People v. Perez CA4/1

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Filed 10/21/25 P. v. Perez CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE D086174

Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No. RIF1801411)
v.

VINCENT ANTHONY PEREZ,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Riverside County,
Matthew Perantoni, Judge. Affirmed.
Cliff Gardner, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General,
Daniel Rogers and Matthew Mulford, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff
and Respondent.
A jury convicted Vincent Anthony Perez of murdering Emil C. and
personally discharging a firearm while actively participating in a criminal
gang. (Pen. Code,1 §§ 187 190.2, subd. (a)(22) & 12022.53, subd. (d).) He was
also found guilty of illegally possessing a firearm after a felony adjudication
(§ 29800, subd. (a)(1)) and shooting at an occupied vehicle for the benefit of a
criminal gang with the personal use of a firearm (§§ 246 & 186.22,
subd. (b)(4)(B)). Perez later admitted he had two prior strikes and the court
found an aggravated sentence was appropriate. (§§ 667, subd, (a) & 1170.12,
subds. (c) & (e); Cal. Rules of Ct., rules 4.408 & 4.421.) The court sentenced
him to life without parole, plus 25 years to life, plus four years.
Perez contends: (1) the six year delay in bringing the matter to trial
violated his right to due process; (2) he received ineffective assistance of
counsel based on counsel’s failure to object to the admission of rap lyrics;
(3) the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to appoint new counsel to
litigate his ineffective assistance of counsel claims; and (4) the instruction
that jurors could rely on Perez’s statements alone to prove he was the shooter
undercut the presumption of innocence. We reject his arguments and affirm
the judgment.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
A. The Shooting
On the evening of August 25, 2017, Jacob S. drove his Ford Bronco to a
gas-station minimart with his friend Emil. Emil stayed in the Bronco while
Jacob went inside the store. Jacob walked by a group of people including
Perez, a Westside Bloomas gang member, his girlfriend Summer T., and two
teenagers, Michael P. and Gabriel L., who were affiliated with the gang and

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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who looked up to Perez.2 As Jacob and Emil drove away, Emil shouted an
insult out the window—something like “fuck Westside Bloomas.” Perez,
agitated by Emil’s insult, gestured at or flashed gang signs towards Jacob’s
car as it drove away.
Jacob drove to another store and then drove by the gas station again.
When Jacob drove by, Perez was sitting in the driver’s seat of Summer’s
parked car, with Summer in the front passenger seat, Michael seated behind
her, and Gabriel behind Perez. Perez was upset and pursued the Bronco
through residential areas. Jacob pulled onto a side street, stopped, and
turned off the headlights, but Perez saw the maneuver and parked behind
the Bronco. Emil got out of the Bronco and Jacob started to open his door
when he heard gunshots. Summer claimed Perez had gotten out of the car
when she and Gabriel heard gunshots from the driver’s side of her car. Emil
suffered two gunshot wounds to the chest and died from the injuries.
B. The Investigation
Surveillance video depicted the license plate for Summer’s car and law
enforcement was able to identify the four individuals inside the car.
Investigators interviewed Summer, Gabriel, and Michael. Summer stated
Perez had been driving, he was the only one who got out of the car, and the
shooting occurred from near the driver’s side door. Summer believed the
people they were following had been with another gang, Westside Riva.
Gabriel also said Perez had been driving and got out of the car. In a drawing,
Gabriel placed Perez on the driver’s side of Summer’s car. This testimony

2 Based on his investigation, the prosecution’s gang expert believed
Summer was an active participant in the Westside Bloomas. Michael’s father
and Gabriel’s father were both Westside Bloomas gang members.

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matched the physical evidence regarding the bullet’s trajectory which
indicated the shooter had been standing on the driver’s side of Summer’s car.
Michael, who was 15 years old at the time, claimed he shot Emil.
When Michael described where he claimed to have been standing—to the
right of, and while shooting over a passenger-side door of Summer’s car—
doubt arose because it seemed “physically impossible” to square Michael’s
account with the trajectory of the bullet and the physical evidence. When
pressed, Michael said that he would take “the rap” for the shooting because a
“homie” might “rot in jail” while he might be released in “10 or 15” years.
The investigator believed that by saying he would take the rap, Michael was
admitting to shooting the gun even though he had not done so.
DISCUSSION
A. The Trial Court Properly Denied Perez’s Motion to Dismiss
1. Additional Facts
A criminal complaint was filed against Perez in March 2018, and he
was arrested in April 2018. On Perez’s motion, trial was continued to
February 2020 and then again until April 2020. At the readiness conference
in March 2020, the court continued the trial due to the COVID-19 emergency
declarations. Perez waived time and trial was continued several more times
until September 2021. In March 2021, Michael passed away after a traffic
collision.
After two additional continuances, Perez twice moved to continue trial
because his counsel was not prepared to proceed. Between April 2022 and
February 2023, the court continued trial four more times. In May 2023,
Perez again requested a continuance to allow counsel time to prepare for
trial. The matter was trailed to September 8, 2023, during which time the
district attorney requested two continuances because she had COVID-19.

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The day before trial, Perez sought to dismiss the case alleging the
delays violated his right to due process. The trial court denied Perez’s motion
to dismiss finding he had not been prejudiced by Michael’s death because
Michael’s entire interview statement would be admissible. At trial, the jury
watched a video recording of Michael’s two-hour interview and confession.
During closing, the prosecutor argued Michael lied and took blame for the
shooting “trying to protect his homie.” Defense counsel argued Perez was not
guilty because Michael confessed to the crime.
2. Analysis
Perez concedes the trial court had a legitimate reason for delaying his
trial due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Nonetheless, he asserts the trial court
violated his right to a speedy trial under both the federal and state
Constitutions because Michael died during the unjustifiable delay which
prevented the defense from calling him as a witness. Perez asserts it was
impossible for defense counsel to respond to the prosecutor’s argument that
Michael had lied and thus impossible for the jury to properly make a
credibility determination. He also claims the trial court’s failure to find any
prejudice necessarily skewed the balancing process in which the court was
required to engage.
The federal and state Constitutions guarantee a criminal defendant the
right to a speedy trial. (U.S. Const., 6th Amend.; Cal. Const., art. I, § 15.)
The federal right to speedy trial attaches with the filing of the accusatory
pleading or arrest, whichever is first. (Serna v. Superior Court (1985) 40
Cal.3d 239, 262.) To secure dismissal based on the federal speedy trial right,
the Supreme Court applies a balancing test that considers four factors:
whether the delay before trial was unusually long, who—the government or
the defendant—bears greater responsibility for the delay, whether the

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defendant timely asserted the right to a speedy trial, and whether the delay
prejudiced the defendant. (Barker v. Wingo (1972) 407 U.S. 514, 530
(Barker).) The defendant bears the burden of demonstrating a speedy trial
violation under this four-factor test. (People v. Williams (2013) 58 Cal.4th
197, 233 (Williams).) A post-accusation delay of about a year is generally
considered “ ‘presumptively prejudicial.’ ” (Doggett v. United States (1992)
505 U.S. 647, 652, fn. 1.) Nonetheless, because the speedy trial right is
inherently imprecise, the amount of delay sufficient to trigger review depends
on the specific circumstances of each case. (Barker, at pp. 530–531.) We
review a trial court’s grant or denial of a speedy trial motion for abuse of
discretion based on the circumstances. (Id. at pp. 528–529.)
The first and second factors examine the length and responsibility for
the trial delays. Here, although a criminal complaint was filed in March
2018, the trial did not take place until nearly six years later, in September
2023. The trial was twice continued at defense counsel’s request, while all
remaining continuances stemmed from the COVID-19 pandemic, including
two attributable to the prosecutor’s illness with the virus. Quarantines and
health restrictions have historically been treated as valid grounds to continue
a trial, given the serious risks of exposing court participants to illness. (Elias
v. Superior Court (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 926, 942 (Elias).) This long delay
undoubtedly created hardship for Perez but the pandemic was an emergency
outside the responsibility of both the prosecution and the court.
The third factor concerns the timely assertion of the right to a speedy
trial, which the defendant is responsible for invoking. (Barker, supra, 407
U.S. at p. 531.) “The defendant’s assertion of his speedy trial right . . . is
entitled to strong evidentiary weight in determining whether the defendant is
being deprived of the right,” but “failure to assert the right will make it

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difficult for a defendant to prove that he [or she] was denied a speedy trial.”
(Id. at pp. 531–532.) The inquiry is not limited to counting how many times a
defendant objected or agreed to continuances. Instead, the court looks to the
broader context—such as how timely, consistent, and genuine the objections
were, the reasons behind any acquiescence, whether the defendant had
counsel, and the defendant’s overall pretrial conduct. (Williams, supra, 58
Cal.4th at p. 238.) Taken together, these circumstances reveal whether the
defendant truly sought a speedy trial. (Ibid.)
Here, although Michael confessed to the crime before Perez’s arrest and
died approximately three years after Perez’s arrest, the record reflects no
effort by Perez to invoke his speedy trial right. During the entire period
between arrest and trial, Perez never objected to a continuance, never
demanded that trial proceed, and never moved to dismiss on speedy trial
grounds until the eve of trial. This silence undermines any claim that Perez
genuinely sought a prompt resolution of the charges and weighs heavily
against him in the balancing analysis. In short, Perez’s failure to act
demonstrates acquiescence in the delay, making it difficult to conclude that
his constitutional right to a speedy trial was denied.
The last factor—prejudice to the defendant—requires evaluating the
case in light of the interests the speedy trial right protects, preventing
oppressive pretrial incarceration, reducing the accused’s anxiety, and
avoiding impairment of the defense. (Barker, supra, 407 U.S. at p. 532.) The
last interest is the most critical, since delays that hinder trial preparation
threaten the fairness of the entire system, especially when witnesses die,
disappear, or lose the ability to recall past events accurately. (Ibid.) Perez
contends that Michael’s death was prejudicial because only law enforcement
was able to interview him. However, nearly two and one-half years elapsed

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between Michael’s confession and his death, providing ample opportunity for
the defense to interview him. Further, Michael’s prior statement that he was
willing to “go down for some shit I didn’t do” suggests that, if he had testified
at trial under oath, his account could have shifted in a way detrimental to
Perez. Accordingly, the record does not support a finding of prejudice
sufficient to weigh in the Perez’s favor under the federal speedy trial
analysis.3
B. No Ineffective Assistance of Counsel in Admitting Rap Lyrics
1. Additional Facts
Perez and Summer were in a romantic relationship. At trial, the jury
heard, without objection, a jailhouse phone call Perez made to Summer. The
recording began with a voice-over warning giving notice that the call was
“subject to recording and monitoring.” Perez sang or rapped:

“I told ‘em if they don’t wanna see me that I’m a Westside
hustler. I told ‘em I’m from the West and I’m holdin’ the
jacket ‘cause some of them killers they bad actors. I watch
it how to do it ass backwards. Man, a matter of fact, that’s
my homeboy factor.”

“[¶] . . . [¶]

“That’s what’s up. That’s what’s crackin’. I’m from the
numbers, that’s what bracken and stay, mother fucker
happenin’. Hell yeah I got to have some the crafts. If you
stupid snatch your hat. . . . I wake up with them rats. . . . I
stay flowing. Fools ain’t knowing—why you going’
(unintelligible).”

3 Perez mentioned the state constitutional right to a speedy trial in the
trial court but he forfeited any claim that his state right was violated by
failing to make such an argument with citations to pertinent authority and
reasoned analysis in his opening brief. (People v. Clayburg (2012) 211
Cal.App.4th 86, 93 [failure to present “reasoned argument and analysis”
forfeits issue on appeal].)

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According to the prosecution’s gang expert, these lyrics referenced
Perez putting in work for the Westside Bloomas gang and being part of the
gang. Summer stated that “being from the numbers” meant the numbered-
street neighborhood of Bloomington, which was part of the territory of the
Westside Bloomas. The prosecution gang expert used Perez’s rapping as one
factor indicating that Perez was a gang member. In closing, the prosecutor
argued that Perez’s rap to Summer demonstrated him being a proud gang
member who committed the murder based on Emil’s disrespect of the gang.
2. Analysis
Defense counsel did not object to the recitation and admission of the
rap lyrics, forfeiting the issue. (Evid. Code, § 353 [party may not complain on
appeal that evidence is inadmissible absent a timely and specific objection on
that ground below].) Perez nevertheless argues counsel rendered ineffective
assistance by failing to object, claiming the trial court likely would have
excluded the evidence.
To establish ineffective assistance, a defendant must show both that
counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and
that, but for counsel’s errors, there is a reasonable probability of a more
favorable outcome. (Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687.) A
reviewing court may resolve the claim on the ground of lack of prejudice
alone. (Id. at p. 697.) And on direct appeal, a conviction will be reversed only
if the record affirmatively establishes counsel had no rational tactical
purpose, was asked for a reason and provided none, or could have had no
satisfactory explanation. (People v. Mai (2013) 57 Cal.4th 986, 1009.)
Even assuming counsel had grounds to object, Perez cannot show
prejudice. An error is prejudicial only if there was a “reasonable chance, more
than an abstract possibility,” that it affected the verdict. (College Hospital

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Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 8 Cal.4th 704, 715.) Here, the record shows no
such chance.
The prosecution presented extensive independent evidence of guilt.
The gang expert testified that Perez was a Westside Bloomas member,
“respect is everything” in gang culture, members violently retaliate against
disrespect or intrusions, and the shooting was committed for the gang’s
benefit. Two witnesses—Summer and Gabriel—told law enforcement that
Perez was driving, he was the only person to exit the car, that the shots came
from the driver’s side of Summer’s car. Gabriel testified similarly at trial.
Although Michael claimed he was the shooter, he contradicted himself
by admitting he was prepared to “go down for some shit I didn’t do,” because
it was what he had “sign[ed] up for.” His confession was also undermined by
physical evidence suggesting it was “physically impossible” to reconcile his
account with the bullet trajectory and crime scene findings. After learning of
Michael’s claim, Gabriel expressed surprise, stating he had personally seen
the shooter, it was not Michael, and Michael was “stupid” to take the blame.
Considering this overwhelming evidence, Perez cannot establish a
reasonable probability of a different outcome had the rap lyrics been
excluded.4 His ineffective assistance claim therefore fails.

4 Perez’s reliance on People v. Venable (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 445 (review
granted May 17, 2023, S279081) to show the prejudicial effect of the rap
lyrics is misplaced. In Venable, the evidence of defendant’s involvement was
weak, consisting of a police informant who gave conflicting accounts and
testified the defendant was being framed. (Id. at p. 458.) In contrast,
defendant’s aunt supplied an alibi, and defendant denied any role in the
shooting. (Ibid.) Here, in contrast, two witnesses identified Perez as the
shooter and the physical evidence supported their testimony.

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C. The Trial Court Properly Denied Replacement Counsel
1. Additional Facts
In a police interview held about two months after the shooting, Michael
admitted to using a .38 caliber gun, which he disposed of following the
incident. He told police that about three weeks to a month earlier, a person
name Anthony R. from Bloomington had been arrested with a .38 caliber gun.
At sentencing, Perez told the court he believed his counsel may have been
ineffective because he asked counsel to follow-up on Michael’s claim that he
gave the gun to a man named Anthony R. in Bloomington. Perez said his
counsel and investigator did not find an Anthony R. arrested for a firearm
but that a private investigator hired by his family learned that Anthony R.
had been arrested with the gun described by Michael.
Perez claimed this failure to investigate violated his right to due
process and raised a doubt whether he received a complete defense. The
prosecutor replied that Michael’s entire interview had been played for the
jury and the information about Anthony R. was part of the evidence. After
the court asked for clarification, Perez indicated he wanted defense counsel
relieved, and another attorney appointed to investigate the issue and file a
new trial motion. The court held a Marsden5 hearing, which it ultimately
denied. Following the hearing, Perez stated he was prepared to proceed with
sentencing.
2. Analysis
Perez contends the trial court abused its discretion in denying his
request for new counsel. He argues that if defense counsel had located the
gun, ballistic testing could have been conducted to compare it to the murder
weapon, and the results would have corroborated Michael’s confession.

5 People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118.

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Ineffective assistance of counsel is not among the statutory grounds for
a new trial (§ 1181), but courts have nonetheless allowed new trials on that
basis. (See, e.g., People v. Smith (1993) 6 Cal.4th 684, 692–693, 695 (Smith).)
When a defendant makes a posttrial request for the appointment of new
counsel to pursue a motion for new trial on the ground of ineffective
assistance, the court must hold a hearing so the defendant can explain the
claim. (Id. at p. 692.) Once the defendant has been afforded that
opportunity, the decision whether to appoint new counsel rests within the
trial court’s discretion, and we will reverse only upon a showing of abuse of
discretion. (People v. Streeter (2021) 54 Cal.4th 205, 230.) Substitution of
counsel is warranted when the trial court concludes that continued
representation would substantially impair the defendant’s right to assistance
of counsel. (People v. Sanchez (2011) 53 Cal.4th 80, 89.) This standard is met
where counsel is not providing adequate representation, or where an
irreconcilable conflict exists that threatens effective representation. (Ibid.)
There is no error here. The Marsden hearing transcript does not show
a breakdown of the attorney-client relationship or an irreconcilable conflict,
and Perez does not argue otherwise on appeal.6 Instead, he asserts that
evidence showing Michael gave the gun to Anthony R. would have
corroborated Michael’s confession and created reasonable doubt in the jurors’
minds regarding the identity of the shooter. Defense counsel confirmed that
Perez had told her Anthony R. was arrested with a gun two weeks after the
shooting, and that a newspaper article reported a gang member’s arrest with
a gun. Counsel had both a paralegal and an investigator attempt to locate

6 The People filed an application for the Marsden transcript. (Cal. Rules
of Court, rule 8.47(b)(1)(A).) Receiving no opposition, we granted application.
We did not receive a request from the People to file a supplemental brief.

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the article, but neither was successful. Perez also refused to provide
information about the investigator hired by his family.
We begin with the presumption that counsel’s performance fell within
the broad bounds of professional reasonableness and accord great deference
to strategic choices. (People v. Lewis (2001) 25 Cal.4th 610, 674.) Here,
defense counsel pursued the lead but was unable to uncover any
corroborating evidence. Her decision to forgo further investigation was a
tactical one, made against the backdrop of Perez’s own refusal to assist in his
defense by sharing information about the private investigator retained by his
family. Counsel could reasonably have concluded that contacting Anthony R.
was more likely to harm than to help, since it was Perez—not Michael—who
knew Anthony’s last name, suggesting Perez had a closer connection to the
gun than he admitted. Interviewing Anthony R. carried the risk of eliciting
testimony that Perez himself had transferred the gun, which would have
undercut rather than advanced his claim of innocence. On this record, the
challenged decision reflects a considered tactical judgment, not ineffective
assistance.
In any event, defense counsel did not ignore the issue at trial. She
cross-examined a Riverside County sheriff’s investigator about law
enforcement’s failure to follow up on Michael’s statements concerning the
gun. The investigator admitted Anthony R. had been convicted of gun
possession, though the San Bernardino sheriff’s department never recovered
the weapon. Counsel relied on this testimony in closing to argue that
Michael’s confession was corroborated and that law enforcement had failed to
pursue evidence that might have implicated another suspect. Ultimately,
however, whether Perez or Michael supplied Anthony R. with a gun would
not have resolved the central question of who fired the fatal shots.

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The record demonstrates that defense counsel pursued reasonable
investigative steps, made a tactical decision supported by potential
justification, and effectively used available evidence at trial. Perez’s claim
falls far short of establishing that counsel’s performance was deficient, let
alone that any alleged deficiency prejudiced the outcome. Because Perez
failed to present a colorable claim of ineffective assistance, the trial court
acted well within its discretion in denying the Marsden motion and declining
to appoint new counsel.
D. The Trial Court Properly Instructed the Jury
1. Additional Facts
The prosecution introduced two pre-trial audio recordings of Perez.
About three weeks before the shooting, Perez and Summer spoke to Westside
Bloomas gang member, Mike Guerra, on the telephone. Guerra was in jail
and the call was recorded. Perez complained that certain people were
“wearing my bones down” and that these people had him being “the judge,
the jury and the counsel and the counsel and the executioner, they’re all
fucking, eh, the prosecutor, the DJ, . . . everything.” The prosecutor mentioned
this phone call during closing when addressing whether the shooting was
carried out in furtherance of the gang. The second recording is Perez rapping
with Summer.
Without objection, the trial court instructed the jury with CALCRIM
No. 359, which stated:
“The defendant may not be convicted of any crime based on his out-of-
court statement alone. You may rely on the defendant’s out-of-court
statement to convict him only if you first conclude that other evidence
shows that the charged crime was committed. [¶] That other evidence
may be slight and need only be enough to support a reasonable
inference that a crime was committed. [¶] This requirement of other
evidence does not apply to proving the identity of the person who
committed the crime. If other evidence shows that the charged crime

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was committed, the identity of the person who committed it may be
proved by the defendant’s statement alone. [¶] You may not convict the
defendant unless the People have proved his guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt.” (Italics added.)

2. Analysis
Relying on People v. Rivas (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 1410 (Rivas), Perez
contends, under the facts of this case, the trial court erred instructing jurors
with the italicized language that they could rely on Perez’s “statements
alone” to infer identity. He argues that, even taken collectively, these
“statements alone” were insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
he was the shooter. Thus, the trial court’s instruction to jurors that they
could rely on his “statements alone” to find the identity of the shooter gave
jurors an impermissible shortcut which undercut the state’s burden of
proving identity beyond a reasonable doubt.7
CALCRIM No. 359 embodies the corpus delicti rule, which requires the
prosecution to present evidence that a crime occurred independent of the
defendant’s out-of-court statements. (People v. Ledesma (2006) 39 Cal.4th
641, 721.) The showing may be minimal and need not connect the defendant
to the crime. (Ibid.) The rule does not demand independent proof of the
defendant’s identity as the perpetrator. (Ibid.) Once the existence of a crime
is established, however, the defendant’s own out-of-court admissions may be
used to prove he or she committed it, as identity is not part of the corpus
delicti. (Ibid.) The corpus delicti “rule is intended to ensure that one will not
be falsely convicted, by his or her untested words alone, of a crime that never
happened.” (People v. Alvarez (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1161, 1169.) Whenever a

7 Although Perez failed to object to the instruction, we reach the merits
of his claim since Rivas found no forfeiture where the challenged instruction
affected a defendant’s fundamental rights. (Rivas, supra, 214 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1421.)

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defendant’s extrajudicial statements form part of the prosecution’s case, the
trial court must sua sponte instruct the jury that conviction requires some
additional proof the crime occurred. (Id. at p. 1170.)
We review a claim of instructional error de novo. (People v. Posey
(2004) 32 Cal.4th 193, 218.) In reviewing the instructions, we assume the
jurors are intelligent persons, capable of understanding and correlating the
given instructions. (People v. Ramos (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1082, 1088
(Ramos).) In reviewing a claim that the given instructions lowered the
standard of proof, we consider whether there is a reasonable likelihood the
jury misapplied the instruction. (Victor v. Neb. (1994) 511 U.S. 1, 6.) We do
not view the challenged instruction in isolation but consider it in the context
of the instructions as a whole. (People v. Moore (2011) 51 Cal.4th 1104,
1140.)
As a preliminary matter, Rivas, supra, 214 Cal.App.4th 1410,
addressed an earlier version of CALCRIM No. 359. At that time, the third
paragraph of the instruction stated only: “The identity of the person who
committed the crime [and the degree of the crime] may be proved by the
defendant’s statement[s] alone.” (Rivas, at p. 1428, fn. 5; CALCRIM No. 359,
2013 ed.) In response to Rivas, the Judicial Council of California amended
the instruction by adding the additional language now found in its current
version. (Judicial Council of Cal., Crim. Jury Instns. (2025) Bench Notes to
CALCRIM No. 359, p. 132.)
Turning to the merits, there is no reasonable probability the jury
understood it could convict Perez under a reduced standard of proof or that
the outcome would have been more favorable absent the alleged error. The
instructions, viewed as a whole, emphasized that guilt must be proven
beyond a reasonable doubt. CALCRIM No. 359 itself contained that

16
requirement, and CALCRIM No. 220 defined “reasonable doubt,” explained
that it applied to every element, and directed that the jury must acquit
unless guilt was established to that standard. Taken together, these
instructions correctly conveyed the prosecution’s burden, foreclosing any
realistic possibility the jury relied on a lesser standard. (See Ramos, supra,
163 Cal.App.4th at p. 1088 [jurors are presumed intelligent and capable of
following instructions].)
Moreover, nothing in the record suggests the jury relied on CALCRIM
No. 359 to establish identity. Perez’s statements to Guerra occurred before
the shooting and therefore could not have identified him as the shooter. His
statements to Summer, made after the shooting, contained no reference to
the crime. The jury was also expressly instructed that some instructions
might not apply depending on its factual findings and to follow only those
that did. Because Perez’s statements were not inculpatory on the issue of
identity, there was simply no evidence to which CALCRIM No. 359 could
have applied. Accordingly, even if the instruction was erroneous, it was
harmless beyond any reasonable doubt.

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DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.

IRION, Acting P. J.

WE CONCUR:

BUCHANAN, J.

RUBIN, J.

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