People v. Hancock CA2/2

CourtListener 10714227Calctapp29 oct. 2025

Texte intégral

Filed 10/29/25 P. v. Hancock CA2/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE, B337106

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. XCNA384043)
v.

MICHAEL HANCOCK,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Craig Richman, Judge. Affirmed.
Nancy L. Tetreault, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Idan Ivri and Nikhil Cooper, Deputy Attorneys
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_______________________________
Michael Hancock appeals from the trial court’s denial of his
petition for resentencing pursuant to Penal Code section 1172.6
following an evidentiary hearing.1 Hancock pleaded guilty to first
degree murder committed during an eight-day string of armed
robberies in 1982. The trial court found the evidence sufficient to
find beyond a reasonable doubt that Hancock was a major
participant in the robbery and attempted robbery leading to the
murder with reckless indifference to human life. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
I. Procedural Background
After a lengthy preliminary hearing, Hancock pleaded
guilty in 1986 to first degree murder and attempted robbery of
Nasario Ortiz (§ 187, subd. (a); count 1, §§ 211, 664; count 2),
grand theft (former § 487, subd. (3); count 8), and 17 counts of
robbery (§ 211; counts 3, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 19, 21, 22,
23, 24, 25 & 26); and further admitted a principal armed
enhancement (§ 12022, subd. (a)) as to all robbery counts except
count 3. The court found not true the personal use of a firearm
allegations as to counts 1 through 4.
In 1987, Hancock was sentenced to a term of: (1) 25 years
to life for the count 1 murder; (2) a consecutive midterm of
three years for the count 6 robbery, plus one year for the firearm
enhancement; (3) a consecutive one-third the midterm, or
one year, for the count 7 robbery; and (4) concurrent midterms for

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
Effective June 30, 2022, section 1170.95 was renumbered to
section 1172.6, with no change in text. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.)
We refer to the statute only by its current number for clarity and
convenience.

2
the remaining counts, with the related firearm enhancements
stayed pending completion of sentence.
In 2020, Hancock filed a petition in propria persona under
section 1172.6 seeking resentencing for his murder conviction.
The trial court appointed counsel and set an evidentiary hearing.
The trial court held the evidentiary hearing in February
2024. The court denied the petition, finding beyond a reasonable
doubt that Hancock was not eligible for relief because he “was a
major participant with reckless disregard.”
Hancock timely appealed. (§ 1237, subd. (b); Cal. Rules of
Court, rule 8.308(a).)
II. Factual Background
For the evidentiary hearing, the trial court reviewed the
preliminary hearing transcripts of Hancock and his codefendant,
Alton Lefridge, Jr., which covered three days and 24 witnesses.
Both Hancock and the People argued and submitted on that
record without providing new evidence. We detail the facts
relating only to those counts for which Hancock pled guilty.
A. October 8, 1982 Robberies of Yukie Koyama and
Yuji Kameda and Grand Theft from Yukie
Koyama (Counts 4, 7 & 8)
On October 8, 1982, at approximately 11:30 p.m., Yukie
Koyama and her boyfriend, Yuji Kameda, left the El Cholo
restaurant on Western Avenue in Los Angeles and walked to her
silver-blue BMW, about a block behind the restaurant. As soon as
they got into the car, Hancock and Lefridge approached. Lefridge,
who had a firearm like a shotgun, went to the driver’s side, while
Hancock went to the passenger side. Lefridge said, “Give me the
money,” with the gun pointed right next to Koyama’s head
through the window. Koyama gave Lefridge her purse and
Kameda gave Hancock his wallet. Next, the men ordered them

3
out of the car. Hancock pulled on Kameda’s shoulder, which made
Koyama frightened, so they exited the car. Lefridge and Hancock
got in the BMW and drove away.
B. October 9, 1982 Robberies of Jackie Atkins,
Brenda Weber, Charles Whitaker, James
Herbert, Timothy Garrett, Sally Denne, and
Debra Tarczy (Counts 9–15)
On October 9, 1982, at approximately 7:50 p.m., Jackie
Atkins parked her car in front of her house on Alcott Street in
Los Angeles. She noticed a metallic blue BMW parked on the
corner in a red zone. As she exited her car and retrieved a
package from the back seat, two men approached. Lefridge, who
came to the driver’s side door, pointed a shotgun at her, and the
other man went to the passenger side. Lefridge demanded her
purse, watch, necklace and other possessions. She complied and
Lefridge passed them to the other man. They told her to get back
in her car and not to move. Then they drove off in the BMW.
Shortly thereafter, at 8:00 p.m., Brenda Weber was exiting
a car on Francis Avenue in Los Angeles. She was with her son,
Cedric Hopson, and a friend, Charles Whitaker. As they were
standing outside talking, two men approached and got on either
side of the group. One man, armed with a sawed-off shotgun,
demanded their money and jewelry. Weber handed over her
purse and her watch. Hopson had nothing to give them, but they
took Whitaker’s money and jewelry as well. Weber identified the
unarmed man as Hancock.
At about 9:30 that same night, James Herbert and Tim
Garrett were standing on West 8th Street in Los Angeles. They
were speaking to Sally Denne and Debbie Tarczy, who were
seated inside Denne’s car, about to leave. A car pulled up whose
driver, later identified as Lefridge, was armed with a shotgun.
Lefridge and the second man got out and threatened to shoot

4
Herbert and Garrett unless they turned around and stayed
silent. Lefridge held the gun to the back of Herbert’s head and
took money from his pockets. The second man likewise took
property from Garrett, including an Omega watch. The assailants
also took Denne’s and Tarczy’s purses and jewelry. At one point,
Herbert turned around and pushed the barrel of Lefridge’s gun
aside. In response, Lefridge hit him in the head with the shotgun.
Herbert lost consciousness and fell to the ground. He was
hospitalized for three days.
C. October 12, 1982 Robbery of Warnetta Williams
(Count 19)
On October 12, 1982, at approximately 9:15 p.m., Warnetta
Williams was standing outside of her car with her three-year-old
son inside. Two men approached. One, whom she later identified
as Hancock, was holding a shotgun. They demanded her jewelry,
her purse, and her keys. She complied.
D. October 14, 1982 Robberies of Villalaz Salvador
Munoz, Blanca Pineda, and Attempted Robbery
and Murder of Nasario Ortiz (Counts 1–3)
On October 14, 1982, at about 9:15 p.m., Villalaz Salvador
Munoz drove Blanca Pineda to her home on West 9th Street. Also
in the car were Munoz’s friend, Nasario Ortiz, and Munoz’s eight-
year-old child. Pineda and Munoz had different recollections of
the events that followed.
Pineda testified Hancock and another man approached, and
she identified Hancock as the man holding a rifle.2 When the
passengers exited the car, the men approached from either side.

2 We assume, as do the parties, that witness Pineda
misidentified Hancock at trial and that it was Lefridge who held
and shot the rifle, as the trial court found insufficient evidence to
support any personal weapons enhancements against Hancock.

5
The man holding the rifle demanded money, and the unarmed
man took Pineda’s purse. Ortiz was holding a white plastic bag.
Ortiz pulled out his pockets and said he had no money. Then the
man holding the rifle told Ortiz to “get away a little,” and shot
him dead. The two men took off running.
According to Munoz, three men came up to his car when
they arrived at Pineda’s apartment building. Two had pistols and
a third, whom he identified as Lefridge, had “something like a
rifle.” The three men demanded money. Munoz saw Ortiz shake
his empty pockets out. Hancock and a second gunman took
Pineda’s purse and the white plastic bag Ortiz was holding, and
ran. Lefridge remained and shot Ortiz with the rifle.
Both witnesses testified the entire incident took about
five minutes. Hancock’s fingerprint was discovered on the white
plastic bag Ortiz had been holding.
E. October 15, 1982 Robberies of Robert Conrad
Mitchell, Lucille Patterson, Annette Bryant,
Stanley Lewis, Dorothy Lewis, and Ruth Lewis
(Counts 21–26)
On October 15, 1982, at approximately 8:15 p.m., Robert
Conrad Mitchell left the El Cholo restaurant on Western Avenue
with Lucille Patterson. As they walked toward his parked car, a
black car pulled up and two men got out. The driver, whom
Mitchell later identified as Hancock, pointed a shotgun at
Mitchell’s stomach and demanded money.3 The other man was
not armed. They took Mitchell’s money and ring and Patterson’s
purse and jewelry, and then drove off.

3 We similarly assume Mitchell misidentified Hancock
instead of Lefridge at trial as the man holding the shotgun.

6
At about 8:45 that same night, Stanley Lewis drove
Annette Bryant to the home of Dorothy Lewis on South
8th Avenue. When he opened the car door, Lefridge and Hancock
approached. Lefridge held a sawed-off shotgun to Stanley’s4 neck
and told him not to look or he would “blow [him] away.” Stanley
turned away and Hancock told Stanley to give him his jewelry.
After Stanley complied, Lefridge told him to throw his car keys
under the car and run away. When Stanley started walking down
the street, he felt a push in the back with the gun. Bryant stayed
in the car initially, and then Hancock opened the car door and
told her to remove her jewelry. After she handed it to Hancock,
he walked back over to Lefridge.
At that point, Dorothy drove up and parked her car with
Ruth and Kelly inside. Lefridge came to Dorothy’s side armed
with a sawed-off shotgun, stuck his hands in the window and
unlocked the door. Putting his gun to Dorothy’s temple, Lefridge
demanded her purse and jewelry. Hancock approached the car
and took her purse. Lefridge then demanded Dorothy’s keys,
threw them under the car, and both men left.
Later that evening, at about 10:45, Lefridge and Hancock
led police on a high-speed chase in a stolen Mustang.5 The chase
ended when they crashed into a parked vehicle. The men fled on
foot, but police found them. Police recovered three rings and a

4 Since they share the same last name, we refer to Stanley,
Dorothy, Ruth, and Kelly Lewis by their first names.
5 The Mustang was stolen during a robbery on October 11,
1982, about which testimony provided at the preliminary hearing
inculpated only a single robber, and was not among those counts
to which Hancock pled guilty. Two additional robberies were also
the subject of the preliminary hearing but did not result in
charges being filed against Hancock.

7
watch on Lefridge’s person and Garrett’s Omega watch in
Hancock’s possession.
DISCUSSION
I. Applicable Legal Principles for a Petition for
Resentencing under Section 1172.6
Effective January 1, 2019, the Legislature limited
accomplice liability under the felony murder rule and eliminated
the natural and probable consequences doctrine as it relates to
murder. (Sen. Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.).)
Section 1172.6 provides a mechanism by which people, “ ‘who
believe they were convicted of murder for an act that no longer
qualifies as murder following the crime’s redefinition in 2019[]
may seek vacatur of their murder conviction and resentencing by
filing a petition in the trial court.’ ” (People v. Arnold (2023)
93 Cal.App.5th 376, 382.)
If the trial court concludes the petition makes a prima facie
showing for relief, it must issue an order to show cause and hold
an evidentiary hearing. (§ 1172.6, subd. (c).) At the evidentiary
hearing, the prosecution bears the burden of proving, beyond a
reasonable doubt, that the petitioner is ineligible for
resentencing. (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).) At the evidentiary stage,
the trial court “may consider evidence previously admitted at any
prior hearing,” except for “hearsay evidence that was admitted in
a preliminary hearing pursuant to subdivision (b) of
[s]ection 872,” which shall be excluded from the hearing as
hearsay, unless there is another hearsay exception that makes
the evidence admissible. (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).)
We review the trial court’s denial of a section 1172.6
petition for substantial evidence. (People v. Reyes (2023)
14 Cal.5th 981, 988.) “Under this standard, we review the record

8
‘ “ ‘in the light most favorable to the judgment below to determine
whether it discloses substantial evidence—that is, evidence
which is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—such that a
reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt.’ ” ’ ” (Ibid.) The review on appeal is different
from the role of the trial court in deciding the section 1172.6
petition in the first instance: “While the trial judge must review
all the relevant evidence, evaluate and resolve contradictions,
and make determinations as to credibility, all under the
reasonable doubt standard, our job is to determine whether there
is any substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, to
support a rational fact finder’s findings beyond a reasonable
doubt.” (People v. Clements (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 276, 298.)
II. Evolution of the Major Participant with Reckless
Disregard for Human Life Standard
Section 189, subdivision (e) provides: “A participant in the
perpetration or attempted perpetration of a felony listed in
subdivision (a) in which a death occurs is liable for murder” if,
among other things, “[t]he person was a major participant in the
underlying felony and acted with reckless indifference to human
life, as described in subdivision (d) of [s]ection 190.2.”
(Id., subd. (e)(3).)
The language in sections 190.2, subdivision (d) and 189,
subdivision (e)(3), derives verbatim from the United States
Supreme Court’s decision in Tison v. Arizona (1987) 481 U.S. 137,
which upheld a death sentence against a challenge under the
Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. (People v.
Estrada (1995) 11 Cal.4th 568, 575.) The incorporation of Tison’s
standard in section 190.2 brought California’s capital sentencing

9
statutory law into conformity with prevailing Eighth Amendment
doctrine. (Estrada, at p. 575.)
Subsequently, the California Supreme Court provided
guidance on the meaning of the two statutory phrases “major
participant” and “reckless indifference to human life.” (People v.
Banks (2015) 61 Cal.4th 788, 801–804 (Banks); People v. Clark
(2016) 63 Cal.4th 522, 610 (Clark).) In Banks, the California
Supreme Court explained that “Tison and a prior decision on
which it is based, Enmund v. Florida (1982) 458 U.S. 782
[(Enmund)] collectively place conduct on a spectrum, with felony-
murder participants eligible for death only when their
involvement is substantial and they demonstrate a reckless
indifference to the grave risk of death created by their actions.”
(Banks, at p. 794.) “Somewhere between them, at conduct less
egregious than the Tisons’ but more culpable than Earl
Enmund’s, lies the constitutional minimum for death eligibility.”
(Id. at p. 802.) And the court explained Enmund’s conduct does
not represent the constitutional maximum for death ineligibility;
that is, Enmund does not establish “the most culpable one can be
and yet still be constitutionally ineligible for death, such that any
variation could move one into the death-eligible zone.” (Banks, at
p. 811.)
While Banks provided a list of considerations for the “major
participant” prong, Clark identified a list of considerations
relevant to the “reckless indifference” prong of the requirement.
(People v. Emanuel (2025) 17 Cal.5th 867, 883 (Emanuel); People
v. Scoggins (2020) 9 Cal.5th 667, 676, 683 (Scoggins).)
A. Major Participant
In Banks, the court identified the following factors a court
should consider in determining whether an individual was a

10
major participant: “[(1)] What role did the defendant have in
planning the criminal enterprise that led to one or more deaths?
[(2)] What role did the defendant have in supplying or using
lethal weapons? [(3)] What awareness did the defendant have of
particular dangers posed by the nature of the crime, weapons
used, or past experience or conduct of the other participants?
[(4)] Was the defendant present at the scene of the killing, in a
position to facilitate or prevent the actual murder, and did his or
her own actions or inaction play a particular role in the death?
[and] [(5)] What did the defendant do after lethal force was
used?” (Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 803, fn. omitted.) The court
continued, “No one of these considerations is necessary, nor is
any one of them necessarily sufficient. All may be weighed in
determining the ultimate question, whether the defendant’s
participation ‘in criminal activities known to carry a grave risk of
death’ [citation] was sufficiently significant to be considered
‘major.’ ” (Id. at p. 803.)
In Banks, the evidence placed the nonshooter defendant at
the Enmund end of the Tison-Enmund spectrum as it related to
the “major participation” requirement, acting solely as the
getaway driver for an armed robbery. (Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th
at pp. 804–805.) The court explained there was no evidence the
defendant there played any role in planning the robbery; no
evidence he procured weapons; no evidence any of the
participants had previously committed murder, attempted
murder, or any other violent crime; the defendant was absent
from the scene of the crime and there was no evidence he saw or
heard the shooting; he had no immediate role in instigating it,
nor could he have prevented it. (Id. at p. 805.) The court also
found insufficient evidence of “reckless indifference,” where

11
“nothing at trial supported the conclusion beyond a reasonable
doubt that [the defendant] knew his own actions would involve a
grave risk of death.” (Id. at p. 807.)
B. Reckless Indifference
In Clark, the California Supreme Court declined to
consider whether a nonshooter defendant was a major participant
because the evidence was insufficient to uphold a finding that he
acted with reckless indifference to human life. (Clark, supra,
63 Cal.4th at p. 611.) The Clark court noted there was both a
subjective and objective element to reckless indifference, quoting
Model Penal Code section 2.02, subdivision (2)(c): “ ‘A person acts
recklessly with respect to a material element of an offense when
he consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk
that the material element exists or will result from his conduct.
The risk must be of such a nature and degree that, considering
the nature and purpose of the actor’s conduct and the
circumstances known to him, its disregard involves a gross
deviation from the standard of conduct that a law-abiding person
would observe in the actor’s situation.’ ” (Clark, at p. 617.)
The Clark court “set out a nonexhaustive list of
considerations relevant to [the reckless indifference standard],
including [(1)] use of or awareness of the presence of a weapon or
weapons, [(2)] physical presence at the scene and opportunity to
restrain confederates or aid victims, [(3)] the duration of the
crime, [(4)] knowledge of any threat the confederates might
represent, and [(5)] efforts taken to minimize risks.” (People v.
Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 706, citing Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th
at pp. 618–623.) The “major participant” and “reckless
indifference” elements significantly overlap. (Strong, at p. 706;
Clark, at p. 615.)

12
Clark applied this standard and the factors spelled out in
Banks and other appellate cases to its facts. First, there was only
one gun at the scene, and Clark was not carrying it. (Clark,
supra, 63 Cal.4th at pp. 618–619.) Second, Clark was waiting
across the parking lot when the shooting occurred. (Id. at
pp. 619–620.) Third, the robbery was planned to occur after
closing time, when most of the store employees were gone, and
the period of interaction between perpetrators and victims was
designed to be limited. (Id. at pp. 620–621.) Fourth, because
Clark was across the street from the scene, “[he] had no
opportunity to observe anything in [the shooter’s] actions just
before the shooting that would have indicated that [the shooter]
was likely to engage in lethal violence.” (Id. at p. 621.) Finally,
there was evidence Clark made some efforts to minimize the risks
of violence, such as not loading the gun or loading it with only
one bullet; however, the court determined Clark’s subjective risk-
mitigation efforts did not necessarily foreclose an objective
finding he acted with reckless indifference. (Id. at p. 622.)
Turning to the facts, the court concluded that “there appear[ed]
to be nothing in [Clark’s] plan that one c[ould] point to that
elevated the risk to human life beyond those risks inherent in
any armed robbery,” which is insufficient to show reckless
indifference to human life. (Id. at p. 623.)
Most recently, in Emanuel, supra, 17 Cal.5th 867, the
California Supreme Court applied the Banks and Clark standard
on reckless indifference to a resentencing petition filed under
section 1172.6. The court held the facts before it did not support a
finding of reckless indifference, reversing the denial of
resentencing. Specifically, the evidence showed Emanuel set out
to commit a robbery in a public place in the middle of the

13
afternoon. He was not armed and did not know his confederate
was armed or likely to use lethal force. The crime unfolded
without a prolonged period of restraint. When met with
unexpected resistance from the victim, Emanuel told his
confederate, “ ‘let’s go,’ ” and began to walk away. (Emanuel, at
p. 896.) The court concluded his conduct in fleeing the scene
without rendering aid after the shooting was ambiguous; it could
have reflected a lack of regard for the victim, a desire to avoid
arrest, or both. (Id. at p. 893.) However, as the remaining factors
weighed against a finding of reckless indifference, the court
concluded that standing alone, the last factor was insufficient to
demonstrate reckless indifference. (Id. at p. 891.)
III. Application of the Law to the Facts
Applying the law from these decisions and others to the
facts from the evidentiary hearing in this case, we conclude there
is substantial evidence to support the trial court’s finding that
Hancock was a major participant in the robbery and attempted
robbery of October 14, 1982, that led to Ortiz’s murder, acting
with reckless indifference to human life.
A. Major Participant
1. Role in the Planning
There is no evidence of who planned the robbery that led to
Ortiz’s death. However, it took place on October 14, after at least
five other robberies by Lefridge and Hancock the week prior. All
of the robberies for which Hancock pleaded guilty followed a
similar pattern; thus, while we cannot say Hancock planned the
robberies to occur this way, we can clearly infer he understood
and agreed as to how they were generally going to unfold,
including on the night the murder took place.

14
The modus operandi, in which Hancock repeatedly
participated, was as follows. First, Lefridge carried a gun, while
Hancock did not. Second, the robberies all took place in the
evening, between 7:50 and 11:30. Third, Lefridge approached the
driver’s side of a parked car while its occupants were exiting or
entering, and Hancock generally approached the passenger side.
Fourth, Lefridge told the victims they were being robbed, at
which time he and Hancock demanded their valuables. Fifth,
both men collected the items and fled.
Hancock argues Lefridge was the leader during the
robberies and Hancock was no more than a subordinate aider and
abettor to Lefridge. But “[a] major participant need not be the
ringleader.” (People v. Williams (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1244, 1281.)
And the question whether Hancock was no more than a
subordinate aider and abettor requires a review of all the factors.
Here, the multiple robberies Hancock and Lefridge had recently
committed together put Hancock on notice of the plan for the
robbery that led to Ortiz’s murder, including the use of a lethal
weapon. This factor weighs in favor of finding Hancock was a
major participant.
2. Supplying or Using Lethal Weapons
There is no substantial evidence Hancock either supplied or
used the weapon that killed Ortiz. While one witness, Pineda,
testified Hancock did have a weapon, the People did not pursue
that theory at the preliminary hearing and the trial court found
the allegation not true. Hancock’s plea did not admit any firearm
enhancement as to the murder or attempted robbery of Ortiz.
This factor weighs against finding Hancock was a major
participant.

15
3. Awareness of Dangers Posed by the
Nature of the Crime, Weapons Used, or
Past Experience of the Other Participants
Again, their recent string of robberies together put Hancock
on notice that Lefridge would be armed with a sawed-off
shotgun—a highly lethal weapon. He was also aware Lefridge
was willing to use it. On at least one occasion, Lefridge used the
weapon to knock a victim unconscious. However, there is no
evidence Hancock knew Lefridge would actually shoot Ortiz.
Hancock also knew the robberies would be carried out at night.
One of the witnesses, Munoz, placed an additional gunman at the
robbery, but there is no evidence as to whether that additional
gunman made the crime more or less potentially dangerous.
Nonetheless, given Hancock’s knowledge that Lefridge would be
armed with a sawed-off shotgun at night and was willing to
subject his victims to extreme violence, this factor weighs in favor
of finding Hancock was a major participant.
4. Presence at the Scene of the Killing, or in
a Position to Facilitate or Prevent the
Murder
Hancock was present for and actively participated in the
attempted robbery of Ortiz. Among other things, his fingerprint
was found on the white bag Ortiz had been holding. It is true
Hancock (and the additional robber, if there was one) had
stepped away from the victims’ car when Lefridge told Ortiz to
move away and then shot him. Hancock argues this factor weighs
against finding he was a major participant, since he was running
away when the gun was fired. However, all the robbers left
together in the same vehicle when they fled, so Hancock cannot
have been too far away when the killing occurred. And he was

16
present during the encounter up to the killing. He was certainly
not, for example, waiting across the street in a getaway car with
no knowledge of the events as they were transpiring. We cannot
say this factor weighs in favor or against finding Hancock was a
major participant.
5. What the Defendant Did After the Killing
After the shooting, Hancock fled in the same vehicle with
Lefridge. Hancock did not turn around or offer help to Ortiz.
The very next night, Hancock and Lefridge committed
two more armed robberies together, involving six new victims,
using the same modus operandi. For these subsequent robberies,
Lefridge was still armed with the shotgun, and pointed it at a
victim’s stomach, at another’s neck and another’s temple, while
Hancock demanded or took valuables. This factor weighs heavily
in support of a finding that Hancock was a major participant.
6. Totality of the Circumstances
Reviewing the factors in this nonexhaustive list and the
totality of the circumstances, we have no trouble concluding the
evidence supports the trial court’s finding that Hancock was a
major participant in the attempted robbery that led to Ortiz’s
death. Rather than a mere “subordinate aider and abettor,”
Hancock was integral to the entire armed robbery scheme even
though he was not the one holding the gun. While Lefridge held
the gun, Hancock demanded and took valuables from the victims,
and then fled with Lefridge. With two men, there was less of a
chance for the victims to escape or fight back. Hancock knew the
plan well, and was a central participant in it on at least
five occasions before the robbery that led to Ortiz’s death.
Nor was Hancock so surprised or repelled by Lefridge
shooting Ortiz that he discontinued their criminal partnership.

17
Instead, Hancock participated in two more robberies the next
night, using the same modus operandi and even the same weapon
that killed Ortiz. The partnership ended only as a result of their
arrest.
Hancock’s role in the robbery was clearly more substantial
than those defendants found not to have been major participants,
such as in Enmund and Banks. In Enmund, the defendant
actually planned the robbery, but he was not present and was
waiting in a getaway car when the unplanned murder occurred.
(Enmund, supra, 458 U.S. at p. 788.) In Banks, the defendant
was absent from the scene of the robbery, sitting in a car and
waiting, with no evidence that he heard or saw the shooting.
(Banks, supra, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 805.) In contrast, Hancock
participated in multiple armed robberies, including several on
the same night, which he either helped to plan or knowingly took
part in, playing a central role in taking the valuables while his
violent partner wielded a lethal weapon.
B. Reckless Indifference
1. Use of or Awareness of the Presence of
Weapons and Knowledge of Cohort’s
Likelihood of Killing
As noted above, there is no substantial evidence Hancock
used weapons in the commission of the attempted robbery. He
was, however, aware Lefridge was armed with a lethal weapon in
the robbery on October 14, 1982, and in the preceding robberies.
(Cf. Emanuel, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 885 [“no evidence in the
record demonstrating that, prior to the robbery, Emanuel knew
[the killer] possessed a gun, would bring that gun to the robbery,
or was likely to use lethal force”].) Hancock was also aware
Lefridge had used the shotgun to knock a previous victim

18
unconscious. This put Hancock on notice that Lefridge was
capable of violence that could cause great bodily injury, if not
death. There is no evidence Hancock thought the weapon was
unloaded. On the other hand, there was no evidence Hancock had
prior knowledge Lefridge would shoot the weapon. Nevertheless,
this factor weighs in support of a finding of reckless indifference.
2. Duration of the Crime
The robbery that culminated with Ortiz’s death lasted
about five minutes. “Courts have considered ‘whether a murder
came at the end of a prolonged period of restraint of the victims
by defendant’ in analyzing the defendant’s culpability.” (Scoggins,
supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 680, quoting Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at
p. 620.)
The robbery was relatively short in duration, although it
did involve several victims who were each told to hand over their
valuables, one of whom emptied his pockets to show he did not
have anything in them. This apparently angered Lefridge who
told him to “move away,” and then shot him at close range. This
factor weighs against a finding of reckless indifference.
3. Efforts Taken to Minimize the Risk of
Violence
Contrasted with Clark, Scoggins and Emanuel, the record
here does not reflect Hancock made efforts in advance to
minimize the risks of violence. (Cf. Emanuel, supra, 17 Cal.5th at
p. 895 [Emanuel unarmed during robbery at a public park in the
middle of the afternoon]; Scoggins, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 683
[Scoggins’s plan was for a daytime confrontation in a public
parking lot without the use of weapons]; Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th
at pp. 621–623 [Clark and his confederates waited until after a

19
store was closed before they robbed it; there were not supposed to
be any bullets in the gun; and the gun only had one bullet in it].)
Here, while there was no direct evidence Hancock played a
role in planning the robbery leading to Ortiz’s death, he
participated in at least six robberies up to and including that one.
So the evidence shows Hancock willingly participated in a string
of nighttime robberies in parking lots or driveways open to the
public but where the light was dim. The record does not reflect
how many people were, or were likely to be, present at the time of
the incident. There was no evidence Hancock knew Lefridge was
likely to shoot someone, but there was evidence Hancock knew
Lefridge was willing and able to commit violence with the weapon
sufficient to inflict great bodily injury. There was no evidence the
gun was just for show or that the gun did not or was not supposed
to contain bullets. As there is no evidence Hancock attempted to
mitigate any dangers, this factor weighs in favor of a finding of
reckless indifference.
4. Physical Presence at the Scene and
Opportunity to Restrain Confederates or
Aid Victims
It is uncontested that Hancock was physically present
during the robbery, although he was leaving the scene at the time
Lefridge shot Ortiz. Nonetheless, Hancock’s fingerprint was on
the white bag Ortiz turned over at the robbery, and Hancock was
present when Ortiz pulled out his pockets and said he had no
money. Before Lefridge shot Ortiz, Lefridge told him to “get away
a little.” Hancock and Lefridge left the scene in the same vehicle.
“ ‘Proximity to the murder and the events leading up to it
may be particularly significant where . . . the murder is a
culmination or a foreseeable result of several intermediate steps,

20
or where the [co-]participant who personally commits the murder
exhibits behavior tending to suggest a willingness to use lethal
force. In such cases, “the defendant’s presence allows him to
observe his cohorts so that it is fair to conclude that he shared in
their actions and mental state. . . . [Moreover,] the defendant’s
presence gives him an opportunity to act as a restraining
influence on murderous cohorts. If the defendant fails to act as a
restraining influence, then the defendant is arguably more at
fault for the resulting murders.” ’ ” (Emanuel, supra, 17 Cal.5th
at p. 889, quoting Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 619.)
Hancock was at the scene and it is reasonable to infer he
was aware of the risk of impending lethal violence once Ortiz
indicated he had no money, or when Lefridge told Ortiz to get
away a little. There is no evidence Hancock told Lefridge to let
Ortiz be, even after Ortiz turned out his empty pockets.
(Cf. Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 621 [“Nor did defendant have
an opportunity to observe [the shooter]’s response to [the victim’s]
unanticipated appearance or to intervene to prevent her
killing.”].)
In any event, “[t]he essential question underpinning our
analysis is not whether [the nonshooter] did enough to stop [the
killer’s] unplanned act of violence; it is whether [the nonshooter]
acted with the requisite mens rea, i.e., reckless indifference to
human life. The focus should not be on the ultimate efficacy of his
actions, but on what his actions reveal about his mental state.”
(Emanuel, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 891.)
This factor weighs slightly in favor of a finding of reckless
indifference. On the one hand, Hancock was at the scene and saw
the events leading up to the shooting yet made no attempt to

21
intervene; on the other, he was in the process of leaving when the
shooting occurred.
5. Hancock’s Age Does Not Mandate
Reversal
Hancock argues that, although he argued the issue to the
trial court in his evidentiary brief, the trial court erred in failing
to explicitly account for his age (23) in determining whether he
acted with reckless indifference.
While the California Supreme Court has not yet addressed
this factor, some appellate courts have found a defendant’s youth
relevant to the reckless indifference analysis. (Emanuel, supra,
supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 885, fn. 6, citing cases.) For example, in
People v. Pittman (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 400, 416–417, the court
acknowledged numerous appellate decisions treating a
defendant’s youth, defined roughly as 25 years or younger, as a
factor within the totality of the circumstances relevant to the
requisite mental state for felony murder. Those cases reason that,
in light of our evolving understanding of adolescent brain
development, “it is far from clear [whether a juvenile could be]
actually aware ‘of particular dangers posed by the nature of the
crime, weapons used, or past experience or conduct of the other
participants.’ ” (People v. Harris (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 939, 960.)
Hancock notes the record does not show the trial court
considered his age. However, nor does the record show the
opposite. “Absent evidence to the contrary, we presume that the
trial court knew the law and followed it.” (People v. Ramirez
(2021) 10 Cal.5th 983, 1042.) All the caselaw Hancock cites
predates the February 2024 evidentiary hearing at which the
trial court made its ruling.

22
Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s implied
finding that Hancock’s age at the time of his crimes does not
overcome the other factors supporting a finding of reckless
indifference.
First, “the presumption of immaturity weakens as a
defendant approaches 26.” (People v. Oliver (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th
466, 489.) Second, as in Oliver, the differences in brain
development cited in the caselaw which can affect a youthful
offender’s mental state do not apply given the facts in this case.
(Ibid.; see also Miller v. Alabama (2012) 567 U.S. 460, 471.) Here,
rather than impulsivity or vulnerability to peer pressure, the
evidence shows a pattern of robberies committed with the same
deadly weapon, both before and after the event leading to Ortiz’s
death. The murder did not happen during a single impulsive
event but as one in a series that took place over a week. There is
no evidence any kind of peer pressure was applied to Hancock.
Hancock argues that Lefridge was the leader, because he carried
the shotgun, drove the cars, took the lead in approaching the
victims, and engaged in all the violence. Even so, there is no
evidence Hancock felt compelled to assist Lefridge in these
robberies or felt pressure to join him, rather than simply making
a bad decision. (Cf. People v. Ramirez (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 970,
991 [detailing evidence that a 15-year-old defendant was
influenced by peer pressure].) There is no evidence Hancock
wanted to end his relationship with Lefridge after any of the
robberies. This factor is neutral.
6. The Totality of the Circumstances
Weighing all the factors above and the totality of the
circumstances, the trial court did not err in concluding the
evidence supported a finding of deliberate indifference beyond a

23
reasonable doubt. If there were any doubt about Hancock’s state
of mind before he committed the robbery and attempted robbery
leading to Ortiz’s death, it was put to rest by Hancock’s continued
participation in further robberies the very next night using the
same modus operandi, including the lethal sawed-off shotgun.
Hancock’s youth does not weigh to the contrary, where he can
point to no evidence that he felt pressured or was forced to
participate, or that he acted impulsively in going along with
Lefridge. That he continued to commit more robberies after
Ortiz’s murder shows Hancock was indifferent to whether the
crimes he committed with Lefridge ended in the taking of a
person’s life, the precise question the trial court was required to
consider.
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.

RICHARDSON, J.
I CONCUR:

GOORVITCH, J. 

 Judge of the Los Angeles County Superior Court, assigned
by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the
California Constitution.

24
B337106
People v. Hancock
CHAVEZ, Acting P. J., Concurring.

I concur in the judgment only.

CHAVEZ, Acting P. J.

1

Poursuivez vos recherches dans ChatGPT ou Claude

Connectez Omnilex pour rechercher dans le corpus juridique depuis votre assistant IA.