People v. Olson CA5

CourtListener 10711679Calctapp27 oct. 2025

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Filed 10/27/25 P. v. Olson CA5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE,
F085849
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No. MCR066322)
v.

JEFFREY LEON OLSON, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Madera County. Ernest J.
LiCalsi, Judge.
Dale Dombkowski, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Kimberley A. Donohue, Assistant Attorney General, Darren K. Indermill and
Jeffrey D. Firestone, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
-ooOoo-
Defendant Jeffrey Leon Olson was charged with murder and two associated
firearm enhancements. He pleaded not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity, and he
waived a jury trial. The trial court found defendant guilty of first degree murder, found
the firearm allegations true, and found defendant had not proved by a preponderance of
the evidence that he was insane at the time of the crime.
Defendant now appeals his conviction, asserting the trial court erred in failing to
hold a hearing sua sponte to determine whether he was competent to stand trial in light of
(1) the opinions of two court-appointed doctors that defendant should be committed to a
state hospital due to his insanity at the time of the crime, (2) other symptoms of his
conditions noted by the doctors, (3) defendant’s suicidal ideation, and (4) his refusal to
attend court on one occasion. Defendant argues this constitutes substantial evidence of
incompetence, which should have led the trial court to pause the criminal proceedings
and hold a competency hearing.
The People contend these facts do not constitute substantial evidence of
incompetence to stand trial such that the trial court should have called for a competency
hearing on its own initiative. The People note that the two doctors only opined on
defendant’s insanity at the time of the crime, arguing this is an issue that is legally and
factually distinct from defendant’s competency to stand trial. The People argue that the
facts highlighted by defendant do not demonstrate his inability to understand the nature
of the proceedings or assist with his defense.
We affirm.
PROCEDURAL SUMMARY
On May 26, 2020, the Madera County District Attorney filed an information
charging defendant with the murder of Maigan Olson (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a);

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count 1).1 The information further alleged, in the commission of count 1, defendant
personally used a firearm (§§ 12022.5, subd. (a), 12022.53, subd. (b)), personally and
intentionally discharged a firearm (§ 12022.53, subd. (c)), and personally and
intentionally discharged a firearm causing death (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)). On August 25,
2020, Defendant pleaded not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity. The court
appointed Drs. Michael Zimmerman and Adrian Della Porta under section 1026 to
evaluate defendant’s sanity at the time of the offense.
Dr. Della Porta submitted his report to the court in September 2020. The doctor
reported that, during the interview, defendant was generally a reliable historian and
expressed that he understood the nature of the charges against him and the purpose of the
evaluation. Defendant described the voices he had been hearing, including that they had
previously told him to kill himself. Dr. Della Porta believed that defendant “was in an
acute psychotic episode” during the shooting, opining that the “psychotic process …
clouded his thinking.” Dr. Della Porta further opined defendant “remain[ed] a substantial
danger to the health and safety of others” (boldface omitted), and recommended the court
place him at a state psychiatric hospital for restoration of sanity.
Dr. Zimmerman submitted his full report to the court in December 2020. The
doctor reported that, over the course of four interviews, defendant’s mental status exams
were normal, and he expressed that he understood the nature of the charges against him
and the purpose of the evaluation. Defendant often “rapidly switch[ed] from realistic to
unrealistic statements” and described the voices he had been hearing in the years prior,
including that in 2019 and 2020 the voices had told him to kill himself. The doctor
conducted tests revealing “severe psychopathology,” including high scores on the
paranoia and schizophrenic scales. Dr. Zimmerman diagnosed defendant with

1 All further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code except as
otherwise stated.

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“Schizophrenia, Continuous,” opined that defendant was insane at the time of the
shooting, believed defendant remained a substantial danger to the health and safety of
others and himself, and recommended defendant be placed in a state hospital. At trial,
when Dr. Zimmerman was asked whether defendant’s clarity returned after shooting his
wife, the doctor responded, “that is how it works in my experience.” Dr. Zimmerman
also noted that defendant’s schizophrenia had “periods of alleviation.”
On September 15, 2021, defendant refused to leave his cell to attend a court
hearing. The next day, the trial court issued a continuous order to extract him from his
cell and transport him to court for the duration of the prosecution. The guilt phase of the
trial began on May 9, 2022, followed by the sanity phase on August 29, 2022. On
January 9, 2023, the trial court found defendant guilty of first degree murder and found
the firearm allegations true. On January 30, 2023, the court found defendant had not
proved by a preponderance of the evidence that he was insane at the time of the crime.
On March 1, 2023, the trial court sentenced defendant to an aggregate term of
50 years to life: 25 years to life for the murder and a consecutive 25 years to life term for
the section 12022.53, subdivision (d), enhancement; the court stayed execution of the
remaining firearm enhancements.
On March 2, 2023, defendant filed a notice of appeal.
FACTUAL SUMMARY
On April 16, 2020, defendant and his wife Maigan argued in their residence;
defendant played with their newborn child while their daughter worked on her laptop
nearby. When Maigan said, “‘I’m done with this arguing,’” defendant left the baby,
walked into the master bedroom, returned with a “long rifle,” and shot his wife three or
four times. Defendant’s daughter ran from the house and told a neighbor “he shot her.”
Defendant then exited the house and asked his daughter, in a raised but monotone voice,
to “come back” and “‘[c]ome give me a hug.’” Later, when officers approached
defendant, he said, “‘She’s dead’” and “‘I shot her.’” When an officer told defendant to

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hand the infant to him, and when another officer arrested him, defendant willingly
complied with a “‘lack of emotion.’” Later, defendant’s father-in-law said to an officer
that defendant was “‘probably off his medications.’”
Under questioning by the police, defendant indicated he had anxiety and had been
hearing voices for about six months, stated he could not explain why he shot his wife, and
admitted he stopped taking his anxiety and antipsychotic medication a year prior. On
occasion, defendant made unintelligible and incongruent statements to the officers, but he
often answered the questions asked by the officers and denied that the voices told him to
kill his wife.
DISCUSSION
Defendant contends the evidence before the court was sufficient to trigger the trial
court’s sua sponte obligation to state a doubt as to defendant’s mental competence to
stand trial. The People disagree, as do we.
A. Legal Principles and Standard of Review
“Both the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution and state law prohibit the state from trying or convicting a criminal
defendant while he … is mentally incompetent.” (People v. Rogers (2006) 39 Cal.4th
826, 846 (Rogers); see § 1367, subd. (a); Drope v. Missouri (1975) 420 U.S. 162, 172
(Drope).) “A defendant is mentally incompetent … if, as a result of a mental health
disorder or developmental disability, [he] is unable to understand the nature of the
criminal proceedings or to assist counsel in the conduct of a defense in a rational
manner.” (§ 1367, subd. (a); see People v. Rodriguez (2014) 58 Cal.4th 587, 624 [noting
the competency inquiry focuses on whether a defendant can “consult with [his] attorney
with a reasonable degree of rational understanding or lacks a rational and factual
understanding of the proceedings against [him]”].)
If the trial court is presented with “‘“substantial evidence of [a defendant’s]
present mental incompetence,”’” the defendant is entitled to a competency hearing “‘“as

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a matter of right.”’” (People v. Woodruff (2018) 5 Cal.5th 697, 721 (Woodruff).)
Substantial evidence of incompetence is evidence “that raises a reasonable or bona fide
doubt concerning the defendant’s competence to stand trial.” (Rogers, supra, 39 Cal.4th
at p. 847.) “Evidence of incompetence may emanate from several sources, including the
defendant’s demeanor, irrational behavior, and prior mental evaluations.” (Ibid.) The
substantial evidence test can also be satisfied if a psychiatrist or psychologist opines that,
because of mental illness, the defendant cannot understand “the purpose or nature of the
criminal proceedings being taken against him or is incapable of assisting in his defense or
cooperating with counsel .…” (People v. Pennington (1967) 66 Cal.2d 508, 519
(Pennington).) The United States Supreme Court has noted that “even one … factor[]
standing alone may, in some circumstances, be sufficient,” and there are “no fixed or
immutable signs which invariably indicate the need for further inquiry to determine
fitness to proceed.” (Drope, supra, 420 U.S. at p. 180.) However, any such evidence
“must bear on the defendant’s competency to stand trial, rather than simply establish the
existence of a mental illness that could conceivably affect his ability to understand the
proceedings or assist counsel.” (People v. Ghobrial (2018) 5 Cal.5th 250, 270
(Ghobrial).) California courts have consistently held that, to be entitled to a competency
hearing, “a defendant must exhibit more than bizarre, paranoid behavior, strange words,
or a preexisting psychiatric condition that has little bearing on the question of whether the
defendant can assist his defense counsel.” (People v. Ramos (2004) 34 Cal.4th 494, 508
(Ramos); accord Rogers, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 847.)
If substantial evidence exists showing the defendant cannot assist counsel or
understand the proceedings, the trial court is to “state that doubt in the record and inquire
of the attorney for the defendant whether, in the opinion of the attorney, the defendant is
mentally competent.” (§ 1368, subd. (a); see Ghobrial, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 274 [noting
how substantial evidence of present incompetence could require “the trial court, on its
own motion, to declare a doubt”].) On appeal, the court examines “the inferences that

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were to be drawn from the undisputed evidence” and asks “whether, in light of what was
then known, the failure to make further inquiry into [the] petitioner’s competence to stand
trial, denied him a fair trial.” (Drope, supra, 420 U.S. at pp. 174, 175.) “‘The decision
whether to order a competency hearing rests within the trial court’s discretion, and may
be disturbed upon appeal “only where a doubt as to [mental competence] may be said to
appear as a matter of law or where there is an abuse of discretion.”’” (Woodruff, supra, 5
Cal.5th at p. 721; see Rogers, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 847 [“A trial court’s decision
whether or not to hold a competence hearing is entitled to deference, because the court
has the opportunity to observe the defendant during trial.”]).) However, “‘[a] trial court
reversibly errs if it fails to hold a competency hearing when one is required under the
substantial evidence test.’” (Woodruff, supra, at p. 721.)
B. Analysis
Here, defendant contends the trial court should have recognized substantial
evidence that he was not competent to stand trial and held a competency hearing, given
the two doctors’ opinions that defendant was not sane at the time of the crime, the
evidence on which they based those opinions, defendant’s expressed suicidal ideation,
and his refusal to attend court. The court rejects defendant’s arguments.
In Ghobrial, supra, 5 Cal.5th at pages 269 through 274, our Supreme Court
rejected a similar argument that the trial court should have paused criminal proceedings
and conducted a competence hearing. There, the record indicated the defendant did not
exhibit any behavior over the course of the three-year proceedings before the trial court.
(Id. at p. 270.) Further, no issue was ever raised regarding the defendant’s competence
by the defendant or his counsel, by the court, or by any of the mental health professionals
who treated the defendant in those three years. (Id. at p. 271.) In the penalty phase, the
defendant presented evidence that he had severe mental health issues, mainly from
multiple witnesses who testified the defendant had previously displayed an inability to
think and communicate logically. (Ibid.) This included one doctor who opined the

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defendant’s auditory hallucinations interfered with his ability to communicate, and the
defendant’s thought processes were disorganized due to his mental health issues. (Ibid.)
The Supreme Court concluded, “[u]ltimately, although defense counsel’s penalty phase
mitigation evidence showed that [the] defendant suffered from serious mental illness, …
[it] did not constitute substantial evidence of present incompetence that required the trial
court, on its own motion, to declare a doubt .…” (Id. at p. 274.) The court noted that the
witness testimony and doctor’s opinion did not reveal whether the defendant’s symptoms
were ones that persisted through trial, but instead concerned the defendant’s condition
before trial began. (Id. at p. 272.) The court also noted the absence of any indication that
the defendant’s symptoms manifested during the trial itself, as well as that no one raised
any doubts about the defendant’s competence at any point. (Ibid.)
California courts have concluded similarly in situations where the evidence
highlighted on appeal failed to demonstrate that the defendant’s mental health condition
affected his or her ability to assist with defending the case or understand the proceedings.
For example, in People v. Bloom (2022) 12 Cal.5th 1008, at pages 1030–1035 (Bloom),
no violation of state or federal constitutional rights was found in the trial court’s failure to
suspend trial and institute competency proceedings, despite the trial court’s awareness of
the defendant’s history of mental illness; that mental health professionals had opined the
defendant was incompetent in a previous trial years prior; that defense counsel stated the
defendant had “‘always been skirting the edges of incompetence’” (id. at p. 1031); that
the defendant engaged in conspiratorial and paranoid behaviors throughout his trial; and
that the defendant refused to attend the sanity phase proceedings. The Bloom court
reminded that to raise a doubt, “‘expert testimony that a defendant is psychopathic,
homicidal, or a danger to him- or herself and others’” is not, on its own, dispositive of the
competency question. (Id. at p. 1032.) Regarding the defendant’s refusal to attend court,
the Supreme Court stated that no competency hearing was required when a “‘defendant’s
lack of cooperation’ arises from unwillingness rather than inability.” (Id. at p. 1035.) In

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People v Welch (1999) 20 Cal.4th 701, 742 (Welch), the court found no abuse of
discretion in the trial court’s failure to hold a competency hearing just because the
defendant presented evidence that he had severe delusional paranoid disorder and
paranoid schizophrenia. Other Courts of Appeal have consistently rejected incompetency
arguments where the evidence of the defendant’s behaviors can be characterized as
“‘“mere bizarre actions” or statements .…’” (Bloom, supra, at p. 1033.)
Here, the court finds the record lacking in substantial evidence indicating
defendant was unable to understand the nature of the criminal proceedings or assist his
counsel in a rational manner regarding his defense. (§ 1367, subd. (a).) Defendant
contends the trial court should have recognized the opinions of Drs. Della Porta and
Zimmerman, that defendant was insane at the time of the crime and should be placed in a
state hospital for the restoration of sanity, as evidence that defendant also was
incompetent to stand trial. (See Pennington, supra, 66 Cal.2d at p. 519 [noting the
substantial evidence test can be satisfied if “a psychiatrist or qualified psychologist
[citation], who has had sufficient opportunity to examine the accused, states under oath
with particularity that in his professional opinion the accused is, because of mental
illness, incapable of understanding the purpose or nature of the criminal proceedings
being taken against him or is incapable of assisting in his defense or cooperating with
counsel”].)
To the extent defendant requests the court draw a per se equivalence between the
doctors’ opinions on defendant’s sanity at the time of the crime and his sanity during the
court proceedings, such an equivalence is rejected. The “issues involved in an insanity
defense are not the same as those involved in a competency to stand trial evaluation”
(People v. Campbell (1987) 193 Cal.App.3d 1653, 1662, fn. 3; see People v. Coogler
(1969) 71 Cal.2d 153, 168, fn. 7 [noting the factors that may tend to establish the
defendant’s disability under § 1367 do not necessarily coincide with those that tend to

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establish he was insane under the M’Naghten test2 at time of the crime]; People v. Brock
(1962) 57 Cal.2d 644, 648–649 [discussing the differences between sanity under § 1368
and sanity under the M’Naghten test].) And as courts have recognized, merely having a
preexisting psychiatric condition is not enough to trigger the court’s duty without some
other indication the conditions affected defendant’s competence during the trial
proceedings. (Ramos, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 508; Rogers, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 847.)
As to the substance of the doctors’ opinions, their conclusions were based largely
on how they believed defendant’s mental health issues affected him on the date of the
shooting. Most tellingly, when Dr. Zimmerman was asked how defendant’s mental
health issues would have worked, he stated his belief that after defendant finished
shooting his wife, it relieved the tension of his psychosis and his clarity returned. True,
Dr. Zimmerman diagnosed defendant with “Schizophrenia, Continuous,” recorded
defendant’s test scores “highest on the Paranoia and Schizophrenic Scales,” and noted
reports that defendant heard voices with or without medication and had thoughts of
suicide. Dr. Della Porta similarly recorded his observations of defendant’s tangential
thoughts and reports of voices. However, the doctors issued their reports 19–20 months
prior to trial, and neither were requested to or opined on defendant’s competency to stand
trial. Dr. Zimmerman also noted that defendant’s schizophrenia had “periods of
alleviation.” The doctors’ opinions that defendant suffered from serious mental health
issues, without more to connect these issues to defendant’s inability to understand the
trial proceedings or assist counsel with his defense, do not call into question defendant’s
competence at trial. (Ramos, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 508; Rogers, supra, 39 Cal.4th at
p. 847.)

2 Insanity under M’Naghten’s Case (1843) 8 Eng.Rep. 718, 722 concerns whether
the “defendant was unable either to understand the nature and quality of the criminal act,
or to distinguish right from wrong when the act was committed.” (People v. Powell
(2018) 5 Cal.5th 921, 955, fn. omitted; see § 25, subd. (b).)

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Defendant also cites his refusal to attend court on September 15, 2021, and his
disheveled appearance during the proceedings, to argue he was actively psychotic
throughout the proceedings. Even in concert with the doctors’ opinions, these facts do
not convince the court that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to find
substantial evidence of his incompetency. (Woodruff, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 721.) Such
actions, whether categorized as “bizarre, paranoid behavior,” an unwillingness to attend
court, or evidence of his “preexisting psychiatric condition,” have “little bearing on the
question of whether the defendant can assist his defense counsel.” (Ramos, supra, 34
Cal.4th at p. 508; see Bloom, supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 1035.) Defendant argues each of
these facts could have indicated that defendant was unable to assist counsel or understand
the proceedings. Defendant’s arguments are speculative. (See People v. Waidla (2000)
22 Cal.4th 690, 735 [“‘[S]peculation is not evidence, less still substantial evidence.’”].)
Neither defendant nor his counsel indicated any difficulties assisting with the defense or
understanding the proceedings and, as the People point out, defendant’s on-the-record
responses to the trial court’s questions and statements over a two-year period were
intelligible and did not indicate lack of competency. Simply, there is even less in the
record here than in Ghobrial, Bloom, and Welch to call into question defendant’s
competence to stand trial. (See Ghobrial, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 270 [reminding that “the
evidence must bear on the defendant’s competency to stand trial, rather than simply
establish the existence of a mental illness that could conceivably affect [the defendant’s]
ability to understand the proceedings or assist counsel”].)
In sum, none of the evidence highlighted by defendant, either singularly or in
combination, raises an inference of defendant’s inability to understand the proceedings or
assist his counsel with his defense such that the trial court should have doubted
defendant’s competence and made further inquiry. (Drope, supra, 420 U.S. at pp. 174–
175.) The trial court did not abuse its discretion in failing to order a competency hearing

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sua sponte, and the court finds no doubt as a matter of law as to defendant’s competence
to stand trial based on the record before us. (Woodruff, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 721.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.

MEEHAN, J.
WE CONCUR:

LEVY, Acting P. J.

DeSANTOS, J.

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