CourtListener 10711680•People v. Mathews CA2/2
Texte intégral
Filed 10/27/25 P. v. Mathews CA2/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE, B336330
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
v. BA509767)
JAMOR JACOB MATHEWS,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Karla D. Kerlin, Judge. Affirmed.
Robert L.S. Angres, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters and Susan
Sullivan Pithey, Assistant Attorneys General, Noah P. Hill and
Heidi Salerno, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
_________________________________________
A jury convicted Jacob Jamor Mathews (appellant) of
murder and attempted murder. He asserts that the trial court
erred in refusing to limit expert testimony and in instructing the
jury on a kill zone theory of attempted murder. Because there
was no prejudicial error, we affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
1. Facts
Appellant was a pimp and a member of the Crips in south
central Los Angeles.
In June 2021, members of the rival Hoover gang in a
Mercedes Benz tried to rob appellant of his jewelry. As appellant
fled, the Hoover members shot at him. They then took his car
that he left behind, which contained his phone and other
belongings. Appellant did not recognize his attackers or their
car. Thereafter, appellant was on the lookout for the gold or
silver Mercedes Benz he had seen so he could exact revenge.
On July 23, 2021, Deonte Pinkney and 15-year-old Precious
B. went to the McDonald’s drive-thru on Normandie and
Manchester about 3:00 a.m. Pinkney was driving his new silver
Mercedes Benz with tinted windows, and Precious B. was in the
passenger’s seat with the seat reclined. On their way back to
Pinkney’s home, a white Infiniti SUV with a broken right
headlight and no front license plate pulled up next to Pinkney’s
car, and the two drivers raced next to one another, speeding and
then slowing down, for several seconds. The driver of the white
Infiniti then fired three shots into Pinkney’s car before speeding
off. One bullet passed through the front passenger’s side window,
flew just past Precious B.’s face, and hit Pinkney in the head,
killing him instantly. The other two bullets went through the
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rear passenger’s side window and the front windshield on the
passenger’s side.
One week after the shooting, on July 30, 2021, officers
pulled appellant over in his white Infiniti SUV for having a
broken headlight. The car had no front license plate. The officers
conducted a search and found a black semiautomatic nine
millimeter gun.
2. Procedural Background
On March 16, 2023, appellant was charged by information
with one count each of murder (Pen. Code,1 § 187, subd. (a)),
attempted murder (§§ 664/187, subd. (a)), shooting at an occupied
vehicle (§ 246), and being felon in possession of a firearm
(§ 29800, subd. (a)(1)). It was further alleged that appellant had
suffered a prior strike. (§§ 667, 1170.12.) With respect to the
murder and attempted murder counts, it was alleged that
appellant personally used a firearm. (§ 12202.5, subd. (a).)
The first trial resulted in a mistrial due to a hung jury. A
second jury convicted appellant on all counts and found true the
firearm enhancement. The trial court found true that appellant
had suffered a prior strike and sentenced him to 50 years to life,
plus four years in state prison.
DISCUSSION
1. Any error in declining to limit the testimony of the
ballistics expert was harmless.
Appellant’s counsel sought to limit the testimony of the
ballistics expert who compared the bullet fragments found in
Pinkney’s car to bullets fired from the gun found in appellant’s
car when he was arrested. Specifically, appellant asked the court
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
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to preclude the expert from testifying without a doubt that the
bullets were fired from the same gun, and to limit the expert to
stating that the bullet samples were consistent or similar to one
another. The trial court denied appellant’s motion to so limit the
expert’s testimony.
We need not decide whether this was error because any
error was harmless under the applicable Watson standard.
(People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818; People v. Prieto (2003) 30
Cal.4th 226, 247 [“erroneous admission of expert testimony only
warrants reversal if ‘it is reasonably probable that a result more
favorable to the appealing party would have been reached in the
absence of error’ ”].) Had the expert testified that the bullets and
fragments were consistent rather than stating without a doubt
that they had come from the same gun, it would not have made
any difference to the outcome given the other overwhelming
evidence that appellant was the one who shot Pinkney.
Footage from surveillance cameras showed a white Infiniti
SUV with a broken headlight and no front license plate racing
next to Pinkney’s car when the shooting occurred. Precious B.,
who was in the passenger’s seat of Pinkney’s car when he was
shot, testified that the gunfire came from the white car seen in
the surveillance footage. Cell tower records showed that
appellant’s phone was in the vicinity of the shooting when it
occurred. Appellant was arrested one week after the shooting
after he was pulled over in his white Infiniti SUV that had a
broken headlight and no front license plate, like the one seen in
the surveillance footage. Appellant’s Instagram contained photos
and videos of appellant in his white Infiniti SUV with what
appeared to be the same black semiautomatic gun found in his
car when he was arrested.
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Several weeks before the shooting, appellant had been
attacked and his car stolen by members of the rival Hoover gang,
who were driving a car similar to Pinkney’s. Appellant’s
Instagram messages confirmed that since that attack appellant
had been on the lookout for a gold or silver Mercedes Benz. Less
than two hours after the shooting, at 4:46 a.m., appellant sent a
message to his acquaintance Greeneyez, asking, “Who in that car
bro?” Appellant asked Greeneyez whether the car was a “BMW
or Benz.” Greeneyez answered that it was a “Benz,” and
appellant responded, “oh, yea, mando.” At 5:42 a.m., appellant
made a post on Instagram with the text, “blow up in his face”
with a purple devil emoji, and “stomped down on me” with an
emoji of a star—a symbol associated with the Hoover gang.
While appellant was in jail after being arrested, he was
recorded speaking on the phone with someone about snitches,
stating that he was going to kill some snitch because he was
“going to do life anyway.” In another recorded call, he stated he
was not “worried about it” because he “was by [him]self” and only
he “know[s] the truth.” When asked about these statements at
trial, appellant was unable to provide a coherent explanation.
When asked why he said on the phone that he was “going to do
life anyway,” he responded, “I don’t know,” and explained that he
was “talking in general.” When asked what he meant when he
said he was by himself, appellant responded, “I always say that I
was by myself.”
Given the abundance of evidence showing that appellant
shot Pinkney, there is no reasonable probability that the jury
would have reached a different verdict had the court limited the
ballistic expert to testifying that the bullets were “similar” or
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“consistent” rather than that they came from the same gun
without a doubt.
2. Substantial evidence supports the kill zone
instruction for attempted murder.
The crime of attempted murder requires the specific intent
to kill. (People v. Canizales (2019) 7 Cal.5th 591, 602 (Canizales),
citing People v. Lee (2003) 31 Cal.4th 613, 623.) Consequently, a
defendant who intends to kill one person, but shoots another
person, is not guilty of attempted murder of the second person.
(People v. Bland (2002) 28 Cal.4th 313, 331 [“transferred intent
does not apply to attempted murder”].) However, because “a
primary intent to kill a specific target does not rule out a
concurrent intent to kill others” (Bland, at p. 331, fn. 6), a
defendant who “specifically intend[s] to kill every single person in
the area in which [his] primary target [is] located”—in the so-
called “kill zone”—can be liable for the attempted murder of
anyone in that area. (People v. McCloud (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th
788, 803; Canizales, at p. 606 [defendant is liable under a “kill
zone” theory if he “intentionally created a zone of fatal harm”].)
Relevant circumstances from which a jury could properly
infer the defendant intended to create a zone of harm include “the
type of weapon used, the number of shots fired (where a firearm
is used), the distance between the defendant and the alleged
victims, . . . the proximity of the alleged victims to the primary
target” (Canizales, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 607), and the placement
of the shots (People v. Vang (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 554, 564).
The record in this case contains substantial evidence to
support the kill zone instruction. Appellant used a
semiautomatic weapon and fired three shots into three separate
areas of Pinkney’s car: the passenger’s side front and rear
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windows, and the front windshield. The shots were made at close
range—appellant’s car was next to or near Pinkney’s. Further,
appellant’s motive to kill anyone who might be inside of the
vehicle was shown by the circumstance that he had been seeking
revenge on individuals who had robbed him and who he did not
recognize, but who he saw in a similar Mercedes Benz. A jury
could infer from this that appellant intended to kill everyone
inside the car to increase the chance of killing one or more of the
individuals who had robbed him. (See People v. Vang, supra, 87
Cal.App.4th at p. 564.)
Appellant relies on People v. Booker (2020) 58 Cal.App.5th
482 to argue that the trial court erred in giving the kill zone
instruction, but Booker is readily distinguishable. In that case,
the shooter drove up to the driver’s side window of a stationary
vehicle and shot the driver three times at close range. (Id. at pp.
489, 500.) The driver’s side window was shattered, but no bullet
holes were found on any part of the car. (Id. at pp. 488, 500.)
There was no evidence that any bullets reached the passenger’s
side of the car, where the only other occupant of the car was
sitting. (Id. at p. 500.) Nothing in the record suggested the
shooter used a semiautomatic or automatic weapon. (Ibid.)
Here, on the other hand, appellant drove up to the passenger’s
side window of a moving car and used a semiautomatic gun to
shoot several shots at different areas of the car, with one bullet
barely missing Precious B.’s face. These circumstances, combined
with the strong evidence of appellant’s motive to kill the
occupants of Pinkney’s car, support the kill zone instruction.
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DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
LUI, P. J.
We concur:
RICHARDSON, J.
GOORVITCH, J.*
* Judge of the Los Angeles County Superior Court,
assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of
the California Constitution.
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