Keller v. Bisno CA2/2

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Filed 10/27/25 Keller v. Bisno CA2/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO

KATHERINE D. KELLER, B334054
Cross-complainant and Respondent,
(Los Angeles
v. County
Super. Ct. No.
JEANETTE ANN BISNO,
18STCV09206)
Cross-defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. James E. Blancarte, Judge. Affirmed in part
and reversed in part.
Law Offices of Robert H. Bisno and Robert H. Bisno for
Cross-defendant and Appellant.
Willoughby & Associates, Anthony Willoughby and
Anthony Willoughby II for Cross-complainant and Respondent.

__________________________________________
This case involves a dispute over a parking space that
unfortunately made its way into a courtroom. The dispute led to
a misdemeanor assault conviction followed by this civil judgment
in the aggregate amount of $193,255. This reflects overzealous
litigation and waste of judicial resources.
Jeanette Ann Bisno (Bisno) appeals from the judgment that
she is liable to Katherine D. Keller (Keller) for assault, battery,
and intentional infliction of emotional distress. We affirm the
judgment against Bisno for assault and battery and Keller’s
$10,355 award of special damages for economic loss. However,
we reverse the judgment in favor of Keller for intentional
infliction of emotional distress and her $28,900 award of general
damages for noneconomic loss. The jury awarded damages
improperly based on a claim of emotional distress that was never
pleaded and never the subject of a motion to amend.
Additionally, the trial evidence was insufficient to support the
cause of action as pleaded. We also reverse Keller’s $154,000
punitive damages award for insufficient evidence of Bisno’s
ability to pay and improper argument by Keller’s counsel.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I. The Parking Space Dispute
On December 13, 2018, Keller and Bisno were each looking
for a parking space inside a Beverly Hills parking structure.
Keller drove into a parking space and noticed Bisno’s car stopped
directly behind her. When Keller left her car, Bisno approached
on foot, screamed threats and obscenities, and demanded Keller
vacate the parking space. Keller was carrying a cup of coffee and
began to walk away. Bisno followed, knocked the coffee cup from
Keller’s hand, pushed her, and kicked the fallen cup.

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According to Bisno, Keller was behind her in the line of
drivers seeking an empty parking space. Suddenly, Keller passed
Bisno on the right and pulled into a parking space for which
Bisno had been waiting. Bisno emerged from her car to speak to
Keller, who immediately refused to move her car. Keller
approached Bisno, carrying a coffee cup. Bisno feared she would
be harmed. Bisno admitted to having pushed Keller and
knocking the coffee cup from her hand. Bisno then kicked the
cup out of the way so Keller could not grab it and throw coffee at
her. Bisno agreed she “did overreact.”
The parking structure’s video camara captured the
incident. After police arrived and watched the video recording,
they found Bisno.1 She was cited and released on a charge of
misdemeanor battery.
II. Relevant Pretrial Proceedings
On December 20, 2018, Bisno, represented by her husband
Robert H. Bisno (Attorney Bisno), filed a lawsuit against “Doe”
defendants for assault, battery, intentional infliction of emotional
distress, false imprisonment, and false arrest.
On March 8, 2019, a misdemeanor complaint was filed
charging Bisno with committing simple battery against Keller.
On March 13, 2019, Bisno was arraigned on the
misdemeanor complaint and pleaded not guilty. She was
represented by Attorney Bisno.
On March 14, 2019, Bisno amended her lawsuit to
substitute Keller as a Doe defendant.
On June 20, 2019, Keller filed a cross-complaint against
Bisno for assault, battery, intentional infliction of emotional

1 The video recording was played for the jury during trial.

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distress, violating Civil Code section 52 (Bane Act) and malicious
prosecution.
On October 29, 2019, Bisno pleaded no contest to simple
assault.2 She was placed on summary probation, ordered to
complete community service and an anger management class,
and to pay statutory fines and fees.
On December 2, 2020, a restitution hearing was held in
criminal court. Anthony Willoughby, Keller’s retained counsel on
her cross-complaint, requested attorney fees be awarded to Keller
as victim restitution under Penal Code section 1202.4.3 The
criminal court denied the request.
On December 4, 2020, Bisno dismissed her lawsuit against
Keller without prejudice.
III. Motions In Limine
Both parties brought pretrial motions in limine. Pertinent
here, the trial court granted Bisno’s motions to prevent Keller
and Attorney Willoughby from referring to any matters beyond
the assault, battery, and intentional infliction of emotional
distress causes of action as alleged in the cross-complaint.

2 The criminal court’s minute order shows a battery
conviction under Penal Code section 242. But the Misdemeanor
Advisement of Rights, Waiver, and Plea Form shows Bisno
pleaded no contest to assault under Penal Code section 240.
3 Attorney Bisno continued to represent Bisno throughout
the trial, posttrial motions, and now on appeal. Likewise,
Attorney Willoughby remained Keller’s counsel of record
throughout the trial, posttrial motions, and now on appeal. The
trial court denied Attorney Willoughby’s motion to recuse
Attorney Bisno from representing Bisno.

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IV. Jury Trial and Special Verdict
On August 7, 2023, trial began. On August 10, 2023, the
jury returned a special verdict, finding for Keller on all causes of
action. Responding to questions in the special verdict form, the
jury found Bisno engaged in nonconsensual touching of Keller by
which Keller was reasonably offended; and Bisno caused Keller
“emotional distress” by her willful, wanton, and reckless conduct.
The special verdict form asked for awards of special and
general damages for the findings of liability for assault and
battery and intentional infliction of emotional distress without
apportionment between the causes of action. The jury awarded
Keller special damages of $9,500 for past economic loss medical
expenses and $855 for future economic loss medical expenses.
The jury awarded Keller general damages of $28,000 for past
noneconomic loss physical pain/mental suffering and $900 for
future noneconomic loss physical pain/mental suffering. The jury
awarded Keller $154,000 in punitive damages.
V. Posttrial Motions and Appeal
The trial court entered judgment on August 21, 2023.
Bisno’s posttrial motions for a new trial, judgment
notwithstanding the verdict, and to vacate the judgment were
denied. Bisno timely filed this appeal from the judgment.
DISCUSSION
The lack of civility between counsel is quite evident in the
record. One procedural error is largely dispositive of this appeal.
It concerns Keller’s presentation of her emotional distress claim.
She was improperly allowed to try the claim against a party not
named and using facts not alleged in her cross-complaint.
Moreover, there was insufficient evidence to support the

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emotional distress claim she alleged in her cross-complaint. We
also conclude the punitive damages award must be reversed.
I. Keller’s Emotional Distress Claim as Alleged in Her
Cross-complaint
The elements of intentional infliction of emotional distress
are: “ ‘ “ ‘ “(1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant
with the intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the
probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff’s
suffering severe or extreme emotional distress; and (3) actual and
proximate causation of the emotional distress by the defendant’s
outrageous conduct.” ’ ” ’ ” (Hughes v. Pair (2009) 46 Cal.4th
1035, 1050; Grenier v. Taylor (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 471, 486.)
In her cross-complaint, Keller alleged Bisno engaged in
extreme and outrageous conduct when she “verbally accosted . . .
Keller, and knocked a cup of coffee out of her hands” and
“willfully and intentionally blocked and obstructed . . . Keller’s
pathway to exit the parking structure.”
Additionally, Bisno “willfully and maliciously assaulted and
battered . . . Keller by forcefully pushing her in the chest with
both hands causing . . . Keller [to] move backwards, and
subsequently body-checking . . . Keller as she attempted to leave.”
Finally, Bisno’s “extreme and outrageous conduct is the direct
and proximate cause of . . . Keller suffering severe emotional
distress that no reasonable person in a civilized society should be
expected to endure because . . . Keller was forced to endure
embarrassment, humiliation, mental anguish and losses to her
reputation, as [Bisnos] engaged in unlawful conduct in assaulting
and battering . . . Keller.”

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II. Keller’s Emotional Distress Claim as Presented at
Trial
Keller’s emotional distress claim was tried on the theory
that Bisno and Attorney Bisno worked together to pursue a
personal vendetta against her.
Attorney Willoughby told the jury in his opening statement:
Attorney Bisno represented his wife at her misdemeanor
arraignment on the related criminal charges. His reason for
doing so was to improperly obtain Keller’s “confidential and
privileged” identifying information to name her in Bisno’s civil
complaint. Attorney Bisno also placed numerous “harassing”
phone calls to Keller threatening “to ruin her financially.” Bisno
then filed the amended complaint against Keller “for absolutely
no reason and to drive up her costs.” Attorney Willoughby told
the jury: “[A]fter hearing the evidence here, you will find that . . .
Bisno’s conduct was totally inappropriate, that they then utilized
her husband’s access to the legal system as an attorney and their
wealth to try to ruin my client who hadn’t done anything.”
The opening statements of both counsel were immediately
followed by Keller’s direct testimony. As relevant here, over
Attorney Bisno’s objection, Keller testified that he telephoned her
“ten times” in March 2019, “harassing me” and “threaten[ing] to
ruin me financially.” Keller testified: Bisno’s “lawsuit that came
to me was for $50,000 for them trying to say that I assaulted her
and battered her and false arrest and false imprisonment [sic].”
Keller testified: “My husband and I were both very distraught
over the idea that someone who is a lawyer could sue someone for
any reason without any just cause.” Keller testified she had to
incur the unexpected expense of hiring an attorney to defend
herself against Bisno’s lawsuit, which caused her “emotional

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distress.” The trial court overruled Attorney Bisno’s objection,
stating it was to be “reserve[d]” “for either a post trial motion or
for a further motion outside . . . the presence of the jury.”
Keller testified: “[A]fter feeling tons of anxiety and stress
from being called multiple times and now being in a lawsuit, . . . I
sought out emotional wellbeing balance through chiropractor
[sic], acupuncture, and therapy.” On cross-examination, Keller
testified to not having “this emotional distress before the
lawsuit.”
In his closing arguments, Attorney Willoughby argued:
The Bisnos “acted in concert, just like they acted in concert in
this trial.” After discovering Keller’s telephone number, “they
used it to locate [Keller] and start prosecuting her, and
persecuting her.” Attorney Willoughby argued “long before they
[the Bisnos] served [Keller] with the lawsuit, [Attorney Bisno]
started calling her and telling her they are going to ruin her and
ruin her financially, and that starts the problem.” Attorney
Willoughby argued: “They don’t dismiss their frivolous complaint
for another two years.”
In discussing the special verdict form, Attorney Willoughby
asked the jury to find Keller suffered emotional distress, again,
because “they” (the Bisnos) improperly obtained her name, which
Attorney Bisno used to amend the civil complaint and to make
multiple telephoned threats. He argued: “This lawsuit was
started by them frivolously filing a lawsuit.” Attorney
Willoughby maintained that Keller “should be compensated for
the emotional distress that they put her through.” “And when
you go back in that jury room, [sic] those two are a team.”

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III. Scope of the Cross-complaint
The scope of the issues to be decided by the jury must be
measured by the scope of the pleadings. Generally, “ ‘[t]he
pleadings establish the scope of an action and, absent an
amendment to the pleadings, parties cannot introduce evidence
about issues outside the pleadings.’ [Citation.] When evidence is
not pertinent to the issues raised by the pleadings, the evidence
is irrelevant and it is proper to preclude the introduction of such
evidence.” (Schweitzer v. Westminster Investments, Inc. (2007)
157 Cal.App.4th 1195, 1214.) In sum, a party cannot obtain relief
on a cause of action not contained in its pleadings. (See Davis v.
Farmers Ins. Exchange (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 1302, 1325–1326;
Griffin Dewatering Corp. v. Northern Ins. Co. of New York (2009)
176 Cal.App.4th 172, 210.)
Keller’s cross-complaint named Bisno alone as a cross-
defendant. Keller’s intentional infliction of emotion distress
cause of action expressly rested on Bisno’s “outrageous”
assaultive conduct. As discussed, Keller’s trial theory was both
Bisno and Attorney Bisno were liable for intentional infliction of
emotional distress by acting in concert to harass, threaten, and
file a lawsuit “without cause” against her. Because this new
theory of liability was not pleaded, the issues it raised were
outside the scope of the cross-complaint and any supporting
evidence should have been excluded. (Schweitzer v. Westminster
Investments, Inc., supra, 157 Cal.App.4th at p. 1214.)
In concluding the trial court erred, we note Keller knew of
the Bisnos’ purported misconduct (harassing telephone calls and
retaliatory lawsuit) when she brought her cross-complaint,
having filed it after Bisno amended her lawsuit naming Keller as
a defendant. Yet Keller did not seek to amend her cross-

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complaint before or during trial to name Attorney Bisno or to
assert additional facts supporting her new theory of emotional
distress liability. Nor did Keller request at the conclusion of trial
to amend her cross-complaint to conform to the admitted
evidence. Absent an amendment to the cross-complaint, Keller’s
new theory of liability against the Bisnos could not serve as a
basis for recovery.
Further, evidence of the purported harassing telephone
calls and retaliatory lawsuit was not relevant to Bisno’s
assaultive conduct as alleged in the cross-complaint. Thus, there
was no reasonable basis to construe the emotional distress cause
of action as encompassing Keller’s new theory of liability.
Interestingly, the trial court did determine the telephone
calls and lawsuit evidence were inadmissible. It granted Bisno’s
pretrial motion in limine No. 5 in which Attorney Bisno argued
this evidence should be excluded as irrelevant and prejudicial.4
He also argued Attorney Willoughby should be prohibited from
mentioning this evidence when speaking to the jury.5 Because

4 The record does not contain the trial court’s ruling on the
motion in limine. There were, however, many unreported
chambers conferences during which the motion may have been
granted. Indeed, the trial court told counsel: “You have both
turned a parking lot dispute into a federal case. I haven’t spent
this much time in chambers, much less on a weekend, on mega-
multi-million-dollar cases that I’ve had before me.” In any event,
Keller does not contend the court denied or failed to rule on the
motion.
5 The ruling on motion in limine No. 5 precluded Keller or
Attorney Willoughby “from arguing, referring insinuating,
introducing as evidence or attempting to introduce as evidence of
liability or damages any of her legally protected activities or the

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the evidence was not pertinent to the issues raised by the cross-
complaint, we agree with Bisno that the trial court should have
adhered to its ruling and prevented the evidence from being
admitted.
Keller does not contend the motion in limine should have
been denied. Instead, she argues that by not objecting, Bisno
forfeited any challenge to the trial court’s failure to enforce its
ruling on the motion. Keller misreads her record. At the outset
Attorney Bisno interposed frequent objections that were
consistently overruled. A party will be excused from objecting
where objection would be futile. (Duronslet v. Kamps (2012) 203
Cal.App.4th 717, 727 [“[A] party need not make a continuing
objection to a particular line of evidence once the party’s initial
objection to that line of evidence has been overruled.”].) In any
event, Attorney Bisno continued his efforts to convince the trial
court the evidence previously ruled as inadmissible should be
kept from the jury. We also reject Keller’s suggestion the trial
court’s failure to enforce its ruling was justified because the
evidentiary context in which the motion was granted had
somehow changed.
IV. Insufficient Evidence of Intentional Infliction of
Emotional Distress as Alleged in the Cross-complaint
Next, we consider whether there was substantial evidence
to support the emotional distress claim as alleged in the cross-
complaint had evidence of the harassing telephone calls and
retaliatory lawsuit been excluded.

legally protected actions taken by [Attorney Bisno] . . . and that
[Bisno] is liable for any actions taken by [Attorney Bisno].”

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“ ‘In applying this standard of review, we “view the
evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party,
giving it the benefit of every reasonable inference and resolving
all conflicts in its favor . . . .” [Citation.]’ [Citation.]
‘ “Substantial evidence” is evidence of ponderable legal
significance, evidence that is reasonable, credible and of solid
value.’ [Citation.] We do not reweigh evidence or reassess the
credibility of witnesses. [Citation.] We are ‘not a second trier of
fact.’ ” (Pope v. Babick (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 1238, 1245.)
To establish intentional infliction of emotional distress, the
defendant’s extreme and outrageous conduct must actually and
proximately cause the plaintiff severe or extreme emotional
distress. (Hughes v. Pair, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 1050.) “Severe”
means “ ‘substantial or enduring as distinguished from trivial or
transitory. [Citation.] Such injury may include “ ‘all highly
unpleasant mental reactions, such as fright, horror, grief, shame,
humiliation, embarrassment, anger, chagrin, disappointment,
worry and nausea.’ ” ’ ” (Stephens v. Coldwell Banker
Commercial Group, Inc. (1988) 199 Cal.App.3d 1394, 1402,
disapproved on other grounds in White v. Ultramar, Inc. (1999)
21 Cal.4th 563, 574, fn. 4.)
The evidence at trial showed Bisno’s assaultive behavior
was certainly intentional and outrageous. Keller reasonably was
greatly disturbed by the parking space dispute. However, Keller
did not produce sufficient evidence that Bisno’s conduct actually
and proximately caused her to suffer severe emotional distress—
such that it was enduring and substantial—to justify an award of
damages on the claim.
Keller’s own testimony supported the inference that her
“mental reactions” to Bisno’s outrageous conduct were transitory.

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She testified it “was just a crazy incident that happened” and left
her “in shock” at the time. Keller “remember[ed] being really
embarrassed that [it] happened at all.” The “whole experience
was so overwhelming and traumatic”; “the worst day of [her] life.”
Keller’s healthcare expert witnesses relied on either their
memories or copies of bills they had sent to Keller for services
rendered. No medical records were produced in support of their
testimony.
Jeremy Brook, Keller’s chiropractor, began treating her in
2021, three years after the incident. Brook opined Keller “had
been under a lot of emotional stress” from having been “attacked”
in a parking structure and “the person was now suing her.”
Carla Vidor testified as Keller’s acupuncturist and
practitioner of “Chinese medicine.” Vidor began treating Keller
in September 2019 or perhaps earlier and was still treating her
at the time of trial. Vidor opined the acupuncture was helping
Keller “manage” her “anxiety.” Vidor recalled Keller was crying
and “shaken up” on one occasion about an altercation.
By contrast, Keller repeatedly testified her emotional
distress (“tons of anxiety and stress”) was the result of Attorney
Bisno’s harassing telephone calls and Bisno’s lawsuit. Keller also
testified the emotional distress was ongoing due to “the criminal
case,” the lawsuit, and the cross-complaint. And, prior to being
served with the lawsuit, Keller testified to having experienced no
emotional distress.
V. Punitive Damages Award
Bisno challenges the $154,000 award of punitive damages.
We agree Keller did not present sufficient evidence of Bisno’s
financial condition to support the award.

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“[A]n award of punitive damages cannot be sustained on
appeal unless the trial record contains meaningful evidence of the
defendant’s financial condition.” (Adams v. Murakami (1991) 54
Cal.3d 105, 109; see Garcia v. Myllyla (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 990,
995 [“A plaintiff who seeks punitive damages ordinarily must
introduce evidence of a defendant’s net worth.”].) “ ‘Although net
worth is the most common measure of the defendant’s financial
condition, it is not the only measure for determining whether
punitive damages are excessive in relation to that condition.’ ”
(Doe v. Lee (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 612, 620; see Baxter v. Peterson
(2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 673, 681.) “ ‘ “What is required is
evidence of the defendant’s ability to pay the damage award,” ’ ”
regardless of the measure used. (Green v. Laibco, LLC (2011) 192
Cal.App.4th 441, 452; see Baxter, at p. 680.) A “ ‘plaintiff who
seeks to recover punitive damages must bear the burden of
establishing the defendant’s financial condition.’ ” (Reliant Life
Shares, LLC v. Cooper (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 14, 42; see Adams,
supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 123.)
“ ‘[I]n most cases, evidence of earnings or profit alone [is]
not sufficient “without examining the liabilities side of the balance
sheet.” ’ [Citation.] ‘ “What is required is evidence of the
defendant’s ability to pay the damage award.” [Citation.] Thus,
there should be some evidence of the defendant’s actual wealth.
Normally, evidence of liabilities should accompany evidence of
assets, and evidence of expenses should accompany evidence of
income.’ ” (Doe v. Lee, supra, 79 Cal.App.5th at p. 621; see Baxter
v. Peterson, supra, 150 Cal.App.4th at p. 680.)
Keller failed to meet her burden to prove Bisno’s ability to
pay punitive damages in the amount of $154,000. According to
Keller’s opening brief, evidence elicited from Bisno on cross-

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examination established Bisno’s “wealth”: (1) Bisno drives a
Porsche 911 Turbo car; (2) she and her husband “own” homes in
Beverly Hills and Bel Air; and (3) Bisno draws money from an
LLC when she needs cash. Accordingly, Keller asserts, Bisno has
“[a]n unlimited source of funds for her lifestyle.”
However, Keller presented no evidence or analysis of
Bisno’s existing or ongoing costs or liabilities. Instead, during
closing argument, Attorney Willoughby made the following
remarks without supporting evidence: Bisno “is driving a
$200,000 car,” and the Bisnos “had a $30 million house.”6 The
house was lost to foreclosure as part of a “bust-out scheme.”
Attorney Willoughby explained: “[Y]ou build the property, you
have it, you take out the loans and everything out of the property,
and then you let it be foreclosed upon. You took all the assets out
of the property” and hid them in the LLC.
Bisno’s uncontroverted testimony was the Beverly Hills
home was lost to foreclosure in 2009 and the Bel Air home was in
foreclosure at the time of trial. There is no evidence to suggest
Bisno has income enabling her to satisfy the punitive damages
award while covering necessary living expenses and paying the
compensatory damages. We therefore reverse the punitive
damages award for insufficient evidence. (Doe v. Lee, supra, 79
Cal.App.5th at pp. 623–624.)

6 During Bisno’s direct examination, Attorney Willoughby
asked her to confirm the Beverly Hills property “was worth
“32,000,308,000 [sic].” The trial court sustained Attorney Bisno’s
objection to the question. Bisno went on to testify she had no
idea of the value of that property.

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VI. Special Damages Award for Economic Loss
Bisno contends Keller was prohibited from seeking
damages for economic loss in the cross-complaint due to the
denial of Keller’s request to be awarded victim restitution in the
criminal case under Penal Code section 1202.4. Not so.
Penal Code section 1202.4 was enacted to ensure a crime
victim who suffers economic loss from the commission of a crime
will receive restitution from the convicted perpetrator of that
crime. (Vigilant Ins. Co. v. Chiu (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 438,
443.) As mentioned, Attorney Willoughby in the cross-complaint
sought attorney fees as victim restitution in the criminal case.
The statute specifies “[a]ctual and reasonable attorney’s fees”
“accrued by a private entity on behalf of the victim” are
reimbursable as economic loss. (Pen. Code, §1202.4, subd.
(f)(3)(H).) Such fees are awarded, however, only if they are
attributable to the victim’s efforts to recover economic loss
resulting from the criminal conduct. (Walker v. Appellate
Division of Superior Court (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 651, 659; People
v. Fulton (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 876, 879, 884–885.)
The criminal court denied Attorney Willoughby’s request,
finding the attorney fees were not incurred because of Keller’s
attempts to recover economic damages from Bisno’s criminal
conduct.
Vigilant Ins. Co. v. Chiu, supra, 172 Cal.App.4th 438 held a
victim has a right to both restitution and a separate civil
judgment so long as there is no double recovery. (Id. at pp. 445–
446; accord, Kerley v. Weber (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 1187, 1197.)
There is no issue of double recovery here; the criminal court
declined to award Keller attorney fees.

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DISPOSITION
The judgment on the verdicts for assault and battery is
affirmed. The judgment on the verdict for intentional infliction of
emotional distress and attendant damages is reversed. The
award of punitive damages is reversed. The parties shall bear
their own costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

LUI, P. J.
We concur:

CHAVEZ, J.

RICHARDSON, J.

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