CourtListener 10731256•Watson v. Bevins CA2/5
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Filed 11/5/25 Watson v. Bevins CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
JOSEPH C. WATSON, B337961
Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County Super.
Ct. No. 22STCV13181)
v.
KEVIN BEVINS et al.,
Defendants and Respondents.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Mark H. Epstein, Judge. Affirmed.
Keiter Appellate Law, Mitchell Keiter for Plaintiff and
Appellant.
Collins + Collins, Robert H. Stellwagen, Megan K. Lieber
and James C. Jardin for Defendant and Respondent Michael
Cody.
Messner Reeves, Andrew S. Hollins and Paul Hesse for
Defendants and Respondents Truck Insurance Exchange, Kevin
Bevins and Kathleen Baxter-Walker.
This is an appeal from a judgment following an order
granting summary judgment. Plaintiff/appellant Joseph Watson
was a board member of a homeowner’s association (HOA) and
represented the association as its attorney. Watson filed a
lawsuit against Nathaniel Pickett for failing to pay HOA dues;
Pickett countered by filing his own lawsuit against Watson and
others. Watson tendered his defense in the action filed by Pickett
to defendant/respondent Truck Insurance Exchange (Truck), the
insurer of the HOA. Attorneys and defendants/respondents
Kevin Bevins, Kathleen Baxter-Walker, and Michael Cody
represented Watson in the matter. The case ultimately settled
with Pickett receiving $160,000 from the insurance company;
Watson was released with no admission of liability and suffered
no out of pocket loss.
Watson was dissatisfied with the representation he
received in the case and filed a lawsuit against Truck and the
attorneys. The gravamen of Watson’s complaint was that, in
Pickett’s action against him, Watson’s lawyers should have filed a
motion for judgment on the pleadings (MJOP) as it would have
dismissed him from the lawsuit more quickly and preserved his
business reputation as an arbitrator with the Financial Industry
Regulatory Authority (FINRA).
Defendants’ motion for summary judgment was granted
and judgment was entered in favor of defendants. Watson
challenges that ruling on appeal. We hold defendants had no
duty to file a MJOP and affirm the judgment.
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I. BACKGROUND
A. The Underlying Actions
The litigation began with a 2016 complaint filed in San
Bernardino County by Joseph Watson, as counsel for an HOA,
against respondent Nathaniel Pickett alleging the failure to pay
HOA dues. Pickett filed a cross-complaint against Watson and
the HOA; he ultimately dismissed the cross-complaint but, in
July 2018, he filed a new action against Watson, the HOA, and
others. With respect to Watson, the 2018 complaint alleged
breach of fiduciary duty and conversion; it was amended (but not
with respect to the causes of action) in November 2018. On
March 8, 2019, Watson’s demurrer to the first amended
complaint was overruled. A second amended complaint was filed
on February 28, 2020; again, the allegations against Watson
remained the same.
Watson filed a cross-complaint (representing himself) in
Pickett’s 2018 action; he alleged breach of contract, breach of
fiduciary duty, and conversion. He then tendered his defense in
the action filed by Pickett to Truck, the HOA’s insurance carrier.
Truck assigned the defense to in-house attorneys Kevin Bevins
and Kathleen Baxter-Walker. Bevins was the lead; his firm
consisted of employees of Farmers Insurance Exchange
(Farmers)—the company that managed claims on behalf of
Truck. Watson was told that all attorneys and staff in Bevins’s
firm were employees of Farmers. He was advised, in writing,
that the insurance company had the authority to make
settlement offers and settle the lawsuit filed against him.
On June 29, 2021, Pickett filed a MJOP on Watson’s cross-
complaint. The hearing was calendared for August 18, 2021, but
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was ultimately continued to September 29, 2021. On August 12,
2021, after Watson filed his opposition, he instructed Bevins not
to file a MJOP on Pickett’s complaint because he believed it
would undermine his cross-complaint. Six days later, Watson
reversed course and instructed Bevins to file a MJOP in time to
be heard on September 29, 2021. According to Watson’s
declaration in support of his opposition to the summary judgment
motion, Baxter-Walker informed him that the MJOP was not
filed because it “would not be meritorious.”
On the hearing date, the San Bernardino County Superior
Court granted Pickett’s MJOP as to Watson’s claims for breach of
fiduciary duty and conversion but denied it on the breach of
contract claim. The notice of ruling does not explain the court’s
rationale and a copy of the reporter’s transcript of the
proceedings is not part of the appellate record.1 In September
2021 Truck retained outside counsel (Michael Cody) because
Watson claimed he had a “conflict” with in-house counsel
assigned to his case. On November 17, 2021, at the direction of
Truck, Cody filed a substitution of attorney and became Watson’s
attorney.
1 In the introduction section of his opening brief, Watson
asserts the arguments that supported Pickett’s MJOP would
have also supported a MJOP filed by Watson. Because we do not
have a transcript of Pickett’s MJOP proceedings and have no
information regarding the rationale of the San Bernardino
County Superior Court, we are not inclined to jump to that
conclusion. In addition, Watson’s point is not developed in the
argument section of his brief. (Aton Center, Inc. v. United
Healthcare Ins. Co. (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 1214, 1240–1241 [an
appellate court is not required to consider an undeveloped
argument].)
4
On January 10, 2022, the trial court bifurcated the 2016
action from the 2018 action. It acknowledged Watson was
dismissed from the 2016 action in 2017. The surviving aspects of
the 2016 action were set for trial on April 11, 2022, while the
2018 matter was set for trial setting conference for that same
date. The court ordered there would be no additional discovery
and that it would not entertain any other dispositive motions.
Later that day, Watson emailed Cody and suggested Cody file a
MJOP. Three months later, before the trial setting conference,
the 2016 and 2018 cases settled; Truck paid $160,000 in
exchange for the release of Watson and others. The release
provides that it “shall never at any time or for any purpose be
considered an admission of liability or responsibility on the part
of any of the parties herein released.”
B. Summary Judgment
In April 2022, Watson filed a complaint against Truck,
Cody, Bevins, and Baxter-Walker alleging misconduct,
negligence, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The
complaint was based on what Watson believed to be poor legal
representation in the 2018 San Bernardino County case filed
against him. Two motions for summary judgment were filed—one
by Cody and another by the other defendants. An opposition and
replies to the opposition followed. The trial court granted the
motion on December 13, 2023.
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II. DISCUSSION
A party is entitled to summary judgment if there is no
triable issue of material fact and the party is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).) 2 “‘A
defendant moving for summary judgment bears the initial
burden to show the plaintiff’s action has no merit. [Citation.]
The defendant can meet that burden by either showing the
plaintiff cannot establish one or more elements of his or her cause
of action or there is a complete defense to the claim. [Citations.]
To meet this burden, the defendant must present evidence
sufficient to show he or she is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law. [Citation.]’” (Swanson v. Morongo Unified School Dist.
(2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 954, 962; see also § 437c, subd. (p)(2).)
“Once the defendant meets that burden, the burden shifts
to the plaintiff to present evidence establishing a triable issue
exists on one or more material facts. [Citations.] ‘In deciding
whether a plaintiff has met h[is] burden of proof, we consider
both direct and circumstantial evidence, and all reasonable
inferences to be drawn from both kinds of evidence, giving full
consideration to the negative and affirmative inferences to be
drawn from all of the evidence, including that which has been
produced by the defendant.’ [Citation.]” (Carlsen v. Koivumaki
(2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 879, 889.) “[T]he court must consider all
admissible evidence on the motion, except that to which
objections have been sustained, and ‘all inferences reasonably
deducible’ therefrom, except that summary judgment may not be
granted based on such inferences if they are contradicted by other
2 Further statutory references are to the Code of Civil
Procedure.
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inferences or evidence that raises a triable issue of fact.
[Citation.]” (Y.K.A. Industries, Inc. v. Redevelopment Agency of
City of San Jose (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 339, 352–353.) “‘An
issue of fact can only be created by a conflict of evidence. It is not
created by “speculation, conjecture, imagination or guess work.”
[Citation.]’” (Carlsen v. Koivumaki, supra, 227 Cal.App.4th at p.
889.)
“We independently review an order granting summary
judgment. [Citation.] We determine whether the court’s ruling
was correct, not its reasons or rationale. [Citation.] ‘In practical
effect, we assume the role of a trial court and apply the same
rules and standards which govern a trial court’s determination
of a motion for summary judgment.’ [Citation.] We review for
abuse of discretion any evidentiary ruling made in connection
with the motion. [Citation.]” (Shugart v. Regents of the
University of California (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 499, 504–505.)
A. No Duty to File a MJOP
“Where the injury is suffered by reason of an attorney’s
professional negligence, the gravamen of the claim is legal
malpractice, regardless of whether it is pled in tort or contract.
[Citations.]” (Kracht v. Perrin, Gartland & Doyle (1990) 219
Cal.App.3d 1019, 1022–1023; see also Hydro-Mill Co., Inc. v.
Hayward, Tilton & Rolapp Ins. Associates, Inc. (2004) 115
Cal.App.4th 1145, 1159–1160; Jackson v. Rogers & Wells (1989)
210 Cal.App.3d 336, 346–349; Southland Mechanical
Constructors Corp. v. Nixen (1981) 119 Cal.App.3d 417, 428–429.)
We agree with defendants that all three of Watson’s causes
of action sound in legal malpractice. The complaint begins, “the
crux of this lawsuit is that [d]efendants had the duty to protect
and defend [plaintiff] . . . but [d]efendants here willfully and
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intentionally refused to file a Motion for Judgment on the
Pleadings . . . that would have resulted in [plaintiff] being
dismissed as a [d]efendant altogether.” Indeed, all three causes
of action have the same factual foundation, i.e., defendants
caused harm (whether intentionally or negligently) to Watson
because they failed to file a MJOP.
In the cause of action for wanton/reckless misconduct,3
Watson alleged, “Defendants willfully wantonly, or recklessly”
breached their duty to “competently represent” Watson. The
claim stated, “Defendants acted with actual knowledge that if
they had filed the MJOP on behalf of [Watson], then [Watson]
would have been dismissed altogether . . . .” To support
negligence, Watson incorporated the paragraphs supporting the
cause of action for misconduct and specified that defendants, in
their legal representation of him, “breached their legal duty of
care owed to [Watson].” In claiming intentional infliction of
emotional distress, Watson “incorporate[ed]” the factual
underpinnings of the other causes of action and alleged
defendants conduct was intentional and caused extreme
emotional distress. In sum, the legitimacy of the complaint stood
or fell on whether defendants had a duty to file an MJOP on
plaintiff’s behalf.4 As Watson himself pointed out in the first
3 “‘[W]anton’ or ‘reckless’ misconduct . . . describes conduct by
a person who may have no intent to cause harm, but who
intentionally performs an act so unreasonable and dangerous
that he or she knows or should know it is highly probable that
harm will result. [Citations.]” (City of Santa Barbara v. Superior
Court (2007) 41 Cal.4th 747, 754, fn. 4.)
4 Watson disagrees with this characterization of his
complaint. He spends a good portion of his opening brief arguing
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sentence of his opposition to summary judgment, the “entire
[summary judgment] [m]otion” hinged on the question of “Why
didn’t [defendants], file a MJOP in [the 2018 case] on Mr.
Watson’s behalf . . . ?”
Legal malpractice exists when an attorney breaches his or
her duty to the client and that breach proximately causes an
actual loss or damage to the client. (Coscia v. McKenna & Cuneo
(2001) 25 Cal.4th 1194, 1199.) An attorney’s duty is “to use such
skill, prudence, and diligence as members of his or her profession
commonly possess and exercise . . . .” (Ibid.) “The attorney is not
liable for every mistake he may make in his practice; he is not, in
the absence of an express agreement, an insurer of the soundness
of his opinions . . . ; and he is not liable for being in error as to a
question of law on which reasonable doubt may be entertained by
well-informed lawyers. [Citations.]” (Kirsch v. Duryea (1978) 21
Cal.3d. 303, 308 .) Latitude is to be given to attorneys in their
selection of competing strategies. (Id., at p. 309.) An attorney “is
not liable for an informed tactical choice within the range of
reasonable competence.” (Barner v. Leeds (2000) 24 Cal.4th 676,
690.)
that the causes of action are akin to the breach of a fiduciary
duty. Watson heavily relies on his declaration submitted to the
trial court wherein he states that Bevins told him the insurance
company instructed Bevins not to file the MJOP because it
sought to damage Watson’s claims against Pickett. As stated by
the trial court, there was no evidence that the decisions of
Watson’s attorneys were “actually made” to benefit Pickett. More
to the point, Watson did not plead a cause of action for breach of
fiduciary duty.
9
In August 2021 and January 2022, Watson asked his
attorneys to pursue a MJOP on the ground that Pickett did not
have authority to bring his breach of fiduciary duty and
conversion causes of action.5 But this argument was previously
made when Watson, in pro per, filed the January 4, 2019
demurrer. In the demurrer he argued Pickett’s lawsuit was
invalid because Watson had no duty to Pickett and he (Watson)
could not be sued as a board member. The trial court rejected the
argument by way of an order overruling the demurrer. It is true
that a MJOP may be filed on the same grounds that were raised
and rejected in a previous demurrer, but this is permissible only
if “there has been a material change in applicable case law or
5 In the trial court, Watson took the position that the MJOP
would have been granted on all causes of action, and he would
have been dismissed from the case much sooner than his release
on the settlement date. In his opposition to the summary
judgment motion, he highlighted the importance of a dismissal at
this stage in the two ways. Watson pointed out that, while the
lawsuit was pending, he was required as a FINRA arbitrator, to
disclose that he had been sued but, if he had been dismissed at
the MJOP stage, that disclosure would have been absolved.
Second, he drew a distinction in the reputational damage of being
dismissed at the MJOP stage versus being dismissed without
admitting liability at the settlement stage; the former being less
damaging.
On appeal, however, Watson takes the position that “some”
of the Pickett’s claims would have been dismissed if a MJOP had
been filed. Watson does not explain the change in positions, why
the dismissal of some actions would absolve him of his disclosure
obligations, or how it would have benefited him to have some
actions dismissed at a MJOP but settle (without admission of
liability) on one or more remaining action.
10
statute since the ruling on the demurrer.” (§ 438, subd. (g)(1).)
Watson does not address this provision in his opening brief even
though the trial court indicated that, if the MJOP had been
brought, it would have been “improper” under section 438,
subdivision (g)(1).6 Nor does he discuss the trial court’s order
precluding further dispositive motions. Watson’s defense
attorneys had no professional duty to file a futile MJOP based on
a previously rejected theory.7 Indeed, had Cody filed a MJOP, he
would have directly violated a court order not to do so.8
6 The trial court’s determination that MJOP would not have
passed muster under section 438, subdivision (g)(1) is also
relevant to causation. While causation is not discussed in detail
herein, we make the following observations. To satisfy the
element of causation, plaintiff was required to establish a more
favorable judgment or settlement would have resulted if
defendants had filed the MJOP. (Viner v. Sweet (2003) 30 Cal.4th
1232, 1241.) Causation is a question for the trial court in a legal
malpractice action if the issue hinges on a question of law that
would have been determined by the trial court in the underlying
action. (Piscitelli v. Friedenberg (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 953, 970.)
Because the trial court acknowledged the MJOP would have been
improper, it stands to reason that the motion would have been
denied. This, in turn, defeats the element of causation.
7 At oral argument (but not in his brief), Watson contended
the motion was permissible under section 438, subdivision (g)(2).
This provision allows for a MJOP when a prior demurrer was not
made on the same ground. Because Watson’s demurrer covered
the grounds proposed for the MJOP, subdivision (g)(2) is not
applicable.
8 “The judgmental immunity doctrine relieves an attorney
from a finding of liability even where there was an unfavorable
result if there was an ‘honest error in judgment concerning a
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B. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (IIED)
Even if we were to carve out the IIED action as not
sounding in legal malpractice, Watson’s arguments remain
unpersuasive. To establish IIED, a plaintiff must prove “(1)
extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant with the intent
to cause, or reckless disregard for the probability of causing,
emotional distress; (2) suffering of severe or extreme emotional
distress by the plaintiff; and (3) the plaintiff’s emotional distress
is actually and proximately the result of the defendant’s
outrageous conduct.” (Chang v. Lederman (2009) 172
Cal.App.4th 67, 86.)
We begin and end our discussion with the first element.
“Outrageous conduct is that which exceeds ‘“. . . all bounds
usually tolerated by a decent society, [and is] of a nature which is
especially calculated to cause, and does cause, mental distress.
[Citation.]”’” (McDaniel v. Gile (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 363, 372.)
Watson does not mention the outrageous conduct element of IIED
in his opening brief, nor does he tie specific evidence to conduct
doubtful or debatable point of law . . . .’” (Blanks v. Seyfarth
Shaw LLP (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 336, 379.) Cody argues for the
applicability of this doctrine. Because we hold Cody did not make
any error in judgment, we decline to address the doctrine.
Truck, Bevins, and Baxter-Walker, argue the insurer and
its counsel had a right to settle the case and had no duty to
consult Watson. Their argument is supported by appropriate
authority, e.g., Fiege v. Cooke (2004)125 Cal.App.4th 1350,1355
and Western Polymer Technology, Inc. v. Reliance Ins. Co. (1995)
32 Cal.App.4th 14, 24. But we do not interpret the basis of
Watson’s causes of action to be that defendants’ entry into the
settlement was inappropriate; rather, our reading of the
complaint is that its factual basis is grounded in the failure to file
the MJOP.
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that is calculated to cause mental distress. Certainly, the
decision to not file a unmeritorious MJOP is far afield from
outrageous conduct.
C. Conflict of Interest
Watson claims the order granting summary judgment
should be reversed because Watson was represented by Farmer’s
attorneys and “Pickett was also its client.” It is quite clear from
the record that Pickett’s attorney (Robert D. Conway, Esq.) was a
member of a firm that was distinct from the firms associated with
Bevins and Cody. Also, Watson fails to cite any authority
explaining (1) why, as a matter of law, it is inappropriate for an
insurance company to employ two different firms to represent
opposing sides in a lawsuit, and (2) how this purported conflict
factors into whether the complaint survives a summary judgment
motion. It is the appellant’s burden to provide reasoned
arguments and citations to relevant legal authorities to support
that argument. (Lee v. Kim (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 705, 721.)9
9 Having determined that failing to file the MJOP was not a
legitimate foundation for Watson’s causes of action, we do not
address Watson’s argument that the trial court erroneously
imposed an issue sanction, i.e., finding Watson’s destruction of
relevant evidence precluded him from arguing his damages
included the loss of FINRA arbitration income.
13
DISPOSITION
The order granting summary judgment and the judgment
are affirmed. Defendants are to recover costs on appeal.10
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.
KUMAR, J.*
We Concur:
HOFFSTADT, P. J.
MOOR, J.
10 We decline the invitation by Truck, Bevins and Baxter-
Walker to find Watson’s appeal frivolous.
Retired Judge of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI,
section 6 of the California Constitution.
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