, after the court found the prosecutor’s “office policy”
would not protect the public and stated it would “not be
exercising [its] discretion” to strike the firearm enhancement, the
court stated it would instead sentence McFadden according to the
“interest of justice.” The court cited the facts that McFadden was
on probation for “violent offenses” when he murdered Onah, that
the crime involved “great violence” and “great cruelty,” that Onah
seemed “very vulnerable,” and that McFadden occupied a position
of leadership over Wicker, “who appeared from the evidence was
possibly being pimped out” by McFadden or at least McFadden
“clearly brought” Wicker to Onah’s apartment. The trial court
did not err in concluding that, considering the cruel and violent
circumstances of the crime and the principal role McFadden
played, it was not in furtherance of justice to strike the firearm
enhancement. As the trial court put it, McFadden’s sentence was
one he “earned.” (See People v. Walker, supra, 16 Cal.5th at
p. 1033 [the factors in California Rules of Court, rules 4.421
(circumstances in aggravation) and 4.423 (circumstances in
mitigation) are “circumstances ‘long deemed essential to the
“furtherance of justice” inquiry’”].)
People v. Gonzalez (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 215, cited by
McFadden, to the extent it was correctly decided, is

21
distinguishable. At a resentencing hearing in that case the
defendant, who had been sentenced to 75 years to life, asked the
superior court to strike under section 1385, subdivision (c)(2), a
firearm enhancement of 25 years to life. (Gonzalez, at p. 222.)
The trial court found the defendant would pose a danger to
society “‘currently at the time of sentencing,’” which the trial
court clarified meant “‘forward looking from today, not forward
looking from 50 years from now.’” (Id. at pp. 223, 224.) The court
in Gonzalez held the trial court erred in its “singular focus on
whether the defendant currently poses a danger” because, the
court in Gonzalez explained, “a crucial part of the inquiry” under
section 1385, subdivision (c)(2), “is how the dismissal of the
enhancement will impact the length of the defendant’s sentence.”
(Gonzalez, at p. 228.) The court explained that a “currently
dangerous defendant who will be released from prison within a
short timeframe might be found by the trial court to pose a
greater danger to the public than a defendant who is currently
dangerous but who has no prospect of release from prison until he
is elderly” and that “future review” by the Board of Parole
Hearings “will act as a safety valve against a release that would
endanger the public.” (Ibid.)
The trial court here did not base its public safety
assessment solely on McFadden’s current dangerousness. The
trial court did not use the word “current,” “present,” or any
synonym at the sentencing hearing. Contrary to McFadden’s
description of “the facts of the offense” and his criminal “record”
as “backward looking factors,” the facts showed, as the court
explained in denying McFadden’s Romero motion, McFadden’s
“inability . . . to follow court orders while being on probation” and
a “disregard for the law while even being in custody.” Those

22
traits related to whether McFadden will pose a danger to society
in the future. Absent evidence to the contrary, we presume the
trial court properly determined that, as required by section 1385,
subdivision (c)(2), “dismissal of the enhancement would result in
physical injury or other serious danger to others.” (See People v.
Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th at pp. 376-377 [“‘“[t]he burden is on
the party attacking the sentence to clearly show that the
sentencing decision was irrational or arbitrary,”’” and in “‘“the
absence of such a showing, the trial court is presumed to have
acted to achieve legitimate sentencing objectives, and its
discretionary determination to impose a particular sentence will
not be set aside on review”’”]; People v. Brugman (2021)
62 Cal.App.5th 608, 638 [“In the absence of evidence to the
contrary, we presume that the trial court considered all of the
relevant factors and properly applied the law.”].)

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

SEGAL, Acting P. J.

We concur:

FEUER, J.

STONE, J.

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