People v. Arciga CA2/4

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Filed 11/6/25 P. v. Arciga CA2/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

THE PEOPLE, B337709

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. VA114995)
v.

HECTOR ARCIGA,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County,
Maria Andrea Davalos, Judge. Affirmed.
John L. Staley, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, and Hector
Arciga, in pro. per., for Defendant and Appellant.
No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
In 2014, a jury convicted Hector Arciga of first degree murder, four
counts of home invasion robbery, one count of first degree burglary, and
possession of a firearm by a felon. The jury further found true multiple
firearm enhancements and the special circumstance allegation that the
murder was committed during the robbery and burglary. Thereafter, Arciga
petitioned for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6.1 After an
evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied the petition, finding that Arciga
was a major participant who acted with reckless indifference to human life.
Arciga appeals form the order denying the petition. His appellate counsel
filed a brief under People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216. Arciga filed a
supplemental brief challenging the denial of his section 1172.6 petition and
asserted a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. We have
exercised our discretion and independently reviewed the record for any
arguable issues. Having found none, we affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
1. Evidence at Arciga’s Trial
The following facts are from this court’s nonpublished opinion in People
v. Arciga (Feb. 25, 2016, B258201) (Arciga), which affirmed the judgment in
Arciga’s direct appeal.
According to the prosecution, Arciga, along with his codefendants Pedro
Huerta Zuniga, and Francisco Argenis Parra had a scheme to rob drug
dealers. After gaining a drug dealer’s trust by making an initial small
purchase, they would set up a larger drug purchase. During this second
encounter, they would rob the drug dealer of money and drugs. In the

1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise
stated.
2
instant case, Carlos Zarate was killed and another was injured (Manuel
Rojas) during the second drug purchase.
Jesus Vasquez testified he was a close friend of Zarate’s. About a week
and a half before Zarate’s murder, Vasquez was present when Zarate sold 20
pounds of marijuana to Parra and Zuniga. On April 22, 2009, Vasquez,
Martha Gutierrez (his mother-in-law), Zarate, and Rojas went to an
apartment in Bellflower to sell 140 pounds of marijuana to Parra and Zuniga.
They brought 60 pounds of the drug with them, and planned to deliver the
remainder after receiving the money. Parra was waiting outside the
apartment; Zuniga and Arciga were waiting inside. The parties exchanged
drugs and money. Arciga checked the product, while Gutierrez started
counting the money. She asked Vasquez to assist her. As Vasquez was
walking toward Gutierrez, he glimpsed Zuniga pulling a handgun from his
waist. He heard several gunshots and saw Zarate staggering. Vasquez also
saw Arciga shooting at Zarate while walking toward him. After Zarate had
fallen to the ground, Arciga fired five more shots at him. Zuniga then
snatched the money from Gutierrez. At around the same time, Vasquez
heard Rojas screaming. After another gunshot, Vasquez observed Rojas on
the floor. Parra took the bag containing the marijuana and handed it to
Zuniga. Zuniga then dragged the bag to the exit. Vasquez did not see Arciga,
but presumed that he had already left the apartment. Parra, who was armed
with a semi-automatic, pointed the gun at Vasquez, and asked Vasquez if he
had a gun. Vasquez told him, “No,” and lifted his shirt to show he was not
armed. Gutierrez also interposed herself between Parra and Vasquez. As
Parra turned to leave, he struck Rojas, who was still on the ground, on the
top of the head with his gun. After Parra left, Vasquez ran toward Zarate’s
body and started screaming to wake him up. He noticed a .45-caliber

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handgun on top of the body. Vasquez recognized that the gun belonged to
him, and took it. He subsequently disposed of the gun. Vasquez, Gutierrez,
and Rojas then left the apartment. Vasquez did not call 911 after the
shooting or contact the police. Rather, the police contacted him later.
Rojas’s and Gutierrez’s trial testimony was substantially similar to
Vasquez’s testimony. Rojas testified that he realized it was a setup when
Gutierrez was counting the stacks of money, and there were large bills on top
of the stacks and $1 bills underneath. At almost the same instant, Rojas
heard someone say, “This is a stick up.” He saw Zarate reach for his gun, but
Zarate did not have enough time to pull it out before he was shot. After
Zarate fell to the ground, Gutierrez yelled out, “Oh, my God. Run. Run.”
Rojas panicked and ran toward the front door. Arciga then shot him in the
left buttocks area, and Rojas fell to the ground. He closed his eyes and
pretended to be dead. He heard people walking out and dragging the bag of
drugs with them. As the last person left, someone pistol-whipped Rojas.
From their positions in the apartment, Rojas deduced that it was Parra who
had pistol-whipped him.
After the men left, Gutierrez had someone drive Rojas to a nearby
hospital, where he had surgery to repair a shattered left femur bone. Police
officers interviewed Rojas at the hospital; he told them he had been shot in a
driveby shooting by unknown assailants. However, Rojas, who was working
as an informant for the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), called his
handler that day and informed the DEA agent about what had happened. A
few days later, Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department deputy sheriff and homicide
detective Steven Blagg, after being informed that Rojas had pertinent
information about the shooting, met with Rojas. Rojas described the actual
events to the detective.

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Gutierrez testified that when the shooting started, she covered her face.
Later, she saw Zuniga pointing a gun at Vasquez. She went over and pushed
the gun away from Vasquez’s face. Gutierrez did not know that Zarate had
died until she was informed a few days later. She did not go to the police.
Instead, the police contacted her.
Eusebio Alvarez, a friend of Arciga’s, testified about certain statements
Arciga and Zuniga had made to him after the shooting. Previously, Arciga
had told Alvarez that Parra’s father was involved in “dope rips”—robbing
drug dealers. On April 22, 2009, Arciga called Alvarez, saying, “I got some
weed right now, but you got to let me know if you want it because something
went wrong right now. It’s hot. I just shot somebody.” Later that day,
Arciga came to Alvarez’s house with some marijuana. Arciga asked Alvarez
if Alvarez could “get rid of [the drugs] quick or something because it was real
hot.” Arciga said he had been involved in a shoot-out: he had shot a man and
after the man fell down, he had walked up and shot him several times.
Arciga said Zuniga and Parra were present.
Alvarez testified he did not sell any of the marijuana for Arciga.
However, for $100, he helped Arciga dispose of a nine-millimeter handgun
Arciga said he had used to kill the man.
A few days later, Zuniga contacted Alvarez, saying he had some crystal
methamphetamine he wanted Alvarez to sell. Zuniga admitted there had
been a shoot-out, but said Arciga had lied about shooting the victim. He
bragged, “[Arciga] is talking all this bullshit. I was the one that did it. I’m
the one that shot the guy.”
Maria Eduvina Arteaga de Ayala (Ayala) testified that she lived at the
apartment where the shooting occurred. About a week before the shooting,
Arciga and “Miguel” asked about using her apartment to host two people

5
visiting from Mexico. Arciga also asked her if she wanted to work with them
as a driver. He showed her a box of cash and a handgun. On April 22, 2009,
Miguel called her and stated they wanted her apartment “empty.” Ayala left
the apartment, leaving the door unlocked. As she was driving away from her
apartment that morning, she observed Arciga driving in the opposite
direction. Later that day, the manager of the apartment complex called
Ayala, and told her there was a dead man in her apartment. When Ayala
was later interviewed by Detective Blagg, she initially lied before telling him
the truth. Ayala testified she did not want to work with Arciga, and she
never gave anyone permission to use her apartment to engage in drug deals
or to rob drug dealers.
On November 10, 2009, Parra was stopped for speeding. He was
arrested for driving without a license and the vehicle was impounded.
During the inventory search of the vehicle, two handguns were recovered
from the trunk, including a nine-millimeter Sig Sauer. Parra told Los
Angeles Police Officer Arturo Koenig that he was going to meet and rob a
drug dealer of 200 pounds of marijuana. He admitted being involved in a
prior robbery of a drug dealer, at “32nd and Central” in Los Angeles.
Steven Scholtz, a coroner, testified that he performed an autopsy on
Zarate’s body. Zarate had suffered nine gunshot wounds, including three
that Scholtz opined were fatal.
Phil Teramoto, a criminalist, testified about firearm-related evidence
recovered at the crime scene. From various tests, Teramoto concluded that
three firearms were used during the shoot-out: (1) a .45-caliber handgun that
fired a single shot, (2) a nine-millimeter handgun that fired eight shots, and
(3) a nine-millimeter Sig Sauer—the handgun recovered from Parra’s
vehicle—that fired one shot. A bullet recovered from Rojas’s body was

6
matched to bullets fired from the Sig Sauer handgun, and two bullets
recovered from Zarate’s body were matched with the bullets fired from the
other nine-millimeter handgun. Teramoto also testified that the shot fired
from the .45-caliber handgun had a northern trajectory and hit an exercise
machine at 16.5 inches above the ground.
Los Angeles County Sheriff Deputy Mario Cortez, a latent print
examiner, testified that he matched latent prints developed from evidence
found at the crime scene with fingerprint exemplars from Parra and Zuniga.
Luis Olmos, a criminalist, testified that analysis of DNA found on certain
items at the crime scene indicated that multiple persons handled the items.
Based on their respective DNA profiles, Arciga and Zuniga were possible
contributors to the DNA mixture found on some of the items.
On March 31, 2010, Detective Blagg and two fellow officers interviewed
Arciga following his arrest on an unrelated crime. A recording of the
interview was played for the jury. After waiving his Miranda rights, Arciga
told the officers he had been acquainted with Parra and his father for about
two years. According to Arciga, Parra’s father was involved in robbing drug
dealers. Arciga acted as a lookout during two of these robberies. On one of
those occasions, Zuniga was present. Arciga said that by April 2009 he was
no longer working with Parra’s father or Zuniga. He also denied knowing
Zarate, and initially denied ever being in Bellflower. After being informed
that he had been identified by several witnesses as a shooter during Zarate’s
murder and that his cellphone had been used in Bellflower on April 22, 2009,
Arciga conceded that he had gone with Parra’s father on a drug deal and that
they may have gone to Bellflower.
After further questioning, Arciga admitted going to an apartment in
Bellflower with Parra’s father, Parra, and Zuniga to rob drug dealers. Arciga

7
was not armed, but Parra’s father and Zuniga were armed with pistols. At
the apartment, they met four drug dealers—a woman and three men—who
brought 60 pounds of marijuana. Arciga checked the product while the
woman counted the money. He heard some commotion and looked up. He
saw one of the male drug dealers pull out a pistol, and almost simultaneously
Zuniga pulled out his gun. Arciga did not see Zuniga shooting; he just heard
shots. Arciga ran out of the apartment with the bag of drugs. As he did so,
he saw the drug dealer with the pistol fall to the ground.

2. Verdict and Sentence
A jury convicted Arciga of first degree murder (§ 187, subd. (a); count
1), possession of a firearm by a felon (§ 12021, subd. (a)(1); count 4), home
invasion robbery of Zarate, Rojas, Gutierrez, and Vasquez (§ 211; counts 6-9),
and first degree burglary (§ 459; count 10). The jury also found true the
special circumstance allegation that the murder was committed in the
commission of a robbery and a burglary (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)). As to counts
1, 6, 7, 8, and 9, the jury found true Arciga personally used a firearm within
the meaning of section 12022.53, subdivision (b) and as to count 10, Arciga
also personally used a firearm within the meaning of section 12022.5,
subdivision (a). The trial court sentenced Arciga to life imprisonment
without the possibility of parole, plus 40 years, 4 months.
On appeal, a different panel of this court affirmed the judgment.

3. Section 1172.6 Petition and Evidentiary Hearing
On June 17, 2019, Arciga filed a petition for resentencing under section
1170.95, now section 1172.6. On July 2, 2019, the trial court found Arciga
had established a prima facie case for relief and issued an order to show

8
cause why his petition should not be granted. The court appointed counsel
for Arciga.
On March 6, 2020, the People filed an opposition. The People argued
that Arciga was ineligible for relief because the jury found true the special
circumstance allegation that the murder was committed in the commission of
a robbery and a burglary under section 190.2, subdivision (a)(17). On April
14, 2020, Arciga filed a reply to the opposition. He argued he was not the
actual killer, did not have the specific intent to kill, and was not a major
participant who acted with reckless indifference to human life. Then on
March 27, 2023, Arciga filed a brief for the evidentiary hearing, asserting the
same arguments in his reply brief.
On April 26, 2024, the trial court held an evidentiary hearing on the
petition. The court stated it had reviewed Arciga’s petition, the preliminary
hearing, and jury trial transcripts as well as the trial exhibits. The court
ultimately denied the petition, finding that the People had met their burden
of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that Arciga was a major participant in
the felonies and acted with reckless indifference to human life.
In determining Arciga was a major participant, the trial court made the
following findings. Arciga engaged in an orchestrated plan to commit a
robbery by entering an apartment and using guns, zip ties, and a baton. The
plan was put into motion a week before the murder was committed.
Specifically, Arciga went armed with a firearm to Ayala’s apartment with his
friend “Miguel,” trying to recruit Ayala and use her apartment in exchange
for money. The day of the murder, Miguel called Ayala and said they needed
the apartment empty that day. When she left the apartment, Ayala saw
Arciga driving towards her apartment. Thus, part of Arciga’s role in
planning the robbery was to secure the apartment. Prior to entering the

9
apartment, Arciga also wrapped the money that was to be presented to the
victim to purchase the drugs. In addition, he was in charge of checking the
drugs once they were inside the apartment. Arciga further agreed to carry a
firearm during the robbery, to display it, and was in fact armed with a
firearm during the incident.
While it was not clear who shot and killed the victim, Arciga was
present and available to use lethal force to assist with the robbery. Aside
from Zarate, the other sellers were unarmed and were not in a position to
defend themselves. Arciga was subjectively aware of the inherent danger of
participating in an armed robbery. He was also more aware than the
“average person” because he planned and went to commit the robbery with
people he knew were also armed. Moreover, it is reasonable to infer Arciga
knew they were armed because he never expressed shock that firearms were
used during the robbery. In fact, he told his friend Alvarez that he “shot too.”
Also, the fact that all perpetrators, including Arciga, pulled out their guns at
the same time after somebody said, “this is a stick up,” demonstrates Arciga
was aware use of a firearm was necessary to commit the robbery. The court
noted there was no evidence that Arciga knew his codefendants propensity
for violence or whether it was likely they would use lethal force. Arciga was
also in a position to prevent the murder but did nothing to prevent it. Arciga
made no effort to render aid to the victim after he was shot or call 911.
Instead, he paid Alvarez to dispose of his firearm and sell the stolen drugs.
In determining Arciga acted with reckless indifference to human life,
the trial court noted that many factors for assessing whether a defendant was
a major participant overlap with the finding of reckless indifference to human
life. The court then reiterated relevant factors to support its finding.
Arciga timely appealed.

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DISCUSSION
1. Senate Bill No. 1437 and Standard of Review
Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 1437) and
subsequent related legislation limited accomplice liability under the felony-
murder rule, eliminated the natural and probable consequences doctrine as it
relates to murder, and eliminated convictions for murder based on a theory
under which malice is imputed to a person based solely on that person's
participation in a crime. (See generally People v. Reyes (2023) 14 Cal.5th 981,
986; People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 957, 959; People v. Gentile (2020)
10 Cal.5th 830, 842–843 (Gentile), superseded by statue on another ground as
stated in People v. Wilson (2023) 14 Cal.5th 839, 869.)
Senate Bill 1437 added section 188, subdivision (a)(3), which provides
that “to be convicted of murder, a principal in a crime shall act with malice
aforethought” and malice “shall not be imputed to a person based solely on
his or her participation in a crime.” Senate Bill 1437 also amended the felony-
murder rule by adding section 189, subdivision (e), which provides that a
participant in the perpetration of qualifying felonies is liable for felony
murder only if the person (1) was the actual killer, (2) was not the actual
killer but, with the intent to kill, acted as a direct aider and abettor, or (3) the
person was a major participant in the underlying felony and acted with
reckless indifference to human life, as described in section 190.2, subdivision
(d). (Gentile, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 842.)
Senate Bill 1437 created a procedure, codified at section 1172.6, for a
person convicted of murder under the former law to be resentenced if the
person could no longer be convicted of those crimes under current law.
(People v. Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 959; Gentile, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p.
847.) A defendant commences that procedure by filing a petition containing a

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declaration that, among other things, the defendant could not presently be
convicted of murder under current law. (People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th
698, 708.)
If a petition establishes a prima facie case for relief, the trial court
must appoint counsel if requested, issue an order to show cause, and hold an
evidentiary hearing at which the parties may offer new or additional evidence
and the trial court sits as an independent factfinder to determine beyond a
reasonable doubt whether the defendant is guilty of murder under a valid
theory. (§ 1172.6, subds. (b)(3), (c), & (d)(1); People v. Garrison (2021) 73
Cal.App.5th 735, 745.)
We review a trial court’s findings after a section 1172.6, subdivision
(d)(3), evidentiary hearing for substantial evidence. (People v. Clements
(2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 276, 298.)

2. Major Participant Who Acted With Reckless Indifference to Human Life
At an evidentiary hearing to determine whether a defendant was a
major participant who acted with reckless indifference to human life, a trial
court must consider the factors identified in People v. Banks (2015) 61
Cal.4th 788 (Banks) and People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522 (Clark).
First, to determine “under what circumstances an accomplice who lacks
the intent to kill may qualify as a major participant,” a court should consider,
“What role did the defendant have in planning the criminal enterprise that
led to one or more deaths? What role did the defendant have in supplying or
using lethal weapons? What awareness did the defendant have of particular
dangers posed by the nature of the crime, weapons used, or past experience
or conduct of the other participants? Was the defendant present at the scene
of the killing, in a position to facilitate or prevent the actual murder, and did

12
his or her own actions or inaction play a particular role in the death? What
did the defendant do after lethal force was used?” (Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th
at pp. 794, 803, fn. omitted.)
Second, factors to consider when determining reckless indifference are:
“Did the defendant use or know that a gun would be used during the felony?
How many weapons were ultimately used? Was the defendant physically
present at the crime? Did he or she have the opportunity to restrain the
crime or aid the victim? What was the duration of the interaction between
the perpetrators of the felony and the victims? What was the defendant’s
knowledge of his or her confederate’s propensity for violence or likelihood of
using lethal force? What efforts did the defendant make to minimize the
risks of violence during the felony?” (In re Scoggins (2020) 9 Cal.5th 667, 677
[summarizing Clark factors].)
Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding that Arciga could
be convicted of first degree murder under current law. As laid out in detail
by the trial court, Arciga engaged in an orchestrated plan to commit the
robbery. Arciga, along with his cohorts, entered the apartment armed with
firearms, zip ties, and a baton. This plan was set in motion a week prior to
the murder. Arciga had secured the apartment by recruiting Ayala and
wrapped the money that was to be used in the “purchase” of the drugs. While
it was not entirely clear who shot and killed the victim, Arciga was present,
armed, and ready to use lethal force to assist with the robbery. The evidence
established that Arciga knew his cohorts were armed; he did not express
shock that any firearms were used during the commission of the robbery.
Rather, he told his friend he was the shooter and had that friend not only sell
the stolen drugs but dispose of his firearm. Arciga was in a position to

13
prevent the murder but did nothing to stop it. He also did not provide any
aid to the victim or call the police after the incident.
The totality of the Banks/Clark factors supports the trial court’s finding
that Arciga was a major participant in the burglary who acted with reckless
indifference to human life under current law. (See generally Tison v. Arizona
(1987) 481 U.S. 137, 158 [Tison brothers’ “high level of participation” in
kidnapping and robbery “implicates” them in culminating murder of a
family].) Contrary to Arciga’s contention, the prosecution did not need to
prove he was the actual killer at the evidentiary hearing. Rather, the
prosecution had the burden of proving he was a major participant who acted
with reckless indifference to human life. As discussed above, the prosecution
met their burden beyond a reasonable doubt.
Arciaga also argues that appellate counsel was ineffective and
committed fraud on the court because he filed a Delgadillo brief without
reviewing the record. Also, counsel did not know where he was incarcerated.
Even assuming that this is true, Arciga fails to articulate how these alleged
deficiencies in appellate counsel’s performance were prejudicial. (Strickland
v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 694 [prejudice is shown when “there is a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result
of the proceeding would have been different”].)

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DISPOSITION
The order denying Arciga’s section 1172.6 petition is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

ZUKIN, P. J.

WE CONCUR:

MORI, J.

TAMZARIAN, J.

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