CourtListener 10708940•Moran v. Meyer CA4/3
Texte intégral
Filed 10/22/25 Moran v. Meyer CA4/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
GENE MORAN,
Plaintiff and Appellant, G064927
v. (Super. Ct. No. 30-2022-01269208)
MICHAEL B. MEYER, OPINION
Defendant and Respondent.
Appeal from a postjudgment order of the Superior Court of
Orange County, Sandy Nunes Leal, Judge. Affirmed. Request for judicial
notice denied.
Okorocha Law Firm and Okorie Okorocha for Plaintiff and
Appellant.
Ruochen Liu for Defendant and Respondent.
* * *
In July 2022, Gene Moran filed a complaint against Michael B.
Meyer. The trial court took Meyer’s default and entered a default judgment
against him in January 2023. In July 2024, Meyer sought to have the court
set aside the default and the default judgment because Moran never served
him with the summons and complaint. The trial court granted the motion,
finding the default judgment was void for lack of service.
Moran appeals from this ruling and claims he served Meyer in
Nevada via substituted service. As proof, he points to a certified mail return
receipt which he contends Meyer signed. Moran failed to provide copies of the
summons and complaint which formed the basis for the default judgment,
and which were purportedly served on Meyer. The appellate record is
therefore inadequate, and we would affirm the trial court’s ruling on this
basis alone.
Considering the record we do have, substantial evidence supports
the trial court’s finding Meyer was not served with a copy of the summons
and complaint. Meyer attested he was not living at the alleged service
address at the time Moran mailed the summons and complaint, and there is
no evidence in the record to support Moran’s position that Meyer signed for
receipt of the summons and complaint.
We therefore affirm the trial court’s order setting aside Meyer’s
default and the default judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The appellate record does not include the complaint, and thus we
cannot discuss its allegations. The record also does not contain Moran’s
request for entry of default or the request for entry of default judgment
2
against Meyer. All we can discern from the record before us is, at some point
after Moran filed the complaint, the court took Meyer’s default and entered a
default judgment against him on January 3, 2023.
Although it is unclear from the record, it appears Moran filed an
action on the default judgment in Nevada in 2023. In July and August of
2023, Meyer responded to discovery served by Moran pertaining to the
Nevada litigation.
In July 2024, Meyer filed a motion pursuant to Code of Civil
Procedure1 section 473.5 to set aside and vacate his default and the default
judgment in the instant case. Meyer stated in his declaration in support of
the motion that he did not receive service of the summons, complaint, or
notice of entry of the default judgment. Meyer attested he was not residing at
the location where Moran claimed to have served the summons and
complaint in September 2022. Meyer included, as his proposed responsive
pleading, a motion to quash service of summons. He also filed a request for
judicial notice with seven exhibits, but those exhibits are not part of the
appellate record.
Moran opposed the motion and claimed he served Meyer at an
address in Nevada. Moran produced a quitclaim deed showing Meyer deeded
the same Nevada property to a trust of which Meyer was a trustee. Moran
was not able to effect personal service at the Nevada address. Moran asserted
1 All further statutory references are to the Code of Civil
Procedure unless otherwise stated. Section 473.5 permits a defaulted party to
move to set aside its default and default judgment if service of the summons,
although legally effected, did not result in actual notice to the party. (§ 473.5,
subd. (a).) “The party shall serve and file with the notice a . . . pleading
proposed to be filed in the action.” (Id., subd. (b).)
3
he served Meyer at that address via substituted service. According to the
“Proof of Service by First-Class Mail-Civil,” on August 24, 2022, a process
server mailed a copy of a summons and complaint to Meyer at the Nevada
address via certified mail with return receipt. Moran did not include a copy of
the mailed summons and complaint in the appellate record. Moran attached
to his opposition to the motion to set aside an uncertified document
purporting to respond to his request for proof of delivery. This document
indicates an “item” was “Delivered, Left with Individual” at the Nevada
address on September 26, 2022, but the document does not identify what this
“item” was, nor does it identify who signed for its receipt. There was a
signature in the “Signature of Recipient” box, but it was not legible.
In November 2024, the trial court granted Meyer’s motion to set
aside. The court noted section 473.5 was the wrong vehicle for Meyer to use to
vacate his default and default judgment. Section 473.5, the trial court ruled,
was for situations where service is legally effected, but the service did not
result in actual notice to the served party. The court concluded Meyer’s
declaration established he was not residing at the Nevada address on
September 26, 2022—the date on which Moran claimed he served Meyer via
substituted service. Because Moran never legally served Meyer in the first
place, the default judgment was void. Therefore, pursuant to section 473,
subdivision (d), which permits a court to vacate a void judgment, the trial
court vacated Meyer’s default and the default judgment.2
2 “The court may . . . on motion of either party after notice to the
other party, set aside any void judgment or order.” (§ 473, subd. (d).)
4
DISCUSSION
Moran premises his appeal on his belief he lawfully served Meyer
with a copy of the summons and complaint via substituted service in Nevada.
Alternatively, he contends Meyer’s motion to vacate the default and default
judgment was both untimely and defective because Meyer did not attach a
copy of a proposed responsive pleading to the motion. As we explain, none of
these fronts has merit.
I.
WE DENY MORAN’S REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE
In conjunction with his appeal, Moran filed a motion for judicial
notice. Moran requested we take judicial notice of an uncertified “Docket in
Judgment Enforcement Action in Douglas County, Nevada, Case no. 2023-
CV-00073” and a “Certified Mail Return Receipt and Proof of Service of
Judgment dated October 23, 2023 for Respondent, and October 26, 2023 for
his attorney Justin Clouser.” We deny the request.
The California Rules of Court require Moran to explain in his
motion: (1) the relevancy of the documents; (2) whether the trial court took
judicial notice of the documents, and if not, why the documents are subject to
judicial notice under Evidence Code section 451, 452, or 453; and (3) whether
the documents pertain to events which occurred after the order or judgment
from which the appeal is taken. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.252(a)(2).)
Here, Moran’s motion did not indicate whether he presented the
request to the trial court or whether the events which were the subject of the
documents in the request occurred after the order or judgment from which he
appealed. Either of these shortcomings is fatal to his motion. (LG Chem, Ltd.
v. Superior Court (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 348, 362, fn. 7.)
5
From the record, we can independently determine that Moran did
not make his request to the trial court in the first place. Because the
documents relate to events which took place before the trial court vacated
Meyer’s default and the default judgment, Moran could have made the
request to the trial court. Absent exceptional circumstances, we will “not take
judicial notice of evidence not presented to the trial court.” (Vons Companies,
Inc. v. Seabest Foods, Inc. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 434, 444, fn. 3.) There are no
such exceptional circumstances here.
II.
MORAN DID NOT PROVIDE AN ADEQUATE APPELLATE RECORD
“[I]t is a fundamental principle of appellate procedure that a trial
court judgment is ordinarily presumed to be correct and the burden is on an
appellant to demonstrate, on the basis of the record presented to the
appellate court, that the trial court committed an error that justifies reversal
of the judgment.” (Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 608–609.) “‘“A
necessary corollary to this rule is that if the record is inadequate for
meaningful review, the appellant defaults and the decision of the trial court
should be affirmed.’” [Citation.] ‘Consequently, [the appellant] has the burden
of providing an adequate record. [Citation.] Failure to provide an adequate
record on an issue requires that the issue be resolved against [the appellant].’
[Citation.]” (Id. at p. 609.)
Here, Moran designated as part of the record “Meyer’s Motion to
Set Aside Default Judgment,” “Moran’s Opposition to Motion to Set Aside
Default,” the “Court’s Tentative Ruling,” and the “Courts Final Order
Reversing Tentative.” Moran did not designate Meyer’s request for judicial
notice and the related documents, which Meyer filed with his motion to
vacate his default and the default judgment. Nor did Moran designate the
6
court’s ruling on the request for judicial notice, if any, the complaint, copies of
the summons and complaint Moran allegedly served on Meyer, Moran’s
request for entry of Meyer’s default, or Moran’s request for entry of court
default judgment.
The central issue in this appeal is the validity of Meyer’s default
and the default judgment. We cannot know if the trial court correctly entered
them in the first place without having those documents before us. Moreover,
Moran is appealing from the court’s order granting Meyer’s motion to set
aside his default and the default judgment. We review trial court rulings on
such motions for abuse of discretion—a highly deferential standard of review.
(Luxury Asset Lending, LLC v. Philadelphia Television Network, Inc. (2020)
56 Cal.App.5th 894, 907–908.) We cannot conduct such an assessment
without possessing the documents which the court had at its disposal when it
exercised that discretion.
Moreover, not only are the summons and complaint relevant to
this appeal, the documents are vital to its resolution. The trial court ruled the
default judgment was void because Moran did not serve Meyer with the
summons and complaint. Even if the basis of that conclusion was wrong, i.e.,
Moran did serve Meyer, that does not mean the default judgment was not
void for some other reason. For example, a complaint which contains no
factual allegations against the defaulted party is void for failing to apprise
the party of the nature of the plaintiff’s demands. (Falahati v. Kondo (2005)
127 Cal.App.4th 823, 829.) And a default judgment entered in an amount
greater than stated in the complaint is void for a lack of notice. (Id. at p. 830.)
We will affirm a trial court’s ruling if it is correct on any legal theory, even
one the court did not rely on. (Hoover v. American Income Life Ins. Co. (2012)
206 Cal.App.4th 1193, 1201.) If the default judgment were void for a reason
7
other than lack of service, we would affirm. But because Moran did not
include the complaint in the record, we cannot determine whether the court’s
ruling was otherwise correct.
Notwithstanding the inadequacy of the record, we will proceed to
evaluate the merits of Moran’s claims, to the extent we can.
III.
MORAN HAS NOT DEMONSTRATED THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING
HE DID NOT SERVE MEYER WITH A COPY OF THE SUMMONS AND COMPLAINT
A. Moran Forfeits His Claim of Error
Moran argues there is substantial evidence in the record proving
Meyer had actual notice of the lawsuit before the court took his default and
entered the default judgment. On appeal from a trial court’s factual finding,
we do not ask if there was substantial evidence to support the appealing
party’s version of events. (Schmidt v. Superior Court (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th
570, 582 (Schmidt).) We instead ask if there was substantial evidence to
support the trial court’s ruling. “Failure to acknowledge the proper scope of
review is a concession of a lack of merit.” (Sonic Manufacturing Technologies,
Inc. v. AAE Systems, Inc. (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 456, 465.) Because Moran
did not appropriately identify the standard of review, or tailor his arguments
to it, his contention fails.
B. Substantial Evidence Supports the Trial Court’s Ruling
Even proceeding to review the contention from the correct
standard of review, it is without merit. In conducting a substantial evidence
review, “we accept all evidence supporting the trial court’s order[,] completely
disregard contrary evidence[, and] all draw reasonable inferences to affirm
the trial court.” (Schmidt, supra, 44 Cal.App.5th at p. 581.) “If substantial
evidence supports factual findings, those findings must not be disturbed on
8
appeal. [Citation.] Inferences favorable to appellants may create conflicts in
the evidence, but that is of no consequence. [Citation.] When a civil appeal
challenges findings of fact, the appellate court’s power begins and ends with a
determination of whether there is any substantial evidence—contradicted or
uncontradicted—to support the trial court findings. [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 582.)
Here, Moran contends he properly served Meyer, a nonresident
defendant, pursuant to section 415.40, because either Meyer or his
authorized agent signed for the delivery of the summons and complaint.
Section 415.40 permits a plaintiff to serve a nonresident defendant “by
sending a copy of the summons and of the complaint to the person to be
served by first-class mail, postage prepaid, requiring a return receipt.”
(§ 415.40.) Either the nonresident defendant or their authorized agent can
sign the return receipt. (Cruz v. Fagor America, Inc. (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th
488, 498.) However, service is only valid if Moran presented “evidence
satisfactory to the court establishing actual delivery to the person to be
served, by a signed return receipt or other evidence.” (§ 417.20, subd. (a).)
As proof of satisfactory service, Moran relied on a document
which showed an “item” was “Delivered, Left with Individual” on
September 26, 2022, at Meyer’s alleged address in Nevada and that an
individual signed for the “item.” But there was no evidence that Meyer, or his
authorized agent, signed for the item. The signature was not legible, and
Meyer attested he was not living at that address at the time. In any event,
from the record before us, we cannot confirm whether the “item” referenced
was the summons and complaint.
Moran argues the law prohibits us from relying on Meyer’s “[s]elf-
serving declarations” which, according to Moran, are “not admissible because
the person has a motive to lie.” Moran points to three nonbinding cases to
9
support his position: Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Kuhl (Md. 1983)
463 A.2d 822, 829, which held that under Maryland law self-serving
declarations do not qualify as a declaration against interest for purposes of
its hearsay rule; Sneed v. State (Tex.Ct.App. 1997) 955 S.W.2d 451, 453–454,
which similarly held self-serving statements in medical records do not qualify
as an exception to the hearsay rule under the Texas rules of evidence; and
Copelands’ Enterprises, Inc. v. CNV, Inc. (Fed.Cir. 1991) 945 F.2d 1563, 1567,
applying federal law in a trademark case, which held “self-serving
declarations are insufficient in the context of summary judgment to overcome
other evidence of deceptive use of [a] registration symbol.” These cases do not
support Moran’s position.
C. Meyer Did Not Waive His Claim That He Did Not Have Actual Notice of
the Lawsuit
Moran argues Meyer waived his right to claim he had no actual
notice of this lawsuit because Meyer served discovery responses in the
parties’ Nevada litigation well before Meyer sought to have his default
vacated. But Moran does not explain how Meyer’s participation in a separate
Nevada lawsuit between the parties equates to Meyer waiving his right to
have his default and default judgment set aside in this matter.
From what we can discern from the scant evidence in the record,
Moran filed an action on the default judgment in Nevada. But that is a
separate action from the instant case. (Fidelity Creditor Service, Inc. v.
Browne (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 195, 200 [“judgment creditor may file a
separate action on the judgment”].) We are aware of no authority, nor has
Moran provided any, that Meyer’s participation in that separate action
means Meyer waived his right to claim Moran did not serve him with the
summons and complaint in this case. If anything, the authority is to the
10
contrary. (Id. at p. 202 [“the failure to have served the summons and
complaint is a defense to an action on a judgment”].)
D. Moran Improperly Stated It Was Undisputed Meyer Had Actual Notice
of the Lawsuit
In his opening brief, Moran claimed “[i]t is undisputed that
[Meyer] or his authorized agent signed the restricted delivery, certified mail
return as ‘Michael Meyer’ on September 26, 2022.” This is false. Meyer
attested Moran never served him with the summons and complaint and that
he was not living at the Nevada address at the time Moran claimed to have
served him via certified mail return. We caution Moran against
misrepresenting the record. (Kleveland v. Siegel & Wolensky, LLP (2013)
215 Cal.App.4th 534, 557–558 [sanctions appropriate for misrepresenting the
record].)
E. The Law Does Not Entitle Moran to a Rebuttable Presumption He
Served Meyer with the Summons and Complaint
Finally, Moran contends his filing of a proof of substituted service
created a rebuttable presumption that he properly served Meyer. It is true
“the filing of a proof of service creates a rebuttable presumption that the
service was proper.” (Dill v. Berquist Construction Co. (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th
1426, 1441.) But that presumption arises only if the proof of service
“‘include[s] evidence satisfactory to the court establishing actual delivery to
the person to be served . . . . ’” (Id. at p. 1442.) The trial court was not
satisfied with Moran’s proof, and we take no issue with that conclusion.
IV.
MEYER’S MOTION WAS NOT UNTIMELY OR OTHERWISE DEFECTIVE
Moran argues Meyer’s motion was untimely because Meyer
waited 252 days after Moran served Meyer with the default judgment to file
11
his motion. Section 473.5 allows Meyer 180 days after Moran served him with
the default judgment to file a motion to set aside his default and default
judgment. (§ 473.5, subd. (a).) Here, the appellate record does not support the
conclusion Moran ever served Meyer with the default judgment.
Moran’s evidence to the contrary is contained in his request for
judicial notice, which we have denied, and his general citation to 24 pages in
the record. Putting aside the inadequacy of such a citation (Duarte v. Chino
Community Hospital (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 849, 856 [“‘[i]t is the duty of a
party to support the arguments in its briefs by appropriate reference to the
record, which includes providing exact page citations’”]), those pages actually
include Meyer’s declaration attesting Moran never served him with the
default judgment. If anything, Moran’s citation defeats his position. Either
way, the trial court vacated Meyer’s default and default judgment on the
basis they were void for lack of service—which the court can do at any time.
(§ 473, subd. (d); California Capital Insurance Company v. Hoehn (2024)
17 Cal.5th 207, 225.)
Moran also argues Meyer’s motion to set aside was defective
because Meyer did not include a copy of a proposed responsive pleading with
his notice of motion. However, Moran did not raise this issue below, and we
decline to consider it for the first time on appeal. (Hewlett-Packard Co. v.
Oracle Corp. (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 506, 548 [‘““theories not raised in the trial
court cannot be asserted for the first time on appeal”’”].) Even if we did
consider the claim, it is without basis. A proposed responsive pleading in the
form of a motion to quash service of summons was attached to Meyer’s
motion.
12
DISPOSITION
The postjudgment order vacating Meyer’s default and default
judgment is affirmed. Respondent to recover costs on appeal.
BANCROFT, J.*
WE CONCUR:
MOTOIKE, ACTING P. J.
SCOTT, J.
*Judge of the Orange County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice
pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
13
Vous vous demandez comment ce texte s’applique à votre situation ?
Consultation gratuite, sans engagement
Décrivez votre situation. Notre équipe vous recontactera par e-mail pour votre consultation.
Poursuivez vos recherches dans ChatGPT ou Claude
Connectez Omnilex pour rechercher dans le corpus juridique depuis votre assistant IA.