In re S.L. CA3

CourtListener 10707338Calctapp20 oct. 2025

Texte intégral

Filed 10/20/25 In re S.L. CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT

(Yuba)
----

In re S.L., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile
Court Law.

YUBA COUNTY HEALTH AND HUMAN C103402
SERVICES DEPARTMENT,
(Super. Ct. No. JVSQ2400140)
Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

J.L.,

Defendant and Appellant.

J.L. (mother) appeals from the juvenile court’s jurisdictional and dispositional
order. Mother contends the petition failed to state a cause of action and there was
insufficient evidence to support jurisdiction. We will reverse the order with respect to
allegation g-1 and direct the juvenile court to dismiss that allegation from the petition. In
all other respects, we will affirm.
BACKGROUND
A. Current Petition
The day after S.L. was born, a social worker from the Riverside County
Department of Public Social Services -- Children’s Services Division (Riverside County)

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met with mother in the hospital. Mother was a resident of Yuba County, but she was
serving two years at the Chino Institution for Women in Corona, California. Mother
admitted to the social worker that she had a criminal history as well as a history of
substance abuse but would not answer questions about her sobriety. Mother also
identified S.L.’s father, who was recently sentenced to prison.
The social worker spoke with mother’s nurse, who reported that mother delivered
S.L. by cesarean section at 39 weeks. Mother had a history of methamphetamine use but
tested clean in the hospital. She was taking only acetaminophen after the surgery.
Mother gave the social worker paperwork showing that she received prenatal care in
prison. With approximately seven months remaining on her sentence, mother filled out a
form to release S.L. either to “the maternal step-aunt” L.H. or “the maternal great aunt”
C.G., both of whom live in Yuba County.
The social worker spoke with L.H. and C.G. L.H. had known mother for seven
years and arranged with mother to take legal guardianship of S.L. until mother completed
her sentence. L.H. admitted to having “a CPS case in 1998 for methamphetamine usage”
but said she had “turned her life around.” C.G. also told the social worker she was
prepared to take custody of S.L. C.G. admitted to having a criminal record and a history
of methamphetamine use, but she had been clean since 2017.
The Riverside County social worker spoke to a social worker with the Yuba
County Health and Human Services Department/Child and Adult Protective Services
(Department) about mother and S.L. The Yuba County social worker expressed concern
about giving the newborn minor to either of the caregivers identified by mother. Both
caregivers had “substantiated child welfare history that would prevent them from
obtaining custody” of S.L. and, in that moment, the details of their criminal history were
unknown. The Riverside County social worker had not been able to locate S.L.’s father.
The only phone number she had for him was disconnected.

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The following day, when mother was ready to be discharged from the hospital,
L.H. arrived to take custody of S.L.; L.H. was notified that Riverside County would be
taking custody. L.H. acknowledged a prior “incident” with the Department in 1998 and
said she would work with the Department to “have the incident cleared/expunged and
[would] continue to fight to obtain custody of” S.L. S.L. was placed in a Riverside
County approved, confidential foster home.
Days later, Riverside County filed a Welfare and Institutions Code1 section 300
petition. The petition alleged that the newborn minor came within section 300,
subdivisions (b)(1) and (g). Pursuant to section 300, subdivision (b)(1), Riverside
County alleged that S.L. “has suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the child will
suffer, serious physical harm or illness as a result of the failure or inability of . . . her
parent . . . to supervise or protect the child adequately.” Specifically, Riverside County
alleged that mother had prior substantiated allegations of general neglect as the result of
“substance abuse” relative to her other children C.L. and B.L. Mother was given services
but failed to reunify with C.L., and C.L.’s father was given sole legal and physical
custody. Mother also failed to reunify with B.L., and her parental rights were terminated.
Pursuant to section 300, subdivision (g), Riverside County alleged that S.L. was
either “left without any provision for support; or the child’s parent has been incarcerated
or institutionalized and cannot arrange for the care of the child . . . .” In the allegation
labeled “g-1,” Riverside County alleged that mother was “currently incarcerated and
unavailable to provide the child with care and support.” In their “g-2” allegation,
Riverside County alleged that “[t]he exact whereabouts of father . . . [are] unknown, and
he has failed to make himself available to provide care and support for the child.”

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.

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The Riverside County juvenile court ordered S.L. detained on October 30, 2024.
Mother was denied in-person visitation while she remained incarcerated but was given
services.
On December 3, 2024, the Riverside County social worker filed a motion to
transfer the dependency proceeding to Yuba County. Three days later, Riverside County
submitted their jurisdiction report to the juvenile court. Riverside County reported that
S.L. remained in a confidential foster home and was doing well. Riverside County still
could not locate S.L.’s father.
B. Historical Dependency Proceedings -- Documented in the Jurisdiction Report
1. N.L.
On September 11, 2009, mother called the Department to say she and her two-
week-old baby, N.L., would soon be homeless and had nowhere to go. Mother admitted
to a history of smoking methamphetamine “every day, all day.” She said she last used
methamphetamine the week before. Mother also admitted to using drugs throughout her
pregnancy and getting limited prenatal care. The Department offered her a voluntary
family maintenance plan.
On September 21, 2009, the Department received a report from the local hospital
expressing their concern for N.L.2 Mother tested clean and told the hospital she had been
clean for two years. The hospital said mother was “ ‘not bonding well with the baby,’
was focused only on herself, and would minimally feed the baby and then return him to
the nursery.” Riverside County reported the disposition as follows: “SDM recommends
evaluate-out, however, based on mother’s CPS/dependency treatment as a minor, that

2 The record does not identify which baby but given the timing, we presume it to be N.L.

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substance issues/mental health issues may be present based on the mother’s statements
and as the mother has requested services overridden to a 10-day response.”3
2. C.L.
In February 2018, mother was admitted to a local hospital in labor with S.L.’s half
sibling, C.L. At admittance, mother tested presumptive positive for methamphetamines.
Medical records revealed that mother had only one visit for prenatal care and there was
no information about mother’s substance use. The records provided “very little
information about the mother’s older child; except that the child was not in the mother’s
care, but with a relative.”4 C.L. was delivered by cesarean section and placed in the
neonatal intensive care unit (NICU). After C.L.’s birth, mother and C.L. both tested
negative for drugs.
Approximately two weeks later, law enforcement responded to a report of
domestic violence between mother and C.L.’s father. Mother argued with father when
she found him with a methamphetamine pipe. The argument turned physical, with
mother kicking his car and scratching and biting him. Mother was holding two-week-old
C.L. during the altercation. Mother was arrested and C.L. was placed into protective
custody.
The Department initiated a “family reunification case” for C.L. alleging “general
neglect and emotional abuse.” The Department further alleged “parental substance abuse,
domestic violence, and the condition of the home to include animal feces.” The case was
closed when C.L.’s father obtained full legal and physical custody of C.L.

3 In its February 2025 disposition report, the Department reported that a woman who is
not mother applied to Yuba County for child support of N.L.
4 The record does not identify the “older child” but, presumably, it is N.L.

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3. B.L.
In January 2021, mother went to a local hospital; she was pregnant and had high
blood pressure. She left that hospital against medical advice but soon went to a different
local hospital where she gave birth to S.L.’s full sibling, B.L. B.L. also was delivered by
cesarean section and placed in the NICU. The next day, mother was “yelling and
screaming and upset with hospital staff.” She threatened to leave the hospital with B.L.
against medical advice.
Mother reported to the Department that she had other children living “with
relatives per her arrangements.” She admitted to using methamphetamine through her
first trimester; she stopped using when she was incarcerated and “she remained sober for
the time she was there and after.” Mother denied any mental health history, but records
reflected “several psych holds.”
A few months later, the Department launched a “family reunification case” relative
to B.L. “due to parental substance abuse, mental health, and homelessness.” Mother and
father failed to reunify; their parental rights were terminated in May 2022, and a
permanent plan for adoption was established. B.L. was adopted in July 2022.
4. Mother’s Narrative
Mother reported to Riverside County that she first started using drugs at 12 or 13
years old, including marijuana and methamphetamine. She first got sober at 14 years old
but relapsed at 19 years old. Following her arrest in 2018, mother fell into a “deep
depression.” She found herself without “support, housing, and financial stability.” She
stopped trying to reunify with C.L., gave up on her sobriety, and told the father to take
custody.
After she gave birth to B.L. in 2021, mother was “ ‘on the run’ ” from her parole
officer. She soon turned herself in and got sober; the court did not put her in jail because
she was a new mother. Mother tried to get into several rehabilitation programs but,
because of COVID-19, the programs kept closing. After B.L. was removed from her

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custody, mother relapsed again. She continued to use drugs until she found out she was
pregnant with S.L.
5. Jurisdiction Hearing/Transfer to Yuba County
On December 5, 2024, the maternal aunt, D.P., who lived in Sutter County, was
approved for emergency placement of S.L. (Days later, the juvenile court in Riverside
County conducted the jurisdiction hearing. The court read, considered, and admitted into
evidence the detention and jurisdiction reports. Mother asked the court to transfer the
case to Yuba County that day, “take jurisdiction, [and] hold off on disposition.” The court
found true the allegations in the operative petition, “took jurisdiction,” and ordered the
matter transferred to Yuba County for disposition.
A “transfer in” hearing was set in Yuba County for December 26, 2024. That
hearing was later continued by the Yuba County Juvenile Court to January 16, 2025, at
which time the court accepted the transfer in, appointed counsel, and set the disposition
hearing for February 20, 2025.
On February 18, 2025, mother filed a motion to dismiss the section 300 petition
for “failure to state a cause of action and insufficiency of the evidence.” Boldface and
capitalization omitted.) The following day, the Department submitted its disposition
report recommending continued services to mother. The Department reported that S.L.
continued to live with D.P. in Sutter County, appeared “overall happy,” and was
developmentally on track.
On March 27, 2025, the juvenile court in Yuba County heard mother’s motion to
dismiss the petition and presided over the disposition hearing. At the outset of the
hearing, mother orally amended her motion to dismiss “to be a motion to strike the G-1
and G-2 allegations at this point. We are not making any argument about the B-1
allegation. I have reviewed both the detention report and the jurisdiction report, which
were admitted in evidence at the jurisdiction hearing. There would have been sufficient

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evidence that it was more than just the evidence of drug abuse that would have qualified
under B-1, so we are not making an argument as to B-1.”
The juvenile court denied mother’s motion: “I’m not going to relitigate what
Riverside County has already litigated.” The court ordered in-person visitation between
mother and S.L. three times a week, supervised by D.P. The court continued
reunification services for mother and set the six-month review hearing. Mother filed a
timely notice of appeal.
DISCUSSION
I
Failure to State a Claim
Mother contends the section 300 petition failed to state a cause of action -- a claim
akin to a demurrer. We disagree.
In the civil context, a complaint, with certain exceptions, need only contain a
“statement of the facts constituting the cause of action, in ordinary and concise language”
(Code Civ. Proc., § 425.10, subd. (a)(1)) and will be upheld “ ‘so long as [it] gives notice
of the issues sufficient to enable preparation of a defense’ ” (Doe v. City of Los Angeles
(2007) 42 Cal.4th 531, 549-550). The same rule applies here. (See Estate of Wooten
(1880) 56 Cal. 322, 325 [a petition in probate proceedings is akin to a complaint or other
pleadings in a civil action].)
In reviewing a complaint’s legal sufficiency, a court will treat the demurrer as
admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions, or
conclusions of law. (Esparza v. Kaweah Delta Dist. Hospital (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 547,
552.) It is well settled that a “demurrer lies only for defects appearing on the face of the
complaint.” (Stevens v. Superior Court (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 594, 601.) “We not only
treat the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but also ‘give the
complaint a reasonable interpretation, reading it as a whole and its parts in their
context.’ ” (Quelimane Co. v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 26, 38.) For

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purposes of ruling on a demurrer, the complaint must be construed liberally by drawing
reasonable inferences from the facts pleaded. (Wilner v. Sunset Life Ins. Co. (2000)
78 Cal.App.4th 952, 958.)
Mother claims the section 300 petition fails to state a cause of action sufficient to
support jurisdiction because there was “no allegation of current substance abuse” and “no
allegation that she failed to protect S.L.” Mother ignores the reasonable inferences to be
drawn from the facts pleaded in the petition; namely, that mother had a history of drug
abuse that resulted in her losing custody of S.L.’s two siblings, and maybe a third. Her
history included periods of sobriety and relapse. It is reasonable to infer from those
allegations that mother could still be using drugs or may use them again in the future.
(See In re T.V. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 126, 133 [a parent’s past conduct is a good
predictor of future behavior].) It also is reasonable to infer that, given mother’s history
with the Department, S.L. could be at risk of neglect or harm as a result of mother’s drug
use. (Ibid.)
Mother also argues that because she did provide a plan for the care and support of
S.L., neither of the section 300, subdivision (g) allegations were sufficient to state a cause
of action. Mother’s argument conflates her demurrer with her claim of insufficient
evidence. Whether there was sufficient evidence to support a claim that she was
incarcerated and unavailable to provide care for S.L., the bare allegation that she was
incarcerated and unavailable to provide care for S.L. is sufficient to state a claim. (§ 300,
subd. (g) [authorizing juvenile court jurisdiction if a parent is incarcerated and cannot
arrange for care of the child].) The same is true for the allegation that S.L.’s father could
not be found and had not made himself available to care for S.L. (§ 300, subd. (g)
[authorizing juvenile court jurisdiction if a parent’s whereabouts are unknown].)
In short, mother’s demurrer on appeal fails.

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II
Sufficiency of Evidence -- Section 300, Subdivision (b)
Mother also claims there is insufficient evidence to support jurisdiction pursuant to
section 300, subdivision (b)(1). We disagree.
As an initial matter, the Department contends mother waived this claim in the trial
court when she modified her motion to dismiss the petition to a motion to strike only the
section 300, subdivision (g) allegations. We will assume, without deciding, that mother
did not waive this claim and address the merits. On the merits, mother’s claim fails.
Pursuant to section 300, subdivision (b)(1)(A), the juvenile court may exercise
jurisdiction over a child if it finds “[t]he child has suffered, or there is a substantial risk
that the child will suffer, serious physical harm or illness, as a result of . . . : [¶] (A) The
failure or inability of the child’s parent . . . to adequately supervise or protect the child.”
“[T]he purpose of section 300, subdivision (b) is to protect the child from a substantial
risk of future serious physical harm and that risk is determined as of the time of the
jurisdictional hearing.” (In re Savannah M. (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 1387, 1397.)
Accordingly, “[w]hile past harmful conduct is relevant to the current risk of future
physical harm to a child [citations], the evidence as a whole must be considered.
‘[P]revious acts of neglect, standing alone, do not establish a substantial risk of harm;
there must be some reason beyond mere speculation to believe they will reoccur.” (In re
J.N. (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 1010, 1025.)
“ ‘ “In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the
jurisdictional findings . . . , we determine if substantial evidence, contradicted or
uncontradicted, supports them. ‘In making this determination, we draw all reasonable
inferences from the evidence to support the findings and orders of the dependency court;
we review the record in the light most favorable to the court’s determinations; and we
note that issues of fact and credibility are the province of the trial court.’ [Citation.] ‘We
do not reweigh the evidence or exercise independent judgment, but merely determine if

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there are sufficient facts to support the findings of the trial court.’ ” ’ ” (In re Cole L.
(2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 591, 602.)
Here, mother acknowledged a long history of drug use that began when she was a
teenager. She had periods of sobriety, but they ended in relapse, often when mother
became overwhelmed by the circumstances of her life. Mother’s drug use likely
contributed to her arrest for domestic violence and caused her to lose custody of at least
two, and maybe three, of her older children. There was evidence at the jurisdiction
hearing that mother was clean at the time she gave birth to S.L. That is, however, only a
moment in time. Looking at her entire history with drugs and the Department, it was
reasonable for the juvenile court to infer that S.L. may be at risk of future harm if mother
relapses into drug use again. This is sufficient to sustain the juvenile court’s
jurisdictional findings.
III
Section 300, Subdivision (g)
Mother also argues the juvenile court “improperly took jurisdiction based on
[section 300,] subdivision (g).” (Boldface and capitalization omitted.) The Department
concedes the court improperly took jurisdiction based on the g-1 allegation, which
alleged that mother was incarcerated and unavailable to provide S.L. with care and
support. We will accept the Department’s concession and direct the juvenile court to
strike the g-1 allegation in the section 300 petition.
The parties do not agree, however, on the fate of the section 300 petition, g-2
allegation. The g-2 allegation provides that the whereabouts of S.L.’s father were
unknown, and he had not made himself available to care for S.L. Mother argues these
allegations also should be dismissed because mother made “an appropriate plan for the
care of” S.L., so the search for S.L.’s father “was unnecessary.” Whether the search for
S.L.’s father was necessary is not a legal basis for dismissing the g-2 allegation. Mother
cites no authority to suggest otherwise.

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It is undisputed that, at the time of the jurisdiction hearing, father’s whereabouts
were unknown, and he had not made himself available to care for S.L. This would be a
sufficient basis for asserting jurisdiction over S.L. (See § 300, subd. (g).) Accordingly,
this claim fails.
DISPOSITION
We reverse the jurisdictional order with respect to the g-1 allegation and direct the
juvenile court to dismiss allegation g-1 from the petition. In all other respects, the order
is affirmed.

/s/
WISEMAN, J.*

We concur:

/s/
KRAUSE, Acting P. J.

/s/
MESIWALA, J.

* Retired Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, assigned by
the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

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